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Introduction
The development of a strategic, mutually beneficial and enduring relationship with China is one of the 
EU’s top foreign policy priorities for this century. In achieving this goal we must convince the 
international community that the EU-China partnership is not a threat, but an opportunity to create a more 
stable and balanced international order.
Jos6 Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, 15 July 2005 *
China and the EU have the same broad agenda in seeking to address current global challenges...they are 
natural partners in many ways.
Javier Solana, EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, 6 September 2005^
Developing the comprehensive strategic partnership at the beginning of the 21st century not only serves 
the mutual interests of China and the European Union but also contributes to peace, stability and 
development in our respective regions and the world at large.
Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 6 May 2004-*
Summary
In the last years, EU-China (or People’s Republic of China -  PRC) relations have been 
growing steadfastly. Since 2004, China has become the EU’s second biggest trading 
partner (after the US) and, according to China customs, the EU has become China’s 
biggest trading partner -  ahead of the US, as well as Japan. If current trends continue, 
Beijing is poised to become the Union’s most important commercial partner in the near 
future. EU cooperation with China is also growing and a significant number of 
dialogues and exchanges on sectoral policies, as well as technical issues have flourished 
in recent years with the aim to support China’s integration in the world economy and
1 Josd Manuel Barroso, The EU and China: painting a brighter future together, Speech by the President 
of the European Commission, Beijing, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 15 July 2005; 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/444&format=HTML&aged=0 
&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
2 Javier Solana, “Driving Forward the China-EU Strategic Partnership, Speech by the EU High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy at the China-Europe International Business 
School, Shanghai, 6 September 2005, available at:
http://www.delchn.cec.eu.int/en/whatsnew/pren060905.htm
3 Wen Jiabao, Vigorously Promoting Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Between China and the 
European Union, China-EU Investment and Trade Forum, Brussels, 6 May 2004; 
http://www.chinamission.be/eng/zt/tl01949.htm
the country’s transition to an open society. At the political level, since 1998 an annual 
EU-China summit is held between European heads of state/government and Chinese 
leaders to discuss bilateral, as well as global issues and since October 2003, the EU and 
China have acknowledged each other as strategic partners. Central to this strategic 
partnership is the idea that relations between the EU and the PRC have gained 
momentum and acquired a new strategic significance. The declaration of strategic 
partnership has been accompanied by two substantial moves: the signature of the 
agreement allowing China to participate in the Galileo global navigation satellite system 
and the promise by EU policy makers to their Chinese counterparts to initiate 
discussions on the lifting of the EU arms embargo on China imposed in the aftermath of 
the Tiananmen Square events. The development of a security-strategic linkage between 
the EU and China has increasingly attracted the attention -  and concern -  of the United 
States. According to Washington, the above initiatives may contribute to help China’s 
military modernisation and potentially tilt East Asia’s strategic balance in Beijing’s 
favour in a situation where there could be future tensions in US-China relations, 
especially over Taiwan.
This thesis examines the evolution of the EU-China relationship in the post-Cold 
War era. The focus is on the European side with the aim to trace the development of 
Europe’s engagement with China from the adoption of the policy of constructive 
engagement in the mid-1990s to the establishment of the strategic partnership. The 
thesis begins with a historical overview of the first twenty years of EU-China relations 
(Chapter 2). The following chapter examines Sino-European relations in the post-Cold 
War period in the context of the EU’s New Asia Strategy and the Asia-Europe Meeting 
process (Chapter 3). Following up on this, Chapter 4 focuses on the policy of 
constructive engagement with its emphasis on economic matters. In this context, the 
Chapter examines the growing significance attached to both sides to the development of 
trade links which has resulted in China becoming the EU’s second biggest trading 
partner and the EU being China’s biggest trading partner. Particular attention is devoted 
to the analysis of EU member states’ commercial competition for acquiring increasing 
shares of the Chinese market and the political consequences of this commercial 
scramble for the EU-China human rights dialogue. The following chapters (5 and 6) 
concentrate on the security-strategic dimension. This section begins with an 
examination of European and Chinese policy makers’ discourses on strategic
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partnership and it argues that beyond the rhetoric, three substantial -  and interrelated - 
issues are giving meaning and content to the strategic partnership: (i) China’s 
participation in the Galileo satellite network; (ii) European advance technology transfers 
to China -  (both analysed in Chapter 5) - and (iii) the proposed lifting of the EU arms 
embargo on China (Chapter 6). The last chapter examines the EU’s Taiwan policy in the 
context of the EU’s Asia policy and growing EU-China relations (Chapter 7). In 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 this study also discusses the United States’ concern -  and 
opposition - towards the emergence of a EU-China security-strategic linkage. It is 
argued in the conclusion that the future challenge for EU policy makers is to find the 
ways to accommodate the growing EU-China strategic partnership with the traditional 
transatlantic relationship in order to create a positive triangulation EU-China-US with 
the aim to avoid serious transatlantic disputes over China and continue, at the same 
time, the development of the EU-China relationship.
This thesis is the result of researches initiated in the academic year 1998-1999 
when this author was preparing a MSc dissertation on EU-Asia relations at the Graduate 
Institute of International Studies in Geneva. This present study also benefited - in terms 
of material/information collected and people contacted - from a three-months project 
undertaken in the Asia-Pacific division of the Department of Political Affairs at the 
United Nations headquarters in New York in 1999 and a one-year appointment as a 
Junior Researcher in the Asia division of the Istituto per gli Studi di Politica 
Intemazionale in Milan in 2000-2001. When this author arrived at the LSE in October 
2001, the idea was to bring together all the different strands and pieces of research that 
over the years had produced a policy paper on the ASEM process, a few short articles 
on EU-Korea and EU-China relations and some working papers on the East Asian 
developmental model and on China’s rise. The aim was then to specialise on EU-China 
relations in the context of broader EU -Asia relations and an international environment 
characterised by American primacy.
At the beginning of this research, in October 2001, the scholarly literature on 
EU-China relations was quite limited. Most of the scholars and commentators who had 
written on EU-China relations had tended to focus on the economic and commercial 
dimension of the relationship, or limit their analysis to the study of the China’s policy of 
a particular European country (mainly the large ones: Germany, France, the UK and
Italy), or uncritically present a list of achievements in terms of cooperation projects 
between the European Commission and the PRC. However, in recent years -  especially 
from 2004 -  due to growing EU-China relations and the establishment of the strategic 
partnership, many more scholars and commentators in Europe, China and also the US 
have started to pay attention to the EU-China relationship and publish both scholarly 
and (increasingly so) policy works. This thesis has followed -  largely by accident - the 
evolution of the EU-China relationship of the last years. The first part of the thesis 
(Chapters 2-3-4) had been written before 2003, when the economic dimension was 
prominent. The second part of this study (Chapters 5-6-7), focusing on the security- 
strategic dimension, has been written from 2004. The establishment of the EU-China 
strategic partnership in October 2003, concomitant with the signature of the agreement 
on China’s participation in Galileo and the beginning of the debate on the lifting of the 
arms embargo have provided the necessary material for the second part of this thesis At 
the practical level, while material for the first part was largely available in the printed 
form, knowledge and information on the security-strategic dimension was mainly held 
by policy makers and was, in Europe, largely scattered across different institutions and 
ministries/agencies within the large EU member states, while being quite difficult to 
access in China. Thus, this study has relied on interviews to collect the relevant material 
on the security-strategic dimension. The methodological implications of such an 
approach will be discussed in the following pages.
Aim and contribution
This study aims to provide the reader with (i) a comprehensive and updated analysis of 
EU-China economic, political and security-strategic relations set against the background 
of EU-Asia relations; (ii) original empirical data on the security-strategic dimension of 
EU-China relations; (iii) an examination of US’ concerns towards the more security- 
related elements of the relationship; and (iv) a contribution to the scholarly literature on 
contemporary EU-China relations and the emergence of the EU as a global actor.
The empirical data are based on fieldworks and a large number of interviews 
carried out in Europe (Brussels, London, Paris, Berlin and Rome), China (Beijing and 
Shanghai) and Japan (Tokyo) in 2004, 2005 and the first months of 2006.
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The scholarly literature on EU-China relations has focused, until recently, 
mainly on the relations of some individual European countries with China or has 
addressed the issue from, predominantly, an economic perspective. This study intends 
to contribute to this literature by including the security-strategic dimension. Moreover, 
it studies the interplay of the national and the EU level in the elaboration of EU foreign 
policy towards China. By tracing the process of convergence in the EU’s China policy 
(among EU member states, but also between the Commission and the Council), this 
study intends to piece together an accurate picture of the dynamics of common policy 
towards China at both the EU and the diverse national levels (with particular emphasis 
on the large member states: Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy).
The research findings confirm the views of those scholars who consider 
contemporary EU-China relations as having acquired a new strategic significance and 
having, as a result, an increasing impact on East Asian affairs and transatlantic relations. 
This position is held by diverse scholars: in the US by David Shambaugh and Robin 
Niblett; in Europe by Frank Umbach and Francois Godement; and in China by Song 
Xinning. Moreover, the research findings invite to qualify the academic conventional 
wisdom of the EU as a civilian-normative or soft power. On certain policy issues the 
EU does indeed show a distinctive behaviour that we would expect from a civilian- 
normative or soft power. For instance, in the case of the growing number of cooperation 
projects by the European Commission and the Nordic countries aimed at civilising 
China according to Western values and transform the Middle Kingdom into an open 
society. On other issues, the EU and its member states pursue policies and initiatives 
that we would expect to come from a more traditional power. For instance, in the case 
of China’s participation in the Galileo satellite system where the EU and some of the 
large EU members have intentionally sought to cooperate with the PRC in order to 
counter a perceived American primacy in the aerospace sector. Moreover, the proposal 
to lift the EU arms embargo on China is clearly aimed at taking advantage of the 
opportunities offered by China’s defence procurement budget, the third largest in the 
world after the US and Russia. The decision of the EU and its member states to 
establish a security-strategic linkage with China derives from the desire to acquire new 
markets for the European defence industry and challenge the dominant position of 
American defence companies, as exemplified by the commercial competition between 
Airbus and Boeing for acquiring increasing shares of the Chinese market.
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Overall, it is possible to argue that the EU and its member states - 
notwithstanding all the contradictions and recurrent setbacks inherent in that particular 
type of unfinished international actor that the EU is -  have indeed succeeded in 
developing, at least in a piecemeal and sometimes un-coordinated fashion, a distinctive 
strategic approach to China that has increasingly attracted the attention -  and concern -  
of the United States. The strong US’ opposition to the lifting of the arms embargo and 
China’s passing of the anti-secession law in March 2G05, coupled with a lack of real 
progress in its human rights record, have laid the basis for the subsequent postponing of 
the arms embargo issue. An eventual lifting, however, would have given both meaning 
and content to the recently established EU-China strategic partnership, as well as 
substantiated the emergence of the EU as a global strategic actor. Now, whether one 
views this as a success or failure depends heavily on the theoretical lens which one 
views the role that the EU should have in the emerging balance of global order. We will 
discuss this question in more detail in the following pages. Here it suffices to say that it 
is the belief of this author that the shelving of the lifting of the arms embargo was, in the 
end, the best possible decision in the current international circumstances. However, it is 
argued here that a renewed European strategic approach to China will soon resurface. 
This author expects that the new EU-China Framework Agreement (currently under 
discussion) and the recently established EU-US and EU-Japan Strategic Dialogues will 
provide the institutional and political framework for the further development of the EU 
strategic approach to China.
Assumptions
Overall, three main assumptions have accompanied this study. They are the following:
1) EU-China relations in the post-Cold War era have acquired a new strategic 
significance. The relationship is therefore worth studying on its own and not 
anymore as a function of relations with the United States.
2) There are transatlantic differences on China’s policy. The EU-China relationship 
is not fraught with the same strategic and military considerations of the US- 
China relationship. The absence of a “China threat” discourse in Europe (with 
the exception of some economic/societal concerns about a “China’s challenge”) 
explains the growing Sino-European partnership in both the economic and the 
security-strategic dimensions.
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3) China is a test for the EU foreign policy and, more generally, for the emergence 
of the EU as a global actor. The EU’s China policy is but a reflection of the 
particular nature and characteristics of this unique and unfinished type of 
international actor that the EU is. In essence, the EU and its member states’ 
engagement with China show elements that we would expect from a civilian/soft 
power and elements that we would expect from a more traditional great power.
We will discuss these assumptions in more detail in the following pages.
The new significance o f contemporary EU-China relations
EU-China relations have been growing steadfastly, especially since the end of the Cold 
War. This is explained by the fact that overall, there are no contentious issues, nor there 
is any substantial dispute between China and the EU. As the China’s EU Policy Paper 
stated: “There is no fundamental conflict of interest between China and the EU and 
neither side poses a threat to the other”.4
The main legal framework for EU-China relations is still the EC-China Trade 
and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) signed in 1985 and which covers economic and 
trade relations as well as the EC-China cooperation programme. Economic and 
commercial considerations have always occupied an important place in the relationship. 
Both sides regard it as the “basis for continuous development of Sino-European 
relations”.5 In 2004, China became the EU’s second biggest trading partner (after the 
US) and, according to China customs, the EU became China’s biggest trading partner -  
ahead of the US as well as Japan. Since 1978, when China started to open up its 
economy, EU-China trade has increased more than 40-fold to reach around €175 billion 
in 2004. If current trends continue, Beijing is poised to become the Union’s most 
important commercial partner in the near future. Moreover, since the mid-1990s, EU 
companies have invested heavily in China, bringing the current stock of EU Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) to over US$35 billion (around 3% of FDI).6
4 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China’s EU Policy Paper, Beijing, October 2003.
5 European Commission, A Maturing Partnership - Shared Interests and Challenges in EU-China 
Relations, Brussels, COM (2003), 533 final, September 2003; see also China’s EU Policy Paper (2003).
6 Data from the Delegation of the European Commission to China (http://www.delchn.cec.eu.int/).
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The current EU cooperation with China is growing in quantity and quality. It is 
currently defined in the last China Country Strategy Paper (2002-2006), which 
concentrates its activities in three areas: (1) support for the social and economic reform 
process and China’s integration in the world economy; (2) prevention of environmental 
degradation; and (3) support for the transition to an open society based on the rule of 
law and respect of human rights.7 Moreover, a significant number of exchanges on 
sectoral policies and technical issues have flourished in recent years. These so-called 
sectoral dialogues now cover a wide range of areas: from space technology to enterprise 
regulation, and from environmental issues to education and the information society. For 
instance, a Science and Technology Agreement was signed in 2000 (renewed in 2004). 
The Commission and the Chinese government also launched a dialogue on cooperation 
in space science, applications and technology. In October 2003, an agreement was 
reached between the EU and China for Beijing’s cooperation and commitment to 
finance 200 million euros (out of an estimated final cost or 3-4 billion euros) of Galileo 
- the global navigation satellite system. An agreement covering joint research on the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy was signed at the 7th EU-China Summit at the Hague in 
December 2004. Finally, a major agreement granting Approved Destination Status 
(ADS) came into effect in 2004. The ADS allows Chinese tourists to benefit from 
simpler procedures to visit the EU and it will have a significant impact on the European 
tourism industry.
In the political dimension, the 1985 TCA agreement was complemented in 1994 
and 2002 by exchanges of letters establishing a EU-China Political Dialogue including a 
Dialogue on Human Rights. Moreover, since 1998 an annual EU-China summit is held 
between European heads of state/government and Chinese leaders to discuss bilateral, as 
well as global issues and in October 2003 at the , 6th EU-China summit the two sides 
established a strategic partnership. In December 2003, the European Security Strategy 
(ESS) A Secure Europe in a Better World, mentioned China as one of the Union’s major 
strategic partners and called for a strategic partnership with Beijing in the context of the 
EU’s CFSP.8 In a further move, at the 8th EU-China Summit in September 2005, 
Brussels and Beijing agreed to set up a Strategic Dialogue to discuss global strategic 
issues, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, international terrorism, 
global security of energy supply, regional crises, and the environment. More
7 European Commission, China: Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006, Brussels, March 2002.
8 See: European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 
December 2003.
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importantly, the Dialogue allows the EU and China to exchange views on the emerging 
global order and, more particularly, East Asia’s strategic balance. The EU-China 
Strategic Dialogue, whose first meeting took place on 20 December 2005, is meant to 
complement the EU-US and EU-Japan Strategic Dialogues on North-East Asia (the first 
initiated in May 2005 and the latter in September 2005).
In the security-strategic dimension, since 2003 consultations on security and 
defence matters, military exchanges and joint manoeuvres with the People’s Liberation 
Army (PLA) have been undertaken by some EU member states (for instance, France 
and Britain; Germany only held consultations). Cooperation over Galileo is promoting 
both the EU’s and China’s space programmes, with important consequences for East 
Asia’s security (and transatlantic relations). Finally, since the European Council of 
Brussels in December 2003, all EU member states have agreed, in principle, to start 
discussions on the lifting of the EU arms embargo on China. The latter has become a 
sensitive and contentious issue between China and the EU, between the EU and the US 
and within the EU itself. The EU has currently postponed any decision regarding the 
lifting of the arms embargo, due to strong US opposition and China’s failure to provide 
clear and specific evidence on the improvement of its human rights record. However, 
the hope in Brussels and Beijing is that a solution is found soon, so that the EU-China 
strategic partnership can develop further. The resolution of the arms embargo issue is 
also an important test for the EU’s cohesiveness and capacity to develop a clear and 
comprehensive strategic vision about China.
At the institutional level, the growing significance of EU-China relations was 
evident during fieldwork and interviews conducted by this author with European and 
Chinese officials. For instance, the Department of European Affairs in the Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has become the largest Department in terms of number of 
officials (more than 130 at the end of 2005).9 At the same time, there are currently more 
than 100 professionals working on China in the European Commission, across the 
different Directorate-Generals.10 According to EU officials, China is the single non-EU 
country which receives most of the attention -  in terms of projects, cooperation 
agreements, issue specific dialogues, Commissioners’ visits, etc - from Brussels, even
9 Personal consultation with Chen Wenbing, Second Secretary, Department o f European Affairs, Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 7 May 2005.
10 Personal consultation with James Moran, Head, China Desk, DG I -  External Relations, European 
Commission.
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more than the US, the Russian Federation, or Japan. The Council, in turn, is 
increasingly staffed with experts seconded by member states. Also EU member states 
devote more and more time, energy and resources to developing relations with China in 
all fields and at all levels. China is one of the countries visited more frequently by 
European heads of state/government. For some EU members, such as France and 
Germany (in particular, during the Schroeder governments: 1997-2005) even more than 
the US. At the societal level, an increasing number of cultural and people-to-people 
exchanges between Europe and China is taking place. A growing number of Chinese 
students and scholars is studying/researching in European countries (in particular, in the 
United Kingdom) and more and more Europeans “go East”. China has also become 
increasingly visible across Europe. For instance, there has been a proliferation, in recent 
times, of the Year o f China in many EU member states.
EU-China relations have also become significant both at the regional and global 
level. As discussed earlier, US scholars and policy makers have started to notice that 
some elements of the EU-China strategic partnership have the potential to affect 
Washington’s strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific. For instance, the recent proposal of 
lifting the EU arms embargo on China has provoked strong opposition from the US and 
led to intense transatlantic discussions. The arms embargo issue has become a “wake- 
up” call for Washington (and Tokyo as well). According to interviews conducted with 
American and Japanese officials, the EU is increasingly being regarded not only as an 
economic power bloc, but also as an emerging strategic global actor whose policies may 
have an impact on Washington’s and Tokyo’s strategic interests in East Asia. For the 
first time since the end of World War II, in fact, some European initiatives towards 
China are conflicting with Washington’s interests (and role) in the region. According to 
the Bush administration and the more conservative American scholars and think tanks 
(PNAC, the Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute), but also for elements within more 
liberal think tanks (Brookings, the CSIS), China’s participation in the Galileo project 
(with the related issue of advanced technology transfers) and the eventual lifting of the 
EU arms embargo on China may contribute to help China’s military modernisation and 
potentially tilt East Asia’s strategic balance in Beijing’s favour in a situation where 
there could be future tensions in US-China relations, especially over Taiwan.
The problem is that Washington is committed to the maintenance of the strategic 
balance across the Taiwan Straits. The term “strategic balance” refers here to the
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relative capabilities of the two sides to achieve their respective strategic objectives in 
relation to the other. For China, this strategic objective is reunification with Taiwan on 
China’s terms. Taiwan’s objectives are to maintain its political independence, freedom 
of action, and way of life, free from coercion or undue influence from China, and to 
gain acceptance as a member of the international community. The concept of a strategic 
balance encompasses but is broader than an assessment of the military balance between 
two sides - though the military balance is what deters China to take over Taiwan, 
according to most American analysts. Cross-strait strategic balance, however, also 
includes the impact of economic, social and cultural ties between China and Taiwan on 
cross-Strait strategic dynamics; the influence of changing social developments on each 
side as they affect notions of self-identity, mutual identity, etc.; and the effect of 
international perspectives and involvement in cross-Strait affairs. Washington is the 
ultimate guarantor of the above strategic balance and as such is concerned if other 
players (in this case the EU) take initiatives which may have the potential to affect this 
strategic balance without prior consultation to - and/or accommodation with - the US.
In sum, the Bush administration has voiced its criticism -  and strongly opposed - 
the more security-related elements of the EU’s China policy, since with these initiatives, 
Washington argues, the Europeans do not take into adequate consideration (i) the US’ 
strategic interests in East Asia and (ii) the role of Washington as the ultimate guarantor 
of regional security. This provides EU policy makers with a crucial challenge: how to 
continue to develop and further upgrade relations with Beijing and, at the same time, 
seek to avoid serious transatlantic disputes over China? In other words, recent 
development of EU foreign policy towards China are posing a major challenge to EU 
policy makers as Europe’s “love affair” with China (as the Far Eastern Economic 
Review dubbed it)11 needs to be accommodated with the traditional transatlantic 
relationship.12 The EU’s China policy of the last years has indeed revealed profound 
differences between the EU and the US on how to deal with China’s rise. We will 
discuss it further in the following section.
11 David Murphy and Shada Islam, China’s Love Affair With Europe, Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 
February 2004, pp. 26-29.
12 See: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Symposia on Transatlantic Perspectives 
on Economic and Security Relations with China, Washington, 108 Congress, Second Session, Brussels 30 
November 2004 and Prague 2 December 2004; available at: 
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2004hearings/transcripts/04 11 30 transcript.pdf.
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Transatlantic differences on China‘s policy
The EU’s policy of engagement with China
With the publication of the European Commission’s document A Long-Term Policy for  
China-Europe Relations in 1995 advocating a policy of constructive engagement 
towards Beijing, the EU entered the debate already underway in the US and East Asia as 
to whether China should be contained or engaged. The examination of the EU’s China 
policy of the last decade contained in the next Chapters indicates that the EU and its 
member states have firmly adhered to the arguments in favour of engagement, in stark 
contrast with the more fleeting attitude of the US. Until 2000, however, coinciding with 
the end of President Clinton’s second mandate, the US’ China policy helped condition 
the development of the EU’s China policy. We will briefly examine the US’ - and other 
Asian countries’ - China policy in order to put the evolution of the EU’s China policy in 
its proper international context.
The US policy toward China has been rather fleeting in the last decade, shifting 
from a relatively hard-line stance by the mid-1990s to a more conciliatory approach 
during President Clinton’s second mandate (1996-2000). For instance, from advocating 
a policy of containment at the beginning of his mandate - and being judged to have 
benefited from this in the 1992 election campaign - President Clinton moved towards a 
more cooperative rapprochement vis-a-vis China. In 1996, Washington granted China 
normal trading relations, began to lower the hurdles it had set for China’s WTO 
accession, and moved towards a policy of engagement with Beijing. Although the 
business lobbies in the US won the debate over China’s MFN status, a powerful array of 
human rights groups, labour unions, and the Taiwanese lobbies within both the 
Republican and Democratic parties succeeded in ensuring that the administration kept at 
least a degree of critical and more political focus on China.13
Also Japan, after suspending its aid programme in 1996 in response to China’s 
missile tests, launched a new policy of engagement in 1997, with generous 
commitments of aid and loans. Similar moves on the part of other Asian states, such as 
Singapore and South Korea, also helped condition the development of the EU’s China 
policy. In 2000 the US administration finally granted China permanent normal trading
13 See: Alastair I. Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds.), Engaging China: The Management o f  an Emerging 
Power London, Routledge, 1999 and Robert S. Ross (ed.), After the Cold War: Domestic Factors and 
US-China Relations, New York, M.E. Sharpe, 1998.
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relations. The Democrats linked this to the creation of a new Congressional Human 
Rights Commission on China and Republicans sought to extract further guarantees on 
security cooperation. While also a number of EU member states were berated by 
opposition parties and human rights groups in their respective countries, the domestic 
politicisation of China, and the consequent linkages between commercial and political 
issues, remained significantly less marked than in the US. More significantly, Western 
policy towards China came to be conditioned by the commercial competition between 
the EU and the US. The rivalry between Airbus and Boeing for new contracts in China 
was the most dramatic example of this increasingly intense competition.14
By the end of the Clinton presidency, China had become Washington’s strategic 
partner. The Bush Administration dropped the conciliatory approach adopted by his 
predecessor by dubbing China, only a few months after his official investiture, a 
“strategic competitor”. After the events of 11 September 2001, the Bush Administration 
put the “China question” aside and allied Beijing in the global fight against terrorism. 
However, in 2005 the debate as to whether Beijing should be contained or engaged has 
resurrected in Washington.15
Contrary to Sino-American relations, EU-China ties have continued to improve 
steadily and Europeans have not bought into the China’s threat discourse coming from 
the other side of the Atlantic. The more consistent European attitude vis-&-vis China is 
explained by the fact that, unlike the US, the EU does not have immediate strategic 
interests in the Asia-Pacific, nor is there a Taiwan question that could trouble EU-China 
relations. However, in the last years there has emerged in some EU member states a 
discourse related to a perceived “China’s challenge”, mainly directed at Europe’s 
economy. The perception here is that China’s active industrial policy is turning the 
country into a low-cost competitor in high-skill industries. As a matter of fact, the 
overall share of high-skill industries in China’s manufacturing exports to the EU-15 has 
already risen above 20%, which is twice as high as the share of high-skill industries in 
the exports of the ten new EU member states to the EU-15. The rapid growth of skill­
intensive imports from China represents a challenge to the EU, for which China 
traditionally was a supplier of low-skill goods. China has started to seriously challenge 
EU industries that are considered sensitive, in particular the chemical, engineering and
14 This will discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
15 See the debate in Foreign Affairs, vol. 84, n. 5, September/October 2005.
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the textile sectors. The latter, in particular, has become a contentious issue across 
Europe reinforcing the perceived need of protectionist measures against China. The 
question of cheap Chinese products invading the EU’s market has become a political 
issue in some EU member states, in particular in France and Italy. Besides the above 
challenges to certain European industrial sectors, however, China continues to be 
perceived in Europe as a country of almost limitless business opportunities. Moreover, 
the domestic politicisation of China, and the consequent linkages between commercial 
and political issues, is significantly less marked in the EU than in the US.
While there is a clear separation in the US’ China policy between the economic 
-  which has continued to flourish - and the security-strategic dimensions -  which is the 
one that poses problems and that we will discuss later - in the case of he EU it is 
precisely the security-strategic dimension that has been developed in recent years, on 
already sound economic ties. As already discussed, there is no Taiwan question that 
could trouble EU-China relations. In this context of complete absence of issues that 
could provoke a conflict between the two sides (as opposed to US-China relations), in 
the last years, the political and security-strategic dimensions have become -  according 
to European Commission officials -  as important as the more traditional economic and 
commercial ones. The emergence, since 2003, of a significant security-strategic 
dimension in EU-China relations is probably the most striking difference between the 
EU’s and the US’ China policy.
In essence, by inviting China to play a prominent role in the development of the 
Galileo satellite system and by proposing to lift the arms embargo (though the latter is 
currently shelved), the EU and its member states intend to build trust with China. It is, 
in other words, the extension in the security-strategic dimension of the policy of 
constructive engagement that has characterised the EU’s China policy in the last decade. 
On the contrary, the Bush administration appears to be intent on a policy of containment 
of China’s power projection and military modernisation. The US is worried about 
China’s potential to become a peer competitor of the US and be able in a not too distant 
future to challenge America’s dominant position in East Asia.
The overriding general objective of the EU’s China policy is to promote the 
fullest possible Chinese involvement in the international arena, whether in the 
economic, social, political, or security-strategic dimensions. This objective is based on
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the understanding that in a situation of growing interdependence, the developments in 
China not only have a far-reaching impact on itself, but also have global and regional 
implications. As a result, the EU believes that an engagement policy with China at all 
levels and in all dimensions is conducive to supporting China’s integration in the world 
economy and its transition to an open society. The transformation of China into a good 
citizen of international society is seen in Europe as a highly strategic objective since a 
fully integrated China will be a responsible stakeholder in the international system. 
Furthermore, since China plays an increasingly important role in maintaining regional 
stability, political developments in China that could affect East Asia’s security 
environment would have a direct detrimental effect on China’s -  and East Asia’s - 
economic growth and, consequently, on EU exports and FDI in the region, thus 
impacting directly upon EU’s economic interests and security. For all the above 
reasons, the EU thinks that it is in its interests (and of the international community as a 
whole) to engage firmly and fully (i.e. across all dimensions) with China. We will see in 
the next section that some American policy makers and scholars have quite different 
views on the best policy to pursue with regard to China’s rise.
The US’ China policy
Most of IR scholars agree that the US-China relationship is one of the most important 
(if not the most important) relationships of the post-Cold War era. China’s ascendancy 
is reshaping Asia’s economic and political power relations in a context where the US 
remains the security linchpin for Asia while the US-Japan alliance serves as the 
cornerstone of the US security strategy in the region.16 According to Wang Jisi, “the 
general trend in Asia is conductive to China’s aspiration to integrate itself more 
extensively into the region and the world, and it would be difficult for the United States 
to reverse this direction”.17
US-China relations are key to the maintenance of regional stability. At the 
economic level there seems to be an implicit bargain with Beijing: Washington tolerates 
China’s surging exports to the US and the resulting bilateral trade surplus for China, but
16 Ralph Cossa, “US Security Strategy in Asia and the Prospects for an Asian Regional Security Regime”, 
in Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2005, p. 64.
17 Wang, Jisi, “China’s Search for Stability with America”, in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, 
September/October 2005, pp. 39-48, p. 43.
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China recycles its new wealth by helping to finance the US budget deficit. 
Economically, therefore, China and the US are more and more interlocked. Together, 
they have been driving the world economy in the last years. At the political level, 
though, things are different. In the 2002 National Security Strategy, the Bush 
administration stated that the US “welcome[s] the emergence of a strong, peaceful, and 
prosperous China”.18 However, the US also believes that China’s declared “peaceful 
rise” cannot be taken for granted and that the lack of democratisation and political 
liberalisation in China could presage tensions in future US-China relations. Moreover, 
the Taiwan issue continues to loom large on US-China relations. At the beginning of his 
first mandate in 2000, President Bush dubbed China a strategic competitor. Bush 
himself has declared his firm commitment to the defence of Taiwan and Secretary of 
State for Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, has expressed alarm with regard to the pace and 
nature of China’s military build-up.19
Thus, while China is an important commercial partner of the US, Beijing is 
neither a political partner nor a military ally of Washington. Since 2005 the debate has 
resurfaced in the US as to whether China should be contained or engaged. Henry 
Kissinger has characterised the US-China relationship as “beset with ambiguity”.20 In 
the 2006 Quadrennial Defence Review Report (QDRR) the Department of Defence 
identifies China as having “the greatest potential to compete with the United States and 
file disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military 
advantages absent U.S. counter strategies”.21 The Pentagon’s perception of China as a 
military threat appears to contrast with assessment by officials of the State Department 
or the Office of the National Intelligence. Robert Zoellick, currently Deputy Secretary 
of State, has urged China “to become a responsible stakeholder” in the international 
system.22 According to John Negroponte, the Director of National Intelligence, China 
must be seen rather as a challenge than as an enemy or military threat.23
18 George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, The National Security Strategy o f  the 
United States o f America, Washington, September 2002, in particular section VIII; 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf
19 Victor Mallet and Guy Dinmore, “The Rivals: Washington’s Sway in Asia is Challenged by China”, 
Financial Times, 18 March 2005, p. 19; see also The United States and Asia: Toward a New US Strategy 
and Force Posture, Santa Monica, RAND, 2001.
20 Henry Kissinger, “Conflict is not an option”, in International Herald Tribune, 9 June 2005, p. 9.
21 US Department of Defence, Quadrennial Defence Review Report, Washington, 6 February 2006, p. 29.
22 Robert B. Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility”, Remarks to the National 
Committee on US-China Relations, Washington, 21 September 2005.
23 For more details see: Bill Gerts, “China’s emergence as military power splits strategists on threat to 
U.S.”, in The Washington Post, 7 February 2006, p. 9.
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American scholars and policy makers alike can be divided, broadly speaking, in 
three different schools of thought. One side of this debate points to China’s 
accumulation of military capacity, its emergent economic strength and its increasingly 
nationalistic and adversarial postures on certain issues -  in particular on the Taiwan 
question. As a consequence, they advocate a firm US (and possibly Western) policy of 
restricting the projection of such power. The scholars and policy makers in favour of a 
containment policy are to be mainly found in the Department of Defence and in the 
more conservative think tanks (American Enterprise Institute/Project for the New 
American Century, the Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute), but also within more 
liberal think tanks (the Brookings Institution and the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies). To those arguing for such a policy of containment, lenient 
policies undertaken with the aim of securing strategic partnership with China would 
merely embolden the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in its authoritarianism at home, 
encourage further nationalistic posturing abroad, and, by facilitating the growth of 
China’s trade surplus, provide resources for additional arms development.
On the other side, there are those who favour an engagement policy vis-a-vis 
China. The advocates of engagement argue that China is still relatively weak militarily 
(compared to the US), spending less as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
on defence than the US and still handicapped by relatively primitive military hardware 
based on Soviet technology. Moreover, some scholars argue that the potential of the 
Chinese market may be overstated and that China is facing so many internal challenges 
that the Chinese leadership needs a stable and peaceful international environment in 
order to focus on domestic issues. Among the problems that are presenting a challenge 
to the current Chinese leadership there are the role of the CCP, political liberalisation, 
ethnic conflicts, but also the social costs of the reform of the ailing State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs), unemployment, inflation, the growing gap between rich and poor 
and between the coastal areas and the interior, migration due to inequalities in regional 
development or to environmental degradation. In sum, for the advocates of engagement, 
the above problems suggest the need for cooperation with China at the bilateral level as 
well as in multilateral (i.e. UN, WTO), inter-regional (APEC) and regional bodies 
(ASEAN Regional Forum). Hence, the insistence of some American scholars and policy 
makers on a firm policy of engagement toward China. Traditionally, members of this 
approach are found in the Department of State and the Bureau of the US Trade
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Representative, as well as within the more liberal think tanks (with some exceptions, as 
discussed earlier).
For other commentators, the containment versus engagement debate does not 
fully capture the complexity of the US-China relationship and its consequences for the 
Asian region. Some scholars currently argue that there could be no question of not 
engaging with China and supporting China’s new regional diplomacy, but that there is 
equally no good reason for pandering to China and being less critical to its authoritarian 
regime. As Aaron Friedberg has emphasised, many realists are actually optimistic about 
the future of US-China relations in the face of China’s rise and disagree with others 
about the likelihood -  let alone the inevitability -  of military conflict accompanying this 
rise.24 Some realists such as Robert Ross, Avery Goldstein and Zbigniew Brzezinski 
argue that the nuclear revolution and geography make territorial conquest more difficult 
in East Asia. As a result, most realists agree with many non-realists that, given these 
realpolitik forces for stability, the real threats to regional peace and stability are posed 
not by shifts in relative material power alone, but by those shifts combined with mutual 
perceptions of hostility that are rooted in historical conflicts, outstanding territorial 
sovereignty disputes, and so forth 25
In a recent article in International Security, Thomas Christensen has argued that 
whether one views the US’ Asia policy since the end of the Cold War as a success or a 
failure depends heavily on the “theoretical lens with which one views the challenges 
posed by the rise of the People’s Republic of China”.26 Christensen argument is more 
nuanced and will likely influence American foreign policy towards Asia since the 
author has recently assumed a position within the US Department of State. In essence, 
he argues for a moderate US strategy toward China and the region that mixes elements 
of containment and engagement. In such a strategy a firm security posture toward China 
would not only hedge against a potential turn for the worse in Chinese domestic politics 
and foreign policy but it would also help shape long term Chinese political and
24 Aaron L. Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable”, International 
Security, Vol. 30, No. 2, Fall 2005, pp. 7-45.
25 See: Robert S. Ross, “The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century”, in 
International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4, Spring 1999, pp. 49-80; see also Avery Goldstein, Rising to the 
Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security, Stanford: CA, Stanford University Press, 
2005; and Zbigniew Brzezinski, in Brzezinski and John J, Mearsheimer, “Clash of the Titans”, in Foreign 
Policy, No. 146, January/February 2005, pp. 46-50.
26 Thomas J. Christensen, “Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy 
toward East Asia”, in International Security, Vol. 31, No. 1, Summer 2006, pp. 81-126, p.l.
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diplomatic evolution in directions that reduce the likelihood of unwanted conflicts and 
tensions in US-China relations. At the same time, continues Christensen, positive US 
diplomatic and economic initiatives towards China would not simply build trust and 
reassurance in the region, but would also maximise US leverage over the region in case 
of future US-China tensions. In other words, the American scholar is advocating a 
combination of the stick and the carrot: a firm security posture -  especially with regard 
to any unilateral move by China to take Taiwan by force -  but at the same time 
behaving in a constructive way towards Asia and China, since it if appears that the US 
are provocative toward Beijing, that might force regional actors to make a stark and 
unwelcome choice between Beijing and Washington, with the risk to jeopardise US’ 
policy in the region.
A difference stance has been expressed by Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of 
Defence. In June 2005 Rumsfeld declared that China “appears to be expanding its 
missile forces, allowing them to reach targets in many areas of the world, not just the 
Pacific region. China also is improving its ability to project power, and developing 
advanced systems of military technology ...Since no nation threatens China” -  
Rumsfeld asked -  “one must wonder: Why this growing investment? Why these 
continuing robust deployments?”.27 Following up on his boss’ remarks, the 2005 US 
Department of Defence Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 
(MPPRC) concluded that the modernisation of the PLA had gone beyond preparing for 
a Taiwan scenario and was likely to threaten third parties operating in the area, 
including the US.28
While Chinese leaders insist that their country is engaged in a “peaceful rise” 
and “harmonious development”, some powerful voices in the US argue that China is 
focusing on procuring and developing weapons that would counter US naval and air 
power, especially in the Taiwan Strait.29 The US is committed to assisting the island 
under the Taiwan Relations Act, the 1979 law that accompanied the US switch of
27 The IISS Asia Security Conference, First Plenary Session, The Hon. Donald Rumsfeld, 4 June 2005, 
available at: http://www.iiss.org/
28 US Department of Defence, Report on the Military Power o f the People’s Republic o f  China 
(MPPRC), October 2005.
29 2004 Report to Congress o f the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Chapter 8: 
China’s Military Modernization and the Cross-Strait Balance, available at: 
http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2004/04reportpagel5.pdf
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diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.30 On the basis of the Taiwan Relations 
Act, the US export weapons to the island. The US President, George W. Bush, declared 
in April 2001 that the US would do “whatever it takes” to defend Taiwan against an 
attack by mainland China.31 Washington has recently reminded Beijing that the US has 
committed itself to reduce progressively arms sales to Taiwan but also to maintain a 
qualitative advantage in favour of Taipei which, according to the above mentioned 
MPPRC Report, is currently diminishing due to recent acquisitions by the PLA.32 
Chinese leaders have always maintained that they reserve the right to use violence at 
home to keep China intact -  and they stress that Taiwan is part of the Chinese territory. 
In March 2005 the Chinese National People’s Congress adopted the anti-secession law, 
which reiterates the “sacred duty” for the PLA to take military action if Taiwan takes a 
decisive step toward declaring independence.
Any tension in Cross-Strait relations could thus presage tensions between 
Washington and Beijing. In this context, recent European initiatives aimed at 
establishing a security-strategic linkage with Beijing are impacting on Sino-US 
relations. This explains the strong opposition of the US against the lifting of the arms 
embargo and the need to obtain reassurances from European partners that China will not 
be allowed to access the encrypted features of the Galileo satellite system. The arms 
embargo issue, in particular, has become a “wake-up” call for the US and has led some 
American commentators to dub Europe an “irresponsible” player in East Asia.33 Robert 
Zoellick, currently US Deputy Secretary of State and himself in favour of a policy of 
engagement with China, posed the following question in April 2005 with regard to the 
EU proposal to lift the arms embargo on China: “As Europe becomes a larger player on 
a global stage, we urge it to consider some of the messages it sends. Why would Europe 
want to send that symbolic message to this point?”.34
Following up on Zoellick’s remark we will now discuss what kind of power the 
EU is (and/or should be), what we should have expected EU foreign policy towards
30 Section 2(b)(6), The Taiwan Relations Act, P.L. 96-8, approved April 10, 1979.
31 See: Ashley J. Tellis, “Military Modernization in Asia”, in Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military 
Modernization in an Era o f  Uncertainty, Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (eds.), Seattle, The National 
Bureau o f Asian Research, 2005, pp. 3-40 and Michael D. Swaine and Roy D. Kamphausen, “Military 
Modernization in Taiwan”, in ibid. Strategic Asia 2005-06, pp. 387-422.
32 Michael D. Swaine and Roy D. Kamphausen, “Military Modernization in Taiwan”, in Strategic Asia 
2005-06, pp. 387-422.
33 This emerged with interviews with all US scholars and policy makers.
34 International Herald Tribune, 6 April 2005.
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China to be in the period under consideration (1995-2005) and what would constitute, 
eventually, an effectively EU strategic approach to China.
China as a test for the emergence o f  the EU as a global actor
China is a test for the EU foreign policy and, more generally, for the emergence of the 
EU as a global actor The EU’s China policy is but a reflection of the particular nature 
and characteristics of this unique and un-finished type of international actor that the EU 
is. According to Hans Maull, during the Cold War, the role of the European Community 
was to provide vital economic and military support for the US in its efforts to contain 
the Soviet Union and in this context it constituted a key part of the Cold War global 
order. Moreover, the EC created a new way of ordering regional interstate relations that 
came to be associated with the term civilian (or normative) power. 35 In the post-Cold 
War era, however, the EU is seeking its proper place and role in the emerging global 
order. In this vein, Maull’s article asks whether Europe will continue to support 
American hegemony, or become an alternative source of power and attraction in an 
emerging multipolar system, or become itself a superpower. In essence - Maull asks - 
what will be the EU’s role in the new balance of global order?36 This thesis findings 
attempt to contribute to these important questions. For Maull, the EU will remain, for 
the foreseeable future, a collective of nation states, i.e. “a post-modern actor, but neither 
a great power nor a quasi-state in the making”.37 More specifically, Maull argues, the 
EU will continue to be a civilian power which, however, does not entail an inability or 
unwillingness to use military power, but rather it suggests the specific way in which 
military power is exercised and applied -  i.e. towards a civilising of international 
relations.38 At the same time, Maull argues, the EU is also a power, able to influence 
other actors in the system. Its principal instruments of influence are its economic 
weight, capital and technology resources, and soft power -  mainly in the form of 
development aid and cooperation programs. But, Maull argues, “the EU is not a power 
in international relations in the traditional sense of the world and it is unlikely to 
become one any time soon”.39 While Maull’s comments are worth taking into 
consideration and provide us with useful analytical tools for conceptualising the role of
35 Hans Maull, “Europe and the New Balance of Global Order”, in International Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4, 
2005, pp. 775-799, p. 776.
36 Ibid., p. 776.
37 Ibid., p. 777.
38 Ibid., p. 781.
39 Ibid., p. 793.
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the EU in international relations, this thesis finds that in the case of the EU’s China 
policy the EU and its member states have also pursued actions and displayed behaviours 
that we would expect to come from a more traditional great power.
A starting point for conceptualising a great power is the definition provided by 
Martin Wight in his Power Politics. In the section on Great Powers, Wight makes 
reference to the definition of a great power made at the Paris Conference in 1919, which 
distinguishes between powers with general interests and powers with limited interests. 
According to this definition, “great powers are powers with general interests, i.e. whose 
interests are as wide as the states-system itself, which today means world wide”.40 
Wight also reports the definition given by Arnold Toynbee: ”A great power may be 
defined as a political force exerting an effect coextensive with the widest range of the 
society in which it operates” as well as the definition of Sir Alfred Zimmem: “every 
Foreign Minister of a great power is concerned with all the world all the time”.41 From 
these classical definitions of a great power it is possible to argue that the EU, today, 
does show elements in its actions and behaviours that can be associated to those of a 
traditional great power. The point here is not that the EU is either a civilian power 
whose aim is civilising international relations or a great power that purses power 
politics. The EU, today, is both.
The analysis of the EU’s China policy indicates that on certain policy issues the 
EU does indeed show a distinctive behaviour that we would expect from a civilian- 
normative or soft power. For instance, in the case of the growing number of cooperation 
projects by the European Commission and the Nordic countries aimed at civilising 
China according to Western values and at transforming the Middle Kingdom into an 
open society. At the same time, on other issues the EU and its member states pursue 
policies and initiatives that we would expect to come from a more traditional great 
power. For instance, in the case of China’s participation in the Galileo satellite system 
the EU and some of the large EU members have intentionally sought to cooperate with 
the PRC in order to counter a perceived American primacy in the aerospace sector. 
Moreover, the proposal to lift the EU arms embargo on China is clearly aimed at taking 
advantage of the opportunities offered by China’s defence procurement budget, the 
second largest in the world after the US. The decision of the EU and its member states
40 Martin Wight, Power Politics, London, Continuum-RIIA, 1995, p. 50.
41 As quoted in ibid., p. 50.
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to establish a security-strategic linkage with China derives from the desire to acquire 
new markets for the European defence industry and counter American primacy in the 
defence and aerospace sector.
The existence of both civilian -  or soft power - Europe and great power Europe 
comes from the distinctive type of international actor that the EU is. This dual nature 
derives from the diversity of the actors involved in the EU foreign policy. For instance, 
in the political/human rights dimension of the EU’s China policy, while the European 
Commission and the more principled EU member states (mainly the Nordic countries, 
the Netherlands, Ireland and the United Kingdom, to a certain extent) have channelled 
resources into development cooperation projects aimed at Chinese civil society, the 
other EU member states (mainly the large core members: Germany, France, Italy and 
the other Latin countries) have tended to overlook human rights and democratisation 
issues and have sought to maintain, instead, good political relations with the Chinese 
leadership. As a result, they have given the impression of acquiescing to the current 
CCP leadership. Moreover, in the security-strategic dimension, the large EU member 
states (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain) have supported China’s 
participation in the Galileo satellite system and advocated, at least initially, the lifting of 
the arms embargo (France, Italy and Spain still support the lifting). At the same time, 
the smaller and neutral countries (in particular the Nordic countries) have criticised the 
more security-related elements of the EU’s China policy and asked that the lifting be 
lifted only if and when China makes real progress in its human rights’ record and 
legislation. In sum, it appears that there has been a division of labour in EU foreign 
policy towards China. While the EU level (i.e. the European Commission) and the more 
principled EU member states (mainly the Nordic countries) have been used to engage 
Chinese civil society and put human rights and democratisation pressure on Beijing, the 
large EU members have rather engaged the Chinese government by seeking to maintain 
good political relations with the Chinese leadership in order to boost commercial 
exchanges.
In such a context, what we should have expected EU foreign policy towards 
China to be in the period under consideration (1995-2005) and what would constitute, 
eventually, an effectively EU strategic approach to China?
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]With the policy of constructive engagement adopted since the mid-1990s and 
upgraded in 2003 to include a security-strategic dimension, the EU and its member 
states have consistently focused on promoting China’s fullest possible involvement in 
the international arena, i.e. in the economic, social, political, security-strategic and even 
military dimensions. The emphasis has been on supporting China’s integration in the 
international community and its transformation into an open society with the underlying 
belief that this approach would lead, over time, to greater political liberalisation within 
the country. This EU’s strategy is aimed at supporting Chinese civil society and, at the 
same time, at maintaining a stable domestic environment.
Thus, the EU and its member states have adopted a strategy of engagement 
towards China aimed at both the state and the societal level. The latter, more in tune 
with the notion of civilian power Europe, has been mainly carried forward by the 
European Commission and the more principled EU member states. We will see in 
Chapter 4 that the European Commission and the Nordic countries have channelled a 
considerable amount of resources and energies into projects aimed at supporting 
China’s transformation process. The European Commission, in particular, assists 
China’s transformation process through, firstly, support for the social and economic 
reform process, focusing primarily on China’s integration in the WTO, on providing 
expertise on information and communications technology, on social security (pensions, 
health, unemployment, insurance) and on the development of human resources such as 
the exchange and training of managers and the participation of Chinese students in the 
Erasmus Mundus programme. Secondly, the EU provides Beijing with expertise on 
environment and sustainable development. Thirdly, the Commission supports a number 
of projects in China aimed at providing support for the transition to an open society 
based on the rule of law and respect of human rights, through the promotion of good 
governance and democracy and human rights-related policies.
With regard to Europe’s engagement with China at the state level, we will see in 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 that the German China policy model of prioritising good political 
relations with China has succeeded in influencing the behaviour of the other EU 
member states, especially the large ones (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and 
Italy). Since the mid-1990s, the large EU members have consistently sought to 
maintaining good political relations with Chinese leaders and avoided raising 
contentious issues. This is due to both domestic and strategic factors. Domestically, by
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the desire to acquire increasing shares of the promising Chinese market with the aim to 
redress growing trade deficits and protect Europe’s (relative) welfare position (in 
particular in Europe’s core members: Germany, France and Italy). Strategically, the EU 
and its member states have become concerned of the possible implications of an abrupt 
collapse of the CCP regime in an environment of growing nationalism. The perception 
is commonly held that the rise of nationalism is actually the flip-side of the process of 
economic liberalisation, insofar as it is being driven by the CCP leadership’s need, 
faced with new centripetal forces, to find a discourse capable of holding China together. 
Therefore, it is widely assumed among officials interviewed at the European 
Commission and in the large member states that the EU needs to engage Beijing in all 
dimensions (economic, social, political, security-strategic) and at all levels (state and 
societal) so as to help China integrate in international society such that the benefits 
flowing from this would serve to temper internal instability -  and thus avoid disruptions 
to Europe’s growing economic interests in the area. Moreover, the EU policy makers 
interviewed largely believe that through an active engagement and cooperation at all 
levels and in all dimensions, it would be possible to further the protection of human 
rights and advance political liberalisation. This idea stems from the assumption that 
human rights tend to be better understood and better protected in societies open to the 
free flow of trade, investment, people, and ideas. This is a major reason for the EU and 
its member states to continue to engage China at all levels and in all dimensions.
The EU foreign policy towards China in the last decade raises the question of 
whether the EU is a truly strategic international actor. In other words, whether European 
governments have been willing and able to think “strategically” about their place in the 
world, their preferred pattern of world order, and their preferred strategic partners. In 
their edited book on Rethinking European Order, William Wallace and Robin Niblett 
have examined the question of how far European governments and elites responded to 
the transformation of their strategic environment at the end of the Cold War by 
rethinking their strategic foreign policies. Tanking into consideration the period 1989- 
1997, they concluded that in almost all the cases, European governments and elites 
tended to avoid world order issues and Europe’s role and place in it.42
42 Robin Niblett and William Wallace (eds.), Rethinking European Order: West European Responses, 
1989-1997, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001.
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In the case of the EU’s China policy, since 2003 it appears that EU policy 
makers have started to think strategically about China. However, it seems that this 
European strategic approach is the result of the insistence of the Chinese leadership to 
think about EU-China relations in strategic terms and place the Sino-European strategic 
partnership within discourses of the emerging global order. In September 2003, the 
Commission released its last policy paper on China A Maturing Partnership: Shared 
Interests and Challenges in EU-China Relations, which called for a strategic 
partnership with Beijing, stating that: “It is in the clear interest of the EU and China to 
work as strategic partners on the international scene....Through a further reinforcement 
of their cooperation, the EU and China will be better able to shore up their joint security 
and other interests in Asia and elsewhere”.43 In October 2003 the Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs released its answer to the Commission’s document. In the China’s EU  
policy paper it is pointed out that “China is committed to a long-term, stable and full 
partnership”. The Chinese document clearly states that Beijing wants closer political 
ties with the EU, indicating that China will continue to deepen its relations with 
individual EU governments.44
China’s interest in cultivating a partnership with the EU and, individually, with 
the large EU members (UK, France, Germany, Italy and Spain) is part of China’s 
attempt to cope with the constraints of American power in the post-Cold War era and to 
hasten the advent of an international system in which the US would no longer be so 
dominant. Chinese policy makers and scholars repeatedly stress that Beijing’s 
partnerships with other great powers are both a reflection of the transition to multi­
polarity and an arrangement that will accelerate the process.45 According to Avery 
Goldstein, the purpose of establishing strategic partnerships “has been to enhance 
[China’s] attractiveness to the other great powers while retaining flexibility by not 
decisively aligning with any particular state or group of states”.46 Thus, since the mid- 
1990s, strategic partnerships allow Beijing to address its own concerns about the US 
primacy without alienating the economically indispensable US. In this context, 
establishing a strategic partnership with the EU and its large members is seen in Beijing 
as a move that enhances China’s international status, as well as foster the emergence of
43 European Commission, A Maturing Partnership - Shared Interests and Challenges in EU-China 
Relations, Brussels, COM (2003) 533 final, 10 September 2003.
44 China's EU Policy Paper (2003).
45 Interview, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 23 September 2004.
46 Avery Goldstein, “The Diplomatic Face of China’s Grand Strategy: A Rising Power’s Emerging 
Choice”, in The China Quarterly, No. 168, December 2001, pp. 835-864, p. 846.
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a multi-polar world order (but being flexible enough to change direction if 
circumstances change).47
In this vein, Chinese leaders have repeatedly stated that the strategic partnership 
with the EU should serve to promote “global multilateralism”, the “democratisation of 
international relations” and what is being referred to as “global multipolarisation”. In 
Beijing’s view, China and the EU are both on a “peaceful rise”, i.e., on the way to 
become “global balancing forces” pursuing similar international political strategies. 
Thus, Chinese leaders hope to enlist the EU as one of the emerging poles that, at least in 
principle, could work with Beijing on fostering a multilateral environment and limit 
some of the perceived American unilateral attitudes in world affairs.48 The discourse on 
multipolarity is shared by some EU policy makers, in particular the French political 
elite and, to a lesser extent, elements within the European Commission in Brussels. 
However, both China’s and France’s discourse on multipolarity cannot be seen as power 
balancing in the classic sense. In the case of China, multipolarity is taking the form of 
the establishment of strategic partnerships with other great powers within a broader 
multilateral system based on the United Nations and international law. For French 
policy makers as well, the notion of multipolarity is not employed for balancing against 
the US in the classic sense, but rather for meaning an international system in which 
“each large geographic region, each big power and collectivity of states, can assume 
together their responsibilities, with the UN being the grand symbol”.49 In other words, 
“a benign multipolar international system whose modus operandi is multilateralism”.50
Thus, it seems that both Chinese and French leaders were willing to think 
strategically about their place (in the case of French leaders, this place would be both 
France and Europe) in the world, their preferred pattern of world order, and their 
preferred strategic partners. Although EU policy makers have remained vague with 
regard to the concrete objectives and purpose of the strategic partnership with China 
(with the only exception of French leaders), the EU and its members states have stressed 
multilateralism as a common ground for the development of the EU-China
47 Interview, Chinese Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 23 September 2004.
48 Personal consultation with Chen Wenbing, Second Secretary, Deprtment of European Affairs, Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 26 September 2004.
49 Dominique de Villepin during the joint press conference o f the French, Russian and German foreign 
ministers, Paris, 5 March 2003, www.diplomatie.gouv.fr
50 Michael Brenner and Guillaume Parmentier, Reconcilable Differences: US-French Relations in the 
New Era, Washington: DC, Brookings Institution, 2002, p. 118.
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relationship.51 Thus, the European strategic approach to China entails the idea -  grosso 
modo -  that Europe’s preferred pattern of world order is a benign multipolar 
international system whose modus operandi is multilateralism. Europe’s preferred 
strategic partners, in the same vein, are those countries which, according to the 
European Security Strategy, are committed to an effective multilateral system and to 
upholding and developing international law and the role of the United Nations. The EU 
hopes to enlist China among the countries that are committed to an effective 
multilateralism. The ESS makes clear that the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable 
and that the EU is seeking an effective and balanced partnership with the US. In this lies 
a future challenge for the EU: to accommodate the emerging EU-China strategic 
partnership -  based on multilateralism -  with the traditional transatlantic relationship 
and the unilateral attitudes of the United States during the George W. Bush 
administration.
Research design
This research has been conducted using a qualitative approach. The latter is a research 
strategy that emphasizes words (or discourse) rather than quantification in the collection 
of data. Moreover, this study has employed an inductive approach to the relationship 
between theory and research. In this way, it has been possible to draw generalisable 
inferences out of empirical data.
The terms “critical” and “analysis” have been added to EU foreign policy 
towards China. An explanation of the meaning of the two words will help the reader 
understand this choice. The semantic origin of the word critical stems from the Greek 
crisis (verb: crinomay) which stands for distinguish, discriminate, separate, meaning the 
capacity of discriminating or judging. Analysis is the result of the combination of the 
Greek word ana and lyo. Ana means upwards, towards higher levels and lyo means to 
free something in the sense of decomposing or deconstructing something. The idea here 
is that by moving upwards, i.e. reaching a higher position, it is possible to achieve a 
better and more comprehensive vision of the subject at hand. Analysis, therefore, means 
to free something, to deconstruct with the idea of an upward movement. Thus, a critical 
analysis means that the aim is to move upwards in order to reach a higher position -  a
51 On this point see also: European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security 
Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003.
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vantage point - from where it is possible to deconstruct something, to show how the 
different parts of the whole hang together and what their relationship to each other are. 
The vantage point is particularly important for identifying the levels of analysis best 
suited for studying EU-China relations, as well as for selecting the relevant actors.
In terms of level of analysis, it is argued here that current EU-China relations 
need to be studied taking into consideration three levels: (i) the bilateral; (ii) the inter­
regional; and (iii) the global. David Kerr has recently proposed to adopt the “emergent, 
but often contradictory, linkages between states, regions, and world order” for the study 
of the China-Europe relationship.52 While at the beginning of the 1990s Michael 
Yahuda had remarked that the EU-China relationship was one of “secondary 
significance”53, more recently David Kerr has argued that this relationship “has fallen 
back to third place”. According to Kerr, “the primary relationships are within regions; 
the secondary relationship is with the US hegemon; inter-regionalism is now a tertiary 
relationship”.54 This present study proposes to employ the following three-level 
analysis:
1) First level: EU-China relations. This includes the interplay between the EU level 
and the national level. The actors under consideration here are, on the one hand, 
the European Commission (EU level) and, on the other hand, the large member 
states - Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy (national level), both in 
their bilateral dealings with China and in their common positions taken within 
the CFSP framework.
2) Second level: EU-Asia relations. The analysis of EU foreign policy towards 
China is placed within the broader frameworks of EU-Asia relations, in 
particular the EU’s New Asia Strategy (NAS) and the Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM) process. In particular, ASEM has become the most important inter­
regional forum for discussion and cooperation between the EU and East Asia, 
providing both the Europeans and East Asians with an institutional mechanism 
within which to engage -  and manage -  China’s rise.
52 David Kerr, “Between Regionalism and World Order: five structural factors in China-Europe relations 
to 2025”, paper presented at the international conference on The International Politics o f  EU-China 
Relations held at the British Academy, London, on 20-21 April 2006.
53 Michael Yahuda, “China and Europe: The Significance of a Secondary Relationship”, in Thomas W. 
Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds.), Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory & Practice, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1995, pp. 266-282.
54 David Kerr, (2006), p. 15.
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3) Third level: Global level. EU foreign policy towards China is increasingly 
having an impact on the United States and other concerned Asian partners of the 
Union. China’s participation in the development of Galileo, European advanced 
technology transfers to Beijing and the proposed lifting of the arms embargo 
(though currently postponed), have the potential to affect East Asia’s strategic 
balance, thus impacting directly on American interests in the region.
The sampling of material and actors
In social and political research, the sampling process is the first step in the research 
design. The sampling in qualitative research is concerned with the selection of 
documents for content and discourse analysis, as well as with the selection of people to 
be interviewed/consulted. In the case of documents, both primary and secondary sources 
have been used. In particular, the author’s fellowship at the EU Institute for Security 
Studies in Paris (October-December 2005) has allowed him access to unpublished 
material and internal documentation from the Council of the EU.
With regard to interviews, they have provided an invaluable resource for 
confirming hypothesis or gain new perspectives. The present research has employed the 
following sampling strategies for selecting the interviewees: (i) convenience sampling 
(accessibility); (ii) snowball sampling (referral by one interviewee to another) and (iii) 
triangulation, i.e. interviews in different sites: for instance, the Commission in Brussels 
and the Commission delegations in China and Japan; foreign ministry in the UK, 
France, Germany and Italy and embassies of the above countries in Beijing; Chinese 
foreign ministry in Beijing and Chinese embassies in the UK and France; Japanese 
foreign ministry in Tokyo and Japanese embassy in the UK. This method - triangulation 
- has allowed this author to verify and confirm the consistency of the information and 
data collected.
With regard to the EU, this thesis has taken into consideration the institutions 
which have been directly involved in the production of EU foreign policy towards 
China: the Council and the European Commission. Moreover, the following member 
states (foreign ministries and other relevant departments) have been researched: United 
Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy. This arbitrary selection has been operated for the 
following reasons: (i) influence of the above EU members in the elaboration of EU
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foreign policy towards China; (ii) relevance of the above four EU members, in terms of 
weight, size and capacity to project their influence abroad (though to varying degrees);
(iii) knowledge of the language of the above countries and, thus, possibility to engage 
with primary documents (iv) manageability of the thesis and interviews to be conducted.
With regard to officials selected for interviews, the aim at the beginning of the 
research was to consult with the Director/Deputy Director of the Division or Office 
responsible for China in the institutions mentioned above. The reason for this selection 
is related to the combined problem of accessibility and authority of the source/person 
interviewed. The above director/head (or deputy director/deputy head) is ultimately 
responsible for the output of the official papers and positions which are consequently 
worked out at the highest political level (usually, much more difficult to reach, in 
particular given the fact that the more security-strategic related elements of the EU’s 
China policy seems to have become the prerogative not of the Foreign Ministry but of 
the office of the Prime Minister/President/Chancellor). By consulting with the 
director/head (or deputy director/deputy head), it has been possible to acquire relevant 
data and insightful information on thepolicy making process that has led to a certain 
position or policy adopted by the EU institutions or member states towards China. In the 
end, the following officials have been interviewed:
European Commission: Mr. James Moran, Head, China Desk, DG I -  RELEX. Mr 
Moran is considered the “father” of all the policy papers on China produced by the 
Commission since 1995 and he is widely recognised, within the EU institutions in 
Brussels, as the most authoritative voice on China. In this context, a fellowship granted 
to this author to spend three months (October-December 2005) at the EU Institute for 
Security Studies in Paris for writing a policy paper on the EU’s strategy towards China 
has greatly helped for obtaining lengthy interviews with James Moran and other high- 
ranking officials. Other interviewees in the China desk: Henriette Geiger, Jan Willem 
Blankert (Brussels); Giovanni Cremonini, First Secretary (Political), European 
Commission delegation in Beijing (China); Michael Reiterer, Minister, Deputy Head of 
Delegation, European Commission delegation in Tokyo (Japan).
Council: Dr. Antonio Tanca, Head of Section, DG E - External Relations/Asia Oceania 
(Japan, Korea, Oceania, ASEM). Mr Tanca is currently the most senior official in the 
Council dealing with China. Above him there is only Robert Cooper (Director of DG E)
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and Javier Solana (High Representative for the CFSP). Other officials interviewed in the 
DG E - External Relations/Asia Oceania: Ana Ramirez Fueyo.
Council - Office of the Personal Representative of the High Representative on Non­
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Ms. Annalisa Giannella, Director, 
Personal Representative for Weapons of Mass Destruction. Ms Giannella is the most 
senior official within the EU dealing with the arms embargo issue. She travels 
extensively and she does not give official interviews. She has overall responsibility for 
explaining the EU’s position on the proposed lifting of the arms embargo to Europe’s 
closest partners in America and Asia. It was possible to consult with her at the margins 
of the international conference on China’s Challenge to Europe and the US organised 
by the Aspen Institute (Italy) in Rome on 11 March 2005 and at the margins of the 
annual conference of the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris on 26 September 
2005. Other people interviewed working in the office of Ms. Giannella: Dr. Stephan 
Klement.
Foreign & Commonwealth Office: Mr Denis Keefe, Deputy Director Asia Pacific, Head 
of Far Eastern Group (London); Julia Sutherland, Far Eastern Group; Ian Seckington, 
First Secretary (Political), British Embassy in Beijing (China).
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Mr Marc Abensour, Deputy Director, Far East; and 
Mr Pierre Levy, Director, Centre of Analysis and Forecasting (Paris); Emmanuel 
Lenain, First Secretary (Political), French Embassy in Beijing (China).
German Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Dr Volker Stanzel, Director, China Office; and Dr. 
Heinrich Kreft, Senior Strategic Analyst, Policy Planning (Berlin); Manfred Huterer, 
Political Department Press Counsellor, German Embassy in Beijing (China).
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Ms Cristina Ravaglia, Head, Division of Asia- 
Pacific (Office 3: China, Japan, North-East Asia); and General Alberto Traballesi, 
Representative of the Prime Minister for Coordination of Production and Export of 
Weapons (Rome); Antonio Enrico Bartoli, First Secretary (Political) and Vincenzo del 
Monaco, First Secretary (Economic and Commercial), Italian Embassy in Beijing 
(China).
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Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Ms Yang Hua, Deputy Director, Department of 
European Affairs; and Chen Wenbing, Second Secretary, Department of European 
Affairs (Beijing); Chen Wen, Second Secretary, Chinese Embassy in London (UK); 
Wang Yi, First Secretary (Political), Chinese Embassy in Paris (France).
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Otaka Junichiro, Deputy Director, European 
Policy Division, European Affairs Bureau (Tokyo); Jun Hasebe, Second Secretary, 
Japanese Embassy in London (UK).
United States: Matthew Goodman, former Assistant Secretary for International Affairs 
(East Asia), US Department of the Treasury; and Maura Connelly, Minister Counselor 
for Political Affairs, US Embassy in London (both consulted in London).
Taipei Representative Office in the UK: Dr Edgar Lin, Representative of Taiwan to the 
UK.
A complete list follows:
European Commission: DG I -  RELEX: China Desk and ASEM Desk; DG V- TREN: 
Galileo Desk; Commission delegation in Beijing and Tokyo.
Council: General Secretariat, DG E - External Relations/Asia Oceania
European Parliament: (Luciano Vecchi, Italy, Socialist group; Graham Watson, UK,
Lib-Dem).
Germany: Ministry of Foreign Affairs; German Embassy in Beijing.
France: Ministry of Foreign Affairs; French Embassy in Beijing.
United Kingdom: Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO); British Embassy in 
Beijing.
Italy: Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Italian Embassy in Beijing.
People’s Republic of China: Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Chinese Embassy in Brussels, 
London and Paris.
Japan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Japanese Embassy in London.
United States: US Embassy in London.
Taiwan: Taipei Representative Office in the UK.
Business sector: EU Chamber of Commerce in China; EADS (France); BAE Systems 
(UK); Finmeccanica (Italy).
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NGOs: Human Rights Watch; Amnesty International.
Moreover, a large number of scholars from the following research institutes and
universities have been consulted:
London: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Royal Institute for
International Affairs (RIIA);
Berlin: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP);
Paris: Institut Francais des Relations Internationales (IFRI), Fondation pour la
Recherche Strategique (FRS);
Milan: Istituto per gli Studi di Politica intemazionale (ISPI);
Rome: Istituto Affari Intemazionali (IAI);
Beiiing: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Renmin University;
Shangahi: Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS), Fudan University;
Tokyo: Tokyo University;
Washington: Brookings Institution, Project for the New American Century (PNAC),
Heritage Foundation, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
For a complete list of the persons interviewed, please see the Bibliography.
Methodology for the collection of data
For the collection of data the following research methods have been employed:
1) Qualitative interviewing -  both semi-structured and unstructured.
2) Collection of printed documents, as well as unpublished material (working 
papers, internal mimeos, etc.).
3) Participation to conferences attended by policy-makers and academics; in 
particular, three conferences have provided with useful insights and access to 
policy makers: (i) international conference on China’s Challenge to Europe and 
the US organised by the Aspen Institute (Italy) in Rome on 11 March 2005; 
Developing a European Security Perspective on China organised by the EU 
Institute for Security Studies in Paris on 3 March 2006; international conference 
on The International Politics o f EU-China Relations organised by David Kerr of 
Durham University at the British Academy in London on 20-21 April 2006.
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The scholarly literature on EU-China relations
As discussed earlier, this thesis aims to provide the reader with original empirical data 
on the security-strategic dimension and with a critical and comprehensive analysis of 
EU foreign policy towards China in the last decade, i.e. from, the adoption of the policy 
of constructive engagement in 1995 until the recent strategic partnership. With 
comprehensive it is meant all the dimensions of foreign policy: economic, social, 
political, security-strategic, and even military
In Europe,55 the study of EU-China relations has been approached, since the late 
1970s, mainly from the two “area studies” concerned: on the one hand, scholars of 
China/East Asia and on the other hand, scholars of European integration studies have 
taken an interest in it. Most notably in the UK, a few places have emerged: the LSE, 
SOAS and Durham University. At the LSE, coming from China/East Asia area studies: 
Michael Yahuda (currently at George Washington University and one of the first to 
write on EU-China relations since the beginning of the 1990s) and more recently, 
Christopher Hughes. Also recently coming from the European integration studies and 
European foreign policy studies: William Wallace and Christopher Hill (currently at 
Cambridge University). At SOAS, coming from China/East Asia area studies: Robert 
Ash. At Durham, coming from China/East Asia area studies: William Callahan 
(currently at Manchester University) and David Kerr, organiser of the most 
comprehensive conference to date on the international politics of EU-China relations.56
In France, the study of EU-China relations has been carried out, most notably, by 
the Centre Asie of the Institut Fran9ais des Relations Internationales (IFRI): Francis 
Godement (former Director) and Valerie Niquet (current Director); by the French 
Centre for Research bn Contemporary China: Jean Pierre Cabestan (former Director and 
currently Senior Researcher at the CNRS); and the centre CERI-Sciencespo: Jean-Luc 
Domenach (Director of Research) and Fran9oise Mengin (Researcher). In Germany, at
55 This writer was commissioned by the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris to produce a list of 
European experts on China/East Asia which was subsequently used by the EUISS to organise the 
conference: Developing European Security Perspectives on China, Paris, 5-6 March 2006.
56 The International Politics o f EU-China Relations, held at the British Academy, London, on 20-21 
April 2006.
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the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP): Gudrun Wacker (Head Research Unit 
Asia) and Kay Moeller (Senior Researcher); at the Research Institute of the German 
Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP): Eberhard Sandschneider (Director) and Frank 
Umbach (Researcher). In Italy, EU-China relations have been carried out at the Aspen 
Institute (Italy): Marta Dassu (Head of International Programs) and Roberto Menotti 
(Researcher); and at the Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Intemazionale (ISPI): Maria 
Weber (Senior Research Fellow -  Asia Division).
In China, the scholarly community of European specialists has begun to take 
shape in the early 1980s. During that decade, the Institute of West European Studies 
was established in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), a national 
Association of European Studies was founded, and European sections were developed 
in the principal international relations research institutes. Since the mid-1990s, Chinese 
scholars have taken an active interest in European developments and, more particularly, 
the emergence of the EU as an autonomous actor from Washington. In this context, 
Chinese scholars have argued for a multi-polar perspective in international politics and 
have interpreted the role of -  and hoped for - a united Europe as a compromise between 
the traditional dependence on the US and greater autonomy in the future. In China three 
places have emerged for the study of Europe-China relations: (i) the Institute of 
European Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Zhou Hong, Director; and the 
following professors: Luo Hongbo; Wu Baiyi; Wu Xian); (ii) the Centre for European 
Studies, Renmin University of China (Song Xinning, Director); and (iii) the Centre for 
European Studies, Fudan University (Dai Bingran, Director).
In the United States, David Shambaugh (George Washington University and 
Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution) is the foremost scholar to have worked on 
EU-China relations since the early 1990s. Robin Niblett at the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (CSIS) in Washington DC has also taken an interest in EU-China 
relations and published articles on China in transatlantic relations. The lack of expertise 
in the US on EU-China relations has been the cause for much transatlantic 
misunderstanding, especially during the debate on the arms embargo issue.
46
Since the early 1990s, the scholarly literature on Europe-China relations has 
approached the subject matter from three main perspectives, which reflect the level of 
analysis discussed above.
The bilateral level
Scholars have taken the following approaches:
(i) The historical and diplomatic relations between the EC/EU and China: Kay Moller57 
and Hervd Dejean de la Batie.58
(ii) The historical and diplomatic relations between European countries and China: 
Eberhard Sandschneider59, Patricia Wallons.60
(iii) The economic significance of the relationship: Franco Algieri61; Peter Ferdinand62, 
Marcus Taube.63
(iv) The role of Hong Kong and Macau in China’s relations with Europe: Michael 
Yahuda64, Miguel Santos Neves and Brian Bridges.65
(v) The role of Taiwan in China’s relations with Europe: Jean-Pierre Cabestan.66
(vi) The strategic significance of the EU-China relationship: Michael Yahuda,67 David 
Shambaugh,68 Lanxin Xiang,69 Richard Grant70 and Song Xinning.71
57 Kay MOller, “Diplomatic Relations and Mutual Strategic Perceptions: China and the European Union”, 
The China Quarterly, March 2002, n. 169, pp. 10-32.
58 Hervd Dejean de la Batie, La politique chinoise de TUnion europeenne: en progress, mais peut mieux 
faire, mimeo, 13 February 2002
59 Eberhard Sandschneider, “China’s Diplomatic Relations with the States o f Europe”, The China 
Quarterly, March 2002, n. 169, pp. 33-44.
60 Patricia Wellons, “Sino-French Relations: Historical Alliance vs Economic Reality”, in The Pacific 
Review, Vol. 7, No. 3,1994, pp. 341-348.
61 Franco Algieri, “EU Economic Relations with China: An Institutional Perspective”, The China 
Quarterly, March 2002, n. 169, pp. 64-77.
62 Peter Ferdinand, “Economic and Diplomatic Interactions between the European Union and China”, in 
Richard L. Grant (ed.), The European union and China: A European Strategy fo r the Twenty-First 
Century, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995.
63 Marcus Taube, “Economic Relations between the PRC and the States of Europe”, The China 
Quarterly, March 2002, n. 169, pp. 78-107.
64 Michael Yahuda, Hong Kong: China;s Challenge, London and New York, Routledge, 1995.
65 Miguel Santos Neves and Brian Bridges (eds.), Europe, China and the Two SARs: Towards a New Era, 
Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2000.
66 Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “France’s Taiwan Policy : A Case of Shopkeeper Diplomacy”, in Werner 
Meissner and Jean-Pierre Cabestan (eds.), “The Role of France and Germany in Sino-European 
Relations”, East-West Dialogue, special issue, vol. VI, n. 2 - vol. VII, n. 1, June 2002, pp. 264-291.
67 : Michael Yahuda, “China and Europe: The Significance of a Secondary Relationship”, in Thomas W. 
Robinson and David Shambaugh, Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1994.
68 David Shambaugh, China and Europe: 1949-1995, London, SOAS-Contemporary China Institute, 
1996.
69 Lanxin Xiang, “An EU's Common Strategy for China”, in The International Spectator, Vol. 26, No. 3, 
July-September 2001, pp. 89-99.
70 Richard L. Grant (ed.), The European Union and China: A European Strategy fo r the Twenty-First 
Century, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995.
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(vii) Strategic partnership: Centre for European Reform72, European Policy Centre.73
Inter-regional level
EU-China relations have also been studied within the broader context of EU-Asia 
relation. Scholars have taken the following approaches:
(i) The economic and commercial relationship between the two regions: 
Christopher Dent74, and Franco Algieri.75.
(ii) The diplomatic and institutional cooperation between the two regions: Georg 
Wiessala76.
(iii) The prospects of regionalism and inter-regional cooperation: Paul Cammack 
and Gareth Richards77.
(iv) The EU’s involvement in the security mechanisms of the Asia-Pacific region: 
Trevor Taylor.78
It is noteworthy the publication in 1998 (in a timely coincidence with the second ASEM
70held in London in 1998) of the book Europe and the Asia Pacific, which brings 
together scholars from Europe and East Asia. This is probably the most comprehensive 
publication of the nature of - and prospects for - the relationship between Europe and 
Asia.
The global level
71 Song Xinning, “China’s Rise and the European Experience”, in Teaching and Research, No. 4,2004.
72 Katinka Barysch, Charles Grant and Mark Leonard, Embracing the dragon: The EU ’s Partnership with 
China, London, Centre for European Reform (CER), May 2005.
73 Fraser Cameron, Axel Berkofsky, Stanley Crossick, EU-China relations -  towards a strategic 
partnership, European Policy Centre, Working Paper n. 19, July 2005.
74 Christopher Dent, The European Union and East Asia: An Economic Relationship, London, Routledge, 
1999.
75 Franco Algieri, “The Coherence Dilemma of EU External Relations: The European Asia Policy”, in 
Paul Cammack and Gareth A. Richards (eds.), Asia-Europe Inter-Regionalism (special edition o f the 
Journal o f  the Asia Pacific Economy), Vol. 4, No. 1,1999.
76 Georg Wiessala, The European Union and Asian Countries, London, Continuum-Sheffield Academic 
Press, 2002.
77 Paul Cammack and Gareth A. Richards (eds.), Asia-Europe Inter-Regionalism (special edition o f the 
Journal o f  the Asia Pacific Economy), vol. 4, n. 1,1999.
78 Trevor Taylor, European Security and the Asia-Pacific Region, London, Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1997.
79 Hanns Maull, Gerald Segal and Jusuf Wanandi (eds.), Europe and the Asia Pacific, London, 
Routledge, 1998.
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More recently, EU-China relations have been studied by scholars interested in the new 
significance acquired by EU-China relations for transatlantic relations and, more 
generally, the emerging global order: David Shambaugh80, Frank Umbach81, Markus 
Taube82, and Robin Niblett83, Moreover, some research institutes have devoted to the 
issues symposia which have been later published.84
Structure of the thesis
This thesis is divided in 7 chapters (plus introduction and conclusion). The development 
of the thesis is historical. Chapters 2 and 3 provides the background for the core of the 
thesis (Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7). The historical development is also mirrored in the 
content of the chapters: Chapters 2, 3 and 4 deal predominantly with economic issues, 
while chapter 5, 6 and 7 address the security-strategic dimension of EU foreign policy 
towards China. Security-strategic issues have emerged in the last years and most of the 
material for those chapters is based on interviews. The last Chapter examines the 
Taiwan issue which will be, according to this author, the next issue in EU-China 
relations, in particular around 2008, when presidential elections will be held in Taiwan 
and the Olympic Games in Beijing.
Chapter 1: This chapter discusses the main questions and problems posed by the EU’s 
engagement with China: What is, after all, the EU? Does it exist a EU foreign policy?
80 David Shambaugh, “European and American Approaches towards China: Different Beds, Same 
Dreams?” in .China Perspectives, No. 42, July-August 2002, pp. 4-12; see also by the same author: 
“China and Europe: The Emerging Axis”, in Current History, September 2004, pp. 243-248; and “The 
New Strategic Triangle: US and European Reactions to China’s Rise”, in The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 
28, No. 3, Summer 2005, pp. 7-25.
81 Frank Umbach, “EU’s Links with China Pose New Threat to Transatlantic relations”, European 
Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 2, Spring 2004.
82 See also Markus Taube, Transatlantic Economic Competition and Cooperation with China in the post 
WTO Accession Era, paper available at:
http://www.dgap.org/attachment/36292e5f08f727196eb4calQd4df243/13d0841584596c25d89a6820dlf8 
1764/taube.pdf.
83 Robin Niblett, China, the EU, and the Transatlantic Alliance, U.S.-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission, Hearing on “China’s Growing Influence: Objectives and Strategies”, Friday, July 
22,2005, available at:
http://www.uscc.gOv/hearings/2005hearings/written testimonies/05 07 21 22wrts/niblett robin wrts.ht 
m.
84 See in particular: Transatlantic Dialogue on China: Final Report, A Joint Project of the Henry L. 
Stimson Center and Research Institute of the German Council on Foreign Relations with the support of 
the German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Volkswagen Foundation, Washington, Report No. 
49, February 2003, available at: http://www.stimson.org/tadc/pdf/fmalreport.pdf: see also Bates Gill and 
Gudrun Wacker (eds.), China’s Rise: Diverging US-EU Perceptions and Approaches, Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin, August 2005.
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What are the instruments at its disposal? And, finally, how do EU policy makers reach 
foreign policy decisions about China?
Chapter 2: This chapter traces the development of the first twenty years of EU-China 
relations (1975-1995). More specifically, the first part of the chapter examines the 
evolution of the relationship from its inception in 1975 until the end of the Cold War in 
1991. The second part concentrates on the evolution of the EU’s China policy in the 
first half of the 1990s, culminated in 1995 with the adoption of the EU’s policy of 
constructive engagement towards China.
Chapter 3: This chapter covers the period from 1993 (adoption of the German concept 
paper on Asia) until 1998 (ASEM II in London and first EU-China summit), with the 
intent to provide the reader with an analysis of the main themes that have characterised 
the development of the EU’s New Asia Strategy (NAS) and the Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM), the two broader frameworks within which the EU has developed the policy of 
constructive engagement towards China.
Chapter 4 : This chapter discusses the development of the policy of constructive 
engagement that has characterised Europe’s approach towards China since the mid- 
1990s. The first part of the chapter analyses European and Chinese policy makers’ 
discourse on economic security and the reasons given for fostering EU-China 
commercial ties. Subsequently, the chapter focuses on the fierce competition among EU 
members for China’s market shares and the political consequences of this commercial 
“scramble” for the EU-China human rights dialogue.
Chapter 5: This chapter examines European and Chinese policy makers’ discourses on 
strategic partnership, arguing that beyond the rhetoric, three substantial and interrelated 
issues are giving meaning and content to the EU-China strategic partnership: (i) China’s 
participation in the Galileo satellite network; (ii) European advance technology transfers 
to China; and (iii) the proposed lifting of the EU arms embargo on China. After 
discussing the discourse on strategic partnership, this chapter analyses Galileo and the 
related issue of European advanced technology transfers to China.
Chapter 6: This chapter examines the other key element of the EU-China strategic 
partnership: the arms embargo issue. The first part examines the debate on the lifting of
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the arms embargo, as well as the positions of the EU member states. The following 
section analyses the current provisions of the EU Code of Conduct and the role of the 
European defence sector. In the last part, the chapter discusses the international politics 
of the arms embargo issue, with particular emphasis on the US’s opposition to the 
lifting.
Chapter 7: The first part of the chapter examines the evolution of the EU’s Asia strategy 
since the late 1990s and discusses whether the EU has become an additional factor -  
albeit unconsciously -  of East Asia’s strategic balance. In this context, the rest of the 
chapter analyses the Taiwan issue and the EU’s Taiwan policy from its inception in 
1972. In the conclusion, the chapter evaluates the EU’s Taiwan policy in light of the 
EU’s Asia policy and growing EU-China relations.
In the Conclusion, the more important points raised in the thesis are discussed, as well 
as some promising avenues for future research. In particular, we will present the reader 
with some concluding remarks on China in transatlantic relations and the EU’s 
pretensions to be a global actor and its capabilities. In this vein, in the following 
Chapter we will discuss EU foreign policy and the instruments at its disposal to engage 
China.
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Chapter 1
European Union foreign policy and China
This chapter discusses the following: First of all, what is the EU? Does it exist a 
EU foreign policy? And what are the instruments at its disposal? Secondly, how do EU 
policy makers reach foreign policy decisions about China?
1.1 The European Union as a global actor
Over the years, scholars have formulated different -  and diverging -  conceptualisations 
as to what entity the EU is and whether there exists a distinctive European Union 
foreign policy as such. For instance, William Wallace has defined Europe as a “partial 
polity”, i.e. a political entity which lacks, however, many of the features that we might 
expect to find in a traditional state. Accordingly, Wallace describes the EU policy­
making as “post-sovereign”, since “it spills across state boundaries, penetrating deep
O f
into previously domestic aspects of national politics and administration”. According to 
Brian White, the EU has succeeded in building an international order between nation­
states that challenges the traditional state-based system of international relations.86 
Given its distinctive, if not unique, type of internationally-acting body, the EU has 
increasingly been studied as a particular kind of global actor. According to Christopher 
Hill and Michael Smith,
Empirically the EU can be seen as one of the world’s two economic ‘superpowers’, and an increasingly 
significant influence in the realms of international diplomacy, ‘soft security’, and broader world order. 
Analytically, the Union poses major challenges by virtue of its status as something more than an 
intergovernmental organisation but less than a fully-fledged European ‘state’.87
85 William Wallace, “Post-sovereign Governance: The EU as a Partial Polity” in Helen Wallace, William 
Wallace and Mark A Pollack (eds.), Policy-Making in the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2005 (Fifth Edition), pp. 483-503, p. 493.
86 Brian White, Understanding European Foreign Policy, Houndmills, Palgrave, 2001.
87 Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, “International Relations and the European Union: Themes and 
Issues”, in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (eds.), International Relations and the European Union, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 3-17, p 4.
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Given the hybrid nature of the EU as a partial polity, is it possible to argue that 
the EU is an international actor? Since European countries have begun interacting in the 
framework of the European Political Cooperation - and later, the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) - a number of concepts have been put forward by researchers in 
order to explain the international behaviour of the EC/EU. In 1977 Gunnar Sjostedt 
developed the concept of actorness, arguing that the EC/EU is indeed an international 
actor since it possesses the necessary structural prerequisites for action in world affairs: 
a legal personality, a distinctive diplomatic service (i.e. the Commission delegations 
abroad) and the capacity to enter into negotiations with third parties.88 In 1990, David 
Allen and Michael Smith proposed the concept of presence. According to the two 
scholars, the EC/EU has a presence in international relations since it exhibits distinctive 
forms of external relations and, more importantly, is perceived to be a significant player
O Q
m the international system by other important actors. . Ben Rosamond has added that 
the EU has a “subjective aspect”, represented by the fact that an European “collective 
self’ is validated by other significant actors in the international system90. In sum, as 
Christopher Hill has underlined, Europe is a genuine international actor in some 
respects, but not all.91
Having established that the EU has some attributes of international actorness and 
that it has presence in international affairs, researchers have turned their attention to the 
question of the kind of power that the EU is. The majority of scholars have argued that 
the EC/EU is a civilian -  or normative -  power. In 1972 Duchene created the term 
civilian power, arguing that the EC/EU should not try to imitate traditional power 
politics states, but rather seek to become an entity intent on spreading civilian and 
democratic values abroad. In recent years, scholars have supported the idea of 
normative power Europe. For instance, Karen Smith has argued that military power 
would be both too expensive and too politically divisive for the EU. Instead, Smith 
argues, the EU should focus on its soft power capabilities, since the Union is very well
88 Gunnar Sjostedt, The External Role o f the European Community, Famborough, Saxon House, 1977.
89 David Allen and Michael Smith, “Western Europe’s Presence in the Contemporary International 
Arena”, in Review o f International Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1, January 1990, pp. 19-39.
90 Ben Rosamond, Theories o f European Integration, London. Macmillan, 2000, pp. 176-177.
91 Christopher Hill, “The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualising Europe’s Foreign Policy”, in 
Journal o f  Common Market Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, September 1993, pp. 305-328.
92 F rancis Duchene, “Europe’s Role in World Peace”, in Richard Mayne (ed.), Europe Tomorrow: 
Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead, London, Fontana/Collins (for Chatham House), 1972, pp. 32-47.
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placed for this.93 Chris Hill, on the contrary, has pointed out to the continuing 
importance of military power for the conduct of international relations and has accused 
the advocates of a civilian power Europe of making a virtue out of necessity.94 More 
recently, Bastian Giegerich and William Wallace have questioned the notion of the EU 
as a soft power by analysing the empirical evidence of the EU’s military involvements 
abroad.95 In sum, if the EU as a global actor has been defined in different ways, what 
about EU foreign policy?
1.2 EU foreign policy
Over the years, scholars have provided different definitions of European Union (or 
simply European) foreign policy. It is clear that it cannot be easily contained within a 
traditional state-centred analysis with relatively clear boundaries between internal and 
external policy environments. According to Brian White, EU foreign policy must be the 
object and the subject of analysis in a way that it is qualitatively different from the 
analysis of national foreign policies.96 Among the different definitions of EU foreign 
policy, Roy Ginsberg has defined it as the activity that “refers to the universe of 
concrete civilian actions, policies, positions, relations, commitments and choices of the 
EC (and EU) in international politics”.97 From this definition it is clear that EU foreign 
policy is a complex and unique policy domain both in terms of context and types of 
activity. In fact, EU foreign policy emerges from this unique type of international actor 
-  “a partial polity” -  that is the EU. In addition, the EU foreign policy does not emerge 
from a single, authoritative source but comes in at least three forms or types of 
activity.98
The first form can be identified as the foreign policy - or external relations - of 
the European Community which emerged as a direct consequence of the establishment
93 Karen Smith, “Beyond the civilian power EU debate”, in Politique Europeenne, Vol. 17 (2005), 
pp. 63-82; see also Jan Zielonka, Explaining Euro-paralysis: why Europe is unable to act in international 
politics, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1998.
94 For more details on the debate see Christopher Hill, “European Foreign Policy: Power Bloc, Civilian 
Model -  or Flop?” In Reinhardt Rummel (ed.), The Evolution o f an International Actor: Western 
Europe’s New Assertiveness, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1990.
95 Bastian Giegerich and William Wallace, “Not Such a Soft Power: The External Deployment of 
European Forces”, in Survival, Vol. 46, No. 2, Summer 2004, pp. 163-183.
96 Brian White (2001).
97 Roy Ginsberg, The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire, Lanham: MD, Rowman 
& Littlefield, 2001, p.3.
98 Brian White (2001), p. 13.
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of the original European Communities in 1957 and cover principally trade, aid and 
development relations with third parties. This type of policy can be regarded as 
constituting the foreign economic policy dimension of the EU foreign policy." The 
European Commissioner for External Relations (head of the Directorate-General I for 
External Relations: DG RELEX) is thus responsible for -  and acts on behalf of the EU -  
only in matters that fall within the competence of the Commission. As a matter of fact, 
the four Commission documents on China, as well as the China Strategy Paper 
produced so far by the China desk of the DG RELEX cover economic, aid and 
development issues, but not political and security issues which are dealt in the CFSP 
framework.
Thus, while EC foreign policy is constituted by economic issues, the political 
and security dimension of the EU foreign policy -  since the Treaty of Maastricht the 
CFSP -  is differentiated from the EC foreign policy by issue area and by its location in 
the “pillar” structure of the EU.100 For instance, it is within the CFSP framework that 
the lifting of the EU arms embargo on China is discussed.101 Finally, there is a third 
type of EU foreign policy, namely the foreign policies of the member states themselves. 
Thus, each analysis of the EU foreign policy must include what Christopher Hill has 
called “the sum of what the EU and its member states do in international relations”.102 
In recent years, scholars of EU foreign Policy have adopted the concept of 
Europeanisation to explain the incremental reorientation of EU member states’ foreign 
policies. We will discuss Europeanisation in more detail in the following section.
1.3 Europeanisation
Europeanisation is a relatively new concept in the scholarly literature. There is still 
much debate on the nature, causes and effects of Europeanisation and, needless to say, 
little agreement on the definition. One of the oldest conceptions defines Europeanisation 
in terms of national adaptation to EU membership. In other words, an “incremental
" Ib id ., p. 15.
100 The three-pillar structure of the “new” European Union includes: a) the first pillar, now referred to as 
the European Community, composed by the three originally separated Communities: European Steel and 
Coal Community, European Economic Community and European Atomic Energy Community; b) the 
second pillar of a Common Foreign and Security Policy; c) the third pillar for co-operation in Justice and 
Home affairs, these last two pillars being intergovernmental.
101 The arms embargo was imposed by member countries in 1989 in the framework of the then European 
Political Cooperation.
102 Christopher Hill, “Convergence, Divergence and Dialectics: National Foreign Policies and the CFSP”, 
in Jan Zielonka (ed.), Paradoxes o f  European Foreign Policy, The Hague, Kluwer, 1998.
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process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and 
economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and 
policy-making”.103 The national adaptation school suggests that Europeanisation is a 
top-down process translating change from the supranational/European level to the 
national level in decision making politics. For instance, the China Strategy Paper 
adopted by the European Commission in 2002 aims at coordinating and harmonising the 
existing development policies of member states. In this sense, the European 
Commission is reorienting the direction and shape of member states development 
policies towards China.104 In contrast to this approach, scholars have also pointed out to 
a bottom-up understanding of Europeanisation. In the national projection school, 
member states are the primary actors and agents of change, rather than passive subjects. 
In this case, the notion of Europeanisation views the state, especially the large ones, as 
being pro-active in projecting its preferences, policy ideas and models to the European 
Union.
We will see in Chapter 4 that in the case of the German China policy model, 
Bonn/Berlin has been able to project its national policy and policy style at the EU level. 
In other words, Germany has succeeded in Europeanising its national priority and 
strategy towards China (and East Asia too, as we will see in Chapter 3). This has had 
several benefits for the German government: firstly, it has increased its national 
influence; secondly, it has reduced the risks and costs of pursuing a 
controversial/negative policy towards Beijing. The Europeanisation of Germany’s 
China (and East Asia’s) policy -  in the version of national projection - is not only 
evident in the influence of the German approach towards China on the other member 
states (especially the large ones), but also in the adoption by the European Commission 
of the policy of constructive engagement towards China strongly advocated and 
sustained by Bonn since the early 1990s. Thus, national projection works both in the 
horizontal (or sideways) direction -  i.e. influence upon other member states - and the 
bottom-up direction -  i.e. influence and preferences projected upon EU institutions.
Another meaning of Europeanisation refers to the reconstruction of identities in 
contemporary Europe. This version is used mainly by anthropologists and social
103 Robert Ladrech, “Europeanisation of Domestic Politics and Institutions: The Case o f France”, in 
Journal o f  Common Market Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1994, pp. 69-87, p. 69.
104 Commission Working Document, Country Strategy Paper China: 2002-2006; available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/extemal relations/china/csp/02 06en.pdf.
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constructivists for describing elite socialisation among national officials attached to the 
Commission and the other EU institutions in Brussels or in the delegations of the 
Commission abroad. In this context, EU officials are increasingly thinking in 
“European” rather than “national” terms. Christopher Hill and William Wallace have 
underlined the potential transformational effects of elite socialisation.105 This 
phenomenon of elite socialisation was fairly evident during this author’s interviews in 
Beijing with officials from the Embassy of Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy 
and the European Commission delegation.
To sum up, Europeanisation is characterised by three directions: (i) a top-down 
process; (ii) a bottom-up and sideways process involving the export of national 
preferences and models; (iii) the socialisation of interests (and identities). While 
scholars have offered other definitions of the concept of Europeanisation, it seems to 
this author that the above three capture the whole essence of the process.106 The 
question is to what extent Europeanisation explains members states foreign policy 
towards China? Britain and France, for instance, increasingly accept that they can no 
longer, today, pursue a totally independent foreign policy towards China. In particular, 
Jacques Chirac, the French President, has repeatedly declared that the size and weight of 
China cannot be engaged by France alone, but only by a political entity of bigger 
magnitude such as the EU. Even the UK, the member state traditionally most opposed 
to European supranational integration and in favour of intergovernmental decision 
making within the EU, has in recent years increasingly moved towards using the EU as 
a platform for advancing its policies -  and interests - towards China and East Asia.107
The Europeanisation perspective portrays the member states as subject to the 
constraints, opportunities and influences of EU membership. At the same time, the 
intergovernmental perspective (with its realist and liberal variants), views the member 
state as an independent power driven by its national interest, a state that shapes, 
influences and sets the pace of EU foreign policy and determines its level of cooperation 
according to its interests in the issue at hand.108 The supranational-intergovernmental
105 Christopher Hill and William Wallace “Introduction: Actors and Actions”, in Christopher Hill (ed.), 
The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy, London, Routledge, 1996, pp. 1-16., p. 6.
106 For more details on other “Europeanisation” schools, see Reuben Wong, “The Europeanisation of 
Foreign Policy”, in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (eds.), International Relations and the European 
Union, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 134-153.
107 Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 13 April 2006.
108 Wong (2005).
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divide has narrowed in recent years as member states adjust to the increasing 
“Brusselsisation” of foreign policy making, namely the steady enhancement of 
Brussels-based decision making bodies (the Council and the Commission). According 
to Costanza Musu:
In the intergovernmental framework within which the EU’s CFSP is elaborated, EU member states have 
hitherto displayed little desire to set out binding foreign policy convergence criteria that might limit their 
freedom of action. On the other hand, we have to acknowledge that in the sphere of foreign policy,
coordination -  albeit in an informal, incremental and not codified fashion - does take place. ^
It can be argued that the ensuing foreign policy of each member state towards 
China is the end product of a complex series of negotiations between governments, EU 
institutions, (Commission, Council, and the EP), officials, and member state 
representatives, as well as a process of policy learning and emulation between 
individual member states.110 What about the foreign policy towards China of the large 
EU member states?
1.4 The large EU member states’ strategies towards China
With regard to EU member states, this study concentrates on the four large EU members 
-  Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy. We will now briefly look at their 
strategic approaches to China.
Since the early 1990s, Germany has consistently concentrated its energies on 
building good economic and political relations with Beijing. This pragmatism goes back 
to 1955, when despite the Hallstein doctrine that denied diplomatic recognition to all 
states that recognised East Germany, the Federal Republic established a trade office in 
China. This pragmatic economic policy soon paid good dividends. By 1966, West 
Germany was China’s major European trading partner. In the 1980s, it was estimated 
that almost 50% of the foreign technology imported into China came from West 
Germany.111 Sino-German commercial relations have largely benefited from Berlin’s 
strategy to avoid raising confrontational issues with Beijing and to reaffirm the “one
109 Costanza Musu, “European Foreign Policy: A Collective Policy or a Policy of Converging Parallels?”, 
in European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring 2003, pp. 35-49.
110 Wong (2005).
111 Kay MOller, “Diplomatic Relations and Mutual Strategic Perceptions: China and the European 
Union”, in Richard L. Edmonds (ed.), China and Europe since 1978: A European Perspective, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002.
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China” policy in many occasions.112 For instance, in January 1993 Chancellor Kohl 
refused to approve the sale of 10 submarines and 10 frigates to Taiwan in order not to 
upset relations with the PRC.113 This German China policy model has been founded, 
according to Christoph Nesshover, on three principles: (i) silent diplomacy -  i.e., no 
confrontation with Beijing on human rights or other sensitive issues; (ii) change through 
trade -  i.e., encouraging political liberalisation in China via economic development; and 
(iii) a strict “one China” policy -  i.e., without conceding to the pro-Taiwanese lobby.114 
This strategy of depoliticising economic relations with Beijing has brought home 
tremendous commercial results: since the mid-1990s, Germany had become, by far, 
China’s most important European trading partner. At the political level, the relationship 
is underpinned by regular state visits, including an annual visit to China by the German 
chancellor. In 2004 the Sino-German relationship has been upgraded to strategic 
partnership and a hotline between heads of state has been opened.
France views China as a great business opportunity, but also as a strategic partner 
within its vision of a multipolar international system. France was the first country to 
establish full diplomatic relations with China at the ambassadorial level in January 
1964, but the smooth relationship suffered a severe setback when France sold Mirages 
2000-5s and La Fayette-class frigates to Taiwan in the early 1990s. At the economic 
level, France is now China second largest European trading partner. Economic relations 
are highlighted by the sale of Airbus aircrafts to China, and France’s cooperation in 
technological sectors such as atomic power, defence, and satellite technology. 
Traditionally weaker cultural ties were recently intensified by the “Chinese Culture 
Year” declared in France in 2003/2004, the largest cultural exchange between China 
and an European country to date. First among European countries, France established its 
strategic partnership with the PRC in 1997, and has since set up a hotline between the 
heads of state. At the strategic level, France is the EU member states, which has
112 The “one China” policy is the principle that there is one China and that mainland China, Tibet, Hong 
Kong, Macao, Xinjiang and Taiwan are all part of that China. The “one China” policy is also a 
requirement for any political entity to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic o f China.
113 Personal consultation with Dr. Heinrich Kreft, Senior Strategic Analyst, Policy Planning Staff, 
German Foreign Ministry, 6 March 2006.
114 Christoph NesshOver, “Bonn et Paris face & P6kin (1989-1997): vers une strategie commune ?" in 
Politique Etrangere, 1/1999, pp. 91-106 ; see also Reuben Wong R, Towards a Common European 
Policy on China? Economic, Diplomatic and Human Rights trends since 1985, paper presented at the 
International Political Science Association Conference on: “The European Union and the World: Asia, 
Enlargement and Constitutional Change”, Beijing, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), 5-6 
May 2005.
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supported more strongly China’s participation in the Galileo satellite system, as well as 
the lifting of the arms embargo.
The UK views China through the prism of its global ambitions. Sino-British relations 
were dominated, and are still influenced, by the issue of Hong Kong. Although Britain 
was one of the first Western European states to recognise the PRC (in 1950), full 
diplomatic relations were not commenced until March 1972. In the run-up to the 1997 
handover of the former British crown colony of Hong Kong to the PRC, under the “one 
nation-two system principle”, relations came under strain due to the different political 
visions of Hong Kong’s future. Relations smoothened under the Blair government. The 
UK perceives China as not only an important trade partner, but also as holding very 
high strategic relevance, given that both countries sit permanently on the UN Security 
Council. In May 2004 Tony Blair and Wen Jiabao officially announced the upgrading 
of Sino-British relations to strategic partnership, implementing a mechanism of mutual 
visits by the respective heads of government and foreign ministers. Complementing the 
government’s initiative, the UK-China interaction group of the British parliament has 
also started to plan activities.
Italy views China through the prism of a great business opportunity as well as history 
and civilisation. However, in recent years Italy has also started to consider the PRC as a 
challenge, expressed in the fear of an invasion of large quantities of Chinese products. 
The emergence of a “China question” in Italy is explained, in large part, by the fact that 
in a wide range of low-tech productions (such as textiles, shoes, etc.), Italy and China 
compete against each other, with the difference that Italy does not enjoy China’s 
comparative low labour costs. At the political level, Rome has constantly maintained 
good political relations with Beijing. The Italian government was the first European 
country to resume relations with China in the months following Tiananmen and the 
Italian government started to lobby the other EC members as early as Autumn 1989 in 
order to ease sanctions against Beijing.115 Since 2004 Italy-China relations have been 
upgraded to strategic partnership underpinned by a mechanism of mutual visits by the 
respective heads of government and foreign ministers. Strategically, Italy has strongly 
supported China’s participation in the Galileo satellite system and the lifting of the arms 
embargo.
115 Personal consultation with Gianni de Michelis, Italian MP and former Italy’s Foreign Minister at the 
margins of the international conference on China’s Challenge to Europe and the US organised by the 
Aspen Institute, Rome 11 March 2005.
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EU member states compete against each other, especially in the economic- 
commercial dimension. As discussed earlier, however, EU member states are 
increasingly committed to a common -  but not single -  foreign and security policy 
towards Beijing. What are then the instruments at the disposal of the EU to implement 
its foreign policy decisions towards China?
1.5 The instruments of EU foreign policy
Signed on 7 February 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht laid the foundation for the CFSP 
and a future common defence policy (which later grew into a European Security and 
Defence Policy). The Treaty devised a new political community -  the European Union -  
axed on a “three pillars” structure: Economic Community/EMU (first pillar); CFSP 
(second pillar); and co-operation in judicial and home affairs (third pillar). Each pillar 
was under the direction of a different institution and each had its own decision-making 
process. Under the new Treaty, the European Council was to decide what areas should 
become areas of joint action and define matters on which decisions were to be taken by 
a qualified majority.116 The Commission was accorded a right of initiative on CFSP 
matters.117
The pillar structure meant that the European Parliament and the European Court 
of Justice were excluded from involvement in it. As Amhild and David Spence argued, 
“with CFSP defined as a separate pillar of the Union, co-operation was to operate on 
intergovernmental lines...The paradox was that there was a fundamental ambiguity: a 
single institutional framework was an objective countermanded by the pillar structure in 
theory, and, as later became clear, by policy making in practice”.118 This ambiguity was 
clearly manifested, for example, in the external representation of the EU, which was the 
shared responsibility of the Presidency and the Commission, the latter being in charge 
of areas falling within the competence of the EC (mainly trade policy), and the 
Presidency representing the Union in CFSP matters (the so-called high politics).
116 Treaty on European Union, Title V, Article J.3.1-2. Available at: 
http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top.html.
117 Ibid., Article J.8.3
118 Amhild and David Spence, “The Common Foreign and Security Policy from Maastricht to 
Amsterdam”, in Eliassen (ed.), 1998, pp. 43-58. Quotation from p. 45.
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In developing the CFSP, the Maastricht Treaty determines the roles and 
responsibilities of different actors in this field as well as describing certain instruments 
and procedures through which cooperation can be organised. The responsibility for 
CFSP decision making rests with the Council of the European Union (or simply, the 
Council) which can meet either as heads of state and government (in this case it takes 
the name of European Council) or at the level of ministers with specific issue areas. The 
CFSP is dealt with by foreign ministers meeting in the framework of the General 
Affairs Council (GAC). The Council defines the principles and objectives of particular 
policy initiatives and decides which instrument should be used to achieve those 
objectives. For instance, the decision to initiate discussions leading to the eventual 
lifting of the EU arms embargo on China was taken at the Council meeting and inserted 
in the Presidency Conclusions in December 2003.
The Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 created the position of the High 
Representative for the CFSP, who is also the Secretary-General of the Council. Javier 
Solana became the first High Representative on 18 October 1999. The High 
Representative assists the Council “in particular through contributing to the formulation, 
preparation and implementation of policy decisions, and when appropriate and acting on 
behalf of the Council at the request of the Presidency, through conducting political 
dialogue with third parties”.119 After the member countries, acting in the framework of 
the CFSP, decided to initiate discussion on the lifting of the arms embargo, the office of 
Javier Solana became the focal point for the preparation and eventual implementation of 
the decision. In this context, Annalisa Giannella, the Personal Representative on Non­
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction to Solana travelled to the United States, 
Japan, Australia and to the other concerned Asian partners of the EU, to explain why the 
Europeans were considering lifting the EU arms embargo on China.
The Council is presided over for a period of six months by each member state in 
turn. The Presidency organizes and chairs all meetings and takes the leading role in 
working out compromises capable of resolving difficulties. The objective in creating the 
position of the High Representative and linking his activities with those of the 
Presidency was to increase the overall coherence of the CFSP in conditions where EU 
member states were interested to retain their sovereignty in this area of decision making.
119 Treaty on Amsterdam, article J.8.5.
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In the case of the CFSP towards China, the role of the Presidency has become extremely 
important. It was in October 2003, during the Italian Presidency, that the EU-China 
strategic partnership was established, China’s cooperation over Galileo agreed upon and 
discussions for the lifting of the arms embargo initiated (with the Presidency 
Conclusions of December 2003 mentioning for the first time the lifting of the arms 
embargo). We will see in Chapter 4 that Italy has consistently been one of the strongest 
supporters of the policy of constructive engagement towards China.120 The UK 
Presidency in the second half of 2005, instead, has been responsible for steering the 
CFSP towards China during the most troublesome period, characterised by the strong 
opposition of the US to the lifting of the arms embargo and by the passing of the anti­
secession law (clearly directed at Taiwan) by the National People’s Congress (NPC) in 
March 2005. It was the delicate work “behind the scenes” of the British Presidency that 
found a compromise on the lifting of the arms embargo (postponement and no­
discussion) and begun the EU-China strategic dialogue (initiated in December 2005) 
alongside the EU-US and EU-Japan strategic dialogues on East Asia.121 Thus, in the 
case of China the Presidency has become, over the years, an increasing important actor 
for the agenda-setting and for initiating (or pushing) certain dossiers.
The Commission of the European Communities (or simply the Commission) is 
considered to be fully associated with the CFSP but is not part of it. The Commission 
may submit proposals to the Council but may not initiate policies or actions 
independently. In this context, the role of the Commission within the CFSP differs from 
its role in matters where the supranational European Communities (EC) have an 
overriding legal competence. This explains why the four Commission’s papers on China 
are Communications from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. 
Furthermore, there is a certain degree of overlapping -  and incommunicability 
sometimes -  between the China desk of the European Commission and the DG E 
(External Relations/Asia Oceania) of the Council, which has emerged during the 
interviews.
In terms of foreign policy instruments, the Treaty of Maastricht introduced two 
new foreign policy instruments: joint actions and common positions, which were to
120 Interview with Cristina Ravaglia, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Head, Division o f Asia-Pacific 
(Office 3: China, Japan, North-East Asia), 14 December 2004.
121 Interview with Denis Keefe, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Deputy Director Asia-Pacific, Head 
of Far Eastern Group, 13 April 2006.
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serve the purpose of providing the CFSP with means of action; later, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam introduced a further instrument, the common strategy. Currently, only three 
common strategies have been adopted: towards Russia, Ukraine, and the Mediterranean. 
No joint action, common position, or common strategy has been adopted vis-a-vis 
China. In a final move towards the harmonisation of EU’s policy-making, the EU 
member states have signed in Rome, on 29 October 2004, the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe. Its main aims are to replace the overlapping set of existing 
treaties, streamline decision-making among the 25 member states, and provide a 
coherent basis for the actions and policies of the Union. In other words the Constitution, 
by enhancing the EU’s capacity to act internationally, is meant to mark a significant 
step on the way towards convergence.
In the Constitution, EU member states, commit themselves to drastically 
overhaul the way in which Europe conducts its foreign policy. They declare that: “The 
Union’s competence in matters of foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of 
foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union’s security, including the 
progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common 
defence”.122 Furthermore, the European Constitution not only calls for a fully-fledged 
Union Minister for Foreign Affairs,123 but it also intends to create a European External 
Action Service (EEAS)124 -  i.e., a European diplomatic service -  and a European 
Defence Agency (EDA). It also calls for a stronger Council presidency to solve the 
ever-present problem of the rotating presidencies.
Despite of all its contradictions, the EU Constitution certainly symbolises how 
far the EU member states had come in accepting political, alongside economic, 
integration -  first suggested in 1970. Subsequent developments in the ratification 
process of the Constitution, however, seem to indicate that more obstacles than initially 
foreseen are lying on the road ahead. Had the ratification process been successful in 
fact, the Treaty would have been scheduled to enter into force on 1 November 2006. 
However, in 2005, both France and the Netherlands rejected the Constitution in two 
separate referenda. Although several EU countries have approved the Treaty - including 
Spain and Luxembourg - unanimity is required before it can enter into force. At the time
122 Art. 1-16.1 European Constitution; the text o f the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe is 
available at:
123 Art.I-28 European Constitution.
124 Art III-296.3 European Constitution.
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of writing, numerous states have put on hold the ratification of the Treaty, and the future 
of the Constitution and the implementation of its provisions are therefore highly 
uncertain.
Conclusion
We have discussed in this chapter that EU foreign policy towards China is, in essence, 
the sum of what the EU and its member states do in their relations with Beijing. The 
main actors of the EU’s China policy are the European Commission and the large EU 
member states (Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy) with the notable 
contribution of the Nordic countries with regard to development cooperation with 
China. It appears that there has been a division of tasks, which will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 4. This division of labour in EU foreign policy can be summarised as 
follows: while the EU level (i.e. the European Commission) has been used to engage 
Chinese civil society and put human rights and democratisation pressure on Beijing, the 
large EU members have rather engaged the Chinese government by seeking to maintain 
good political relations with the Chinese leadership in order to boost commercial 
exchanges.
The above division of labour is but the result of that particular international actor 
that the EU is. The EU remains an unfinished international actor and its foreign policy 
will continue to mirror its internal integration process. As the reader will see in the 
following chapters, the EU’s engagement with China in the period 1995-2205 has 
provided the EU with one of its crucial and most complex tests for assessing its capacity 
to emerge as an effective global actor. In the next Chapter, we will examine the first 
twenty years of the EU-China relationship (1975-1995), while the remainder of this 
study concentrates on the last decade (1995-2005).
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Chapter 2
From secondary relationship to post-Cold War partnership: 
EU-China relations in the period 1975-1995
In analyzing the international situation, we pay particular attention to Europe, for Europe plays a key role 
in determining if there will be peace or war. For many years our relations with Eastern Europe were 
abnormal. Now, basing ourselves on an objective judgment, we are of the opinion that both Western and 
Eastern Europe are a force for maintaining peace. Both Eastern and Western Europe need to develop, and 
the more they develop the stronger force for peace they become.
Deng Xiaoping, April 1980 125
Under the present complex international situation, strengthening the ties between the EC and China is of 
great importance to world peace and stability.
Gianni de Michelis, Italy’s Foreign Minister, 28 September 1989 (a few months after Tiananmen)
Introduction
This chapter traces the development of the first twenty years of EU-China relations 
(1975-1995). More specifically, the first part of the chapter examines the evolution of 
the relationship from its inception in 1975 until the end of the Cold War in 1991. The 
second part concentrates on the evolution of the EU’s China policy in the first half of 
the 1990s, culminated in 1995 with the adoption of the EU’s policy of constructive 
engagement towards China.
A closer examination of Sino-European relations prior to 1991 reveals that the 
relationship was of a secondary significance and that Europe-China relations were, 
overall, derivative of the Cold War and broader relations with the superpowers. Chinese 
leaders, for instance, viewed relations with the European states more as a dependent
125 Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), 2 April 1980, as quoted in Harish Kapur, Distant Neighbours: China 
and Europe, London and New York, Pinter, 1990, pp. 124-125.
66
variable to China’s relations with the two superpowers than as a fully-developed 
relationship in its own worth pursuing regardless Cold War constraints. At the same 
time, in the 1970s and 1980s only a few European countries pursued relations with 
Beijing independent of Washington and Moscow, the exceptions being the 
Scandinavian countries, Albania and France. This general European neglect was 
implemented within the context of the Cold War and Washington’s trade and strategic 
embargo on China. The end of bipolarity, thus, created new possibilities for the EU- 
PRC relationship.
In the second part, the chapter focuses on post-Cold War developments in 
Europe and China. At the beginning of the 1990s, Chinese leaders had come to perceive 
the post-Cold War environment as a transition process from a bipolar to a multi-polar 
system of international relations, while EU policy makers tended to avoid world order 
issues and became intent on deepening the integration process and on equipping the EU 
with a common foreign and security policy.126 It is argued, here, that it was the fleeting 
bilateral relations between the large EU member states and China that characterised the 
first part of the 1990s and that would have a significant impact upon the evolution of the 
EU’s China policy.
In this context, particular attention will be devoted to the examination of the 
German China policy model. Germany’s approach to Beijing -  spearheaded by the Kohl 
government - has been founded on three principles: (i) silent diplomacy -  i.e., no 
confrontation with Beijing on human rights or other sensitive issues; (ii) change through 
trade -  i.e., encouraging political liberalisation in China via economic development; and 
(iii) a strict “one China” policy -  i.e., without conceding to the pro-Taiwanese lobby. 
The success of the Germany’s China policy made an impact on the rest of Europe’s 
policy making elite. Thus, by the mid-1990s, due to the new weight acquired by 
Germany after the reunification, its lead in formulating a pragmatic approach to Beijing, 
and the awesome commercial results that ensued from it, Germany’s China policy was 
Europeanised. In other words, by influencing the behaviour of other EU member states 
(especially the large ones), there has been a national projection (sideways) of 
Germany’s China policy on the other large EU members. Moreover, Germany’s
126 For more details on the question of how far European governments and elites responded to the 
transformation of their strategic environment at the end o f the Cold War by rethinking their strategic 
foreign policies see: Robin Niblett and William Wallace (eds.), Rethinking European Order: West 
European Responses 1989-1997, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001.
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national preferences vis-a-vis China were also projected upon the EU level (i.e. 
Commission), in the sense that the German China policy model came to influence the 
policy of constructive engagement put forward by the European Commission since the 
mid-1990s (bottom up process). With the publication of its first policy paper on China 
in 1995, the European Commission ushered in a policy of firm engagement towards 
Beijing, marking the beginning of a new era in Sino-European relations
The new EU’s China policy of 1995 followed the adoption, in 1994, of the EU’s 
New Asia Strategy (NAS), which aimed at putting relations between EU member states 
and Asian countries into a single, integrated framework. In 1993, Germany had become 
the first EU member state to elaborate a strategy towards Asia, and something similar to 
the case of the China policy happened, i.e. Germany’s Asia policy was also 
Europeanised. This will be discussed in more detail in the next Chapter, after having 
examined the first twenty-years of EU-China relations.
2.1 Europe-China relations during the Cold War
In 1975, when the PRC and the European Community (EC) established diplomatic 
relations, both sides had already enhanced their respective international standing. 
Beijing had entered into an anti-Soviet partnership with Washington in 1971-72, and the 
EC in 1970 had launched the European Political Cooperation (EPC) process, as the 
forebear for the future CFSP. The European Parliament (EP) had seen its role bolstered 
with the first direct elections scheduled for 1979. Also in 1974, EC heads of state and 
government had agreed henceforth to convene as the European Council, a de facto 
executive for dealing with the most important matters and for setting the agenda of the 
whole European integration process. Moreover, the EC had been authorized to collect 
its own revenues and to advance into new areas of cooperation such as common trade 
policies. In this context, some scholars viewed the establishment of diplomatic relations 
between the EC and the PRC, in September 1975, as the acknowledgement of “each 
other’s future international potential”.127 Chinese leaders hoped that the EC would 
assume a higher political profile in world affairs, thereby helping to play a more active 
role in containing the Soviet Union while contributing to the PRC’s own economic and
127 Among the others, KSy Moller, “Diplomatic Relations and Mutual Strategic Perceptions: China and 
the European Union”, in The China Quarterly, March 2002, n. 169, pp. 10-32; David Shambaugh, China 
and Europe: 1949-1995, London, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), Contemporary China 
Institute, Research Notes and Studies No. 11,1996.
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technological modernisation. The launching in 1975 of Prime Minister Zhou Enlai’s 
“four modernizations” led European policy makers hope that an incipient opening up of 
the potential greatest market of the world was imminent. As well as being deemed 
important in order to benefit from China’s new commercial potential, such an 
engagement was argued to be legitimate on the grounds that China’s economic reforms 
could be expected to presage change in the political domain.
Furthermore, other developments in Chinese domestic politics would have a 
significant impact on the relationship. Indeed, by July 1977, Deng Xiaoping had 
regained its position as vice-chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) by the , 
Third Plenary of the Tenth Central Committee. The following year, the Third Plenary of 
the 11th Central Committee confirmed the victory of Deng’s pragmatic line over what 
remained of the Gang of Four. As a result, Beijing embarked on an active policy of 
improving relations with all countries outside the Soviet orbit, establishing full 
diplomatic relations with the US and trying to commit Japan to a more pro-active anti- 
Soviet line. Chinese leaders also started to perceive Western Europe increasingly in 
terms of Beijing’s national security. In this vein, China became a vociferous advocate of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in order to ease Soviet pressure from 
the tense Sino-Soviet border. In Mao’s three-world view, Europe belonged to the 
“second world” and as such could be mobilised into a worldwide anti-Soviet front.
From the mid-1970s, Chinese officials would encourage European policy 
makers to spend more on defence in an open anti-Soviet move. Chinese leaders would 
oppose any Western moves toward detente with Moscow and support NATO so 
strongly that by the late 1970s China had been labelled by many as the “16th member of 
NATO”.128 Such status also afforded China increased access to European defence 
suppliers. From 1975 to 1980, China dispatched dozens of inspection and shopping 
missions to NATO member states. Furthermore, People’s Liberation Army officers 
were allowed to access important NATO bases and introduced to defense industrialists. 
The Chinese were primarily interested in NATO’s frontier defense planning against a 
Soviet land invasion, the use of battlefield tactical nuclear weapons and antitank 
technology. At that time, Beijing purchased anti-air and anti-tank missiles from Italy 
and West Germany, radars from France, and jetfighter engines and technologies from
128 Shambaugh (1996), p. 12.
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Great Britain.129 This was possible since following the re-establishment of US-China 
diplomatic relations, Washington had accepted that its European partners sold certain 
weapons to the PRC which the US itself, due to domestic constraints, was still unable to 
sell. These moves led the Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU)130 to table a 
draft resolution in May 1978 recommending a careful examination of “the role that 
China can play regarding European security”, as well as favourable consideration of the 
“rising Chinese demands for industrial technology”.131
Further developments in both Western Europe and China in the 1980s moved 
the relationship onto a further stage. In 1979, under the impulse of France and Germany, 
the European Monetary System (EMS) was devised, as a first step towards monetary 
union. In the early 1980s, further steps towards enhanced political cooperation were 
taken and in 1986 the EC member states adopted the Single European Act (SEA). At the 
same time, the PRC had gone through three important policy shifts. In 1978, Deng 
Xiaoping had reaffirmed the primacy of economic development over all other policies. 
Four years later, in 1982, China started adopting a more independent stance vis-a-vis 
both superpowers, a line that was subsequently approved by the 12th CCP Congress in 
September 1982. In the mid-1980s, another major policy shift occurred: starting with 
the assumption that the world was going through important changes, Deng Xiaoping 
officially did away with the Maoist thesis of the inevitability of a nuclear world war and 
became more supportive of disarmament and detente as a matter of principle. Moreover, 
in these new circumstances, Europe as a whole was to be given special consideration. 
According to Deng himself:
In analyzing the international situation, we pay particular attention to Europe, for Europe plays a key role 
in determining if there will be peace or war. For many years our relations with Eastern Europe were 
abnormal. Now, basing ourselves on an objective judgment, we are of the opinion that both Western and
129 David Shambaugh, “China’s Quest for Military Modernization”, in Asian Affairs, May-June 1979, pp. 
295-309.
130 Founded in 1954 as a collective security pact by the United Kingdom, France, the Benelux States, 
Italy and Germany, and succeeding the previous Brussels Pact uniting the former three against a possible 
resurgence of German militarism, the WEU had come close to oblivion by the 1970s because it lacked 
military structures of its own. It was revived ten years later, however, after EPC had failed to make a 
difference during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In 1987, the WEU was charged with co-ordinating 
EC members’ out-of-area activities. In the last years, some EU member states -  for instance, France, 
Germany and the Benelux countries -  tabled plans for the incorporation of the WEU into European 
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In 2002, the WEU Research Institute became the EU Institute for 
Security Studies based in Paris.
131 Frederick Bennett, La Chine et la securiti europienne, Paris, West European Union, 1978. These 
concerns have resurfaced in recent years with regard to European technology transfers to China and the 
arms embargo issue. For more details, see Chapter 5.
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Eastern Europe are a force for maintaining peace. Both Eastern and Western Europe need to develop, and 
the more they develop the stronger force for peace they become.132
From the mid-1980s onwards, it was also Western Europe’s potential role as a 
new pole in a future multi-polar world, and not only as a bulwark against Soviet 
hegemony, that attracted Beijing’s attention.133 Some Chinese scholars had argued for a 
multi-polar perspective in international relations and had interpreted the role of a united 
Europe as a compromise between the traditional dependence on the US and greater 
autonomy in the future. This was not only due to China’s own strategic about turn, but 
also to the growing realisation that the European integration process would have a major 
role to play in the gradual political emancipation of Eastern Europe from Moscow.134
The theme of a united Europe appears in official Chinese statements from the 
second half of the 1980s. In April 1985, Deng Xiaoping stressed the importance of a 
“strong and united Western Europe”, while CCP Secretary-General Hu Yaobang in
1986 declared his wish for “Eastern and Western Europe uniting and jointly conducting 
a policy of independence and self-reliance in opposition to war”.135 Moreover, in May
1987 speaking during an official visit to the Netherlands, prime Minister Zhao Ziyang 
declared that: “The unification of Europe, its growth and strength, the strengthening of 
the cooperation between China and Western Europe, and the rapprochement between 
Eastern and Western Europe will play an important role for the maintenance of global 
peace”.136 Later, Deng Xiaoping called for the establishment of a “united, strong and 
developing Europe”.137 It was in this context of growing expectations for a united 
Europe that Chinese leaders began to strengthen relations with the different institutions 
of the EC. In 1983 high level consultations at the ministerial level were launched to 
address a wider range of issues. Furthermore, biannual meetings were initiated between 
the political affairs directors of the country holding the EC presidency and the Chinese 
ambassador to the country concerned. Also in the early 1980s, Chinese leaders started
132 Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), 2 April 1980, as quoted in Harish Kapur, Distant Neighbours: China 
and Europe, London and New York, Pinter, 1990, pp. 124-125.
133 Ding Hong and Zhang Baoxiang, Opportunity, Policy and Role: On Western Europe’s Role in Present 
Day World, Beijing, China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, 1987, p. 2, as quoted in 
Kapur, Distant Neighbours, p. 171.
134 Guo Fengmin, “Xiou guojia waijiao zhengcede jiben sixiang” (“Basic thinking in the foreign politics 
of Western European countries”), Guoji wenti yanjiu (Journal o f International Studies), No. 2, 1981, pp. 
25-34.
135 Xinhua News Agency in English, 17 April 1985 as quoted in Ostinformationen, Bonn, Federal Press 
and Information Office, 28 April 1985, p. 24.
136 Radio Beijing in Chinese, 11 May 1987, as quoted in Ostinformationen, Bonn, Federal Press and 
Information Office, 12 May 1987, pp. 29-30.
137 China Daily, 13 May 1987, p. 1.
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establishing relations with the European Parliament through an exchange of delegations 
with the National People’s Congress (NPC). Although the EP did not play a major role 
in the European integration process, nonetheless it consistently supported the 
strengthening of Sino-European ties and had urged the Commission and the Council, 
back in the second half of the 1980s, to promote China’s re-entry into the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).138
China’s professional community of Europe specialists also began to take shape 
during the 1980s, along with the more general development of area studies. The 
Institute of West European Studies was established in the Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences (CASS), a national Association of European Studies was founded, and 
European sections were developed in the principal international relations research 
institutes.139 In the early 1980s, Chinese international affairs specialists also began to 
put forward the idea that the US defence build-up had begun to stabilise the balance of 
power between the superpowers. Moreover, these analysts perceived the emergence of 
an increasingly multi-polar world order as the defining feature of the international 
system of that period. For China this meant that close alignment with the United States 
and NATO was not as necessary to Chinese security as had been the case during the 
previous decade.
The gradual thaw in Sino-Soviet relations further contributed to this perception. 
Based on this assumption of a changing international system, China proclaimed its 
“independent foreign policy” in 1982.140 In this new multi-polar world order, Chinese 
scholars saw Europe as constituting one of the poles. Accordingly, Western Europe 
could act as a counterweight not just against Moscow but against the United States as 
well. Such an analysis reflected China’s desire for the suppression of a bipolar world 
order and the creation of an international system in which regional powers such as 
China played defining roles. However, according to David Shambaugh, in the case of 
Western Europe such perceptions seriously underestimated two factors. First of all, 
Chinese leaders overestimated the political unity of Western Europe while rarely taking
138 European Parliament Working Documents, Document A2.56/87, Brussels, European Communities, 18 
May 1987, p. 6. To note that the EP has been the most prominent critic, in recent years, of China’s human 
rights violations. For more details see Chapters 6 and 7.
139 Interview with Professor Luo Hongbo, Deputy-Director, Institute of European Studies, Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Beijing, 7 May 2005.
140 See: Michael Yahuda, The International Politics o f the Asia-Pacific, London, Routledge, 2005 
(second and revised edition), in particular Chapter 3 (pp. 72-97).
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into consideration the divergences among member states. Secondly, China held the view 
that Western Europe was independent from the US within NATO. There was an 
underlying assumption prevalent among many of China’s Europe specialists that NATO 
was an organisation forced upon Europeans by Americans.141 This assumption led 
Chinese leaders to cultivate anti-American sentiment within Europe in an attempt to 
drive a wedge between Washington and its allies. According to Huan Xiang, “the 
positions and interests of the allies on the two shores of the Atlantic do not actually 
have much in common”.142 This reading was based on a biased perception of the forces 
at work within Europe. It is not surprising that Huan Xiang was giving these remarks in 
France, a country that historically sought to distance itself -  and tried to convince the 
rest of Europe as well -  from a too strong an American embrace. It is therefore possible 
that these misperceptions emerged as a consequence of personal and intellectual ties that 
many Chinese leaders had developed over time with the French political and cultural 
elite, which is well-known for its anti-Americanism. Thus, whereas China sought to 
cultivate anti-Soviet elements in Europe during the 1970s, in the 1980s increased efforts 
were made to woo anti-American and anti-militarist elements. A new strategy of 
cultivating the European Left was put forward by Beijing during the 1980s. Proponents 
of European nationalism and anti-militarism were viewed by Beijing as natural allies in 
its new strategy to accelerate the world’s trend toward multi-polarity.
From an economic perspective, during the 1980s in an attempt to diversify its 
growing dependence on Japan and the US for imported technology, China began to 
increase its commercial ties with West Europeans. On 3 April 1978, a trade agreement 
was signed with the EC, which in 1984 was extended to a broader Trade and Co­
operation Agreement (TCA). The EC offered Most Favoured Nation (MFN) access and 
included in the Community’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) provisions from 
1980, in stark contrast with Beijing’s exclusion from the GSP of the United States. By 
1987, two-way trade totalled $13 billion. Of this amount, Chinese imports from Western 
Europe had grown by 169% over the same period. Nonetheless, this amounted to a mere 
15% of China’s total foreign trade, and a scant 1% of total European Community trade. 
Among West European states, Germany gained the upper hand, accounting for nearly 
40%. As of 1987, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and then West Germany accounted
141 David Shambaugh, 1996, p. 14.
142 Interview with Huan Xiang, “Pekin et les trois mondes”, Politique Internationale, Spring 1986, p. 
191, as quoted in Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “Sino-European Relations”, in Gerald Segal (ed.), Chinese 
Politics and Foreign Policy Reform, London, Kegan Paul International, 1990, p. 219.
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for only 1.7% of total foreign direct investment in China ($39 million).143 While the 
1980s saw a gradual and persistent grow of economic relations between China and 
Western European countries, Sino-European political relations continued to be 
dependent on Cold War imperatives.
i
2.2 Tiananmen
The PLA crackdown on students’ demonstrations of 4 June 1989 had a considerable 
impact on China-West European relations. In the aftermath of the massacre, the EC 
responded by imposing a range of sanctions that paralleled those of the US, although 
cultural exchanges were not officially suspended as was the case with the US. At the 
European Community’s summit in Madrid on 26-27 June 1989, European leaders 
agreed to impose punitive economic sanctions individually and in the framework of the 
EC, suspend all military contacts and arms sales, withhold all ministerial-level official 
visits to China and defer those already scheduled, freeze all government-guaranteed 
loans, and issue a strong statement condemning the massacre.144 Tiananmen caused 
particular problems to the French and British governments. France gave sanctuary and 
political asylum to numerous Chinese involved in the pro-democracy movement and 
this caused strains in Sino-French relations. The British government was in a very 
delicate position since London and Beijing were involved in sensitive negotiations over 
the content of the Hong Kong Basic Law and other important details related to the 
retrocession of the British colony to Chinese sovereignty. In the aftermath of the 
massacre, hundred of thousands of demonstrators flooded the streets of the city for 
unprecedented demonstrations against Beijing and this put a lot of pressure on 
London.145
143 David Shambaugh, “China and Europe: the Development from a Secondary to an Independent 
Relationship”, in Song Xinning and Zhang Xiaojin (eds.), China and Europe Towards the Twenty-First 
Century (Zouxiang Ershiyi Shiji de Zhongguo yu Ouzhou) Hong Kong, The Social Sciences Press, 1997, 
pp. 33-63; see also Michael Yahuda, “China and Europe: The Significance of a Secondary Relationship”, 
in Thomas Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds.), Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 266-282.
144 See: http://aei.pitt.edu/archive/00001453/01/Madrid iune 1989.pdf
145 The Hong Kong issue became still more contentious when in 1992 the new Governor, Chris Patten, 
unveiled plans to substantially broaden the political enfranchisement of Hong Kong citizens in voting for 
their representatives in the Legislative Council. For more details on Hong Kong takeover, see Michael 
Yahuda, Hong Kong: China’s Challenge, London and New York, Routledge, 1996; and Hanns Maull, 
Gerald Segal and Jusuf Wanandi (eds.), Europe and the Asia Pacific, London, Routledge, 1998 (in 
particular chapter 4 and 5).
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On 4 July 1989 the European Community announced its intention to re-establish 
political contacts with China. On 28 September 1989, Italy’s Foreign Minister, Gianni 
de Michelis, met with his colleague Qian Qichen at the margins of the United Nations 
(UN) General Assembly declaring that “under the present complex international 
situation, strengthening the ties between the EC and China is of great importance to 
world peace and stability”.146 Subsequently, the Italian government started lobbying the 
other EC member states for relaxing sanctions against China.
In the months following the massacre, Beijing made a small number of minor 
changes to its human rights legislation and these were received by the EC as 
justification for restoring normal relations. Moreover, following the Group of Seven (G- 
7) summit and US President Bush’s declaration that the US would not oppose the allies’ 
lifting of sanctions, the European governments reinitiated ministerial contacts and 
government-backed loans. On 22 October 1989 EC foreign ministers decided to 
gradually resume economic co-operation and to re-establish high-level contacts. Arms 
sales and military contacts remained frozen (the latter were lifted in 1994), but 
ministerial and head of state visits resumed. In the end, most of West European 
sanctions were lifted during the Summer of 1990. In its turn, China was much less 
vociferous in its condemnation of West European than of American sanctions, although 
it did blame European countries for the economic sanctions adopted that had caused a 
sharp reduction in two-way trade.147
In conclusion, until 1991 China’s relations with Europe continued to be derived 
from - and dictated by - its relations with the two superpowers. Whether as a function of 
Chairman Mao’s post-war two camp worldview, the Sino-Soviet and Sino-American 
estrangements, Mao’s theory of the three worlds, of Deng Xiaoping’s polycentric 
diplomacy, until 1991 Europe’s position in Chinese foreign policy was largely 
determined by Beijing’s relations with Washington and Moscow. Therefore, relations 
with the European states were viewed by Chinese leaders more as a dependent variable 
to China’s relations with the two superpowers than as a fully-developed relationship in 
its own. As David Shambaugh argued, China’s relations with Western Europe were
146 Personal consultation with Gianni de Michelis, Italian MP and former Italy’s Foreign Minister at the 
margins of the international conference on China‘s Challenge to Europe and the US organised by the 
Aspen Institute, Rome 11 March 2005.
147 Markus Taube, “Economic Relations between the PRC and the States of Europe”, The China 
Quarterly, No. 169, March 2002, pp. 78-107.
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‘’’largely pursuit as a means to exploit fissures in their relations with the United States, a 
latter-day version of ‘using the barbarians to control the barbarians’ (yi yi zhi y/)”.148 
The same occurred in China’s relations with Eastern Europe, after the Sino-Soviet split. 
Also in this case, Chinese leaders tended to use relations with European countries as 
part of their policy to gain strategic advantage vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the United 
States.
By the same token, in the 1970s and 1980s only a few European countries 
pursued relations with Beijing independent of Washington and Moscow, the exceptions 
being the Scandinavian countries, Albania and France. This general neglect, as some 
scholars have called it, 149 was implemented within the context of the Cold War and 
Washington’s trade and strategic embargo on China. The US’ West European allies 
cooperated in the efforts of the Coordinating Committee for the control of strategic 
exports to communist countries (COCOM), based in Paris to embargo high technology 
sales and transfers to the PRC.150 Thus, Sino-European relations and vice-versa, prior to 
1991, were derivative of the Cold War and broader relations with the superpowers. The 
end of bipolarity, thus, created new possibilities for the EU-PRC relationship.
2.3 Developments in Europe and China at the beginning of the 1990s
It was not only the events of Tiananmen Square that had an impact on EU-China 
relations. In November 1989 the Berlin Wall had crumbled opening up new possibilities 
for Central and Eastern European countries. The future of NATO was being questioned 
as well as the US’ willingness to remain committed to Europe’s defence. The German 
reunification cast doubt on the principle of territorial integrity enshrined in the Final Act 
of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) held in Helsinki in 
1975.151 At the same time, the US was putting pressure for greater European support in 
military operations beyond the alliance’s traditional concerns, as the allied intervention 
in the Gulf in 1991 later demonstrated.
148 Shambaugh (1996), p. 3.
149 William E. Griffith, “China and Europe: Weak and Far Away”, in Richard Solomon (ed.), The China 
Factort Englewood Cliffs: New Jersey, Prentice Hall, 1981.
150 See Chapters 5 and 6.
151 See: http://www.hri.org/docs/Helsinki75.html.
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The European Community embarked upon a process of deepened integration 
with the aim to raise its international profile. In June 1990, negotiations were’launched 
in Dublin on the establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and of a 
political union. The CFSP also featured on the agenda of the 1991 Intergovernmental 
Conference on EMU and EPC in Rome, and proposals were made for the incorporation 
of ECP into the Community system. However, as Kjell Eliassen argued, the “prevailing 
divisions between Atlanticists and Europeanists and between inter-govemmentalists and 
federalists, as well as the pressing political problems of the day, resulted in the 
postponement of CFSP until the 1991 Maastricht summit”.152
Signed on 7 February 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht laid the foundation for the 
CFSP and a future common defence policy. The Treaty devised a new political 
community -  the European Union -  axed on a “three pillars” structure: Economic 
Community/EMU (first pillar); CFSP (second pillar); and co-operation in judicial and 
home affairs (third pillar). Each pillar was under the direction of a different institution 
and each had its own decision-making process. Under the new Treaty, the European 
Council was to decide what areas should become areas of joint action and define matters 
on which decisions were to be taken by a qualified majority.153 The Commission was 
accorded a right of initiative on CFSP matters.154 The WEU was requested to “elaborate 
and implement decisions and actions which have defence implications”.155 The 
development of such common defence policies would take place within NATO, with 
members being offered dual membership. Denmark and Ireland, for instance, which did 
not want to join the WEU as full members, were granted observer status.156
With regard to CFSP, the pillar structure meant that the European Parliament 
and the European Court of Justice were excluded from involvement in it. As Amhild 
and David Spence argued:
With CFSP defined as a separate pillar of the Union, co-operation was to operate on intergovernmental 
lines...The paradox was that there was a fundamental ambiguity: a single institutional framework was an
152 Kjell A Eliassen, “Introduction: The New European Foreign and Security Agenda”, in Kjell A 
Eliassen (ed.), Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union, London, Sage, 1998, p. 5.
153 Treaty on European Union, Title V, Article J.3.1-2. Available at: 
http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top.html.
154 Ibid., Article J.8.3
155 Ibid., Article J.4.1.
156 Marit Sjovaag, “The Single European Act”, in Eliassen (ed.), 1998, pp. 22-42.
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objective countermanded by the pillar structure in theory, and, as later became clear, by policy making in 
practice.157
This ambiguity was clearly manifested, as discussed in Chapter 1, in the external 
representation of the EU, which was the shared responsibility of the Presidency and the 
Commission, the latter being in charge of areas falling within the competence of the EC 
(mainly trade and development aid), and the Presidency representing the Union in CFSP 
matters (the more security-strategic related issues).
The developments in Europe were carefully analysed by Chinese scholars and 
policy makers.158 The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 had caught Beijing as 
much by surprise as the rest of the world. Official reports at that time vacillated between 
echoing concerns about German reunification and veiled criticism of both NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact for “concocting schemes” to prevent Germany’s reunification.159 By 
1993, some Chinese scholars had identified Germany as the dominant power in Europe 
and thus a “big power sharing world leadership with the United States”.160 Moreover, 
Chinese scholars started to consider the European Union as a more promising partner 
for Bejing on the road towards multipolarity. In this context, Chinese experts of Europe 
observed that Maastricht was mainly a German initiative by which Bonn had replaced 
Paris as the engine of the European integration process, thus changing the EU’s internal 
power relations. Moreover, they would remark that the introduction of a common 
currency would divide the Union into two separate camps, and its widening would 
further contribute to a Europe at two different speeds.161 As far as enlargement was 
concerned, Beijing applied the familiar multi-polarity yardstick: accession to the EU by 
the Central and Eastern European countries was welcomed, accession to NATO was 
not.162
157 Amhild and David Spence, “The Common Foreign and Security Policy from Maastricht to 
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In March 1992, both Li Peng, China’s Prime Minister, and Qian Qichen, the 
Chinese Foreign Minister, visited Western Europe, and Qian’s itinerary included the 
European Commission in Brussels and Germany. In a speech given at the German 
Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), Qian Qichen outlined his views of the China-EU 
relationship. First of all, he argued, “both support the transition process from a bipolar 
to a multi-polar system of international relations”. Secondly, they are “both promoting a 
peaceful and stable international environment and tend to solve global problems through 
consultations rather than the use of force”. Thirdly, China and Europe acknowledge “the 
UN’s leading role in conflict resolution”. Fourthly, the two sides are “highly 
complementary in economic terms”.163 The latter was seen as increasingly important 
from both sides.
In the early 1990s, EU-China economic relations grew steadfastly. With the 
exception of arms sales, cooperation and trade relations had been restored by 1991. 
Negotiations for China’s GATT accession, which had been broken off in 1989, were 
also restarted in 1991. The value of Chinese imports accorded GSP preferences 
increased from 2,9 billions Ecu in 1989 to 14.1 billions Ecu in 1994.164 Also the EU’s 
aid to China increased significantly in the first half of the 1990s. Politically, the only 
explicit form of political pressure that survived the immediate reaction to the 
Tiananmen Square events was the EU’s practice of tabling a resolution criticising 
China’s human rights record in the annual meeting of the United Nations Commission 
on Human Rights (UNCHR). Pressure at this stage was exercised principally by the UK 
in relation to the post-transition provisions for Hong Kong, while other EU member 
states maintained a low profile on this issue.
More importantly, however, by the mid-1990s neither the Commission nor the 
individual member states had outlined a clear and comprehensive political vision of 
China or expressed the content and meaning of the Sino-EU relationship, in striking 
contrast with the Chinese leadership.165 On 12 September 1994, in a further move to 
improve relations with the EU and lay down China’s vision of EU-China relations,
163 Bulletin of the Chinese Embassy in Bonn, 12 March 1992, as quoted by MOller (2002), p. 21; Qian 
also stressed that to maximise benefits from this promising relationship, the “principle of non­
interference” would have to be respected.
164 Data from the following websites: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/index en.htm; and 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/extemal relations/china/intro/index.htm.
165 The same happened in recent years with regard to the EU-China strategic partnership. For more 
details see Chapter 5.
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Jiang Zemin’s, the Chinese President, spelled out the “Four Principles for the 
Development of the Relationship between China and Western Europe”. The four 
principles were: (i) development of relations with a view to the twenty-first century; (ii) 
mutual respect, search for common ground, downplaying of differences; (iii) mutual 
benefit; and (iv) resolution of all international problems through consultation and co­
operation.166 Interestingly, the Four Principles were declared in Paris, instead of 
Brussels. The aim of such a gesture was double. Firstly, it officially signalled the 
mending of Sino-French relations after the row over French arms sales to Taiwan at the 
beginning of the 1990s. Secondly, it conveyed the message that for Beijing what 
mattered were the relations with the individual states of the EU, especially the large 
ones. It is, therefore, to the bilateral relations between the large EU member states (the 
so-called “big four”) and China in the first part of the 1990s that we will now turn our 
attention.
2.4 The relations between the large EU member states and China in the first part 
of the 1990s
It was the fleeting bilateral relations between some of the large EU member states and 
China that characterised the first part of the 1990s and that would have a significant 
impact upon the evolution of the EU’s China policy. Sino-British relations, for instance, 
were strained by the problems related to Hong Kong’s takeover scheduled for 1997. The 
events of Tiananmen Square in 1989 raised anxieties in London about the future of 
Hong Kong and the protection of its residents’ freedoms. The appointment of Chris 
Patten as the new Governor-general of Hong Kong in 1992 worsened Sino-British 
relations further. The pro-democracy activism of the Governor was manifested in the 
moves to introduce political freedoms in a more democratic Legislative Council than 
what Beijing had envisaged in 1984. Moreover, the British proposal to introduce the 
right to abode for Hong Kong residents in the UK, as well as Patten’s unilateral actions 
on constitutional reform in Hong Kong created the conditions for the escalation of 
diplomatic tensions between London and Beijing. In 1994 the Chinese government 
threatened to discriminate against Britain over trade matters. At that point, the European 
Commission and some EU member states intervened by warning China that it could not 
expect to isolate the UK. After that, London and Beijing began discussions to hammer
166 See: David Gosset, “China and Europe: Toward a Meaningful Relationship”, in Perspectives, Vol. 3, 
No. 7, available at: http://www.0vcf.0rg/Perspectives/l 9 123102/ChinaEurope.htm.
80
out their differences and from 1995 onward relations between the two sides started to 
improve.167
However, it was France which experienced the sharpest decline in relations with 
Beijing during the early 1990s. Tensions over the harbouring of dissidents were 
compounded in 1992 when France decided to sell 60 Mirage 2000 fighter-interceptors 
to Taiwan (a deal worth $3.8 billion). This followed the $4.8 billion sale of 16 
LaFayette frigates to the Taiwanese navy in 1991. Beijing reacted harshly. It 
condemned Mitterand’s “short-sighted Socialist government” for “forgetting principles 
for the sake of interest” and “violating the principles which were highly respected by all 
French governments since that of Charles de Gaulle”.168 Following these statements, 
China announced the closure of the French Consulate General in Guangzhou and barred 
French companies from bidding for the contract to build the subway system in the same 
city. In March 1994 relations were further strained by the sale to Taiwan of $2.6 billion 
more in advanced weaponry, including Exocet, Crotale and Mistral missiles, torpedos, 
anti-submarine sensors and electronic warfare equipment. Subsequently, the new 
Balladour government decided to invert this downward spiral trend publicly reaffirming 
China’s “sole and inalienable sovereignty over Taiwan” and committed the French 
government to no further arms sales to the island. With these statements relations 
resumed, the Guangzhou Consulate reopened and a state visit by Prime Minister 
Balladour to China took place in the Spring 1994. In this context, in September 1994 
Jiang Zemin spelled out the Four Principles in Paris with the aim to bolster Sino-French 
relations.
In contrast to the UK and France, Germany and Italy had succeeded in 
maintaining a less volatile political relationship with Beijing. Due to the absence of 
strategic interests in the region, both Rome and Berlin had resumed relations with 
Beijing in the months following Tiananmen. Gianni de Michelis, at that time Italy’s 
Foreign Minister, was the first Western foreign minister to visit Beijing in 1989 after the 
Tiananmen events. In addition, the Italian government started to lobbying the other EC
167 See: Eberhard Sandschneider, “China’s Diplomatic Relations with the States of Europe”, in The 
China Quarterly, vol. 169, n. 1, March 2002, pp. 33-44; and Michael B. Yahuda, “Sino-British 
Negotiations: Perceptions, Organisation and Political Culture”, in International Affairs, vol. 69, n. 2, 
April 1993, pp. 245-266.
168 Patricia Wellons, “Sino-French Relations: Historical Alliance vs Economic Reality”, in The Pacific 
Review, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1994, pp. 341-348.
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members as early as the Autumn of 1989 in order to ease sanctions against Beijing.169 
However, it was the more pragmatic approach adopted by Germany that would have a 
significant impact upon the subsequent evolution of the EU’s China policy, as well as 
on the behaviour of the other EU member states.
Since the early 1990s, Germany has consistently concentrated its energies on 
building good economic and political relations with Beijing. This pragmatism goes back 
to 1955, when despite the Hallstein doctrine that denied diplomatic recognition to all 
states that recognised East Germany, the Federal Republic established a trade office in 
China. This pragmatic economic policy soon paid good dividends. By 1966, West 
Germany was China’s major European trading partner. In the 1980s, it was estimated 
that almost 50% of the foreign technology imported into China came from West 
Germany.170 Sino-German commercial relations have largely benefited from Berlin’s 
strategy to avoid raising confrontational issues with Beijing and to reaffirm the “one 
China” policy in many occasions.171 For instance, in January 1993 Chancellor Kohl 
refused to approve the sale of 10 submarines and 10 frigates to Taiwan in order not to 
upset relations with the PRC. Thus, unlike the problems experienced by the UK over 
Hong Kong or the tensions underwent by France over Taiwan, Germany has 
consistently avoided raising contentious issues pertaining to China’s sense of 
sovereignty and national pride.172
This German China policy model has been founded, according to Christoph 
Nesshover, on three principles: (i) silent diplomacy -  i.e., no confrontation with Beijing 
on human rights or other sensitive issues; (ii) change through trade -  i.e., encouraging 
political liberalisation in China via economic development; and (iii) a strict “one China” 
policy -  i.e., without conceding to the pro-Taiwanese lobby.173 This strategy of
169 Personal consultation with Gianni de Michelis, Italian MP and former Italy’s Foreign Minister at the 
margins o f the international conference on China’s Challenge to Europe and the US organised by the 
Aspen Institute, Rome 11 March 2005.
170 Kay MOller, “Diplomatic Relations and Mutual Strategic Perceptions: China and the European 
Union”, in Richard L. Edmonds (ed.), China and Europe since 1978: A European Perspective, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002.
171 The “one China” policy is the principle that there is one China and that mainland China, Tibet, Hong 
Kong, Macao, Xinjiang and Taiwan are all part of that China. The “one China” policy is also a 
requirement for any political entity to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.
172 Personal consultation with Dr. Heinrich Kreft, Senior Strategic Analyst, Policy Planning Staff, 
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173 Christoph Nesshdver, “Bonn et Paris face & Pdkin (1989-1997): vers une strategic commune ?" in 
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depoliticising economic relations with Beijing brought home tremendous commercial 
results: German exports to the PRC doubled between 1992 and 1994, from DM5.7 
billion to DM10.2 billion. By the mid-1990s, Germany had become, by far, China’s 
most important European trading partner.174
The success of Germany’s China policy made an impact on other EU member 
states’ policies. For instance, the British Secretary for Trade and Industry, Michael 
Heseltine, adopted the German approach when visited China in 1994 accompanied by 
130 businessmen. During the visit, he “carefully avoided raising contentious issues with 
Beijing” and reiterated Britain’s commitment to the “one China” policy. As a result, the 
visit ended with an important number of contracts being awarded to British companies 
and investors.175 Also France tried to copy the German model of good political relations 
with Beijing. As discussed earlier, from a policy of leaning toward Taiwan, France 
shifted to a more unconditional support to Beijing.176 The joint France-China 
communique issued after the state visit to China by Prime Minister Balladour in Spring 
1994 committed Paris to abide by the “one China” policy and to refrain from selling 
new arms to Taiwan. With regard to Italy, Rome has consistently followed the German 
lead of maintaining good political relations with Beijing, in line with its role as a trading 
state.177
To sum up, by the mid-1990s due to the new weight acquired by Germany after 
the reunification, its lead in formulating a pragmatic approach to Beijing, and the 
awesome commercial results that ensued from it, the German China policy had 
succeeded in influencing the behaviour of the other EU member states, especially the 
large ones. In other words, it is argued here that the Germany’s China policy was 
Europeanised in the sense that it became projected (sideways) on to the other large EU 
members. Moreover, a bottom-up national projection also took place, as the German 
approach to China largely influenced the adoption of the policy of constructive
International Political Science Association Conference on: “The European Union and the World: Asia, 
Enlargement and Constitutional Change”, Beijing, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), 5-6 
May 2005.
174 Data from Christoph NesshOver (1999), p. 101.
175 Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 26 October 2004.
176 Interview, French Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, Paris, 7 July 2004.
177 Personal consultation with Marta Dassu, Director of International Programs, Aspen Institute (Italy) 
and currently Foreign Policy Advisor to Italy’s Foreign Minister Massimo D’Alema (Romano Prodi 
government: 2006-). See also: Marta Dassu, “Italian Policy towards China: the Trading State Approach”, 
in Miguel Santos Neves and Brian Bridges (eds.), Europe, China and the Two SARs, Basingstoke, 
Macmillan, 2000.
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engagement at the EU level (by the Commission), which we will examine in the next 
section.178
2.5 A turning point: The adoption of the policy of constructive engagement in 1995
The development of the EU’s New Asia Strategy advocating a more pro-active 
engagement with Asian countries in 1994 (spearheaded by Germany in 1993, as we will 
see in the next Chapter) coupled with the evolution of relations between EU member 
states and China in the first part of the 1990s, contributed to the formulation of the EU’s 
new China policy. On 5 July 1995, the European Commission released its 
Communication A Long-Term Policy for China-Europe Relations. The document 
declared that “the time has come to redefine the EU’s relationship with China, in the 
spirit of the new Asia strategy”. With the aim to put the EU member states’ 
relationships with the PRC into a “single integrated framework”, the Commission 
declared that relations with China “are bound to be a cornerstone in Europe’s external 
relations, both with Asia and globally”.179 Point of departure of the Commission’s 
document is the rise of China, seen as an unprecedented event since the Second World 
War. While the analysis concentrates on China’s economic upsurge and the 
potentialities of its market for European business, the paper lays down a strategy of 
constructive engagement for integrating China into the world community.
Interestingly, the EU borrowed the notion of constructive engagement from 
Asia. The term was indeed used by the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) for describing its rather uneasy relationship with the Burmese junta. With the 
1995 Commission’s paper the EU entered the debate already underway in the US and 
Asia as to whether China should be contained or engaged. One side of this debate 
pointed to China’s accumulation of military capacity, its emergent economic strength 
and its increasingly nationalistic and adversarial postures on international issues, and in 
consequence advocated a firm Western policy of restricting the projection of such 
power. To those arguing for such a policy of containment, lenient policies undertaken 
with the aim of securing strategic partnership with China would merely embolden the
178 This German “leaning” toward China was part of Bonn’s broader strategy towards the Asian region, 
which will be examined in the next chapter. The EU’s New Asia Strategy adopted in 1994 would provide 
the broader framework for the EU’s China policy. For further details see Chapter 3.
179 Commission of the European Communities A Long-Term Policy fo r China-Europe Relations, 
Brussels, COM (95), 279 final, 1995.
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Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in its authoritarianism at home, encourage further 
nationalistic posturing abroad, and, by facilitating the growth of China’s trade surplus, 
provide resources for additional arms development.
Other observers argued that China was still relatively weak militarily, spending 
less as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence than Western powers 
and still handicapped by extremely primitive military hardware. Moreover, some 
scholars argued that the potential of the Chinese market was overstated. For other 
commentators, the containment versus engagement debate had became futile, arguing 
that there could be no question of not engaging with China, but that there was equally 
no good reason for pandering to China and being more tolerant of its authoritarianism 
than that of other countries.180
The evolution of the EU’s China policy during the 1990s appeared to indicate 
EU policy-makers’ firm adherence to the arguments in favour of engagement. There 
was a perception in Europe that reforms were genuinely progressing in China and that 
reformers needed support from the international community. Indeed even key dissidents 
such as Wang Dan were in favour of the West engaging with China as the most likely 
way of triggering an eventual democratic transition. EU policy makers had come to 
perceive China as being a market with almost limitless potential for the expansion of 
economic opportunities.181 As a consequence, European governments sought to 
maintain good political relations with Beijing and tended to exercise far less critical 
pressure on Beijing with regard to human rights and democratisation issues.
The belief in the necessity of maintaining good political relations with Beijing 
was largely driven by commercial considerations. EU member states had to cope with 
the persistent habit of the Chinese leadership to link politics with trade, i.e. to grant 
access to foreign investments and business on the basis of political considerations. With 
key investment contracts often decided personally by senior members of the Chinese 
government, it was assumed that EU governments had to maintain good political
180 The advocates o f containment included: Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, “The Coming 
Conflict with America”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2, March/April 1997, pp. 18-32; Advocates of 
constructive engagement included Robert S. Ross, “Beijing as a Conservative Power”, Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 76, No. 2, March/April 1997, pp. 33-44; Chas W. Freeman, “Sino-American Relations: Back to 
Basics”, Foreign Policy, No. 104, Fall 1996, pp. 3-17. Among the advocates o f a more normal policy mix 
there was Gerald Segal with his influential article: “Does China Matter?”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 5, 
September/October 1999, pp. 24-36.
181 Interview, ibid.
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relations with the CCP regime. By the mid-1990s the idea emerged that the EU 
appeared to have benefited from China’s economic opening to a lesser degree than the 
US or Japan.182 The EU’s share of China’s imports fell from 20% in 1990 to 13% in 
1995.183 The EU accounted for only 5,5% of foreign investment in China between 1990- 
1995, not far behind the 5,1% from Japan and 6.7% from the US, but negligible 
alongside the 75% of China’s FDI originating from the Chinese diaspora. Moreover, 
with key investment contracts often decided personally by senior members of the 
Chinese government, it was felt that the coercive measures on human rights issues 
adopted in the early 1990s after the Tiananmen events had directly contributed to 
Europe’s relatively weak position within the Chinese market. Beijing openly targeted 
concrete commercial reprisals specifically at those EU states, such as Denmark and 
Sweden, which had insisted most strongly on a firm human rights policy.184 Also 
France, which had reacted particularly strongly to the Tiananmen Square massacre, 
became concerned that its companies would be discriminated against by decisions taken 
at the highest political level. As a consequence, for fear of significant commercial 
losses, we saw earlier that Paris decided to reverse its critical position towards Beijing. 
Conversely, by avoiding raising contentious issues with Beijing, Germany had obtained 
great commercial advantages.
Strategic developments were similarly read by EU policy-makers as pointing 
towards the need for a more effective constructive engagement.185 During the mid- 
1990s, tensions emerged within East Asia over a number of territorial claims in the 
South China Sea. Chinese manoeuvres in the Taiwan Strait and its missile tests, timed 
to influence the 1996 Taiwanese election campaign, had given the West one of its most 
serious strategic frights since the end of the Cold War. During the missile test crisis in 
March 1996, the EU Presidency in the CFSP framework stated that:
The EU deeply regrets the firing by the PRC of missiles, beginning in the morning of March the 8th, into 
test zones in Taiwan Strait...The EU, recalling the pledge always made by the PRC to stick to its 
fundamental policy on the Taiwan issue, which is seek a peaceful solution, calls on the PRC to refrain 
from activities which could have negative effect on the security o f the entire region.186
182 Interview, ibid.
183 Christopher M. Dent, The European Union and East Asia: An Economic Relationship, London, 
Routledge, 1999 p. 137.
184 Interview, European Commission delegation in China, Beijing, 23 September 2004.
185 Interview, European Commission delegation in China, Beijing, 23 September 2004.
186 Press statement on China’s military exercises o ff the Taiwan coasts, Italian Presidency of the EU, 8 
March 1996; for more details see Chapter 7.
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In the end, it was left to the US to face China, with Washington deploying two 
aircraft carriers in the area. Eventually, Beijing backed down to the US show of 
strength. However, concerns remained over the prospect of conflict in a channel, the 
South China Sea, which takes a quarter of the world’s shipping.187
These events had arisen within the context of an increasingly strident Chinese 
nationalism.188 Moreover, China continued to increase military spending, with overall 
Chinese defence capability rising 40% between 1989 and 1995, coupled with a 
significant programme of weapons modernisation.189 The EU’s new desire to engage 
with Asian countries reinforced the shift to a strategy of constructive engagement. The 
latter was, for instance, seen as a prerequisite to the development of the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM) in 1996, which was predicated on the desire to harness the support of 
other Asian states to engage with - and successfully manage - China’s rise.190 Moreover, 
the ASEM process was meant to reinforce the perceived importance of cooperative 
relations with Beijing, with the hope that China’s growing assertiveness would not 
cause tensions in the region.191
In sum, for the advocates of a policy of constructive engagement there were both 
commercial and strategic reasons for the EU not to exert punitive pressure on China in 
relation to internal political developments and its growing regional assertiveness.192 
European Commission officials argued that with its policy of constructive engagement, 
the Union would be able to raise human rights issues in a more effective manner, in 
particular over very specific individual reforms.193
187 See: Frank Umbach, Konflikt oder Kooperation in Asien-Pazifik? China Einbindung in regionale 
Sichereitsstrukturen und die Auswirkungen au f Europa, Oldenbourg, Forshungsinstitut der Deutschen 
Gesellschaft fur Auswartige Politik, 2002; William T. Tow, Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking 
Convergent Security, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001; and Trevor Taylor, European 
Security and the Asia-Pacific Region, London, RIIA, 1997.
188 See: Christopher R. Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era, London, Routledge, 2006.
189 The Military Balance 1997/98, London, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997.
190 Interview, European Commission delegation in Beijing, 22 September 2004.
191 We will discuss these issues in more details in Chapter 3.
192 Interview, European Commission delegation in China, Beijing, 22 September 2004.
193 Interview, ibid.; see also: Hervd Dejean de la B&tie, La politique chinoise de VUnion europeenne: en 
progress, mais peut mieux faire, mimeo, 13 February 2002, p. 32; see also Richard Youngs, The 
European Union and the Promotion o f Democracy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, in particular 
chapter 6 on “The EU and China” (pp. 165-190); see also Peter Ferdinand, “Economic and Diplomatic 
Interactions between the European Union and China”, in Richard L. Grant (ed.), The European Union and 
China: A European Strategy fo r the Twenty-First Century, London, RIIA, 1995.
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The evolution of the US’ China policy also contributed to the EU’s firm 
adherence to the reasons of constructive engagement. The relatively hard-line US policy 
towards China began to shift during the mid-1990s. From advocating a policy of 
containment - and being judged to have benefited from this in the 1992 election 
campaign - President Clinton moved towards a more cooperative rapprochement with 
China. In 1996, the administration granted China normal trading relations, consisting of 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) market access, and began to lower the hurdles it had set 
for China’s WTO accession.194 Although the business lobbies in the US won the debate 
over China’s MFN status, a powerful array of human rights groups, labour unions, and 
the Taiwanese lobbies within both the Republican and Democratic parties succeeded in 
ensuring that the administration kept at least a degree of critical and more political focus 
on China.195 For instance, when the US administration finally granted China permanent 
normal trading relations in 2000, Democrats linked this to the creation of a new 
Congressional Human Rights Commission on China and Republicans sought to extract 
further guarantees on security cooperation. While also a number of EU member states 
were berated by opposition parties and human rights groups in their respective 
countries, the domestic politicisation of China, and the consequent linkages between 
commercial and political issues, remained significantly less marked than in the US.196
More significantly, Western policy towards China came to be conditioned by the 
commercial competition between the EU and the US. The rivalry between Airbus and 
Boeing for new contracts in China was the most dramatic example of this increasingly 
intense competition.197 As the Clinton administration opted for increasingly constructive 
engagement with China during his second mandate, EU member states perceived their 
scope to - eventually - pursue a significantly different approach to be consequently 
curtailed. Japans calls for engagement exercised a similar effect. After suspending its 
aid programme in 1996 in response to China’s missile tests, Japan launched a new 
policy of engagement in 1997, with generous commitments of aid and loans. Similar 
moves on the part of other Asian states, such as Singapore and South Korea, also helped 
condition the development of the EU’s China policy.
194 See Alastair I. Johnston and Robert S. Ross (eds.), Engaging China: The Management o f  an Emerging 
Power London, Routledge, 1999.
195 See Robert S. Ross (ed.), After the Cold War: Domestic Factors and US-China Relations, New York, 
M.E. Sharpe, 1998.
196 Interview, European Commission delegation in China, Beijing, 22 September 2004.
197 This will examined in more details in Chapter 5.
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By the mid 1990s, EU policy makers had also identified the prospect of China’s 
internal disintegration as one of their main preoccupations. Some European observers 
propounded the idea that it was the lack of any progress towards a real democratisation 
process that was breeding resentment in the increasingly economically independent 
coastal provinces and that was, therefore, the greatest risk to stability.198 This perception 
was derived, in particular, from the view that the biggest threat to the agreements 
reached with the Chinese leadership lay in internal fragmentation causing these to 
remain unimplemented at the local level. It was this that was perceived as being most 
prejudicial to EU commercial interests: agreements concluded by the central 
government to improve market access conditions for European companies were not 
being followed through at the local and provincial levels.
Finally, EU policy makers became increasingly concerned with the possible 
implications of an abrupt collapse of the CCP regime in an environment of growing 
nationalism, where frustrations with existing structures had not been accompanied by 
any significant positive adherence to liberal democratic values.199 The perception was 
commonly held in the West that the rise of nationalism was actually the flip-side of the 
process of economic liberalisation, in so far as it was being driven by the CCP 
leadership’s need to find a discourse capable of holding China together.200 Therefore, 
the view was maintained that the EU needed to help China integrate into the 
international economic system such that the benefits flowing from this would serve to 
temper internal instability. It was this internal contradiction that would increasingly 
characterise the EU’s China policy in the years to come: on the one hand, elements in 
the Commission and some EU member states, in particular the Nordic countries, would 
continue to exercise pressure on China with regard to the promotion of democracy and 
human rights.201 On the other hand, policy makers from the large EU members, in 
particular France, Germany and Italy and elements within the European Commission 
would become increasingly aware of the dangers inherent in a sudden collapse of the 
CCP regime for both China and, more generally, East Asia’s regional stability -
198 This view was put forward in particular by Sir Chris Patten, shortly before becoming EU 
Commissioner for External Relations. See: Chris Patten, East and West, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1998.
199 Interview, European Commission, DG Development, Human and Social Development Unit, Brussels, 
18 December 2005.
200 See: Christopher R. Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era, London, Routledge, 2006; see 
also David Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds.), China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence, London, 
Routledge, 1997.
201 We will discuss this point further in Chapter 4.
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something that would severely damage Europe’s economic interests in the area.202 We 
will discuss these issues in more detail in the following chapters.
Conclusion
We discussed that prior to 1991 Sino-European relations were derivative of the Cold 
War and broader relations with the superpowers and that the end of bipolarity created 
new possibilities for the EU-PRC relationship to develop. At the beginning of the 
1990s, the Chinese leadership had come to view the EU as a potential new pole in a 
future multi-polar world order, whereas EC/EU members were absorbed by the 
construction of a closer Union and tended to shy away from world order issues. It was 
the bilateral relations between the large EU member states and China that characterised 
the first part of the 1990s and that would have a significant impact upon the evolution of 
the EU’s China policy. We have seen that the EU’s China policy has been increasingly 
influenced by the German China policy model, which was based on the belief to 
maintain good political relations with Beijing in order to obtain commercial benefits.
The successful German China policy model became Europeanised horizontally 
(or sideways), in the sense that it succeeded in influencing the behaviour of other EU 
member states - especially the large ones. Moreover, there was also a bottom-up 
national projection upon the EU level, in the sense that Germany’s China policy 
succeeded in influencing the policy of constructive engagement put forward by the 
European Commission from the mid-1990s.
The new EU’s China policy followed the adoption, in 1994, of the EU’s New 
Asia Strategy (NAS), which aimed at putting relations between EU member states and 
Asian countries into a single, integrated framework. In 1993, Germany became the first 
EU member state to elaborate a strategy towards Asia, and something similar to the case 
of the China policy happened, i.e. Germany’s Asia policy was also Europeanised. In a 
further development of the EU’s Asia strategy, in 1996 the Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM) was established. The ASEM process was conceived in large part as a forum for 
joint East Asian and EU constructive engagement towards China. Within ASEM, the 
emphasis was on cooperation and informal confidence-building processes with critical
202 This perception emerged during interviews conducted by this author with officials form the large EU 
member states and the European Commission.
90
pressure in relation to democracy and human rights conspicuous by its absence. China 
was attracted to ASEM precisely because it saw in it the possibility of more equal 
region-to-region relations bereft of the unilateral Western power politics it so strongly 
sought to counter.
Since the mid-1990s, the NAS (1994), the EU’s China policy (1995) and the 
ASEM process (1996) have become complementary and mutually reinforcing, 
providing the Union with additional tools and initiatives for engaging China and East 
Asia. It is by no chance, in fact, that sometimes the EU-China summits take place at the 
margins of the ASEM meetings, as in the case of the first EU-China summit held during 
the ASEM II in London in 1998. Due to the strategic significance of the NAS and 
ASEM for the EU’s China policy, this study will examine both in the next chapter, 
before returning to a closer analysis of the economic dimension in EU-China relations 
in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 3
The inter-regional level I 
The economic dimension
The EU’s China policy in the context of the New Asia Strategy 
and the Asia-Europe Meeting in the 1990s
The European Union is entrusted with the task o f developing a common foreign and security policy to 
enable it to protect its interests and values as well as playing a constructive role in world politics...to keep 
Europe in its major role on the world stage it is imperative to take account of the emergence of these new 
Asian powers...It is therefore essential that the Union develops the capacity to play its proper role in the 
region.
European Commission, 1994 203
The time has come to redefine the EU’s relationship with China in the spirit of the new Asia 
strategy...relations with China are bound to be a cornerstone in Europe’s external relations, both with 
Asia and globally.
European Commission, 199 5 204
The development and maintenance of every culture require the existence of another different and 
competing alter ego, the construction of identity involves establishing opposites and ‘others’ whose 
actuality is always subject to the continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their differences from 
‘us’. Each age and society re-creates its ‘Others’.
Edward Said, 199 5 205
The East Asian model is taking its place, as countries from Mexico and Chile to Iran and Turkey and the 
former Soviet republics now attempt to learn from its success, even as previous generations attempted to 
learn from Western success ... Asia must transmit to the rest of the world those Asian values that are of 
universal worth ... the transmission of this ideal means the export of the social system of Asia, East Asia 
in particular.
Kishore Mahbubani, 1992 206
203 Commission o f the European Communities, Towards a New Asia Strategy, Brussels, COM(94) 314 
final, 1994, p. 6.
204 Commission of the European Communities, A Long-Term Policy fo r China-Europe Relations, 
Brussels, COM (95), 279 final, 1995.
205 Edward Said, Orientalism, London, Penguin, 1978, p. 336.
206 Kishore Mahbubani, “The West and the Rest”, in The National Interest, Vol. 28, Summer 1992, p. 7.
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Introduction
This chapter examines the EU’s New Asia Strategy (NAS) and the ASEM process, the 
two broader frameworks within which the EU has developed the policy of constructive 
engagement towards China. While the NAS adopted in 1994 concentrates on the whole 
continent, its further development -  which, since 1996, has taken the form of the Asia- 
Europe Meeting (ASEM) -  clearly indicates that the strategic focus of the EU is mainly 
East Asia with a rising China as its centre. In its 1995 Communication on China, the 
European Commission declared that “the time has come to redefine the EU’s 
relationship with China in the spirit of the new Asia strategy... relations with China are 
bound to be a cornerstone in Europe’s external relations, both with Asia and 
globally”.207 Thus, since the mid-1990s, the NAS, the EU’s China’s policy and the 
ASEM process have become complementary and mutually reinforcing. In particular, the 
establishment of ASEM has provided the EU with a forum where to engage China in an 
inter-regional framework.
The first part of this chapter focuses on the main themes that have characterised 
the development of the NAS and the ASEM process. From a strategic perspective, the 
development of the ASEM process has fostered East Asian regionalism and 
acknowledged the existence of a tripolar international economic order. Both trends have 
been welcomed by Chinese leaders as additional factors having the potential to 
contribute, the first, to the emergence of an East Asian bloc independent of Washington 
and, the second, to the more general trend towards the multi-polarisation of the 
international system.
Alongside economic and strategic issues, the ASEM process has become an 
opportunity for a dialogue between cultures and civilisations. In particular, this chapter 
devotes a section to the examination of the discourse of the so-called “Asian values”. 
This is quite important since the ideas that have informed the discourse of the Asian 
values will be encountered when we will examine the EU-China political dialogue, 
especially the human rights dialogue. Interestingly, Chinese scholars and policy makers 
did not take an active part in the elaboration of the Asian values discourse. Instead, the 
South-East Asian elites -  in particular, the Singaporean School -  were most active in 
the articulation of this discourse. While recognising the differences among East Asian
207 A Long-Term Policy for China-Europe Relations (1995).
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societies, the advocates of the Asian values discourse have propounded the idea that 
there are also significant commonalities. Central among these, is the value system of 
Confucianism, shared by most of the countries in the region. Advocates of Asian values 
in the 1990s argued that East Asian development and Asian values had to be seen as 
models which other non-Westem societies should emulate in their efforts to catch up 
with the West and which even the West should adopt in order to renew itself.
The Asian values discourse came to a halt in 1997, when the Asian financial 
crisis broke up. The last part of this chapter will focus on the analysis of the EU’s 
response to the Asian financial crisis. The crisis represented a major test for both East 
Asia and the EU. While it challenged East Asia’s growing assertiveness - and put a halt 
to the spreading of the Asian values discourse -  the crisis also gave the EU the 
opportunity to emerge as an effective player in the management of global economic 
relations. Moreover, the financial crisis unsettled economic power relations in East 
Asia, creating the conditions for China’s emergence as the linchpin of regional 
economic growth. This view was sustained by the economic evidence: by 1999 it 
clearly appeared that China -  along with Taiwan -  had escaped the Asian financial 
crisis largely unscathed. In addition, China had resisted undervaluing its currency, 
acting responsibly for maintaining global economic stability. These elements would 
have an impact on the further development of the EU’s Asia’s strategy and, more 
specifically, on the EU’s China policy. The fact that China escaped largely unscathed 
from the Asian financial crisis and firmly established itself as the engine of regional 
economic growth largely influenced the image of a growing and stable Chinese market 
with important consequences for the further evolution of the EU foreign policy towards 
China.
This chapter covers the period from 1993 (adoption of the German concept 
paper on Asia) until 1998 (ASEM II in London and first EU-China summit), with the 
intent to provide the reader with an analysis of the main themes that have characterised 
the development of the NAS and the ASEM process. Since the mid-1990s, the NAS and 
ASEM have provided the broader frameworks within which the EU has developed the 
policy of constructive engagement towards China. We will return to a closer 
examination of the latter in the next Chapter.
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3.1 The making of the EU’s New Asia Strategy
In 1993, Germany became the first EU member state to elaborate a strategy towards 
Asia. In the Asien Konzept der Bundesregierung, the German government outlined the 
new significance of the Asian markets for Europe. This became evident in 1992, when 
the Union trade with Asia overtook EU-US trade for the first time. In the German 
concept paper it was clearly stated that Germany - and Europe as a whole - -  had to 
directly face the challenge of an economically thriving Asia and “strengthen economic 
relations with the largest growth region in the world”.208 The document also emphasised 
the emergence of China as the rising power in the region and, consequently, the need for 
the EU to engage Beijing in a more constructive way.
The view was held in Bonn that Germany’s economic interests would 
increasingly depend on the ability by German companies to enter into the thriving Asian 
markets. Because of the sheer magnitude of Asia, it was felt that the Federal Republic 
had to necessarily work through the EU in order to increase its political and economic 
leverage vis-a-vis the region. The German document acknowledged Asia’s increasing 
economic and political assertiveness. As a consequence, Bonn pointed out the need for 
Germany - and the EU -  to engage Asian countries in a more constructive way and step 
up high-level visits to the region. While the United Kingdom (UK) and France had been 
traditionally known for their “leaning” towards Asia resulting from their past 
involvement in the region, this new German interest was something of a novelty. 
Following up on Germany, other EU members started to give Asia a higher priority. For 
instance, the French Minister for Industry, Gerard Longuet, while visiting Beijing and 
Hong Kong in 1994, launched a new French strategy called Ten Initiatives for Asia. 
Furthermore, France’s Foreign Minister, Herve de la Charette, announced in 1995 that 
Asia would receive special attention as the nouvelle frontiere of French diplomacy. In 
the same period, also the UK, Italy, and the Netherlands begun to prioritise the 
development of economic relations with Asian countries.209
Concurrent with initiatives by individual EU member states, in 1994 the 
European Commission released its Communication on the EU ’s New Asia Strategy.210
208 Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, Asien Konzept der Bundesregierung, in Europa 
Archiv 6/1994, n. 189, pp. 142-157.
209 Hanns Maull, Gerard Segal and Jusuf Wanandi (eds.), Europe and the Asia Pacific, London and New 
York, Routledge, 1998.
210 European Commission, Towards a New Asia Strategy, Brussels, COM(94) 314 final, 1994.
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The NAS’ overall objectives were four: (i) to strengthen the Union’s economic presence 
in Asia in order to maintain the Union’s leading role in the world economy; (ii) to 
contribute to stability in Asia; (iii) to promote the economic development of the less 
prosperous countries and regions in Asia; (iv) and to contribute to the development and 
consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in Asia.211 The purpose of the EU’s policy in Asia is related to 
economic matters which, according to the Commission, need to be presented “in the 
framework of the political and security balance of power in the region”.212
But, what does Asia mean for the EU? The 1994 Commission’s paper explains 
that Asia should not be taken as a single region, given the different cultural traditions 
and different social, economic and political profiles of Asian countries. Consequently, 
in 1994 the EU’s New Asia Strategy covered 26 countries grouped according to three 
geographic regions: the eight countries and economies of East Asia (China, Japan, 
North and South Korea, Mongolia, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao); the ten countries 
of South East Asia (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, 
Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, and Burma/Myanmar); and the eight countries of South Asia 
(India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Maldives and Afghanistan). 
The rationale that the Commission gave for the EU’s new political approach towards 
Asia was very clear:
The European Union is entrusted with the task of developing a common foreign and security policy to 
enable it to protect its interests and values as well as playing a constructive role in world politics...to keep 
Europe in its major role on the world stage it is imperative to take account of the emergence of these new 
Asian powers...It is therefore essential that the Union develops the capacity to play its proper role in the 
region.213
Thus, the 1994 Commission’s Communication provided EU member states with 
an overall framework for their relations with Asia. While the NAS concentrated on the 
whole continent, the subsequent establishment of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 
1996 clearly indicated that the priority of the EU was the development of relations with 
the economically thriving East Asian countries.
211 Ibid., pp. 2-3.
212 Ibid., p. 2.
213 Ibid., p. 6.
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3.2 The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)
Since the beginning, ASEM has become the most important inter-regional forum for 
discussion and cooperation between the EU and East Asia. The ASEM process begun in 
Bangkok in 1996 where 25 countries took part: on the European side, the 15 EU 
member states (plus the Presidency of the European Commission). On the Asian side, 
ten countries: Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, and 
Vietnam (ASEAN 7) plus China, Japan and South Korea.214 The ASEM process had 
two overall objectives. Firstly, it aimed at bridging the missing link between the EU and 
East Asia. While North America and East Asia had already established an institutional 
mechanism -  the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) - for deepening inter­
regional cooperation and North America and the EU had adopted a New Transatlantic 
Agenda, it was perceived that there was a glaring missing link as far as relationship 
between the EU and East Asia was concerned. Secondly, the ASEM process was 
perceived as instrumental for engaging China within the framework of multilateral 
institutions. Indeed, both European and East Asian policy makers acknowledged 
China’s sheer economic growth and - as a result - its increasing assertiveness in the 
region.215
For instance, Chinese manoeuvres in the Taiwan Straits and its missile tests, 
timed to influence the 1996 Taiwanese election campaign, had given the West one of its 
most serious strategic frights since the end of the Cold War. In the end, it was left to the 
US to face China, with Washington deploying two aircraft carriers in the area. 
Eventually, Beijing backed down to the US show of strength. However, concerns 
remained over the prospect of conflict in a channel, the South China Sea, which takes a 
quarter of the world’s shipping.216 It was felt that the ASEM process would harness the 
support of other Asian states to engage with - and successfully manage - China’s rise. 
Furthermore, it was hoped that ASEM would reinforce the perceived importance of
214 As a result of the enlargement of the EU in May 2004, the ASEM Summit in Hanoi on 8-9 October 
2004 decided to enlarge ASEM to the ten new EU member states, as well as, three new ASEAN countries 
(Cambodia, Laos and Burma/Myanmar) that were not yet part of the process. As stated in the conclusions 
of the External Relations Council (GAERC) of 13 September 2004, the participation of Burma/Myanmar 
was accepted with the expectation that the participation of the Burmese government at the ASEM Summit 
would be lower than Head of State/Government level.
215 Interview, European Commission delegation in Beijing, 22 September 2004.
216 See: Frank Umbach, Konflikt oder Kooperation in Asien-Pazifik? China Einbindung in regionale 
Sichereitsstrukturen und die Auswirhungen au f Europa, Oldenbourg, Forshungsinstitut der Deutschen 
Gesellschaft fur Auswartige Politik,, 2002; William T. Tow, Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking 
Convergent Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001; and Trevor Taylor, European 
Security and the Asia-Pacific Region, London, RIIA, 1997.
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cooperative relations with Beijing so that a growing Chinese nationalism would not be 
allowed to infect relations with the other countries in the region.217
ASEM clearly indicated Europe’s increasing interest in strengthening links with 
the East Asian region. For their part, East Asian policy makers were also keen to 
institutionalise a closer economic and political dialogue with the EU. This resulted from 
a recognition that important changes had occurred in the East Asian region itself, 
helping to create the basis for a growing international assertiveness. In these 
circumstances, the rationale for building a new relationship between EU member states 
and East Asia reflected recognition of the arrival of East Asia as a major region in the 
global economy.218
In 1995, the Permanent Secretary of the Singaporean Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Kishore Mahbubani, expressed the desire of most of the East Asian elites to 
take political advantage of the rapidly growing economic attractiveness of their region 
with these words:
The twenty-first century will be unique because there will be three centres of world power (Europe, North 
America and East Asia) as opposed to two in the twentieth century (Europe and North America) and one 
in the immediate preceding centuries (Europe) ... In the twenty-first century East Asia will shed its 
passivity ... The region’s sheer economic weight will give it a voice and a role 219
The idea for a Europe-Asia Meeting of political leaders was first expressed at 
the World Economic Forum (WEF) Europe/East Asia Economic Summit held in 
Singapore in October 1994.220 The initiative was officially proposed by Mr Goh Chok 
Tong, Prime Minister of Singapore, to French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur during 
a speech given at the Institut Franfais des Relations Internationales (IFRI) on 19th 
October 1994.221 However, during Goh’s earlier visit to Germany and Britain in April 
1994, the idea that Europe and Asia should be brought together in a more 
institutionalised form of cooperation had already been expressed. The proposal was
217 On Chinese nationalism see:
218 Nicola Casarini, Asia-Europe Relations within the Evolving Global Economy: The Interplay between 
Business and Politics, Milan, ISPI, Working Paper n. 15, October 2001.
219. Kishore Mahbubani, “The Pacific Way”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, n. 1, January-February 1995.
220 World Economic Forum, A Programme fo r  Action, WEF Europe/East Asia Economic Summit, 
Singapore 2-4 October 1994.
221 Goh Chok Tong, “L’Asie et l’Europe: une nouvelle alliance pour le XXIe stecle”, Politique 
£trangere, December 1994, pp. 1099-1106.
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subsequently endorsed by the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)222 
which, in the post-Cold War era, found itself in a position in which it was expected to 
play a significant role in the establishment of structures of cooperation that went far 
beyond the South-East Asian region.223 For both sides, it was clear that the ASEM 
process was aimed at pursuing all actions necessary to ensure open markets and a non- 
discriminatory business environment conducive to an expansion of Euro-Asian trade 
and investments. Although political and cultural initiatives had also been incorporated 
in the ASEM framework, it was the promotion of greater economic exchanges between 
the two regions that represented one of ASEM’s paramount objectives.
A number of factors prompted EU and East Asian countries to put forward the 
initiative of a closer linkage. Firstly, the post-world war II period, coinciding with the 
Cold War era, was preoccupied with the political-ideological struggle which somewhat 
overshadowed economic concerns. Even if economic matters were addressed, these 
were always subordinate to the wider ideological conflict. The post-Cold War period, 
however, saw a swing in the pendulum leading directly to all kinds of economic 
conflicts, best revealed by the trade dispute between the US and Japan, on the one hand, 
and the differences between the US and the EU over agricultural policies, leading to the 
paralysis of the Uruguay Round, on the other. Under these circumstances, where the 
possibility of economic conflict among partners had become more likely, it was vitally 
important to establish mechanisms to allow such differences to be settled amicably, with 
as little acrimony as possible. While the North American and East Asian economies had 
established the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process, there was no 
similar mechanism as fas as Europe and Asia were concerned, and through ASEM it 
was hoped that Asian countries could address problems that might arise in connection 
with Europe.224
Moreover, some Asian countries - in particular Singapore and Malaysia - felt 
that, while it was easy in the mid-1990s to encourage Europeans to establish ties with 
Asian countries largely due to the dynamic economic situation in East Asia, the future
222 ASEAN countries at that time were: Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand 
and Vietnam. Laos and Myanmar joined the grouping in July 1997 while Cambodia became the 10th 
member in April 1999.
223 Hadi Soesastro and Jusuf Wanandi, Towards an Asia-Europe Partnership: A Perspective from Asia, 
Jakarta, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 1996.
224 Victor P. Serradell “The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM): A Historical Turning Point in Relations 
Between the Two Regions”, in European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, November 1996, pp. 
185-210.
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remained difficult to predict. Since it was believed that Europe should be structurally 
close to Asia, the establishment of a basis whereby the ties would be of a binding nature 
became a priority and, even if the economic situation were to weaken, the Europeans 
would still benefit as they would have realised by then how significant and integral the 
East Asian economies had become for themselves and the world at large.
In addition, as both South-East Asian and EU members were, in their own ways, 
undertaking a “go-regional policy”, it was realised that there was much that could be 
gained through cooperation. Because the EU countries were not that familiar with the 
new markets in East Asia, just as many East Asian states were having great difficulties 
in coping with the changes in Central and Eastern Europe, it was felt that through 
ASEM the Europeans could facilitate Asian entry into Europe and that Asians could 
facilitate European entry into Asia. Therefore, through strategic alliances closer 
economic ties could be established between the two regions.
To sum up, the establishment of the Asia-Europe Meeting resulted from the 
realisation in a number of European capitals of the economic importance of East Asia 
and the weaknesses of EU involvement in the region. For both sides, the ASEM was the 
occasion to send a message to the United States. ASEM allowed Europe to avoid the 
risk of being isolated by too close a collaboration among the Pacific countries and it 
also gave to East Asia the opportunity to counterbalance the US presence by opening up 
to EU’s economic interests. Furthermore, ASEM had acknowledged the de facto 
diplomatic existence of the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) proposed by 
Malaysian Prime Minister Mohammad Mahathir in 1990 and strongly opposed by the 
US because it was meant to exclude non-Asian powers.
Launched in 1990 as East Asian Economic Grouping (EAEG), it was envisaged 
as a Japanese-led counterweight to the perceived emergence of trade blocs in Western 
Europe and North America. Due to strong resistance from the United States, it remained 
a concept far from formal implementation. Therefore, it was noteworthy that East Asian 
countries had begun to act as a de facto group in the interregional ASEM framework. In 
the end, ASEM upgraded the international status of East Asia. Although it was not 
possible for East Asian countries to appear as a regional grouping vis-a-vis North 
America in APEC, the EU had recognised the East Asian grouping by acknowledging 
that these same states represent “Asia” in ASEM. Therefore, East Asia - as opposed to
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an amorphous Asia-Pacific -  came into existence because it had been acknowledged by 
another regional entity, the European Union. From an Asian, and especially from an 
ASEAN perspective, the goal was not only to have East Asia recognized as the third 
pole of the post-Cold War international economic order. ASEM was also seen as an 
opportunity to reassert a sense of equality between the two regions against an historical 
background tainted by colonial relationships and a more recent history of donor- 
recipient ties. China was attracted to ASEM precisely because it saw in it the possibility 
of more equal region-to-region relations bereft of the unilateral Western power politics 
it so strongly sought to counter. The principle of a “dialogue on an equal basis” was 
included in the Chairman’s Statement of the Bangkok meeting and subsequently 
reiterated on various occasions.225 Finally, the idea of a tri-polar world economy 
underpinning the ASEM process was very attractive to the Chinese leadership and some 
EU policy makers -  in particular the French political elite and some elements within the 
Commission -  as it was seen as an additional factor contributing to the trend towards 
the multi-polarisation of the international system.
3.3 Behind ASEM: the emergence of a tri-polar economic order
From an international relations perspective, the ASEM project was based on the 
underlying assumption that an economics-driven tri-polar international order was 
following the security-dominated bipolar system of the Cold War period. After the end 
of the Cold War, the prevailing image was that with the demise of the second 
(communist) world, the new world order would be structured around the leading powers 
of the first (capitalist) world, and that a new tri-polar system based on the three major 
regions of the world economy - the Triad - would substitute the Cold War bipolarism 
between the United States and the Soviet Union.
The concept of the Triad entailed the notion of the trilateral relationship between 
the US, Western Europe and Japan. The notion had become widely used since the 
publication of Kenichi Ohmae’s book on Triad power.226 The book advised 
multinational companies to establish permanent footholds in all three key markets of the 
capitalist world economy. According to Ohmae, then a top executive with the 
international business consulting firm McKinsey, companies that wanted to survive in
225 Chairman’s Statement o f  the Asia-Europe Meeting, Bangkok, 2 March 1996, point (4).
226 Kenichi Ohmae, Triad Power: The Coming Shape o f  Global Competition, New York, Macmillan, 
1985.
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an increasingly global market had to turn themselves into multiregional enterprises with 
local branches in the US, Western Europe and Japan. Ohmae’s successful book led to 
the wide reception of the Triad image in the transnational business community. At the 
same time, the United Nations did their part to popularise the notion by publishing their 
1991 World Investment Report on the Triad.227 Ohmae’s triadic business strategy and 
the UN’s report reflected the well-established concept of trilateralism.
Trilateralism stands for cooperation among the three pillars of the capitalist 
world economy. Founded in March 1973, the Trilateral Commission provided a forum 
for politicians, business and intellectual leaders from North America, Western Europe, 
and Japan to facilitate the management of complex interdependence among the three 
core democratic centres of the world. The trilateral undertaking became, since the mid- 
1970s, the response to what was perceived as the decline of the post-world war II 
Atlantic-centred international economic order based on US hegemony. The Trilateral 
Commission’s efforts were aimed at promoting a reconstructed capitalist world order 
based on a burden sharing between the United States and the emerging economic 
powers of Western Europe and Japan.228
At the beginning of the 1990s, some European scholars hoped for the formation 
of an effective European-Japanese-American trilateral, global concert system and 
emphasised that “the necessity of trilateral cooperation is still there, if not greater them 
even before”.229 There were, however, also those who feared that, due to the absence of 
the overarching security concern presented by the Soviet Union during the bipolar era, 
the international system would move from Cold War to trade war,230 or would be 
characterised by a “struggle for supremacy” between the trilateral core powers US, 
Japan and Germany.231 Lester Thurow even predicted “the coming battle among Japan, 
Europe and America”.232
227 United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, World Investment Report 1991: The Triad in 
Foreign Direct Investment, New York, United Nations Publications, 1991.
228 For more details see: Joseph S. Nye, Kurt Biedenkopf and Motoo Shiina, Global Cooperation after 
the Cold War: A Reassessment o f  Trilateralism, New York, Paris and Tokyo, The Trilateral Commission, 
1991.
229 Martin E. Winstein and Theodor Leuenberger (eds.), Europe, Japan and America in the 1990s: 
Cooperation and Competition, Berlin, Springer, 1992, p. 2.
230 Fred Bergsten, “The Primacy of Economics”, Foreign Policy, n. 82, Summer 1992.
231 Jeffrey E. Garten, A Cold Peace: America, Japan, Germany, and the Struggle fo r  Supremacy, New 
York, Times Books, 1992.
232 Lester Thurow, Head to Head: The Coming Battle Among Japan, Europe and America, New York, 
Morrow, 1992.
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By the mid-1990s, however, the perception of the US-EU-Japan triad as the 
basic configuration of the new world order had lost much of its appeal. In a context of 
expanding regionalism in North America and Europe and of the economic rise of East 
Asia, in particular in the four Tigers - South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore 
- in South-East Asia and China, the old concept of the Triad had to give way to a new 
image based on the Triad regions: North America, the EU, and East Asia. This image 
would find evidence in the lasting high growth performance of East Asian economies, 
acknowledged by the World Bank in 1993 as The East Asian Miracle.233 At the time the 
report of the World Bank argued that, by using comparative statistics extrapolating 
accumulated GDP figures and growth rates, East Asia would soon be on a par with 
North America and the EU in terms of economic weight and would, consequently, 
assert an increasingly prominent political role in the international system. In 1994, the 
director of the Geneva-based World Economic Forum, Klaus Schwab, and his deputy, 
Claude Smadja, pointed out that:
We are already, economically speaking, in a fully tripolar world, with the three centres of power - 
Western Europe, North America, and East Asia - in a position of strategic economic parity ... if present 
trends continue, East Asia should be poised to claim preeminence over its two counterparts before the 
turn o f the century.234
This idea o f a tri-polar economic world order based on the Triad regions was 
particularly attractive to the trans-national business community because it fit well in the 
familiar Triad concept, and to the East Asian elites as well, since it implied the 
recognition of East Asia as one of the three centres of the world economy. While the 
non-Westem world was represented in the old Triad by Japan only, the new concept of a 
tri-polar world included East Asia as a region despite its political, economic and cultural 
heterogeneity. The idea of a tri-polar world economy was very attractive to the Chinese 
leadership and some EU leaders -  in particular the French political elite -  as it was seen 
as an additional factor contributing to the trend towards the multi-polarisation of the 
international system, a goal repeatedly expressed by Beijing and Paris.
233 World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1993.
234 Klaus Schwab and Claude Smadja, “Power and Policy: The New Economic World Order”, in Kenichi 
Ohmae (ed.), The Evolving Global Economy. Making Sense o f the New World Order, Boston, Harvard 
Business Review, 1995.
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By the mid 1990s, the image of the tri-polar international economic order had 
been sustained by the evidence of a world economy characterised by the concentration 
of the economic activity within North America (NAFTA -  US, Canada and Mexico), 
the European Union (EU-15) and East Asia (Asia 10 - Asian ASEM countries: China, 
Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, and 
Vietnam). As the graph below shows, in 1996 the Triad’s combined share of the total 
world GNP was around 85%, while Africa, Latin America and the rest of the world 
(including vast geographically separated regions such as Russia and Eastern Europe, the 
Middle East, South Asia, and Oceania), were left to divide the remaining 15%.
Figure 1
Share of the world economy (GNP) 
1996
35
Source: Elaboration based on data from the working document presented at the ASEM Foreign M inisters’ 
M eeting in Singapore on 20-21 February 1997.
Global production, trade and investment were concentrated within and among 
these three macro-regions, which provided 90% per cent of global FDI flows and 
accounted for three fourth of world trade (see table below).
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Table 1: The tripolarisation of world trade in 1996
(% of total world imports)
1980 1996
Intra-reeional
Western Europe 28.0 31.0
North America 5.9 7.5
East Asia 6.1 11.2
Total Triad 40.0 49.7
Inter-reeional
W. Europe - N. America 7.7 7.2
E.Asia - N. America 7.1 11.1
W. Europe - E.Asia 4.6 7.5
Total Triad 19.4 25.8
Total (intra and inter­
regional)
59.4 75.5
Source: World Bank, World Development Report, Washington, World Bank Publications, 1997/98 and 
International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, Washington, International Monetary Fund, May 
1997.
By the mid-1990s, East Asia had become a defining part of the post-Cold War 
international economic order. The basis for this economic dynamism were fairly 
evident: most of the East Asian economies experienced sustained real annual growth 
between 7% and 10% in the first part of the 1990s, a fact that contributed to the 
phenomenal expansion of the productive capabilities of the region (see table below).
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Table 2: GDP Growth Rates 1991-1995
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
China 8.0 13.6 13.4 11.8 11.0
South Korea 9.1 5.1 5.8 8.4 8.9
Indonesia 7.0 6.5 6.5 7.3 7.4
Malaysia 8.7 7.8 8.3 8.7 9.4
Singapore 6.7 6.0 10.1 10.1 7.8
Thailand 8.4 7.9 8.2 8.4 8.8
Japan 3.6 0.3 -0.2 0.5 0.6
European Union 1.1 1.0 -0.6 2.8 2.9
World 1.3 2.0 2.5 3.6 3.7
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, Washington, International Monetary 
Fund, 1996.
Furthermore, this growth was accompanied by an equally significant expansion 
of the region’s aggregate trade, investment and GDP per capita. With regard to the 
latter, some scholars argued that in the period 1965-1995 East Asia had significantly 
outpaced the rest of the developed world in terms of GDP per capita growth (see table 
below).
Table 3: East Asia’s annual per capita GDP growth (%), 1965-1995
Four Tigers 6.6
Hong Kong 5.6
South Korea 7.2
Singapore 7.2
Taiwan 6.2
China 5.6
Southeast Asia 3.9
Indonesia 4.7
Malaysia 4.8
Philippines 1.2
Thailand 4.8
OECD 2.1
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Latin America 0.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.2
Source: Steven Radelet and Jeffrey Sachs “Asia’s Reemergence”. Foreign Affairs, November/December 
1997, pp. 44-59, p. 55.
East Asian economic rise prompted regional elites into forecasting an increasing 
assertiveness for the region. As Kishore Mahbubani argued:
It took Britain and the United States fifty-eight years and forty-seven years, respectively, to double their 
per capita output, but Japan did it in thirty-three years, Indonesia in seventeen, South Korea in eleven, and 
China in ten.235
In 1993 the World Bank, using data measured at purchasing power parity (i.e. 
stripping out the effects of the exchange rate), declared that the Chinese Economic Area 
had become the world's fourth growth pole, along with the United States, Japan, and 
Germany.236 According to some estimates of that time, the Chinese economy would 
become the world’s largest early in the twenty-first century.237 This enthusiasm for East 
Asia’s success produced two complementary discourses: economic orientalism in the 
West and its flip-side in the East: the Asian values. We will examine both in the next 
section.
3.4 The flip-side of East Asia’s success: economic Orientalism
In his well-known study on Western conceptions of the Orient, Edward Said pointed out 
that the idea of Orientalism is basically a created body of theory and practice in which, 
for many generations, there had been a considerable material investment. Continued 
investment made Orientalism, as a system of knowledge about the Orient, an accepted 
grid for filtering through the Orient into Western consciousness, just as that same 
investment multiplied - indeed, made truly productive - the statements proliferating out 
from Orientalism into the general culture.238 Borrowing Gramsci’s idea of cultural 
hegemony - the form of cultural leadership that depends on the fact that certain cultural
235 Kishore Mahbubani, "The Pacific Way”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, January-February 1995, p. 103.
236 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries 1993, Washington, The 
World Bank, 1993, pp. 66-67.
237 World Bank, China 2020. Development Challenges in the New Century, Washington, The World 
Bank, 1997; see also IMD Executive Opinion Survey, The Economist, 6 May 1995, p. 5.
238 Edward W. Said, Orientalism, London, Penguin, 1995, p. 6.
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forms predominate over others, just as certain ideas are more influential than others - 
Said notes that “it is hegemony, or rather the result of cultural hegemony at work, that 
gives Orientalism its durability and strength”.239 Moreover, Said continues, 
“Orientalism is premised upon exteriority”, that is, on the fact that the Orientalist (the 
scholar, the journalist, or the businessman), “makes the Orient speak, describes the 
Orient, renders its mysteries plain for and to the West...he is never concerned with the 
Orient except as the first cause of what he says”.240 The principal product of this 
exteriority is the representation: the Orient is transformed from a very far distant and 
often threatening Otherness into figures that are relatively familiar. The exteriority of 
the representation is characterised by the fact that “if the Orient could represent itself, it 
would; since it cannot, the representation does the job, for the West and, faute de mieux, 
for the Orient”.241
Using Said’s conceptual framework, we can now turn to the analysis of the so- 
called economic Orientalism and see how the East Asian economic miracle has been 
constructed. Before the Asian financial crisis hit the region in 1997/98, the rise of the 
East Asian economies had been celebrated by a generation of scholars and policy 
makers in the West.242 Terms such as the “Asian economic miracle” or the “Pacific 
century” flourished all over and soon become cliches. By the mid-1990s, most of the 
intellectual production concerned with Asia had focused its attention on the emergence 
of the region on the international scene, the explanation of its economic success and the 
bright future lying ahead for the whole region.243 Among all the concepts and images 
that flourished the most employed one is, incontestably, the concept of rise (Pacific 
Rising, The Rise o f the East, Asia Rising, Looking at the Sun).244 This editorial 
production had supplanted the abundant literary production of the mid-1980s and early 
1990s devoted to the research and explanation of the Japanese economic supremacy. 
Moreover, as the economic success spread over the whole region, a vast production had
239 Ibid. p.7.
240 Ibid. pp. 20-21.
241 Ibid. p. 21.
242 Richard Robison and David S.G: Goodman (eds.), The New Rich in Asia: Mobile Phones, McDonald's 
and Middle-Class Revolution, London, Routledge, 1996.
243 Among the many catch-titles in French there were: “L'Asie un nouveau monde en puissance”, 
Croissance, Hors-s6rie, n. 3, 1997; David Camroux and Jean-Luc Domenach (eds.), L'Asie retrouvee, 
Paris, Seuil, 1997; Francois Godement, La renaissance de I'Asie, Paris, Odile Jacob, 1996.
244 Simon Winchester, Pacific Rising: The Emergence o f  a New World Culture, New York, Prentice Hall 
Press, 1991; Robert Elegant, Pacific Destiny: The Rise o f  the East, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1990; Jim 
Rohwer, Asia Rising: How History's Biggest Middle Class Will Change the World, Singapore, 
Butterworth-Heinemann, 1995; James Fallows, Looking at the Sun: The Rise o f  the New East Asian 
Economic and Political System, New York, Vintage, 1995.
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been published not only to celebrate the successful enterprises, the originality of East 
Asian management,245 but also the economic policies implemented by the Newly 
Industrialised Countries (NICs).246 This highly uncritical editorial trend was further 
supplemented by the publications of the international organisations: the World Bank, 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), as well as various research institutes and think tanks.247 
This literature often found its raison d'etre in laying out long series of statistical figures, 
data, and tables. Its main goal was not only to demonstrate the economic development 
of East Asia but also - and more importantly - that this ascendant movement was 
reaching the interior provinces of China and was spreading all over the rest of 
developing Asia. This cultural hegemony of modem political economy had less to do 
with the Orient than it did with our world. In fact, like the old nineteenth century 
Orientalism, this enthusiastic literature responded more to the culture that produced it 
than to its putative object. As in the past, this modem Orientalism, its internal 
consistency and rigorous procedures were all designed for readers and consumers in the 
metropolitan West.248 As Said argued:
The development and maintenance of every culture require the existence of another different and 
competing alter ego, the construction of identity involves establishing opposites and ‘others’ whose 
actuality is always subject to the continuous interpretation and re-interpretation of their differences from 
‘us’. Each age and society re-creates its ‘Others’.249
Far from a static thing then, “identity of self or of ‘other’ is a much worked-over 
historical, social, intellectual, and political process that takes place as a contest 
involving individuals and institutions in all societies”.250
245 Philippe Lasserre and Hellmutt Schutte, Strategies pour VAsie-Pacifique: se preparer au si&cle du 
Pacifique, Paris, Dunod, 1996.
246 Anis Chowdhury and Iyanatul Islam,. The Newly Industrializing Economies o f  East Asia (London, 
Routledge, 1993).
247 Among the many works, see in particular: World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth 
and Public Policy, New York, Oxford University Press, 1993; Peter A. Petri, The Lessons o f  East Asia. 
Common Foundations o f East Asian Success, Washington, World Bank Publication, 1993; Asian 
Development Bank, Escaping from the Poverty Trap. Lessons from Asia, Manila, Asian Development 
Bank, 1994; Ross Garnaut and Peter Drysdale, Asia Pacific Regionalism: Readings in International 
Economic Relations, Pymble, Australia, Harper & Collins, 1994; Fred Bergsten and Marcus Noland 
(eds.), Pacific Dynamism and the International Economic System, Washington, Institute for International 
Economics, 1993.
248 See Said, (1995), p. 332.
249 Ibid. p. 336.
250 Ibid. p. 336.
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Thus, by 1997, by engaging in a mainly unconscious process of de-construction 
and re-construction of the East Asian economic rise most authors openly called upon an 
awakening of the West, of the necessity of an encompassing modernisation of its system 
of production and explicitly questioned the basic assumptions of the Western model.251 
The leit-motiv was then, a concern for an urgent and radical structural adjustment that 
the Western countries needed to make in order to be ready for entering into the new 
millennium. In other words, behind a well-supported economic analysis, lied a 
formidable discourse made to convince the Western readers that our economic and 
political future was at stake in Asia.252 A very similar discourse has resurfaced in recent 
years, this time with regard to China’s rise and its economic challenge to the West -  
which we will discuss further in the next Chapter.253
By the mid 1990s, the discourse of economic Orientalism had come to subsume 
that the East Asian economic development had already altered the balance of power 
between Asia and the West. As Paul Kennedy argued, “successful economic 
development generates self-confidence and assertiveness on the part of those who 
produce it and benefit from it”.254 Wealth, like power, is assumed to be proof of virtue, 
a demonstration of moral and cultural superiority. As they became more successful 
economically, East Asian policy makers did not hesitate to emphasise the 
distinctiveness of their culture and to trumpet the superiority of their values and way of 
life compared to those of the West and other societies. A “cultural renaissance”, 
Ambassador Tommy Koh noted in 1993, “is sweeping across Asia”. It involved a 
growing self-confidence, which meant that Asians “no longer regard everything 
Western as necessarily the best”.255 According to the proponents of these ideas, this 
renaissance would manifest itself in increasing emphasis on both the distinctive cultural 
identities of individual Asian countries and the commonalities of Asian cultures which 
distinguished them from Western culture.256
251 David Howell, Easternisation: The Rise o f Asian Power and Its Impact on the West and Our Own 
Society, London, Demos, 1995.
252 See: Frank Gibney, The Pacific Century, Tokyo, Kodansha International, 1990; Etienne Badimont, 
Socrate ou Confucius: Essai sur le devenir de la Chine et de TOccident, Paris, Editions LabSnaudie, 1996; 
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash o f Civilizations and the Remaking o f World Order, London, Simon & 
Schuster, 1996.
253 Around this theme an international workshop was organised by the Aspen Institute (Italy) in Rome, to 
which this author participated: China’s Challenge to Europe and the US, Rome, 11 March 2005.
254 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall o f  the Great Powers, London, Unwin Hyman, 1988.
255 Tommy Koh, America’s Role in Asia: Asian Views, Washington, Asia Foundation, Center for Asian 
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Along with the above also came the articulation by East Asian elites of what 
may be appropriately termed an Asian Occidentalism, a complex of attitudes that 
attempted to portray the West in much the same uniform and negative way which 
Western Orientalism allegedly once portrayed the East. According to Said, Orientalism 
was characterised by the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with 
all the non-European peoples and cultures. There was in addition the hegemony of 
European ideas about the Orient, themselves reiterating European superiority over 
Oriental backwardness.257 However, after having illustrated the formidable structure of 
the European cultural domination over the Orient, Said feared, specifically for formerly 
colonised peoples, “the dangers and temptations of employing this structure upon 
themselves or upon others”.258 This became reality in the 1990s with the emergence of 
the so-called Asian values discourse.
3.5 The discourse of the Asian values
As discussed earlier, the dominant discourse until 1997/98 was that East Asia would 
sustain its rapid economic development, would soon surpass the West in economic 
performance and, hence, would be increasingly powerful in world affairs compared to 
the West. As a result, economic growth would stimulate among Asian societies a sense 
of power and an affirmation of their ability to stand up to the West.259 “The days when 
the United States sneezed and Asia caught cold are over”, declared a leading Japanese 
journalist in 1993, adding that Asians are “at the end of the era of awe and the 
beginning of the era of talking back”, in their relations with the West.260 “Asia’s 
increasing prosperity”, Malaysia’s former Deputy Prime Minister asserted in 1994, 
“means that it is now in a position to offer serious alternatives to the dominant global 
political, social and economic arrangements”.261 The exponents of the Asian values 
discourse were also intent on addressing a powerful message to Western policy makers, 
especially those in the US and in Europe who, in the post-Cold War era, had started to 
advocate the spread of Western style democracy and human rights as tools of foreign
257 Said, (1995), p. 7.
258 Ibid. p. 25.
259 Mahbubani, (1995), p. 101
260 Yochi Funabashi, "The Asianization of Asia", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, November/December 1993, p. 
78. See also: Shintaro Ishihara, The Japan that Can Say No. Why Japan Will Be First Among Equals, 
New York, Simon & Schuster, 1991; Shintaro Ishihara and Mohammad Mahathir, The Asia That Can Say 
No, Tokyo, Kodansha, 1995.
261 Anwar Ibrahim, International Herald Tribune, 31 January 1994, p. 6.
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policy. What the advocates of Asian values meant with their assertions was that the 
West was rapidly losing its ability to make Asian societies conform to Western 
standards concerning human rights and other values.
East Asians elites would argue, indeed, that their economic success was largely 
a product of Asian culture, which was thought of being superior to that of the West, 
which was, in turn, perceived as culturally and socially decadent.262 During the 1980s, 
when the Japanese economy, exports, trade balance, and foreign exchange reserves were 
booming, the Japanese, boasted of their new economic power, spoke contemptuously of 
the decline of the West, and attributed their success and Western failings to the 
superiority of their culture. In the same vein, in the early 1990s, South-East Asian 
leaders, in particular, trumpeted the rise of Asia in relation to the West and contrasted 
the virtues of Asian, basically Confucian, culture responsible for this success - order, 
discipline, family responsibility, hard work, collectivism, abstemiousness - as opposed 
to the self-indulgence, sloth, individualism, crime, inferior education and disrespect for 
authority responsible for the decline of the West. To compete with the East, the 
advocates of Asian values argued, the West “needs to question its fundamental 
assumptions about its social and political arrangements and, in the process, learn a thing 
or two from East Asian societies”.263
In the elaborations of the so-called Asian values - which include, among the 
others, the respect for authority in the family and in the social life, the attempt to avoid 
the conflict in social and political relations, the interest of the group above the 
individual -  South-East Asian elites took the lead. Among them, Lee Kuan Yew, former 
Prime Minister of Singapore, Kishore Mahbubani, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, and others high ranking Singaporeans officials - the so-called 
Singaporean School - who, along with Mohammad Mahathir, Malaysia’s Prime 
Minister, through frequent interviews in the American and European press, explicitly 
and repetitively asserted the validity and importance of Asian values for East Asia’s 
economic growth. Lee Kuan Yew, for instance, pointed out that East Asian economic 
success was particularly the result of a cultural stress on the collectivity rather than the 
individual:
262 Kishore Mahbubani, "The Dangers of Decadence", Foreign Affairs, Vol.72, July/August 1994, pp. 10- 
14.
263 Ibid., p. 12.
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The more communitarian values and practices of the East Asians - the Japanese, Koreans, Taiwanese, and 
the Singaporeans - have proved to be clear assets in the catching up process ... the values that East Asian 
culture upholds, such as the primacy of group interests over individual interests, support the total group 
effort necessary to develop rapidly.264
Moreover, the Malaysia’s Prime Minister added:
The work ethic of the Japanese and Koreans, consisting of discipline, loyalty, and diligence”, Malaysia's 
prime minister agreed, “has served as the motive force for their respective countries’ economic and social 
development. This work ethic is bom out o f the philosophy that the group and the country are more 
important than the individual.265
While recognising the differences among Asian societies, the proponents of the 
Asian values discourse propounded the idea that there were also significant 
commonalities. Central among these, is the value system of Confucianism, shared by 
most of the countries in the region, with its emphasis on thrift, family, work, and 
discipline.266 Equally important is the shared rejection of individualism and the 
prevalence of soft authoritarianism or very limited forms of democracy. Finally, 
proponents of Asian values argued that Asian development and Asian values had to be 
seen as models which other non-Westem societies should emulate in their efforts to 
catch up with the West and which even the West should adopt in order to renew 
itself267 According to some commentators, “the Anglo-Saxon developmental model, so 
revered over the past four decades as the best means of modernising the economies of 
developing nations and of building a viable political system, is not working”.268 Kishore 
Mahbubani even asserted that:
The East Asian model is taking its place, as countries from Mexico and Chile to Iran and Turkey and the 
former Soviet republics now attempt to learn from its success, even as previous generations attempted to 
learn from Western success ... Asia must transmit to the rest of the world those Asian values that are of 
universal worth ... the transmission of this ideal means the export of the social system of Asia, East Asia 
in particular.269
It is interesting to note the parallelism with current discourses which tend to see 
contemporary China as a model that ought to be imitated by developing countries
264 Fared Zakaria,“Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, n. 
2, March/April 1994, pp. 113-114.
265 Mohammad Mahathir, "The Malay Dilemma", quoted in Ogura Kazuo "A Call for a New Concept of 
Asia", Japan Echo, Vol. 20, Autumn 1993, p. 40.
266 Fared Zakaria,“Culture is Destiny”, p. 114.
267 Li Xiangiu "A Post Cold-War Alternative from East Asia", Straits Times, 10 February 1992, p. 24.
268 Yoichi Funabashi, "Globalize Asia", New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol. 9, Winter 1992, pp. 23-24.
269 Kishore Mahbubani, "The West and the Rest", National Interest, Vol. 28, Summer 1992, p. 7.
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worldwide.270 Back in the mid 1990s, the mounting self-confidence of East Asian elites 
seemed to have given rise, in essence, to an emerging Asian universalism comparable to 
that which had been characteristic of the West. “Asian values are universal values. 
European values are European values”, declared Mohammad Mahathir, Malaysia’s 
Prime Minister, to the EU heads of state and government in 1996, at the opening of the 
first ASEM in Bangkok.271
To sum up, by the mid-1990s the Asian values discourse had become the 
ideology of a range of regimes intent on resisting the attempts by American and 
European policy makers to spread Western style democracy and human rights to Asia. 
What the advocates of Asian values meant with their discourse was that the West was 
rapidly losing its ability to make Asian societies conform to Western standards 
concerning human rights and other values. While Western liberals had generally 
proposed that Asia was rapidly being transformed into a world of markets, 
individualism and materialism as capitalism and internationalisation were taking root, 
there was a growing body of opinion among Western neo-liberals that influences could 
be flowing in the other direction, or at least that the Asian model may be an alternative 
to liberalism. Francis Fukuyama pointed out that, while rapid economic development 
would lead to democracy, “the contours of Asian democracy may be very different from 
those of contemporary Western democracy, which has experienced serious problems of 
its own in reconciling individual rights with the interests of the larger community”.272
In the view of both Western conservatives and the advocates of Asian values, 
Western industrialism was built in the nineteenth century upon values of strong 
government, moral propriety, hard work, and thrift similar to those, which characterise 
the Asian values discourse. Margaret Thatcher enthused about “the fundamentally 
vigorous values” of Asia. Asians, she noted “are very hard working, they are very keen 
on self-improvement, very family-minded... all of these are some of the fundamentally 
vigorous virtues, which are enabling Asian countries- to achieve a rate of growth which
270 This is the argument put forward by Kishore Mahbubani in his latest book: Beyond the Age o f  
Innocence: Rebuilding Trust Between America and the World, New York, Perseus Books Group, 2005 
and in his recent article: “Understanding China”, in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 5, September/October 
2005, pp. 49-60.
271 Statement by Mohammad Mahathir, Malaysia’s Prime Minister, at the Asia-Europe Meeting, 
Bangkok, 2 March 1996
272 Francis Fukuyama “Confucianism and Democracy”, Journal o f Democracy, Vol.6, n. 2, April 1995,
p. 21.
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is phenomenal”.273 Moreover, the British Conservative David Howell, former chair of 
the House of Commons’ Foreign Affairs Committee, argued that “Eastemisation is not 
just about adopting the business techniques of those now in the ascendant, the Asian 
dynamos, but about some of the values and attitudes which lie beneath their success 
both as economies and societies”.274 In January 1996, Tony Blair, at that time leader of 
the Labour party, launched his vision of the stakeholder society in Singapore as a 
deliberate bid to tie a conception of the virtue of the principles of markets, self-help and 
technical competence to an endorsement of an Asian model of economic growth and 
social cohesion. However, the Asian financial crisis that erupted in 1997 dealt a 
powerful blow to these ideas.
3.6 The Asian financial crisis and the EU’s response
The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 represented a major test for both East Asia and the 
EU. It challenged East Asia’s growing assertiveness, putting a halt to the spreading of 
the Asian values discourse. It also became a major test for the EU and its ability to 
emerge as an effective global actor. But how did in practice the EU react to the Asian 
financial crisis?
At the outbreak of the crisis in 1997, a clear EU’s response was barely apparent. 
EU policy makers played down the importance for their region of the crisis since the 
conventional wisdom insisted that Asian economic fundamentals remained sound.275 At 
the same time, US policy makers criticised the EU for being less than supportive of 
international efforts, led by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Clinton 
administration, to halt the spread of the crisis. In this context, a first complete package 
of measures had already been articulated by the IMF. In fact, seeking to help East Asian 
elites to avoid defaulting on their debts to foreign creditors, the IMF had offered an 
immediate infusion of foreign exchange in late 1997. The governments of Thailand, 
Indonesia and South Korea had each agreed to an IMF structural adjustment program 
aimed to open up the targeted countries fully to international business and to earn the
273 Australian, 18-19 November 1995; see also the internal debate among the leaders o f the British 
Conservative Party in The Economist, 6 June 1998.
274 Quoted in Garry Rodan, “The Internationalization of Ideological Conflict: Asia’s New Significance”, 
Pacific Review, Vol. 9, n.3, Fall 1996, p. 339.
275 Walden Bello, “The Asian Financial Crisis: Causes, Dynamics, Prospects”, Journal o f  the Asia 
Pacific Economy, Vol. 4, n. 1,1999, pp. 33-55.
115
foreign exchange necessary to pay international debts.276 In defending the IMF 
response to the crisis, its Managing Director at that time, Michel Camdessus, promoted 
a six-point plan to shape the new architecture, by proposing: (I) a more effective 
oversight of countries economic policies; (II) mutual regional surveillance, with 
neighbouring countries getting together to put pressure on one another to pursue sound 
policies; (III) financial sector reform, including better prudential regulation and 
supervision; (IV) more effective structures for orderly debt workouts including ways of 
associating the private sector with official efforts to help resolve sovereign debt 
problems; (V) further capital account liberalisation; (VI) and the strengthening of 
international financial institutions, with increased financial resources.277
As the crisis unfolded, the EU’s response was one of full support for the 
measures imposed by the IMF. According to the EU Trade Commissioner, Sir Leon 
Brittan, the IMF’s prescriptions “would be an opportunity to resist protectionism and 
promote further liberalisation. 278 In the middle of the crisis, the EU saw in the IMF’s 
response a series of policies which would help safeguard EU members’ economies from 
possible risks of contagion. The EU policy makers’ assessment of the crisis was based 
on the perception that currency devaluations could provoke trade conflicts, that there 
could be a significant slowdown of Asian inward Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) 
and that European banks could face enormous losses on their lending to the region.279 
The Commission also stressed the consequences of the Asian crisis for unemployment 
and slower growth in EU members’ economies. Moreover, Brussels even acknowledged 
the potentially destabilising effects of the crisis on the convergence criteria of the 
European Monetary Union (EMU).280
The ASEM II summit in London, in April 1998, soon began to reflect the new 
circumstances. First of all, the initiative shifted from Asia to Europe, with the summit 
providing the EU with the opportunity to show that it could take decisive action to 
respond to the developing crisis in East Asia. In this context, the London meeting not 
only served to endorse fully the implementation of the IMF’s reform packages to 
individual countries - vital for restoring confidence in Asian economies and financial
276 “Rebuilding Asia”, Far Eastern Economic Review, February 12, 1998.
277 Bello (1999), p. 42.
278 Financial Times, 2 December 1997, p. 5.
279 Casarini (2001), p. 44.
280 “Global turmoil could upset run-up to EMU”, Financial Times, 9 December 1997, p. 2.
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markets - but also moved the debate over issues related to global economic governance 
and the role of the EU in it. Europe’s commitment to draw the East Asian countries 
more explicitly into the orbit of neo-liberal orthodoxy propounded by the IMF was 
articulated by the President of the European Commission, Jacques Santer, ahead of the 
London ASEM summit, when he argued that:
Our economies share a common dependence on the global economy and on open access to world markets, 
and it will be essential for the London Summit to emphasize this interdependence. We should set clear 
directions for our future cooperation in strengthening the open and rules-based trading system embodied 
in the WTO. In parallel to this, we must stress in London the importance of global macroeconomic and 
financial stability.281
In this vein, the ASEM II in London discussed specific policy issues, such as the 
lowering of customs barriers, transparency in export dealings and in setting tariffs and 
terms of trade, financial liberalisation, which were part of the broader new architecture 
put forward by the IMF.282 In the end, in the new circumstances created by the Asian 
crisis a new project began to take shape, quite different in character to that which had 
been proposed as strengthening of the third leg of the North America-EU-East Asia 
triangle. Instead of being defensive response to Asia’s economic rise (with the corollary 
of its increasing assertiveness, as discussed earlier with regard to the Asian values 
discourse), the ASEM II in London in 1998 became the opportunity for advancing a key 
role for the EU in furthering global economic governance along the lines already 
articulated and promoted by the US government and the leading international 
organisations charged of the management of the global economy, such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). This EU’s pro-active foreign economic policy served two purposes: firstly, it 
enhanced the role of the Union on matters related to global economic governance. 
Secondly, it laid the basis for a common approach with the United States, reducing as a 
consequence the tensions which had arisen in the earlier stages of the crisis, and making 
it possible that an Atlantic axis could once again establish hegemony in global affairs. It 
is noteworthy, in this context, that the Blair government in the United Kingdom played 
a leading role in orchestrating and presenting the emerging EU position at the ASEM II 
in London.283
281 Jacques Santer, “Asia and Europe: the Road from Bangkok to London and Beyond”, Inaugural ASEF 
Lecture, Singapore, Asia-Europe Foundation (ASEF), 13 January 1998.
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The EU’s initiative put forward at the ASEM II in London advanced the so- 
called Washington consensus, which advocates macroeconomic policies aimed at low 
inflation and balanced budgets, rapid privatisation, maximum freedom for capital and an 
active role for states in setting the rules of the game. At the same time, Europe’s 
strategy aimed at challenging US leadership of the process of global economic 
governance. EU policy makers sought to exploit the resentment of some Asian elites of 
US behaviour, in particular over intrusive demands with regard to human rights, labour 
and environmental standards and the perception among some Asian intellectuals and 
political leaders that the financial crisis was a product of a conspiracy by the US. The 
European approach was seen by East Asian elites as more pragmatic and conciliatory.284 
The EU could, therefore, present itself as a more reliable actor in advancing a regime of 
global economic governance.285 At the same time, the initiatives taken in the middle of 
the Asian crisis allowed EU policy makers to exploit the situation to further the 
development of a common EU foreign economic policy and promote the EU as a global 
economic power.
This pro-active foreign policy agenda was dictated by the belief that Europe’s 
economic security was increasingly affected by developments in Asia. As discussed 
earlier, since the early 1990s the overall objective of the EU’s Asia strategy has been to 
take advantage of Asia’s economic growth in order to maintain Europe’s economic 
global competitiveness and its (relative) welfare position. Thus, the EU’s response to 
the Asian financial crisis was part of this overall strategy to protect the Union’s 
economic security. Strategically, the ASEM II in London also sealed the upgrading of 
the EU-China partnership. In this context, we need to analyse China’s economic 
performance before, during and after the crisis.
284 Interview, European Commission delegation in Japan, Tokyo, 12 May 2005 and ASEM desk, DG I -  
RELEX, Brussels, 10 July 2004.
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3.7 The emergence of China as the cornerstone of the EU’s Asia policy
Since the early 1990s, China’s rise had received the attention of the global capitalist 
elite. In 1994, the Trilateral Commission published its report An Emerging China in a 
World o f Interdependence286 and in the same year the EU adopted its New Asia 
Strategy. In 1995, the Commission’s adopted its first China paper, where it spelled out a 
new approach towards Beijing. The new EU’s China policy brought about a number of 
policy developments. In particular, the EU's general positions on commercial policy 
became significantly more favourable to Beijing. The EU removed China from its list of 
non-market economies, restricting the conditions under which anti-dumping duties 
could be imposed.287 China’s trade surplus with the EU increased fourfold between 
1990 and 1997. Moreover, Beijing took an increasing share of the total benefits of the 
EU’s GSP, by 1997 taking a hefty 30% of the total available preferences, up from the 
15% it took at the beginning of the decade.288 The European Commission aid 
commitments to China increased from 20 million Ecu for 1991-1994 to 70 million Ecu 
for 1995-1999.289 At the bilateral level, while US aid to China remained negligible, 
Beijing rose up the rankings of EU member states’ main aid recipients. Most 
significantly by 1997 China had become by some margin the largest recipient of 
German development assistance.290 The first European Investment Bank (EIB) loan to 
China was agreed in December 1995 and EU governments supported a huge increase in 
World Bank loans to China, with the latter soon becoming the Bank’s largest recipient.
In this context, the outcome of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 would 
further contribute to the image of a rising China. This view was sustained by the 
economic evidence: by 1999 it clearly appeared that China -  along with Taiwan -  had 
escaped the Asian financial crisis largely unscathed, as the table below shows:
286 Yoichi Funabashi, Michel Oksenberg and Heinrich Weiss, An Emerging China in a World o f 
Interdependence, New York, Paris and Tokyo, The Trilateral Commission, The Triangle Papers 45, May 
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faire, Institut Francais des Relations Internationales (IFRI), February 2002.
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Routledge, 1999, p. 140.
289 Franco Algieri, “The Coherence Dilemma of EU External Relations: The European Asia Policy”, in 
Paul Cammack and Gareth A. Richards (eds.), Asia-Europe Inter-Regionalism (special edition of the 
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Table 4: East Asian economies 1996-1999
GDP growth Change in currency
1996 1997 1998 1999
value against US$ 
(June 1997-May 1999)
China 9.6% 8.8% 7.8% 8.2% no change
Indonesia 8.0% 4.9% -13.7% -3.9% -69%
Japan 3.8% -0.7% -2.1% -0.7% -8%
South Korea 7.1% 5.5% -5.5% 3.7% -26%
Malaysia 8.6% 7.8% -7.0% 2.0% -34%
Philippines 5.8% 5.2% -0.5% 2.3% -30%
Singapore 6.9% 8.0% 1.5% 2.0% -17%
Taiwan 5.7% 6.8% 4.8% 4.5% -15%
Thailand 5.6% -1.3% -7.0% -0.5% -30%
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, 2000; and Far Eastern Economic 
Review, 27 May 1999, p. 64.
The changing economic power relations within the East Asian region would 
have a profound impact on the evolution of both the EU’s Asia Strategy and EU foreign 
policy towards China. While the ASEM II became the opportunity for the EU to show 
that it could take decisive action to respond to the developing crisis in East Asia, as well 
as to promote its global economic agenda, the EU and China held their first Summit at 
the margins of the London’s meeting. On the one hand, the ASEM II in London saw the 
South-East Asian elites being preached by EU policy makers about the virtue of neo­
liberalism. On the other hand, Communist China had become the star of the summit. 
The latter was largely due to the Chinese government having resisted to undervalue its 
currency. This was perceived as an act of responsibility by Beijing for maintaining 
global economic stability.291 In this vein, China would be increasingly seen by EU 
policy makers as a stable market for conducting business, something that will have 
profound consequences for the further elaboration of EU foreign policy towards China, 
as we will see in the next chapter.
291 Interview, European Commission, DG RELEX, ASEM desk, 10 July 2004.
120
The crisis also had an impact on East Asia’s strategic balance.292 Indeed, defence 
spending and procurement programmes in the above mentioned countries (China and 
Taiwan) had not suffered to the same extent as elsewhere in the region. China’s level of 
military spending continued to rise during the crisis. In 1998-99 China’s official budget 
increased by 12,9% and in 1999-2000 by 11,5% 293 and Taiwan’s military spending rose 
by more than 20% in real terms between 1992 and 1997 and continued to increase in the 
period 1997-2000.294 We will discuss the significance of these developments in 
Chapters 6 and 7.
Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the main themes that have characterised the development of 
the NAS and the ASEM process in the 1990s. Since the mid-1990s, the NAS and 
ASEM have provided the broader frameworks within which the EU has developed the 
policy of constructive engagement towards China. As the European Commission stated 
in 1995 “the time has come to redefine the EU’s relationship with China in the spirit of 
the new Asia strategy”.295 ASEM, in particular, has become the most important inter­
regional forum for discussion and cooperation between the EU and East Asia. In this 
context, Chinese leaders have come to support ASEM because they see it as an 
additional factor contributing to the emergence of an East Asian bloc independent of 
Washington and, more generally, to the trend towards the multi-polarisation of the 
international system.
This chapter has also examined the emergence of East Asia as the third pole of 
the Post-Cold War international economic order, as well as the growing enthusiasm for 
East Asia’s success. The latter produced two complementary discourses: economic 
orientalism in the West and its flip-side in the East: the Asian values discourse. Thus, 
by 1997, by engaging in a mainly unconscious process of de-construction and re­
construction of the East Asian economic rise most authors openly called upon an 
awakening of the West, of the necessity of an encompassing modernisation of its system
292 Interview with Otaka Junichiro, Deputy Director, European Policy Division, European Affairs 
Bureau, Japanese Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 12 May 2005.
293 Tim Huxley and Susan Willett, Arming East Asia, Oxford, Oxford University Press for The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Adelphi Paper No. 329,1999, p. 21.
294 The significance of these developments will be analysed in more details in Chapter 7.
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Brussels,, COM (95), 279 final, 1995.
121
of production and explicitly questioned the basic assumptions of the Western model. 
The leit-motiv was then, a concern for an urgent and radical structural adjustment that 
the Western countries needed to make in order to be ready for entering into the new 
millennium. In other words, behind a well-supported economic analysis, lied a 
formidable discourse made to convince the Western readers that our economic and 
political future was at stake in Asia. A very similar discourse has resurfaced in recent 
years, this time with regard to China’s rise and its economic challenge to the West -  
which we will discuss further in the next Chapter.
In the same vein, advocates of the Asian values in the 1990s argued that East 
Asian development had to be seen as a model which other non-Westem societies should 
emulate in their efforts to catch up with the West and which even the West should adopt 
in order to renew itself. As discussed above, the exponents of the Asian values 
discourse were mainly intent on addressing a powerful message to Western policy 
makers, especially those in the US and in Europe who, in the post-Cold War era, had 
started to advocate the spread of Western style democracy and human rights as tools of 
foreign policy. What the advocates of Asian values meant with their assertions was that 
the West was rapidly losing its ability to make Asian societies conform to Western 
standards concerning human rights and other values.
Finally, the last part of the chapter has examined the EU’s response to the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997-98. The crisis challenged East Asia’s growing assertiveness, 
putting a halt to the spreading of the Asian values discourse. It also became a major test 
for the EU and its ability to emerge as an effective global actor. More particularly, it 
presented an opportunity for EU policy makers to send a message to East Asian elites 
and advance the role of the EU in the shaping of global economic governance issues. 
This pro-active foreign policy agenda was dictated by the belief that Europe’s economic 
security was increasingly affected by developments in Asia. As discussed earlier, since 
the early 1990s the overall objective of the EU’s Asia strategy has been to take 
advantage of Asia’s economic growth in order to maintain Europe’s economic global 
competitiveness and its (relative) welfare position. We will discuss these issues further 
in the next Chapter.
The financial crisis also unsettled economic power relations in East Asia, 
creating the conditions for China’s emergence as the linchpin of regional economic
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growth. By 1999, it clearly appeared that China -  along with Taiwan -  had escaped the 
Asian financial crisis largely unscathed. In addition, China had resisted undervaluing its 
currency, acting responsibly for maintaining global economic stability. By the end of 
the 1990s China had become increasingly significant for Europe’s economic interests. 
This European enthusiasm for the Chinese market had been translated, at the political 
level, in the policy of constructive engagement that will be examined in more details in 
the next Chapter.
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Chapter 4
The EU’s policy of constructive engagement towards China: 
the trade-off between economic security and human rights
There is no alternative to engagement with China. Indeed, the only way in which solutions will be found 
is if we recognise that the issue surrounding China’s development is global issues which impact directly 
on our own vital interests. By engaging with China, we are not only in a position to point China towards a 
path o f sustainable growth but we will also protecting the welfare of Europe into the next Millennium and 
beyond.
Sir Leon Brittan, Vice-President of the European Commission, 2 February 1998296
We in Europe are full of admiration for China’s spectacular economic growth. China’s economic 
development is truly impressive by any measure. If current annual growth rates persist, China will soon 
be one o f the world’s largest economies. Barely three years after China joined the World Trade 
Organisation, the country has risen to be the third largest global trader. This is really impressive...The EU 
is now China’s largest trading partner. And China is our second largest.
Josd Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, 15 July 2005297
[As part of the EU-China political dialogue]...the EU-China human rights dialogue is undoubtedly the 
most complex and multifaceted dialogue on human rights which we have with any country.
Chris Patten, former EU Commissioner for External Relations, 5 July 2001298
Introduction
As discussed in previous Chapters, the evolution of relations between the large EU 
member states and China in the first part of the 1990s (Chapter 2) coupled with the 
development of the EU’s New Asia Strategy and the ASEM process advocating a more 
pro-active engagement with East Asian countries (Chapter 3) contributed to the
296 Sir Leon Brittan, Engaging China, Speech by the Vice-President of the European Commission, 
London, EU-China Academic Network Annual Conference, 2 February 1998.
297 Josd Manuel Barroso, The EU and China: painting a brighter future together, Speech by the President 
o f the European Commission, Beijing, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 15 July 2005; 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/444&format=HTML&aged=0 
&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
298 Chris Patten, “China’s Candidature for Hosting the Olympic Games in 2008”, Commission 
Statements in urgency debates, by External Relations Commissioner in the European Parliament, Plenary 
Session, Strasbourg, SPEECH/01/33 -  5 July 2001.
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formulation of the new EU foreign policy towards China. Moreover, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, by the mid-1990s, due to the new weight acquired by Germany after the 
reunification, its lead in formulating a pragmatic approach to Beijing, and the awesome 
commercial results that ensued from it, German China policy had succeeded in 
influencing the behaviour of the other EU member states, especially the large ones. This 
Europeanisation of the German China policy did not only take place sideways (i.e., 
influence on the behaviour of the other EU members) - but also bottom-up (influence up 
to the European Commission, i.e. EU level). The Commission adopted its first China 
policy paper in 1995, calling for a constructive engagement towards China (following 
the lead of the US). However, contrary to the US, which had maintained a critical 
attitude towards Beijing, in particular on human rights violations, political liberalisation 
and the Taiwan issue, the Commission’s paper appeared to be influenced by the more 
pragmatic approach characteristic of Germany’s China policy.
Since the mid-1990s, the EU’s policy of constructive engagement has come to 
define Europe’s China policy, characterised by the promotion of the fullest possible 
Chinese involvement in the international arena, whether on economic, social, political, 
security or environmental issues. The focus has been on helping China support its 
transformation process to become a good citizen of international society, with the 
underlying belief that this approach would lead, over time, to greater political 
liberalisation and promotion of human rights.
Concurrent with the above idealistic approach, the EU member states’ 
(especially the large ones) policies towards Beijing has been driven by commercial 
considerations. While China’s economic weaknesses have been fully acknowledged, EU 
governments have come to perceive China as being a market with almost limitless 
potential for the expansion of economic opportunities. Moreover, both the European 
Commission and some EU member states -  especially the large ones -  have come to 
believe that Europe’s economic security and its (relative) welfare position would 
increasingly be linked to China’s long-term and stable development. In other words, EU 
policy makers have come to the conclusion that, in a situation of sluggish economic 
growth in Europe, gaining commercial advantages from the most dynamic market 
would be of great importance for maintaining the Union’s overall global 
competitiveness. In the words of Sir Leon Brittan: “By engaging with China, we are not
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only in a position to point China towards a path of sustainable growth but we will also 
protect the welfare of Europe”.299
At the same time, Chinese policy makers have also established the link between 
the protection of China’s economic security and the bolstering of relations with the EU, 
in particular with regard to the possibility of acquiring advanced Western technology. 
This new securitisation discourse largely explains why, since the beginning of the 
1990s, both the EU and China have attached great importance to the development of 
economic and commercial relations. This discourse follows recognition that the end of 
the Cold War and the globalisation process have led to the emergence of new, broader 
notions of security, among which “economic security” is one of the most important.
Within the discipline of international relations, the term economic security has 
evolved from the more traditional concept of national security.300 The notion of 
economic security -  along with that of ecological/environmental security -  gained 
popularity in the IR research agenda following the end of the Cold War, though 
different scholars have always attached different meaning to it.301 This chapter, thus, 
starts with an examination of European and Chinese discourses on economic security to 
gain a better understanding of the growing Sino-European ties in the post-Cold War era. 
Furthermore, the notion of economic security is used for critically analysing the EU’s 
policy of constructive engagement, its commercial benefits for both European and 
Chinese companies, and its political consequences.
In order to orient the reader, the first part of the chapter analyses the arguments 
employed by EU policy makers for making the link between the Union’s economic 
security and China’s sustainable development. In the following section, we examine
299 Sir Leon Brittan, Engaging China, Speech by the Vice-President of the European Commission, 
London, EU-China Academic Network Annual Conference, 2 February 1998.
300 See: David A. Baldwin, “The Concept of Security” in Review o f International Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1, 
January 1997, pp. 5-26; Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problem in 
International Relations, Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991; Arnold Wolfers, “’National 
Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol”, in Political Science Quarterly, December 1952, pp. 481-502.
301 James Sperling and Emil Kirchner, “Economic Security and the Problem of Economic Cooperation in 
the post-Cold War Europe”, in Review o f International Studies, Vol. 24,1998, pp. 221-237. Like the more 
traditional concept o f security, economic security as such defies clear definition. In the Penguin 
Dictionary of International Relations, it is noted that: “economic security concerns are implicit in 
mercantilism... If the control of the supply of goods and services falls into hostile hands or if the price for 
the supply of the same is set by a hostile actor with monopoly control then the economic security o f the 
recipient is potentially under threat”. Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, The Penguin Dictionary o f  
International Relations, London, Penguin Books, 1998, pp. 490-491.
126
Chinese scholars and policy makers interpretations of the notion of economic security in 
the post-Cold War era and discuss how and why Chinese leaders and scholars have 
made the link between China’s modernisation and the development of relations with 
European countries. The third part of the chapter assesses the growing EU-China 
commercial relations and critically examines the fierce competition among EU members 
for China’s market shares which has characterised the last decade. In the following 
section the analysis focuses on the political consequences of this contemporary 
commercial “scramble” for the Chinese market. We will discuss how EU foreign policy 
towards China has been increasingly characterised by a glaring lack of critical pressure, 
in particular with regard to human rights violations in China and on the Taiwan issue. 
However, the Nordic countries and the European Commission have continued to 
promote and support projects aimed at Chinese civil society, human rights issue, and 
democratisation. In the conclusion, the chapter critically evaluates the EU’s policy of 
constructive engagement towards Beijing and assesses the level of convergence 
achieved by EU members. The findings of this chapter provide the basis for the 
subsequent analysis of the security-strategic dimension of the EU’s China policy carried 
out in the following Chapters.
4.1 The new significance of the Chinese market for Europe’s economic security in 
the post-Cold War era
On 5 July 1995, the European Commission released its Communication A Long-Term 
Policy for China-Europe Relations, which laid down the EU’s new approach towards 
Beijing. The document declared that “the time has come to redefine the EU’s 
relationship with China, in the spirit of the new Asia strategy”. With the aim to put the 
EU member states’ relationships with the PRC into a “single integrated framework”, the 
Commission declared that relations with China “are bound to be a cornerstone in 
Europe’s external relations, both with Asia and globally”. Point of departure of the 
Commission’s document is the rise of China, seen as an unprecedented event since the 
Second World War. While the analysis concentrates on China’s economic upsurge and 
the potentialities of its market for European business, the paper lays down a strategy of 
constructive engagement for integrating China into the world community, in particular 
its participation to inter-governmental organisations and the conditions under which
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China would be re-admitted to the World Trade Organisation (WTO).302 The 
Commission stresses that China’s reform and opening-up process, its size, growth rate, 
and great potential for further development, would mean enormous opportunities for EU 
businesses. Consequently, in order for European industry to be globally competitive, “it 
must be present in the world’s most dynamic market”.303
This idea of the need to maintain the EU’s global competitiveness would find 
support in the emergence of a new conception of European security in the post Cold 
War period. In its 1993 White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, Employment - the 
Challenges and Ways Forward into the 21st Century, the European Commission states 
that in this globalised world, the EU’s economic security must be protected.304 In the 
same year (1993), Germany had proposed a similar argument. The Kohl government 
became the first EU member state to put forward a more pro-active strategy towards 
China and, more generally, Asia. The German document - Asien Konzept der 
Bundesregierung - outlined the new significance of the Asian markets for Europe. This 
became evident in 1992, when the Union trade with Asia overtook EU-US trade for the 
first time. The German concept paper stated that Germany - and Europe as a whole - 
had to “strengthen economic relations with the largest growth region in the world” in 
order to maintain Germany -  and the Union’s - leading role in the world economy 305 
The document also emphasised the emergence of China as the rising power in the 
region and, consequently, the need for the EU to engage Beijing in a more constructive 
way.
Similar moves by the other large EU member states (in particular, France, the 
UK and Italy) helped formulate the link between the protection of EU’s economic 
security and the exploitation of business opportunities in the Asian region and, in 
particular, China. As discussed in Chapter 3, in a further attempt to catch up with 
Germany, the French Minister for Industry, Gerard Longuet, while visiting Beijing and 
Hong Kong in 1994, launched a new French strategy called Ten Initiatives for Asia. In 
Summer 1994, the European Commission adopted the EU’s New Asia Strategy (NAS)
302 Commission of the European Communities, A Long-Term Policy for China-Europe Relations, 
Brussels, COM (95), 279 final, 1995, p. 1. The Commission document was following similar moves by 
the US and, later, Japan.
303 Ibid., p.2.
304 European Commission, White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness, Employment - the Challenges and 
Ways Forward into the 21st Century, COM(93) 700 final, 1993.
305 Asien Konzept der Bundesregierung, in Europa Archiv 6/1994, n. 189, pp. 142-157.
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and a few months later France’s Foreign Minister, Herve de la Charette, announced that 
Asia would receive special attention as the nouvelle frontiere of French diplomacy. In 
the same period, also the UK, Italy, and the Netherlands begun to prioritise the 
development of economic relations with Asian countries.
While Germany took the lead in the elaboration of the EU’s Asia’s - and China’s - 
policy, it was left to the European Commission to put forward a definition of economic 
security for the whole Union. According to the Commission, Europe’s economic 
security can be defined as “the long term ability to protect the relative welfare position 
by ensuring access to resources and production capability, securing market outlets and 
maintaining macroeconomic stability”. More specifically, according to the Commission 
the EU needs to protect its (relative) welfare position by: (i) ensuring access to 
resources and production capability (i.e. access to raw materials, oil, technology); (ii) by 
securing market outlets (i.e. access to export markets for goods and services and the 
ability to extend economic activity like investment beyond national boundaries; (iii) 
maintaining a stable international macroeconomic environment. For the European 
Commission, economic security is closely interlinked with environmental security, 
which is defined as the need to guarantee the maintenance of shared ecosystems.306
Following up on the Commission’s definition, the 1995 and subsequent 
Commission’s papers on China have pointed out that Europe’s economic security is 
directly affected by developments in China, in particular by Beijing’s “steady, sustained 
and environmentally sustainable economic growth”. In other words, the Commission 
asserts that, if this kind of growth is maintained, it is “in the mutual interests of both 
China and the EU”.307 Thus, for the Commission it is fundamental to take advantage of 
the opportunities provided by China’s economic growth in order to protect the EU’s 
(relative) welfare position.
How does, in practice, China’s economic development affect the EU’s economic 
security? For instance, the EU is very sensitive to world oil and food markets. Since
306 Interviews, European Commission, DG RELEX, 9-10 July 2004. The definition has been put forward 
by Unit 1-2 (Policy Planning) of the Directorate General I, External Relations (DG RELEX) in charge of 
Commercial Policy and Relations with North America, the Far East, Australia and New Zealand. Some 
material has been published as a book chapter; see: Katja Afheldt, in collaboration with S. Weyant 
(environment) and M. Gago de la Mata (external relations), Economic Security: The E U ’s Stake in a 
Sustainable Development in China, in Werner Draguhn and Robert Ash (eds.), China’s Economic 
Security, London, Curzon, 1999, pp. 172-229.
307 A Long-Term Policy fo r China-Europe Relations (1995).
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China, due to its large population and economic needs, depends on more and more 
imports, world markets have to make the corresponding adjustments. According to the 
Commission, if China could maintain a steady economic growth and a stable expansion 
of its imports, the possibilities for gradual adjustments could be facilitated. From an 
European perspective, disruptive shocks from sudden oil surges, or strongly fluctuating 
Chinese imports, should be avoided. Otherwise, the world markets and, consequently, 
the Union’s economy, would be adversely influenced.
Furthermore, China is one of the major outlets for European goods and 
investments. At this time of greater economic interdependence, the outside market is 
becoming more important for the EU than ever before. EU exports make up one-fourth 
of world trade and many million jobs depends on exports directly, and even more 
indirectly.308 In addition, with the progress of globalisation in production, more and 
more European businesses are benefiting from the size of the Chinese market and its 
increasing appetite for imports (e.g. capital goods). In the last years, a growing number 
of European companies have been relocating activities to China in order to profit from 
its cost advantage. As a result, they have been improving their overall competitiveness 
vis-a-vis international competitors.309
European FDI flows into China account for some 10% of all FDI. Foreign 
direct investment flows into China have soared from a very modest level in the early 
1990s to reach US$ 52,700 million in 2002. This is almost twice the level of FDI 
inflows into Central and Eastern Europe and fifteen times more than the FDI inflows 
into India.310 The largest investors into China are the overseas Chinese community in 
Hong Kong and Taiwan. Early European FDI into China was primarily motivated by 
the low costs and went into exporting industries. Currently, an increasing share of 
FDI is motivated by the desire to produce for the growing Chinese market. The 
absolute volumes of China-bound FDI flows have multiplied in recent years. For 
instance, British companies’ FDI in China amounted to only USS 72 million in 1985 
but rose to US$ 896 million in 2002. In the same period German FDI flows rose from 
US$ 24 million to US$ 928 million, while French enterprises committed US$ 32 
million in 1985 but US$ 576 million in 2002 to activities in China.
308 For more details, see: European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document -  European 
Competitiveness Report 2004, Brussels, SEC (2004) 1397, November 2004.
309 Ibid, in particular Chapter 5:“The Challenge to the EU of a Rising Chinese Economy”, pp. 299-354.
310 Data from the Delegation of the European Commission in Beijing.
130
Table 5: EU FDI flows to China (1994-2002) in US$ million
1994 2002
Germany 259 928
United Kingdom 689 896
France 192 576
Netherlands 111 572
Italy 206 177
Belgium 32 124
Sweden 24 100
Spain 10 92
EU 12 1,415
EU 15 3,710
World 33,767 52,743
Source: National Bureau of Statistics, Chinese Ministry of Commerce
(http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/index.htmy
In the 2004 European Competitiveness Report, the European Commission argues 
that success in the Chinese market does not only generate growth, but economies of 
scale which are even more important for large enterprises to protect their strategic 
position against their American and Japanese competitors. Since it is generally assumed 
that an increase in European exports, as well as the success of European companies 
abroad would be translated in the creation of more jobs within the EU, it follows that 
securing market outlets and fair competition for European industries in China has 
become a major economic interest for the EU. Thus, only under a steady economic 
growth could China create constant demand for European goods, services, and 
investment in the long run.311
311 European Competitiveness Report 2004; see, in particular, Chapter 5: “The Challenge to the EU of a 
Rising Chinese Economy”, pp. 299-354.
Steady economic growth is also the pre-condition for China’s sticking to its 
transformation process - the transition to a market economy and integration into the 
world economic system - which is absolutely essential to enable European companies to 
compete on equal - or fair - footing in the Chinese market. Moreover, the European 
Commission emphasizes that China’s increasing presence on world markets affects 
global prices and thus shapes the global competitive environment in which European 
industries operate. In sum, any change in China’s economy has, increasingly, a bearing 
on global markets.
China’s domestic economic factors are closely connected to (and interrelated with) 
political factors. Since China plays an increasingly important role in the maintenance 
(or disruption) of regional and global stability, instabilities within China and/or in the 
region will have a direct detrimental effect on the region’s economic performance and 
therefore on EU’s exports and FDI in the entire East Asian region. According to the 
Commission, domestic stability within China does not only depend on internal political 
developments (role of the CCP, political liberalisation, ethnic conflicts) but also on the 
social costs of the reform of the ailing State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), unemployment, 
inflation, the growing gap between rich and poor and between the coastal areas and the 
interior, migration due to inequalities in regional development or to environmental 
degradation. All of them are potential causes of social unrest and, as a consequence, 
potentially damaging to the economic climate and to EU’s economic interests.312
Consequently, the Commission and the EU member states hope that China’s 
foreign policy will continue to be guided by a pragmatic approach usually referred to as 
peaceful rise (or, in the later version, harmonious development). However, the 
Taiwanese issue remains a key problem, as China’s anti-secession law passed in March 
2005 demonstrates. As a matter of fact, any tension arising in the Taiwan Straits has the 
potential to disrupt regional stability and impact on EU’s interests in the area. The EU 
has tended to avoid the Taiwan question. However, the arms embargo issue has proved 
that miscalculations by the part of the EU could upset East Asia’s strategic balance in a 
way that could run counter the stated goal by the EU to be committed to - and 
supportive of - the maintenance of regional stability (in order to protect the Union’s
312 Afheldt (1999).
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interests in the area).313 The impact of developments in China -  and in Cross-Strait 
relations - on the EU is thus not restricted to direct EU-China relations but has a much 
wider nature. Consequently, the EU has a significant interest in both a steady and 
sustained development of the Chinese economy (combined with its integration into the 
world’s economic and regulatory systems) and the maintenance of regional stability. In 
this sense, the EU believes that its interests in East Asia would also be greatly damaged 
by decreasing growth rates in China, since an economic downturn could lead to 
increasing tensions both within China and in the region. Moreover, diminishing 
attractiveness of the Chinese market along with an eventual closing of the country could 
lead to China’s neighbours defiance and containment policies of the West, in particular 
the US. In contrast, EU officials suggest that a firm engagement of China in multilateral 
(i.e. WTO), inter-regional (APEC, ASEM) and regional bodies - ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) - an opening up of the country and 
an engagement policy from the West would allow sustaining growth rates and the 
creation of a good climate for regional and international cooperation. Hence, the 
insistence of the European Commission and its member states on a firm policy of 
engagement towards Beijing.314
The link made by EU policy makers between the protection of the Union’s 
(relative) welfare position and China’s long-term development finds its counterpart in 
Beijing’s view of the significance of Europe for China’s economic security. Since the 
beginning of the 1990s, enhancing relations with European countries has been seen by 
Chinese leaders as part of the country’s strategic goal of boosting China’s 
comprehensive strength. For Chinese leaders, fostering relations with the EU is very 
important for both commercial and security-strategic reasons - in particular, for 
obtaining advance Western technology needed for China’s modernisation.315 We will 
discuss in the next section Chinese scholars and policy makers’ considerations of 
Europe’s role for China’s modernisation process.
4.2 Europe’s significance for China’s economic security
Since the end of the Cold War, the term economic security has become popular in 
Chinese policy speeches and news media analyses. The Chinese term for economic
313 We will discuss these issues in more detail in Chapters 6 and 7.
314 All the interviewees agreed on this point.
315 For further details, see Chapter 5.
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security is Jingji anquart. Most Chinese IR scholars have focused on the external 
dimension of China’s economic security and the term Guojia jingji anquan (national 
economic security) has become the standard notion. At the beginning of the 1990s 
Chinese scholars and policy makers alike begun to elaborate a new understanding of the 
political, military and security implications that the end of the Cold War and the 
gathering process of globalisation and economic interdependence would have on China. 
In the aftermath of 1989 Tiananmen events and with the demise of the Soviet Union as 
a fresh reminder, Chinese leaders insisted that domestic stability should be pursued at 
the expense of democratising China’s political system. Moreover, the first Gulf War in 
1991 was seen by Chinese scholars and policy makers as the demonstration that respect 
and status in international relations were still rooted in military power, which was 
based, in turn, on economic strength.
The main reading at that time was that with the end of the Cold War, the 
economy had become a major factor in determining the growth and decline, as well as 
the rise and fall of nations. This Chinese interpretation seemed to vindicate the view, 
popularised by the book by Paul Kennedy, that only economically sound countries were 
able, in the long-term, to wage war and assert their influence on the global stage.316 
According to this view, the post-Cold War period saw a shift of the main battlefield of 
international competition from the military to the economic one. As a result, for Chinese 
scholars the essence of competition would increasingly be a contest for overall national 
strength based on the economy, as well as the development of science and technology. 
Chinese leaders saw in the dissolution of the Soviet Union an example of how economic 
problems could bring a superpower to a collapse. In addition, the first Gulf War 
reinforced the view of the importance of science and technology for contemporary 
warfare.317
In 1992, Zhao Yang, a Chinese scholar at the Institute of Industrial Economic 
Research of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), defined the threats to 
national economy security as to include the terms of international exchanges in trade 
and investment, science and technology, and the environment. Zhao considered disputes 
between China and its major trading partners to amount to a soft warfare waged against
316 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall o f the Great Powers, New York, Vintage, 1989.
317 Interview, Beijing, 27 September 2004. See also: Daojiong Zha, “Chinese Considerations of 
‘Economic Security’”, in Journal o f Chinese Political Science, Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring 1999, pp. 69-87.
134
Beijing.318 In 1994, other Chinese scholars defined economic security as the “country’s 
global economic competitiveness; its capacity to resist disruptions to, threats to, and 
invasion to its economy; and the domestic and international environments enabling a 
country’s economy to survive and grow continuously”.319
The identification of China’s global economic competitiveness as one key 
indicator of the country’s economic security seems to derive, as in the case of the EU, 
from an uncritical acceptance of the globalist mantra of competitiveness propounded by 
the Geneva-based World Economic Forum (WEF) in its Global Competitiveness 
Report.320 Behind acceptance of the WEF’s competitiveness research framework lies the 
argument of urging implementation of reform measures within China, as well as raising 
awareness about the dangers that China, as an economic entity, faces in a globalised 
world that is perceived to be a zero-sum search for economic supremacy.321
At the political-strategic level, with the end of the Cold War and the possibility 
of a US-dominated global political economic order looming large, Chinese emphasis 
had shifted to finding the ways and means for creating a multi-polar world order in the 
post-Cold War era. The Chinese leadership’s notion of a multi-polar world order would 
increasingly tend to view China as one of the poles striving to be on a par -  and 
competing - with the US.322 As a result, the logic goes that in order to deter American 
unilateral attitudes in world affairs that could harm China’s rise, Chinese leaders must 
equip their country to become strong economically in order to stand guard against US 
efforts to frustrate Beijing’s upsurge.
These Chinese perceptions would find evidence in the growing number of works 
published by some leading American think tanks (in particular, the RAND) on how to
318 Zhao Ying, Xinde Guojia Anquan Guan: Zhanzhen zhiwai de duikangyu xuanze (A New Perspective 
on National Security: No-War Confrontations and Choices for China), Kunming, Yunnan Renmin 
Chubanshe, 1992.
319 Zhao Ying, Xu Heping and Xing Guoren, Zhongguo Jingji Mianlin de Weixian: Guojia Jingji Anquan 
Lun (Dangers Facing China’s Economy: Considerations of China’s Economic Security), Kunming, 
Yunnan Renmin Chubanshe, 1994; see also Liu Jianping, Guojia Jingji Anquan Wenti Yanjiu Shuyao 
(Summary of Research on National Economic Security), in Renmin Ribao, 30 January 1999, p. 6, as 
quoted in Zha (1999), p. 72.
320 See: http://www.weforum.org/site/homepublic.nsf/Content/Global+Competitiveness+Programme.
321 Personal communication with Claude Smadja, Deputy-Director, World Economic Forum, Davos, 2 
February 2000; interview, Beijing, 26 September 2004.
322 For a more comprehensive discussion o f Chinese views of multi-polarity see Chapter 5. See also, 
Christopher Hughes, “Nationalism and Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: Implications for 
Southeast Asia”, The Pacific Review, Vol. 18, no. 1, March 2005, pp. 119-135.
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prevent the emergence of peer competitors to the US in the post-Cold War era.323 In 
order to become stronger and thus be able to counter the perceived US containment 
policies, China needs to improve economic ties and acquire advanced technology from 
other leading nations of the world. In this context, enhancing economic and scientific 
relations with the EU is seen by the Chinese leadership as a highly strategic long-term 
objective. In the 2003 China's EU Policy Paper, Beijing even put forward the strategic 
goal that the “EU become China’s largest trading and investment partner”.324
China’s determination to strengthen economic ties and technology transfers with 
the EU is closely linked with Beijing’s re-definition of its national core interests. Since 
1978, Chinese leaders have identified modernisation and economic development as one 
of the new national core interests and central goals (the others being opposing 
hegemony and achieving unification with Taiwan). Deng Xiaoping declared, in 1994, 
that China’s future and fate, as well as its prosperity (or decline), comprehensive 
national power and international status are directly linked to economic development.325 
The latter is also seen as the “firm, unshakeable and overriding” goal of the Chinese 
Communist Party of China (CCP). In a situation where the Maoist ideology has lost its 
appeal and raison d ’etre, delivering economic development and rising standard of living 
-  along with achieving unification with Taiwan - has become the basis for the 
legitimisation of the ruling CCP.326
According to the Chinese leadership, in order to carry out the modernisation 
process and economic development, both reforms and a open-door policy are needed. 
With regard to the reform process, for the CCP this means the transformation from a 
system of planned economy to a market-oriented one, while the open-door policy is 
based on a firm adherence to the development of economic and technological exchanges 
and cooperation with foreign countries. The overall objective being the maintenance of
323 See in particular Thomas S. Szayna et al., The Emergence o f  Peer Competitors: A Framework for  
Analysis, Santa Monica: CA, RAND, 2001.
324 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China’s EU Policy Paper, 2003, available at: http://www.china- 
un.ch/eng/lizg/zgwizc/t85896.htm). We will discuss it further in the next Chapter.
325 See: Deng Xiaoping, Selected Works. Volume II, Beijing, The People’s Printing House, 1994, pp. 162- 
63 and p. 194.
326 For more details see: Christopher Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era, London, 
Routledge, 2006.
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sustained economic growth over the next decades in order to “build a well-off society in 
a well-rounded way” by the middle of the 21st century.327
With annual average growth rates close to 10% since the open-door policy 
begun, China has become one of the world’s major markets and the third largest 
exporter of goods. According to data released on 20 December 2005 by China’s 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), China’s output for 2004 was 15,987 trillion of 
yuan (US$ 1,971 trillion) - 16,8% more of the other estimates - putting China firmly in 
the sixth place of the world economy (ahead of Italy). In a further estimate of China’s 
output on 25 January 2006, the NBS has corrected upwards (9,9%) the GDP for 2005. 
As a result, China has also outperformed France and the UK, becoming the fourth 
largest economy in 2005 with a GDP of US$ 2,262 trillion (see table below):
Table 6 - GDP of the first seven economies in the world (2005)
(in US$ trillion)
United States 12,473
Japan 4,606
Germany 2,803
China 2,262
United Kingdom 2,188
France 2,112
Italy 1,706
Elaboration data from the Economist Intelligence Unit (2006) World Bank (2005) and China’s National 
Bureau of Statistics (2006)^28
327 Report o f the 13th National Congress o f  the Chinese Communist Party, Beijing, 25 October-1 
November 1987, available at: http://www.chinatodav.com/org/cpc/: see also the conclusions of the Fifth 
Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, Beijing, 8-11 October 
2005.
328 The data have been recently published in Aspenia, n. 32,2006, p. 10.
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If China’s output is measured at purchasing power parity (PPP), a measure that 
strips out the effects of the exchange rate, China is already the third biggest economy in 
the world, contributing 13,4% of world GDP (see table below):
Table 7 - Changes in the world economy
GDP growth % of world GDP (at PPP)
(average year-on-year change)
1986-96 1996-06 1986 1996 2006 201
United States 2,9 3,4 22,5 21,6 20,7 20,0
Euro-zone n.a. 2,0 n.a. 17,6 15,1 13,1
Japan 3,2 0,9 8,8 8,7 6,9 5,3
China 10,0 8,3 5,0 9,4 13,4 19,9
India 5,9 5,9 4,0 5,1 6,0 7,1
Rest of Asia 7,8 6,6 13,1 20,1 25,1 31,9
Elaboration data from: International Monetary Fund (2005), World Bank (2004), OECD (20 05). 329
Owing to China’s gradual opening to the international economy, exports from 
China have grown by more than 10% per year since the second half of the 1990s. China 
is currently the third largest exporter of merchandise goods in the world. In 2004, 
exports accounted for 31% of China’s GDP.330 Since admission in 2001, WTO 
membership has given China much better access to Western markets and propelled it 
into the ranks of the world’s top exporters. Beijing is currently the world’s biggest 
exporter of bicycles, toys, microwaves, TVs and many other consumer electronic goods. 
It produces more than half of the world’s shoes and looks set to capture a similar share 
of the world’s market for clothes in the coming years.331 Moreover, China’s industrial
329 International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook, Washington, September 2005; World Bank, 
World Development Report 2005: A Better Investment Climate fo r  Everyone, Washington, September 
2004, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Economic Survey o f China, 
Paris, October 2005 (http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/25/35294862.pdf).
330 Data from China’s Ministry of Commerce: http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/.
331 See Razeen Sally, China’s Trade Policies in Wider Asian Perspective, paper prepared for the 
LSE/CCER conference, Beijing, 22-23 August 2005, available at:
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policy has selectively attracted FDI in technology intensive industries in order to benefit 
from foreign technology and organisational know how. At the same time, Chinese 
authorities have actively promoted domestic companies -  national champions - which 
are regarded as having the potential to compete in world markets. These have 
contributed to the rapid upgrading of China’s industrial structures.
Since 2004, the EU-25 is currently China’s biggest trading partner and one of its 
most important foreign investors. Import competition from China used to focus on 
labour-intensive goods and low-skill industries. At present, China’s active industrial 
policy is turning the country into a low-cost competitor in high-skill industries. In the 
production of information technology goods -  telecommunication equipment and 
computers -  foreign invested enterprises account for 60-70% of output. These two 
industries are among the top three exporters into the EU and have increased their 
exports at annual rates of some 20-30%. The overall share of high-skill industries in 
China’s manufacturing exports to the EU-15 has already risen above 20%, which is 
twice as high as the share of high-skill industries in the exports of the ten new EU 
member states to the EU-15. The rapid growth of skill-intensive imports from China 
represents a challenge to the EU, for which China traditionally was a supplier of low- 
skill goods. We will discuss in the following section the significance of EU-China 
commercial ties, as well as the political implications of EU member states’ growing 
trade deficits with China.
4.3 EU-China commercial relations
As discussed earlier, the EU has made the link between the protection of its (relative) 
welfare position and China’s development. By the same token, Chinese policy makers 
have also established the link between the protection of China’s economic security and 
the bolstering of relations with the EU, in particular with regard to the possibility of 
acquiring advanced technology that would otherwise be more difficult to obtain from 
the US or Japan. Therefore, enhancing bilateral trade links has always occupied an
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/intemationalTradePolicvUnit/Razeen articles/CHINAtradepolicv%20wi 
th%20charts%20and%20tablesl%20-%202005.doc: see also Katinka Barysch with Charles Grant and 
Mark Leonard, Embracing the dragon: The E U ’s Partnership with China, London, Centre for European 
Reform (CER), May 2005.
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important place in EU-China relations. Both sides regard it as the “basis for continuous 
development of Sino-European relations”.332
As a result, between 2000 and 2004, EU-China trade almost doubled, with exports 
rising from €25.8 billion to €48 billion and imports growing from €74.4 billion to 
€126.7 billion. Since 2004 (after EU’s enlargement), China has become the Union’s 
second biggest trading partner (after the US) and, according to China customs, the EU- 
25 has become China’s biggest trading partner -  ahead of the US as well as Japan. Since 
1978, when China started to open up its economy, EU-China trade has increased more 
than 40-fold to reach around €175 billion in 2004. China trade imbalances are 
increasingly creating problems with the EU (not to mention the US where the trade 
deficit with China has become part of the domestic political debate). The Union’s trade 
deficit with China increased from €48.6 billion in 2000 to €78.7 billion in 2004 (see 
table below).
Figure 2: EU25 trade with China
(in million of euros)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Average growth 
2000-2004 (%)
Imports 74.4 81.6 89.6 105.4 126.7 +14.3
Exports 25.8 30.6 34.9 41.2 48.0 +16.9
Balance -48.6 -51.0 -54.7 -64.2 -78.7
Source: Eurostat (http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal relations/china/intro/index.htm)
This is the EU’s largest bilateral trade deficit and it almost doubled over the last 
four years. The Union and China are -  so far -  quite complementary in the global 
division of labour. China exports to the EU mainly labour-intensive goods, or 
mechanical and electrical products with low technology content, while the EU exports 
to China largely capital-intensive goods, such as steel and chemical products or 
technology-intensive goods. As discussed earlier, however, in the last years China’s
332 A Maturing Partnership - Shared Interests and Challenges in EU-China Relations (2003).
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active industrial policy is turning the country into a low-cost competitor in high-skill 
industries. Consequently, China has started to seriously challenge EU industries that are 
considered sensitive, in particular the chemical, engineering and the textile sectors. The 
latter, in particular, has become a contentious issue across Europe reinforcing the 
perceived need of protectionist measures against China.
With regard to the textile sector, since January 2005, with the Multi-Fibre 
Agreement (MFA) coming into effect, EU tariffs and quotas on Chinese textile had to 
be removed, only to be partly reintroduced in July 2005 following protectionist protests 
across Europe. The question of cheap Chinese products invading the EU’s market has 
become a political issue in some EU member states, in particular in France and Italy. 
This question is also linked to the Market Economy Status (MES) issue. When China 
joined the WTO in 2001, the existing members, including the EU, insisted that Beijing 
remained classified as a non-market economy for a period of 15 years. Such 
classification makes it easier for other countries to impose anti-dumping measures on 
Chinese exports.
Chinese leaders argue that their country has already made tremendous efforts on 
the way to become a market economy and that many countries have already upgraded 
China to MES. Moreover, Chinese officials argue that the Union has upgraded Russia to 
MES, without Moscow being a member of the WTO or its economy being more liberal 
than the Chinese one.333 For China, MES has become a question of political prestige, 
since the upgrade would signify to be regarded as an equal economic partner of the EU. 
In addition, the MES status will make it more difficult for the EU to impose anti­
dumping duties on Beijing.334 At a time when most EU members experience large trade 
deficits with Beijing and China is challenging the relative competitiveness of the new 
EU member states, the MES status has become a sensitive issue, which explains, in part, 
the EU’s refusal to grant it to Beijing.335 In the next section we will examine the 
economic strategies that the Commission and the large EU member states have adopted 
over the years to conquer the Chinese market and try to reduce Europe’s trade deficits.
333 Interview, Yang Hua, Deputy-Director, Division of European Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Beijing, 21 September 2004.
334 Interview, ibid.
335 Fore more details see the European Competitiveness Report 2004, in particular Chapter 5: “The 
Challenge to the EU of a Rising Chinese Economy”.
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4.3.1 EU member states’ competition for China’s market shares
Since the 1985 Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), EU member states have 
entrusted the Commissioner for External Trade to conduct economic negotiations with 
China at the EU level in order to collectively exercise a greater bargaining power. By 
throwing their support behind the Trade Commissioner, EU members have succeeded in 
maximising their economic leverage as a trading superpower vis-a-vis China. In 
particular, the negotiations for China’s entry into the WTO in 2001 have consolidated 
the European Commission’s role as the central actor in EU-China economic relations. 
However, EU governments -  in particular the large ones - have continued to pursue 
economic strategies toward China aimed at championing their national industries. After 
examining the economic strategies adopted by the large EU member states for acquiring 
China’s market shares, we will discuss the political consequences of this contemporary 
European scramble for the Chinese market.
As discussed in Chapter 2, France and Germany have taken the lead in 
championing the interests of their national companies vis-a-vis China. The French 
government, for instance, has traditionally adopted a strategy of pushing politically 
supported large-scale grand contracts.336 Since the establishment of full diplomatic 
relations with Beijing in 1964, French leaders have been active in pressing for 
govemment-to-govemment deals. In 1996, President Chirac announced the ambitious 
goal of tripling the 2% French share of China’s trade to 6% within ten years, confirming 
the French determination to match the German presence in the China market. The state 
visit to China by Chirac in May 1997 was remarkable. The French President was 
accompanied by a large number of French corporate leaders and the state visit resulted 
in the Chinese government buying 30 new Airbuses worth $1.5 billion, together with 
other contracts on power stations and car production. The same practice still continues 
today, as demonstrated by the state visit to France in December 2005 by Wen Jiabao, 
China’s Prime Minister. The visit resulted in China buying 150 Airbus A320 (worth €9 
billion) and a telecommunication satellite from Alcatel (€140 million). Moreover, the 
Chinese leader signed an agreement with Eurocopter for the joint-development of
336 Markus Taube, “Economic Relations between the PRC and the States of Europe”, in The China 
Quarterly, N. 169, March 2002, pp. 78-107.
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helicopters (€300 million), and a financial protocol for the construction of high-speed 
rail systems (€150 million).337
Notwithstanding the significance of these grand contracts, the overall value of 
France-China trade remains modest. In 2003, France’s share of China’s market 
(exports) was 1,5%, distant from Germany’s 4,4%, but ahead of Italy (1,4%), while the 
market share for imports was 4,1%.338 The resulting trade deficit (-€8,7 billion) is 
France’s largest. More importantly, this trade deficit has started to become a contentious 
issue in French domestic politics, especially in 2005 over Chinese textiles.339
With regard to Germany, its strategy of maintaining good political relations with 
Beijing has brought huge benefits to German companies. Following the French example 
of the grand contracts, Berlin has lent its support, for instance, for the sale to China of 
the German-built trans-rapid magnetic levitation train, a project that met with stiff 
competition from Japanese and French rivals. The strong commitment of Chancellor 
Gerhard Schroder was instrumental in awarding the contract to Berlin. The practice still 
continues today. In November 2005, during the state visit to Germany by Hu Jintao, the 
Chinese President, eight deals (worth €2 billion) were signed. The largest deal is an 
agreement with German electronics giant Siemens to produce 60 trans-rapid trains.
Since 2002, China has been Germany’s second biggest export market outside 
Europe after the US, even ahead of Japan. Conversely, Germany is, by far, China’s 
largest EU trading partner and ranks sixth amongst China’s trading partners overall. 
Since 1998, German exports to China have been growing between 20% and 28%. 
Germany’s consistently maintains a trade deficit with China which has ranged between 
€5 billion and €9 billion for years. However, the proportion of the trade deficit to the 
total of bilateral trade is relatively small: in 2004 the deficit was €7.5 billion on total 
trade volume of €49.5 billion. To note that this trade deficit has never become a matter 
of political significance. With regard to FDI, since 1999 Germany has been China’s 
largest European investor. By the end of 2003, German companies had invested a total 
of US$ 9.8 billion in China. In addition to the chemical industry (BASF and Bayer), the
337 Le Monde, Tuesday 6 December 2005; see also “La Chine: le nouvel eldorado d’EADS”, in Air & 
Cosmos, n. 2009, 9 December 2005, pp. 10-11. We will examine the security-strategic implications of 
these deals in Chapter 5.
338 Data from: http://www.diDlomatie.gouv.fr/fr/Davs-zones-geo 833/chine 567/index.html.
339 For a current discussion of the impact of the “China” issue on French domestic politics, see: Erik 
Izraelewicz, Quand la Chine change le monde, Paris, Grasset, 2005.
143
investments have been mainly made in the automobile sector (Volkswagen, BMW) and 
mechanical engineering.340
Also the UK has adopted a commercial strategy of political support to British 
companies. During the state visit to the UK in November 2005, Hu Jintao, the Chinese 
President, approved the entry into the Chinese market of the Lloyd’s of London. 
Moreover, a deal for the sale of the Rolls-Royce Trent 700 engines to Air China to 
power the new fleet of 20 Airbus A330-200 (worth US$ 800 million) and a protocol 
extending co-operation on a US$500 million contract to produce Airbus A320 family 
wing boxes in China were signed.341 The UK consistently runs one of the largest trade 
deficits in the EU with China. In 2004 the trade deficit was €17 billion on total bilateral 
trade of €24 billion. Although the UK government and the business community would 
certainly like to correct this imbalance, this has never acquired a political dimension. 
The stance of the UK government is generally anti-protectionist, and the strategy of 
London in correcting the trade deficit is indicated by the support given to British 
companies.
Unlike France, Germany and the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain have relied 
less on politically-supported large-scale grand contracts. Italian Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs), in particular, have entered the Chinese market without direct 
support from Rome. The Italian government has, in fact, helped its companies 
indirectly, by concentrating on the overall promotion of the “made in Italy” brand. In 
2003, with a total export value of €4.7 billion and a market share of 1,4%, Italy ranked 
third among Chinese EU suppliers, after Germany and France. Conversely, with a total 
import value of €5.5 billion and a market share of 1,5%, Italy ranked fifth among the 
Chinese EU clients (after Germany, the Netherlands, Britain and France).342 Although 
Italy’s trade deficit is smaller than the other large EU member states, the fear of an 
invasion of large quantities of Chinese products has become part of the domestic 
political debate. The emergence of a “China question” in Italy is explained, in large 
part, by the fact that in a wide range of low-tech productions (such as textiles, shoes,
340 http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/laenderinfos/laender/laender ausgabe html?land id=32.
341 See: http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page8508.asp
342 Data from: http://www.italianembassv.org.cn/fechpal.htm.
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etc.), Italy and China compete against each other, with the difference that Italy does not 
enjoy China’s comparative low labour costs.343
Finally, Spain runs a deficit with China as well, but its total bilateral trade was a 
mere €8.5 billion in 2004. However, Madrid is giving more and more priority to the 
establishment of good economic and political relations with Beijing, as demonstrated by 
the recent state visit to Spain (November 2005) by Hu Jintao. The Chinese President 
and Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, the Spanish Prime Minister, announced the 
establishment of a comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries. In 
particular, Spain seems to be very interested in the opening up of China’s tourist 
industry. As one of the world’s most popular tourist destinations, Spain plans to receive 
150,000 to 200,000 Chinese tourists in the next three to five years, with the hope to 
acquire a large share of the promising Chinese tourist market.344
In conclusion, despite a Common Commercial Policy (CCP) and repeated calls 
by the Commission for increased policy coordination, EU member states’ have 
continued to compete against each other for China’s market shares in order to redress 
the growing bilateral trade deficits and maintain the global competitiveness of their 
companies (see table below).
Table 8: EU members’ share of China’s market in 2003 (%)
Exports Imports
Germany 4,4 5,3
France 1,5 4,1
United Kingdom 1,3 4,2
Italy 1,4 1,5
Source: elaboration data from National Bureaus of Statistics (Germany, France, Italy and the UK), 2004- 
2005.
343 For more details on the Italian political debate around the “China question”, see the latest book by the 
former Italian Minister for the Economy: Giulio Tremonti, Rischi Fatali. L ’Europa vecchia, la Cina, il 
mercatismo suicida: come reagire, Milano, Amoldo Mondadori Editore, 2005.
344 For further details see: http://www.casaasia.es/ and
http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/analisis/848.asp.
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This European scramble for the Chinese market has been skilfully exploited by 
the Chinese leadership in order to obtain political concessions, usually in the form of 
silence over sensitive issues pertaining to China’s domestic affairs (human rights 
violations, political liberalisation, Tibet, Xinjiang, etc) or national pride (Taiwan). By 
giving priority to commercial considerations and by avoiding to raise contentious issues 
with Beijing, the large EU members have been greatly responsible for the Union’s 
overall diminution of critical pressure. This attitude has repeatedly met with criticism 
from the European Parliament (EP), the smaller EU members (especially the Nordic 
countries) and NGOs. The EU’s approach has also been criticised by the US on the 
grounds that the large EU members’ uncritical attitude towards Beijing tends to 
undermine the West’s efforts to bring about political change in China.
This uncritical attitude towards Beijing is, partly, the result of the influence 
exercised by the German China policy model on the other large EU members. More 
precisely, as discussed in Chapter 2, since the mid-1990s Germany’s foreign policy 
towards China -  founded on discreet diplomacy, change through trade and non- 
confrontation on human rights - appears to have been Europeanised, in the sense that it 
has become the strategy adopted by the majority of the EU member states, especially 
the large ones. Moreover, this Europeanisation of the German China policy seems to 
have been projected (bottom-up process) upon the EU level, influencing the European 
Commission’s China policy.345 We will examine in the following section the political 
implications of this uncritical approach towards Beijing, in particular with regard to 
human rights violations and the Taiwan issue.
4.4 Human rights and the Taiwan issue in EU-China relations
As discussed earlier, since the mid 1990s EU member states have consistently sought to 
maintain good political relations with Beijing in order to obtain politically-motivated 
commercial advantages. As a result, they have been largely responsible for the EU’s 
overall diminution of critical pressure. On the Taiwanese issue, for instance, we 
discussed in Chapter 2 how Sino-French relations became strained in the first part of the
345 Interviews, European Commission, DG RELEX, China desk.
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1990s over France’s sale of weapons to Taiwan. Faced by commercial reprisals from 
Beijing, in 1994 the new French government (led by Edouard Balladour) decided to 
invert this downward spiral trend publicly reaffirming China’s “sole and inalienable 
sovereignty over Taiwan” and committed the French government to no further arms 
sales to Taipei. With these statements relations improved and French companies could 
return bidding for important contracts in the mainland. This shift in policy in Beijing’s 
favour was remarkable during the state visit by Hu Jintao, the Chinese President, to 
Paris in January 2004. On that occasion, President Jacques Chirac stepped up his 
criticism of Taiwan’s planned referendum on 20 March 2004 (which would ask voters 
whether Taiwan should increase its defences, if China refused to redeploy hundreds of 
missiles pointed at Taiwan), describing it as a threat to stability in East Asia. In Chirac’s 
words:
Le Gouvemement fran?ais confirme sa position constante sur Funicite de la Chine. II s'oppose k quelque 
initiative unilateral que ce soit, y compris un referendum qui viserait k modifier le statu quo, accroTtrait 
les tensions dans le cfetroit et conduirait k I'independance de Taiwan. II considdre que les relations entre 
les deux rives du detroit doivent reposer sur un dialogue constructif afin de trouver un feglement 
pacifique k la question de Taiwan et d'assurer la stability et la prosperity dans la region.346
Following Chirac’s statement, especially his remark that “all initiatives that can 
be interpreted as aggressive by one side or the other are dangerous for everyone and 
thus irresponsible”, Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Richard Shih said that Taipei 
would go ahead with the vote, and blamed China for pressurising European 
governments on the issue. Germany, on the contrary, has had a less fleeting attitude on 
the issue. Bonn/Berlin has consistently reaffirmed the “one China” policy in many 
occasions. In January 1993, for instance, Chancellor Kohl refused to approve the sale of 
10 submarines and 10 frigates to Taiwan in order not to upset relations with the PRC. 
From 1997 to 2005, during the Schroder’s governments, Germany has severely reduced 
ties with Taiwan, demonstrating its firm support to the one China policy.347
With regard to human rights, the shift towards a more uncritical policy by the 
large EU members was manifest most visibly in the decision of the EU to cease 
, supporting a motion against China in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
(UNCHR). In 1997, EU unity on this issue collapsed. A number of states, led by France,
346 Joint Franco-Chinese Declaration, Paris, 27 January 2004. See also http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia- 
pacific/3432675.stm.
347 Interview, German Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, Berlin, 7 March 2006.
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with support from Germany, Italy, and Spain, argued that the exercise had become a 
farce, the resolution had never been passed and only once had made it onto the agenda. 
The belief was that the resolution not only had had no concrete impact on human rights 
conditions in China, but that it was also souring relations with Beijing in a way that 
frustrated efforts to acquire influence over political developments within the PRC. In 
1997, Denmark, the UK, and the Netherlands co-sponsored the resolution on China in a 
national capacity, Copenhagen tabling the resolution. Eventually ten states supported 
the resolution, five voted against (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Greece). After 
this, it was agreed that, henceforth, the EU would cease its practice of supporting a 
resolution each year.
After the French-led defection in 1997, a new EU approach to human rights in 
China was unveiled by the General Affairs Council (GAC), and codified in the 1998 
Commission’s paper Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China,348 At the GAC 
meeting on 14 March 1998, EU member states agreed that at the upcoming 1998 
UNCHR session, the EU would “neither propose, nor endorse” any resolution criticising 
China. This position not to co-sponsor the UNCHR resolution with the US has been 
reached at the GAC each year since 1998. In return for this conciliatory approach, China 
agreed to re-engage in a dialogue on human rights, a quid pro quo imposed most 
stringently by the more principled Nordic states. Sweden, Finland and Denmark -  along 
with the Netherlands and Ireland - have, in fact, consistently put the issue of human 
rights at the top of their agenda, since their public opinions and parliaments pay great 
attention to the problem.
4.5 The EU-China Human Rights Dialogue
Since 1998 the EU-China human rights dialogue has been held twice a year. It 
constitutes the only platform to engage China on sensitive issues and for the channelling 
of EU concerns directly to the Chinese authorities. The Commission supports the 
process through its human rights related co-operation programmes (on village 
governance, legal co-operation, promotion of women’s rights, network on Human 
Rights Covenants etc.). The Commission’s role was further bolstered by the pro-active 
stance on human rights adopted by the former External Relations Commissioner, Chris 
Patten. Known for his strong views on human rights in China since his days as the last
348 European Commission, Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China (1998).
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British Governor-general of Hong Kong, Patten listed constructive engagement, 
multilateral cooperation, as well as the promotion of human rights, good governance 
and the rule of law, as three basic objectives of the EU in its relations with East Asia.349
According to the former External Commissioner, the EU-China dialogue on 
human rights is “the most complex and multifaceted dialogue on human rights” which 
the EU has with any country.350 Although the EU has succeeded in establishing such a 
dialogue with China, it suffers from conflicting interests and coordination problems 
between the General Affairs Council, the EU member states, the Commission and the 
European Parliament (EP). Consultations are held under the CFSP framework and the 
resulting positions are coordinated by the Commission. Moreover, some individual EU 
members -  in particular, the Nordic countries - regularly raise human rights concerns in 
their discussions with Beijing.
The EU-China human rights dialogue has been held for almost ten years now, 
guided by benchmarks set out by the Council. The human rights situation and the 
impact of the dialogue upon it was evaluated by the Council in October 2004. In the 
resulting Council Conclusions it was stated that:
The overall assessment of developments showed a mixed picture of progress in some areas and 
continuing concerns in others. On the one hand, the Council acknowledged that China has made 
considerable progress over the last decade in its social-economic development and welcomed steps 
towards strengthening the rule of law, while urging China to ensure effective implementation of such 
measures. On the other hand, the Council expressed concern that, despite these developments, violations 
of human rights continued to occur, such as freedom of expression, freedom of religion, freedom of 
assembly and association, lack of progress in respect for the rights of persons belonging to minorities, 
continued widespread application of the death penalty, and the persistence of torture.351
The EU continues to express its concerns through its Annual Report on Human 
Rights. In its 2005 edition, the EU states that
Although China amended its constitution in March 2004 to include a reference to human rights and 
although there have been positive developments on social questions including migrant workers and
349 Chris Patten, “What does Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy mean for Asia?”, Speech by 
the Commissioner for External Relations at the Japan Institute for International Affairs, Tokyo, 5 July 
2000.
350 Chris Patten, “China’s Candidature for Hosting the Olympic Games in 2008”, Commission 
Statements in urgency debates, by External Relations Commissioner in the European Parliament, Plenary 
Session, Strasbourg, SPEECH/01/33 -  5 July 2001.
351 See: http://www.hrichina.org/fs/downloadables/pdf/downloadable-
resources/EUChinaWeb.pdf/revision id=10337.
149
HIV/AIDS and on the ongoing reform of the judicial and legal system, the EU remains concerned about 
continuing violations of human rights in China.352
In practice, however, the leading actor within the EU in promoting human rights 
in China has been the European Parliament. Since 1987, the EP has continued to make 
public criticisms of China’s human rights record, especially on Tibet, arbitrary 
detention, capital punishment, religious and political freedoms.353 Moreover, the EP has 
leveraged on the political prestige and international publicity that it can confer on 
foreign personalities embodying the struggle for the advancement of human rights. In 
this context, the EP infuriated Beijing when, in 1996, it awarded the Sakharov Prize for 
Freedom of Thought to Wei Jingsheng, at that time China’s most celebrated dissident. 
Beijing also voiced its criticisms in October 2001 when the EP invited the Dalai Lama 
to address a joint session in Strasbourg.
Notwithstanding the efforts by the EP, the Commission and the Nordic states in 
the promotion of democracy and human rights in China, the large EU member states 
(Germany, France, Italy, Spain and, to a lesser extent, the UK) have tended to shy away 
from open criticising Beijing for fear of commercial losses. It appears that EU policy 
makers -  especially from the large EU members - have concluded that gaining 
immediate commercial advantages would be politically more fruitful than raising 
contentious issues with Beijing. This approach is the result of a number of 
considerations.
First of all, EU member states must cope with the persistent habit by the Chinese 
leadership to link politics with trade, i.e. to grant access to foreign investments and 
business on the basis of political considerations. With key investment contracts often 
decided personally by senior members of the Chinese government, it is assumed that 
only by maintaining good political relations with Beijing, commercial benefits would be 
gained. This is based on the perception that the coercive measures adopted in the 1990s 
on human rights issues had directly contributed to the Union’s relatively weak position 
within the Chinese market in the past. As a matter of fact, in the late 1990s, Beijing had 
openly targeted concrete commercial reprisals specifically at those EU states, such as 
Denmark and Sweden, which had insisted most strongly on a firm human rights policy.
352 EU Annual Report on Human Rights -  2005, in particular pp. 34-39. The Report is available at: 
http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/HRen05.pdf
353 With regard to the European Parliament stance on the Taiwan issue, see Chapter 6.
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Secondly, there continues to be a glaring lack of political unity among EU 
member states and an ingrained habit of undermining each other in search of 
commercial advantages. This is skilfully exploited by the Chinese leadership in order to 
obtain political concessions which usually take the form of silence over sensitive issues. 
In sum, the weakness of policy coordination mechanisms among EU member states has 
contributed to the shift towards the less critical attitude towards China. The EU’s China 
policy on human rights appear to provide one of the clearest cases of diplomatic 
pressure at the EU level being undermined by EU member states’ propensity - and 
ability - to undercut each other in search of commercial advantage.
Thirdly, in a situation of sluggish economic growth and high unemployment in 
the large EU core member states (Germany, France, Italy) there appears to have been 
limited scope for strategic manoeuvring by EU policy makers but concentrate on the 
protection of their countries’ relative welfare position. In other words, in the last decade 
domestic considerations in the large EU members have overshadowed concerns for the 
situation of human rights in distant China.354
To sum up, the EU has been unable to link the promotion of human rights and 
democratisation in China with a broader definition of Europe’s security. It seems that a 
general economic weakness in the last decade, the lack of coordination and the absence 
of principled political leaders in the most powerful European governments are largely 
responsible for an overall uncritical attitude towards Beijing.
Thus, while the European Commission and the • smaller EU members (in 
particular, the Nordic countries) have continued to bring up issues of human rights and 
political liberalisation in their discussions with Beijing, the large EU members -  
Germany, France, Italy, Spain and, to a lesser extent, the UK - have tended to avoid 
raising contentious issues with China in order to obtain (politically-motivated) 
commercial advantages. Given that London, Paris and Berlin are probably the only EU 
members with a real political clout in international affairs, their largely uncritical 
attitude towards China has contributed to undermining Europe’s international image.355
354 This point challenges the idea of the EU as a civilian-normative power. This assumption has been the 
topic o f recent debates among EU foreign policy scholars. See for instance Karen E. Smith, “Beyond the 
Civilian Power EU debate” in Politique Europeenne 17 (2005), pp. 63-82.
355 See Chapters 6 and 7.
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The uncritical stance towards Beijing adopted by the large EU member states 
has also met with a certain amount of criticism from the US. The case of China is 
revealing, in fact, profound differences in the conception of security between the two 
shores of the Atlantic.356 Since the end of the Cold War, Washington has repeatedly 
advocated the link between the promotion of democracy and human rights with a 
broader notion of US national security, in stark contrast to the EU core member states 
which - with the aim to protect the Union’s (relative) welfare position in a situation of 
sluggish economic growth and high unemployment - have preferred to maintain good 
political relations with Beijing and shy away from open criticism of the CCP regime.
The different attitude between the US and the EU emerged clearly during the 
negotiations for China’s entry into the WTO. For instance, the EU appeared to have 
been more flexible than the US over the preconditions for China’s accession to the 
GATT/WTO. While neither the EU nor the US attached overtly political conditions to 
China’s bid for WTO membership, unlike the US the European Commission -  with the 
support of the large EU member states -  granted Beijing a transitional membership 
status, which allowed China the benefits of membership but with a number of important 
exemptions in the short-term.357
In the US, the divide between European and American positions over China’s is 
seen as being of considerable significance, with analysts routinely lamenting how the 
EU’s China policy provides the most worrying demonstration of the fact that US 
pressure for political reform is undermined by some powerful EU governments. The 
differences between the US and the EU are evident in the different emphasis given to 
China’s transformation process. While some US aid has tended to overtly fund 
politicised initiatives like the Radio Free Asia and Voice of America stations, Europe’s 
priority has mainly been to respond to the Chinese government’s own priorities in the 
field of governance, with the hope of securing a former foundation for subsequently 
expanding the scope of political aid. Through grassroots capacity-building and 
awareness-raising initiatives, such as the European Commission-managed village
356 As we will see in Chapters 5 and 6.
357 Marcus Elgin, “China’s Entry into the WTO, with a Little Help from the EU”, International Affairs, 
Vol. 73, No. 3,1997, pp. 494-495.
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governance project, the EU’s approach is principally aimed at establishing the 
democracy-related human capital requisite to prompting eventual political change.358
This approach is based on the belief that by engaging Beijing in a constructive 
way and by concentrating on supporting China’s transformation process, over time the 
Union would be able to acquire more leverage over political developments in China.359 
It is this belief that sustains -  and qualifies -  the policy of constructive engagement. To 
translate this approach into concrete action, in the last decade the EU and its member 
states -  in particular the Nordic countries - have channelled a considerable amount of 
resources and energies into projects aimed at supporting China’s transformation 
process. We will now analyse the Nordic countries’ development policies with China, 
which stand out among EU member states both in terms of financial commitment and 
number of projects. Moreover, we will also look at a more sophisticated form of 
cooperation, namely the UK’s support - through top British financial people -  to 
China’s banking and financial sector reform. Finally, we will examine the growing 
cooperation projects and sectoral dialogues that, over the years, the European 
Commission has launched with the aim to support China’s integration in the 
international community and promote the country’s transition to an open society.
4.6 The Nordic countries’ development cooperation with China
The EU Nordic countries -  Denmark, Finland and Sweden -  are Europe’s biggest 
contributors (in percentage) to China’s development. The three countries have 
focused their development cooperation with China on three broad areas: (i) human 
rights, legal development and democratisation; (ii) environmentally sustainable 
development; and (iii) increased gender equality and social security. While there are 
commonalities in their approach to Beijing, there are also some differences in focus 
and priorities that we will now examine.
358 Interview, Giovanni Cremonini, First Secretary (Political), European Commission delegation, in 
China, Beijing, 22 September 2004.
359 This idea was confirmed to me by Giovanni Cremonini, First Secretary of the Political Section, 
European Commission delegation in Beijing as well as by the representatives of the political section of 
the four largest EU members (Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy) interviewed in Beijing in 2004: Ian 
Seckington, First Secretary (Political), British Embassy in Beijing; Emmanuel Lenain, First Secretary 
(Political), French Embassy in Beijing; Manfred Huterer, Political Department Press Counsellor, German 
Embassy in Beijing; Antonio Enrico Bartoli, First Secretary (Political), Italian Embassy in Beijing.
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With regard to Denmark, development cooperation in China is set out in the 
guidelines Partnership 2000, the new strategy for Denmark’s development policy 
approved by the Folketing (the Danish Parliament) in October 1999. Partnership 
2000 retains the fundamental objectives and principles contained in A Developing 
World: Strategy for Danish Development Policy towards the Year 2000, adopted by 
the Folketing in 1994. Since the mid-1990s Danish development cooperation with 
China has prioritised poverty reduction and sustainable development. The latter, in 
particular, has been bolstered by the establishment of the Partnership Facility 
Programme (PFP) in 2005. The PFP is an integral part of the package of Danish 
environmental assistance to China. The objective of the Partnership Facility 
Programme is to contribute to improve the environment in China by strengthening 
local companies working in the energy and environmental sectors by means of 
transfer of know how and products from private Danish companies. The focus of the 
Programme is on cleaner technology and production, waste and emission treatment, 
waste management, renewable energy production and distribution, energy 
management, environmental audit and management systems, including IT systems.360 
The amount of money devoted to all development cooperation projects in China for 
the period 2002-2006 is 40 million DKK (Danish Krone) -  around €5.4 million.361
As to Finland, development cooperation with China is currently based on the 
government resolution on development policy adopted in February 2004. The main 
goal of Finland’s development policy in China is to contribute to the eradication of 
extreme poverty. The cross-cutting themes in the implementation of the Finnish 
strategy are: (i) promotion of the rights and the status of women and girls, and 
promotion of gender and social equality; (ii) promotion of the rights of groups that 
are easily marginalised, particularly those of children, the disabled, indigenous 
peoples and ethnic minorities, and promotion of equal participation opportunities for 
them; and (iii) consideration of environmental issues.362 The budget for the above 
projects for the period 2004-2007 amounts to €5 million.
Finally, also Sweden has a well-developed cooperation strategy with China 
outlined in the Country Strategy for Development Cooperation with the People’s
360 For more details see:
http://vyww.um.dk/en/menu/DevelopmentPolicv/BusinessCooperation/PartnershipFacilitvProgramme/
361 Ibid.
362 See: http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?nodeid=15318&contentlan=2&culture=en-US
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Republic o f  China (2001-2005).362 In 2006 the Swedish Government approved a new 
co-operation strategy for development cooperation with China for the period 2006- 
2010 with the aim to accelerate China’s reform process and its insertion in 
international society. The Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) has 
identified environmental issues, gender equality, human rights and democracy as 
prioritised areas for the development cooperation between Sweden and China. Since 
2006 the volume of development cooperation amounts to approximately 65 million 
SEK (Sweden Kronor) -  corresponding to around €7 million - annually, excluding 
concessionary credits, grants through NGOs and humanitarian assistance.364 Among 
the EU25, this is the second largest budget for development cooperation with China 
(after Germany).
Overall, the Nordic countries have been the EU member states that have 
contributed the most to development cooperation with China, both in terms of 
financial commitments (the only EU members to have reached the UN’s goal of 
devoting at least 1% of their GDP to development aid) and number of projects. In the 
last years, other forms of cooperation alongside the traditional ones have emerged. 
For instance, after the decision to join the WTO, Beijing has sought the help of the 
international financial community to support the country’s integration into the world 
financial markets. China is emerging as a financial and banking power and thus 
international cooperation is instrumental for preparing the country’s for the full 
opening of China’s domestic banking system to foreign investors in 2007. In this 
context, it is noteworthy the role played by the UK and its financial community, 
which we will discuss in the following section.
4.7 The emergence of China as a financial and banking power and the role of the 
UK and its financial community
With the decision to join the WTO, China has definitively chosed the road toward 
integration into the world financial markets. With the aim to be ready for the full 
opening of China’s domestic banking system to foreign investors in 2007, the 
government in Beijing has stepped up initiatives and cooperation with other countries 
aimed at overhauling China’s financial system. In this context, the UK has played a
363 The Government of Sweden, Country Strategy for Development Cooperation with the People’s 
Republic o f  China (1 January 2001-31 December 2005), approved on 25 January 2001.
364 For more details see: http://www.swedenabroad.se/pages/general 20939.asp
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pivotal role in supporting China’s banking and financial system reform, both at the 
governmental level and at the people-to-people level. With regard to the former, London 
and Beijing have set up in 2003 the China-UK Financial Dialogue Ministerial 
consultations. The financial dialogue provides a framework for the two sides to continue 
to enhance and prioritise exchanges and cooperation in the financial field, in particular 
exchanges and consultations on macro-economic policy and industrial restructuring, 
public financial management, job-creation, competition and regulatory policy, and 
environmental management and protection. With regard to the people-to-people level, 
London has actively encouraged the participation of prominent members of the British 
financial and banking elite to the process of supporting China’s banking and financial 
sector reform.
In March 2003, with the aim to improve banking regulation and supervision -  so 
as to maintain a safe and sound banking system -  the State Council (i.e. the Chinese 
government) established the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC). The 
State Council made this decision based on the assessment of the current circumstances 
of China’s financial sector. With the creation of the CBRC, the Chinese government 
aims to deepen financial reforms, strengthen financial supervision and improve the 
financial system in order to better position China’s financial sector in response to the 
challenges posed by WTO entry.365
The CBRC is an independent banking supervisory authority which has started 
functioning on 28 April 2003 as a government agency under the State Council 
responsible for the regulation and supervision of banks, asset management companies, 
trust and investment companies, as well as other deposit-taking financial institutions.366 
Liu Mingkang, former head of the Bank of China (a state commercial bank) has been 
appointed as the first Chairman of the CBRC. His strategy aims to reduce the build-up 
of bad debts sharply by overhauling management systems and imposing strict corporate 
governance standards. This is close to a revolution for a banking system burdened with
365 Liping He and Xiaohang Fan, “Foreign Banks in post-WTO China: An Intermediate Assessment”, 
China & World Economy, Vol. 12, No. 5, September-October 2004, pp. 3-16.
366 The CBRC was set up pursuant to the Decision on the Exercise of Regulatory and Supervisory 
Functions by the China Banking Regulatory Commission in Place of the People’s Bank of China adopted 
at the Second Session of the Standing Committee of the Tenth National’s People’s Congress on 26 April 
2003. For more details, see: China Banking Regulatory Commission, The 1st Conference o f the Council 
o f International Advisors, Beijing, China, 21-22 November 2003, copy of which was provided to this 
author by Sir Howard Davies.
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bad debts and the legacy of communist central planning. Furthermore, the CBRC has set 
up a Council of international advisors who have the task to offer guidance to China’s 
banking regulator (a ministry-level government organ in China) on how Beijing should 
reform a financial system bogged down in bad debts and sealed off from international 
capital flows. The Council of international advisors includes some of the biggest names 
in world finance: Sir Edward George, former Governor of the Bank of England, Gerry 
Corrigan, former President of the New York Federal Reserve, Sir Andrew Crockett, 
former General Manager of the Bank for International Settlements, David Carse, former 
Deputy Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority; and Sir Howard 
Davies, former Chairman of the UK’s Financial Services Authority and currently 
Director of the LSE.
The establishment of this Council to the CBRC represents a new level of 
openness and transparency for the Chinese government which has never before 
assembled a group of foreigners to help a ministry-level agency in its work.367 The 
Council of international advisors is mainly composed of people from the UK (4 out of 5 
advisors) with only one from the US (i.e. Gerry Corrigan). According to Sir Howard 
Davies, himself a member of the Council of international advisors, the Chinese 
government decided in the late 1990s to follow banking regulations adopted in the UK 
for technical and political reasons.368 With regard to the former, the UK has a well- 
developed set of financial and banking regulations and the Financial Services Authority 
has been taken as an example. This is meant to send a message to global markets that 
the Chinese government is actively working to upgrade the financial and banking 
system. With regard to the more political considerations, according to Davies, the 
Chinese government “aimed at achieved a balance and did not want to be too influenced 
by the US”.369 The US system is appropriate for a federal system, while China does not 
want a system with strong local autonomies for fear of corruption. There are also a 
number of other reasons for leaning more towards the UK, according to Sir Davies: 
increasingly, Chinese companies come to London to raise money, since it is easier for 
them that in the US. Moreover, the historical ties between Hong Kong and London have
367 For further details on the history of China’s banking reform see: Wai Chung Lo, “A Retrospect on 
China’s Banking Reform”, The Chinese Economy, Vol. 34, No. 1, January-February 2001, pp. 15-28.
368 Personal consultation with Sir Howard Davies, Director of the LSE and former Chairman of the 
Financial Services Authority, London, 14 September 2005.
369 Ibid.
157
indeed played a role since the two share the same regulatory environment.370 Thus, it 
appears that the Chinese government has decided to lean more toward the UK system, 
giving London a unique position for supporting -  as well as taking advantage of the 
opportunities offered by -  the emergence of China as a financial and banking power. 
While this is a rather sophisticated form of development cooperation, it is yet another 
area where European expertise -  in this case coming mainly from the UK -  is 
supporting China’s integration in the world economy. We will now examine the 
European Commission’s development cooperation with China which lies at the heart of 
the EU’s policy of constructive engagement.
4.8 At the heart of constructive engagement: the European Commission support 
for China’s integration in the international community and transition to an open 
society
Since the mid-1990s, the policy of constructive engagement has aimed at promoting the 
fullest possible Chinese involvement in the international arena, whether on economic, 
social, political, environmental, or security-strategic issues. The focus has been on 
helping China support its transformation process to become a good citizen of 
international society, with the underlying belief that this approach would lead, over 
time, to greater political liberalisation and promotion of human rights.
The Commission cooperation programme with China constitutes an important 
mechanism for underpinning the overall, broader EU-China relationship through 
providing support for China’s transition process, the sustainability of its economic and 
social reforms, and its further integration into international society and world economy. 
While poverty alleviation is still an important issue in China -  and is a cross-cutting 
objective of a number of Commission programmes - the cooperation strategy intends to 
transcend the more traditional approach to development assistance and constitutes, 
according to European Commission officials, a response to China’s needs, taking into 
consideration the Commission’s comparative advantages among donors, and making 
the most of Brussels’ limited resources.371 The current strategy for cooperation with 
China is defined in the China Country Strategy Paper (CSP) 2002 -  2006, a multi­
370 Ibid.
371 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 18 December 2005.
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annual planning and strategy document adopted in February 2002.372 Building on the 
1998 and 2001 Commission’s papers on China and in the framework of the Regulation 
for developing countries in Asia and Latin America (ALA) , the CSP 2002 -  2006 
translates into action the EU’s objectives towards China. With an indicative budget of 
€250 million, the China CSP provides the general framework for guiding, monitoring 
and reviewing EU assistance to Beijing. The Commission has identified three major 
goals in its efforts to assist China’s transformation process: firstly, support for the social 
and economic reform process, focusing primarily on China’s integration in the WTO, 
on providing expertise on information and communications technology, on social 
security (pensions, health, unemployment, insurance) and on the development o f human 
resources such as the exchange and training of managers and the participation of 
Chinese students in the Erasmus Mundus programme. Secondly, the EU provides 
Beijing with expertise on environment and sustainable development. Thirdly, the 
Commission supports a number of projects in China aimed at providing support for the 
transition to an open society based on the rule of law and respect of human rights, 
through the promotion of good governance and democracy and human rights-related 
policies.
Furthermore, the EC aims to strengthen cooperation with China through the 
launch and further deepening of sectoral dialogues and agreements. Sectoral activities 
currently cover some 20 different areas. It does not deal with exchanges that take place 
in the areas of human rights and migration, which are of a somewhat different nature 
and more directly related to the EU-China political dialogue. Exchanges between the 
EU and China take place under different denominations depending on the specific 
context of the sector. They are referred to as “dialogues”, “regular exchanges”, or 
simply as “cooperation”, and they take place at various hierarchical levels, from 
working level to ministerial level. A variety of participants may be involved, including 
officials, politicians, business organisations, and private companies. Proceedings are 
organised in a flexible way and take the form of working groups, conferences, annual 
formal meetings or simply informal exchanges. Officials from all the Directorates
372 European Commission, “Country Strategy Paper 2002-2006” on China, available at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal relations/china/csp/02 06en.pdf
373 The ALA Regulation has been adopted as a Council Regulation (EEC) 443/92 (25 February 1992) on 
financial and technical assistance to, and economic co-operation with, the developing countries in Asia 
and Latin America. Guidelines for programmes are submitted by the Commission for opinion to a 
committee o f EU member states representatives (the ALA Committee).
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General in the European Commission are involved in regular exchanges with their 
respective counterparts in China.374
According to the European Commission, the sectoral dialogues serve the 
following purposes: (i) sectoral dialogues are instrumental for developing a solid 
foundation for the EU-China relationship which is now characterised by increasingly 
close policy coordination in many important areas; (ii) the dialogues constitute an 
effective tool for further widening and deepening EU relations with China, for 
exploring new areas of common interest, for exchanging know-how, and, especially in 
the area of economic reform and EU models and practices; (iii) sectoral dialogues also 
tend to pave the way for business and other operators by eliminating potential 
regulatory obstacles, and through raising awareness and facilitating contacts. Regular 
exchanges between specialists, officials and the business community serve to boost 
mutual understanding, and provide the substance for further developing the EU-China 
strategic partnership.375
Most of the dialogues have been initiated since 2003, at the time of the 
establishment of the EU-China strategic partnership. The area covered are currently the 
following: competition policy, consumer product safety, customs cooperation, 
education and culture, energy (including nuclear energy), environment, space 
cooperation, Galileo global satellite navigation services, information society, 
intellectual property rights (IPR), maritime transport, regulatory and industrial policy, 
food safety, science and technology, trade policy dialogue, textile trade dialogue, 
macro-economic and financial sector reforms, employment and social affairs. 
Moreover, the following dialogues/exchanges/agreements are envisaged: agricultural 
dialogue, civil aviation, transport. These exchanges reflect the massive growth in 
activity that has recently been characterising the Sino-European relationship. Sectoral 
dialogues and other agreements are meant to play an increasingly important role in 
building the EU-China strategic partnership, with significant economic benefits for both 
sides.
In addition to the bilateral EU-China cooperation programmes, the EU 
entertains several regional assistance programmes within the ASEM framework that are
374 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 18 December 2005.
375Ibid.; for more details on the sectoral dialogues see the website of the European Commission: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/extemal relations/china/intro/.
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also open to China. In this context, it is notable China’s participation to the EU Human 
Rights and Democracy Programme, while other projects are supported through the 
Community’s non-governmental organisation (NGO) co-financing programme.376 All 
these initiatives are aimed at supporting China’s integration in the international 
community and transition to an open society. The European Commission has argued 
that this policy of engagement is based:
On the well-founded belief that human rights tend to be better understood and better protected in societies 
open to the free flow of trade, investment, people, and ideas...This is a major reason why the EU will 
continue to support the active participation of China in the international community in all fields of 
policy.377
In other words, the EU thinks that through an active engagement and 
cooperation in all fields, it would be possible to further the protection of human rights. 
As discussed earlier, the EU has come to the conclusion that in a situation of growing 
interdependence, the developments in China not only have a far-reaching impact on 
itself, but also have global and regional implications. In particular since China - being 
different from the cases of Japan and the Soviet Union -  is “increasingly strong in both 
the military-political and the economic spheres”.378
According to the Commission, China plays an increasingly important role in 
maintaining regional stability. Political developments in China that could affect East 
Asia’s security environment would have a direct detrimental effect on China’s -  and 
East Asia’s - economic growth. Consequently, EU exports and FDI in the region could 
be affected, thus impacting directly upon EU’s economic interests and security. For 
these reasons, the EU thinks that it is in its interests (and of the international community 
as a whole) to engage China across all dimensions, i.e. on economic, social, political, 
security, and even military issues.379 Thus, for the EU there seems to be no other viable 
option than to engage fully with Beijing.
376 Interview, European Commission delegation in China, Beijing, 22 September 2004.
377 Commission of the European Communities, A Long-Term Policy for China-Europe Relations, 
Brussels, COM (95), 279 final, 1995, Section B.2.
378 Ibid., Section B.2.
379 The Commission believes it to be appropriate for the EU to include the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) among the potential dialogue partners. Ibid., Section B .l. We will discuss these issues further in 
Chapters 5 and 6.
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Conclusion
This chapter has provided the reader with an examination of the new discourse on 
economic security which has taken place in both the EU and China since the beginning 
of the 1990s. The advocates of this discourse have propounded the idea that, on the one 
hand, Europe’s protection of its (relative) welfare position is increasingly linked to 
China’s development and the capacity for European companies to acquire growing 
shares of the Chinese market. On the other hand, Chinese policy makers have expressed 
the idea that China’s economic security and modernisation process would increasingly 
depend on fostering relations with European countries, in particular for obtaining 
advance technology that would be more difficult to acquire from the US or Japan. As a 
result of this two-way linkage, EU-China commercial ties have grown impressively in 
the last years.
This chapter has also examined in detail the policy of constructive engagement. Since 
the mid-1990s, the policy of constructive engagement has aimed at promoting the 
fullest possible Chinese involvement in the international arena, whether on economic, 
social, political, environmental, or security-strategic issues. The focus has been on 
helping China support its transformation process to become a good citizen of 
international society, with the underlying belief that this approach would lead, over 
time, to greater political liberalisation and promotion of human rights.
This approach is based on the belief that by engaging Beijing in a constructive 
way and by concentrating on supporting China’s transformation process, over time the 
Union would be able to acquire more leverage over political developments in China. It 
is this belief that sustains -  and qualifies -  the policy of constructive engagement. To 
translate this approach into concrete action, in the last decade the EU and its member 
states -  in particular the Nordic countries - have channelled a considerable amount of 
resources and energies into projects aimed at supporting China’s transformation 
process. We examined the Nordic countries’ development policies with China, which 
stand out among EU member states both in terms of financial commitment and number 
of projects. Moreover, we also looked at a more sophisticated form of cooperation, 
namely the UK’s support - through top British financial people -  to China’s banking 
and financial sector reform. Finally, we examined the growing cooperation projects and 
sectoral dialogues that, over the years, the European Commission has launched with the
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aim to support China’s integration in the international community and promote the 
country’s transition to an open society.
The policy of constructive engagement has come to characterise the EU foreign 
policy towards China since the mid-1990s. Since 2003, a new discourse in EU-China 
relations has emerged: “strategic partnership”. The latter must be seen as the extension 
in the security-strategic dimension of the policy of constructive engagement. We will 
examine this issue in more detail in the next Chapter.
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Chapter 5
Strategic partnership I:
Galileo and advanced technology transfers
China-EU relations now are better than any time in history. There is no fundamental conflict o f interest 
between China and the EU and neither side poses a threat to the other...To strengthen and enhance China- 
EU relations is an important component of China’s foreign policy. China is committed to a long-term, 
stable and full partnership with the EU.
Chinese Ministry o f Foreign Relations, China’s EU Policy Paper, October 2003380
The strategic partnership between China and the European Union is o f immense importance, not just in 
terms o f trade and the economy, but also in terms of our cooperation in all the major political issues the 
world faces.
Tony Blair, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, 6 September 2005381
Never before has the European Union and China embarked on a cooperation project of the same 
magnitude as in Galileo. This project goes well beyond industrial or standardization issues. It entails a 
strong strategic component which will have far-reaching consequences on future Sino-European political 
relations.
F rancis Lamoureux, Director General, DG TREN, European Commission, 16 may 2003382
Introduction
As discussed in the previous Chapter, the growing Sino-European economic ties have 
found their rationale in a new discourse on economic security emerged in Europe and 
China since the beginning of the 1990s. On the one hand, the advocates of this discourse 
have propounded the idea that Europe’s global competitiveness and protection of its 
(relative) welfare position is increasingly linked to China’s (sustainable) development. 
In other words, EU policy makers have come to believe that maintaining Europe’s 
leading role in the world economy would increasingly depend on the capacity for
380 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China's EU Policy Paper, October 2003.
381 Speech by Tony Blair at the 8th EU-China Summit, Beijing, 6 September 2005; 
http://www.chinadailv.com.cn/english/doc/2005-09/06/content 475386.htm
382Speech of F rancis Lamoureux (Director General, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, 
European Commission) at the Opening of EU-China negotiations on satellite navigation, 16 may 2003.
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European companies to acquire China’s market shares. On the other hand, Chinese 
policy makers have expressed the idea that China’s economic security and 
modernisation process would increasingly depend on fostering relations with European 
countries, in particular for obtaining advanced technology that would be more difficult 
to acquire from the US or Japan. China’s access to modem technology is crucial for 
sustaining the country’s economic growth, which is one of the three main historical 
tasks established by Deng Xiaoping as the litmus test for the legitimacy of the post-Mao 
CCP leadership (the other being opposing hegemony and return Taiwan to mainland 
China).383
As a result of this two-way linkage, EU-China commercial ties have grown 
impressively in the last years. Since 2004 (after the EU’s enlargement), China has 
become the Union’s second biggest trading partner (after the US) and, according to 
China customs, the EU-25 has become China’s biggest trading partner -  ahead of the 
US, as well as, Japan. These growing economic ties have created the basis, in recent 
years, for the upgrading of the relationship to include a significant security-strategic 
dimension. In the words of an EC official, the political dimension in EU-China relations 
stands today “on its own feet”. 384
Since October 2003, the EU and China have acknowledged each other as 
strategic partners. Central to this strategic partnership is the idea that relations between 
the EU and the PRC have gained momentum and acquired a new strategic significance. 
More significantly, the declaration of strategic partnership on 30 October 2003 was 
accompanied by two substantial moves: the signature of the agreement allowing China 
to participate in the Galileo global navigation satellite system and the promise by EU 
policy makers to their Chinese counterparts to initiate discussions on the lifting of the 
EU arms embargo imposed on China in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square 
crackdown on students.385 Unofficial consultations on the lifting had begun in the 
previous months. The proposal, however, was first officially included in the Presidency 
conclusions of the European Council of Brussels in December 2003.386
383 See: Christopher R. Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era, Milton Park, Routledge, 2006, p. 
7.
384 Interview with Henriette Geiger, China Desk, DG XII (External Relations), European Commission, 
Brussels, 9 July 2004.
385 Interview, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 7 July 2004.
386 For more details on the arms embargo debate see Chapter 6.
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Thus, since Fall 2003 Sino-European relations have entered a new phase, which 
has increasingly attracted the attention -  and the concerns -  of the US and other Asian 
partners of the EU, in particular Japan.387 The main political question revolves around 
the fact that China’s participation in the Galileo project (with the related issue of 
advanced technology transfers) and the proposed lifting of the EU arms embargo on 
China have the potential to tilt East Asia’s strategic balance in Beijing’s favour, thus 
impacting directly on American strategic interests in the region. What worries more the 
US is the fact that these initiatives do not take into adequate consideration the role of 
Washington as the ultimate guarantor of East Asian regional security.388 In other words, 
for the Bush administration the EU is intervening in East Asia’s strategic balance 
without a clear political strategy.
This chapter begins with an examination of European and Chinese policy 
makers’ discourses on strategic partnership. It is argued here that beyond the rhetoric, 
three substantial -  and interrelated - issues are giving meaning and content to the 
strategic partnership: (i) China’s participation in the Galileo satellite network; (ii) 
European advance technology transfers to China; and (iii) the proposed lifting of the EU 
arms embargo on China. After analysing the discourse on strategic partnership, this 
chapter will examine Galileo and the related issue of European advanced technology 
transfers to China. In the next chapter, we will discuss the arms embargo issue and its 
potential consequences -  if lifted - for East Asia’s strategic balance.
5.1 The discourse on strategic partnership
In the last years, the predominant discourse among EU policy makers involved in the 
elaboration of the EU foreign policy towards China has revolved around the concept of
387 Interview with Jun Hasebe, Second Secretary, Embassy of Japan in the UK, 29 April 2005; and 
interview with Otaka Junichiro, Deputy Director, European Policy Division, European Affairs Bureau, 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 12 May 2005.
388 Personal consultation with Derek J. Mitchell, Senior Fellow, Asia, International Security Program, 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (Washington) and John J. Tkacik Jr., Research Fellow, 
Asian Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation (Washington) at the margins of the international 
conference on China's Challenge to Europe and the US organised by the Aspen Institute (Italy) in Rome 
on 11 March 2005; personal consultation with David Shambaugh, Professor of Political Science and 
International Affairs, Director of the China Policy Program at the George Washington University, and 
Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution, consulted at the margins o f the international conference 
on Also see Chapters 6 and 7.
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strategic partnership.389 In September 2003, the Commission released its last policy 
paper on China A Maturing Partnership: Shared Interests and Challenges in EU-China 
Relations, which called for a strategic partnership with Beijing, stating that:
It is in the clear interest of the EU and China to work as strategic partners on the international 
scene....Through a further reinforcement of their cooperation, the EU and China will be better able to 
shore up their joint security and other interests in Asia and elsewhere.390
In October 2003 the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs released its answer to 
the Commission’s document. In the China’s EU policy paper it is pointed out that 
“China is committed to a long-term, stable and full partnership”. The Chinese document 
clearly states that Beijing wants closer political ties with the EU, indicating that China 
will continue to deepen its relations with individual EU governments. The document 
also stresses that the “one China” principle is a cornerstone of EU-China relations and 
that Beijing “appreciates the EU’s non-conffontational attitude to human rights in 
China”.391 Moreover, the Chinese document indicates that Beijing welcomes co­
operation in the military sphere, leading to a strategic security consultation 
mechanism.392
China’s interest in cultivating a partnership with the EU and, individually, with 
the large EU members (UK, France, Germany, Italy and Spain) is part of China’s 
attempt to cope with the constraints of American power in the post-Cold War era and to 
hasten the advent of an international system in which the US would no longer be so 
dominant. Chinese policy makers and scholars repeatedly stress that Beijing’s 
partnerships with other great powers are both a reflection of the transition to multi­
polarity and an arrangement that will accelerate the process.393 According to Avery 
Goldstein, the purpose of establishing strategic partnerships “has been to enhance 
[China’s] attractiveness to the other great powers while retaining flexibility by not
389 Interviews in Europe and China. See also: Fraser Cameron, Axel Berkofsky, Stanley Crossick, EU- 
China relations -  towards a strategic partnership, European Policy Centre, Working Paper n. 19, July 
2005.
390 European Commission, A Maturing Partnership - Shared Interests and Challenges in EU-China 
Relations, Brussels, COM (2003) 533 final, 10 September 2003.
391 For more details on the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue see Chapter 4.
392 China’s EU Policy Paper (2003), available at:
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/topics/ceupp/t27708.htm.
393 Interview, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 23 September 2004.
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decisively aligning with any particular state or group of states”.394 Thus, since the mid- 
1990s, strategic partnerships allow Beijing to address its own concerns about the US 
primacy without alienating the economically indispensable US. In this context, 
establishing a strategic partnership with the EU and its large members is seen in Beijing 
as a move that enhances China’s international status, as well as foster the emergence of 
a multi-polar world order (but being flexible enough to change direction if 
circumstances change).395
In this vein, Chinese leaders have repeatedly stated that the strategic partnership 
with the EU should serve to promote “global multilateralism”, the “democratisation of 
international relations” and what is being referred to as “global multipolarisation”. In 
Beijing’s view, China and the EU are both on a “peaceful rise”, i.e., on the way to 
become “global balancing forces” pursuing similar international political strategies. 
Thus, Chinese leaders hope to enlist the EU as one of the emerging poles that, at least in 
principle, could work with Beijing on fostering a multilateral environment and limit 
some of the perceived American unilateral attitudes in world affairs.396 The discourse on 
multipolarity is shared by some EU policy makers, in particular the French political 
elite and, to a lesser extent, elements within the European Commission in Brussels. This 
has raised some worries in the US, especially the idea that the establishment of the EU- 
China strategic partnership may contain some elements that seek to limit the US global 
influence.
According to Christopher Hughes, China’s discourse on multipolarity cannot be 
seen as power balancing in the classic sense, but rather as an “essentially domestic 
discourse that is designed primarily to soothe nationalist pressures, rather than as a 
foreign policy prescription”.397 Thus, in the case of China multipolarity is taking the 
form of the establishment of strategic partnerships with other great powers within a 
broader multilateral system based on the United Nations and international law. For 
French policy makers as well, the notion of multipolarity is not employed for balancing 
against the US in the classic sense, but rather for meaning an international system in
394 Avery Goldstein, “The Diplomatic Face of China’s Grand Strategy: A Rising Power’s Emerging 
Choice”, in The China Quarterly, No. 168, December 2001, pp. 835-864, p. 846.
395 Interview, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 23 September 2004.
396 Personal consultation with Chen Wenbing, Second Secretary, Deprtment o f European Affairs, 
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 26 September 2004.
397 Christopher R. Hughes, “Nationalism and multilateralism in Chinese foreign policy: implications for 
Southeast Asia”, in The Pacific Review, Vol. 18, No. 1, March 2005, pp. 119-135, p. 124.
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which “each large geographic region, each big power and collectivity of states, can 
assume together their responsibilities, with the UN being the grand symbol”.398 In other 
words, “a benign multipolar international system whose modus operandi is 
multilateralism”.399
While stressing multilateralism as a common ground for the development of the 
strategic partnership, EU policy makers have remained vague with regard to the 
concrete objectives and purpose of the strategic partnership with China. In a recent 
speech in Shanghai, Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy stated that the strategic partnership is based on the fact the 
Europe and China discuss and seek to cooperate on “global strategic issues such as the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism...global 
security of energy supply, regional crises and the environment”.400 Moreover, the 
strategic partnership is based on common discussions and engagement to defuse crisis 
that could impact on the EU or China, such as North Korea and Iran. Moreover, Solana 
declared that:
China and the EU have the same broad agenda in seeking to address current global challenges...they are 
natural partners in many ways...they both prize international stability and order...and they are both 
strong supporters o f multilateralism and international law as the best means to achieve this. Consultation 
with each other, and other partners, is the rule for us, not the exception. We know that this brings us 
strength...We are also consulting more on our regional policies and programmes. To my mind, this is 
what strategic partnership is all about401
In the same vein, Jose Manuel Barroso, the President of the European 
Commission, in a recent speech in Beijing declared that:
The EU and China have many common multilateral priorities, such as non-proliferation and the reform of 
the UN system, and international cooperation is already a basic part of our relationship. We must go 
further and strengthen our global partnership to promote international cooperation, global security and 
governance and forge new alliances to counter the darker side o f globalisation, which includes
398 Dominique de Villepin during the joint press conference of the French, Russian and German foreign 
ministers, Paris, 5 March 2003, www.diDlomatie.gouv.fir
399 Michael Brenner and Guillaume Parmentier, Reconcilable Differences: US-French Relations in the 
New Era, Washington: DC, Brookings Institution, 2002, p. 118.
400 Javier Solana, Driving Forward the China-EU Strategic Partnership, Speech by the EU High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy at the China-Europe International Business 
School, Shanghai, 6 September 2005, available at
http://www.delchn.cec.eu.int/en/whatsnew/pren060905.htm
401 Javier Solana, “Driving Forward the China-EU Strategic Partnership, Speech by the EU High 
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy at the China-Europe International Business 
School, Shanghai, 6 September 2005, available at:
http://www.delchn.cec.eu.int/en/whatsnew/pren060905.htm
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international crime, terrorism, illegal immigration and epidemics...The development of a strategic, 
mutually beneficial and enduring relationship with China is one of the EU’s top foreign policy priorities 
for this century. In achieving this goal we must convince the international community that the EU-China 
partnership is not a threat, but an opportunity to create a more stable and balanced international order.402
It appears that EU policy makers have preferred to remain high in rhetoric about 
the meaning and content of the strategic partnership.
The Chinese leadership, however, has been less vague. For Beijing, the EU- 
China strategic partnership should be comprehensive, including co-operation in the field 
of traditional security (terrorism, the joint fight against illegal immigration, and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), as well as non-traditional security issues 
(such as energy security, environmental and health security).403 In a speech in May 2004 
in Brussels, Wen Jiabao stated that:
China-EU relationship has withstood the test of time and evolving international situation, and has 
embarked on a course of mature, sound, and steady expansion. It is a shared view of the two sides to work 
for a comprehensive strategic partnership. By ‘comprehensive’, it means that the cooperation should be 
all-dimensional, wide-ranging and multi-layered. It covers economic, scientific, technological, political 
and cultural fields, contains both bilateral and multilateral levels, and is conducted by both governments 
and non-governmental groups. By ‘strategic’, it means that the cooperation should be long-term and 
stable, bearing on the larger picture of China-EU relations. It transcends the differences in ideology and 
social system and is not subjected to the impacts o f individual events that occur from time to time. By 
‘partnership’, it means that the cooperation should be equal-footed, mutually beneficial and win-win. The 
two sides should base themselves on mutual respect and mutual trust, endeavour to expand converging 
interests and seek common ground on the major issues while shelving differences on the minor ones.404
Chinese leaders have expressed on various occasions that cooperation in science 
and technology, the joint development of the Galileo satellite navigation system and the 
lifting of the EU arms embargo on China are important elements of the strategic 
partnership.405 In the China’s EU policy paper it is stated that:
402 Jos6 Manuel Barroso, The EU and China: painting a brighter future together, Speech by the President 
of the European Commission at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, 15 July 2005 
(SPEECH/05/444), available at:
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/444&format=HTML&aged=0 
&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
403 See: China’s position paper on the New Security Concept, available at: 
http://www.chinaembassv.org.tr/eng/xwdt/tl61685.htm.
404 Wen Jiabao, Vigorously Promoting Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Between China and the 
European Union, China-EU Investment and Trade Forum, Brussels, 6 May 2004; 
http://www.chinamission.be/eng/zt/tl 01949.htm
405 Interview with Wang Yi, First Secretary, Political Affairs, Chinese Embassy in France, Paris, 3 
December 2005. See also: “Wen Jiabao Holds Talks with the President of the European Commission”, 
Brussels, 6 May 2004 (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t97483 .htmk and EU-China Joint Press 
Statement, Brussels,, 6 May 2004 (http://www.delchn.cec.eu.int/en/whatsnew/pren060504.htm.
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It is essential to promote China-EU scientific and technological cooperation on the basis of the principles 
of mutual benefit and reciprocity, sharing of results and protection of intellectual property rights. Joint 
development and cooperation on generic technologies and major technical equipment should be stepped 
up and Chinese institutions are encouraged to participate in the EU Framework Programme for Research 
and Technological Development. China will, on the premise of equality and mutual benefit and a balance 
between interests and obligations, participate in the Galileo Programme and enhance cooperation in 
international “big science” projects. Full play should be given to the role of the Scientific and 
Technologic Cooperation Steering Committee and efforts should be made to ensure a successful China- 
Europe Science & Technology and Innovation Policy Forum. Cooperation between scientific and 
technological intermediary agencies of the two sides as well as the interflow and training of scientific and 
technological human resources should be encouraged. Support should be given to Chinese and EU 
enterprises in their involvement in scientific and technological cooperation.406
The China’s EU Policy Paper also mentions cooperation on military matters and, 
in particular, Beijing’s request of an early lifting of the EU arms embargo:
China and the EU will maintain high-level military-to-military exchanges, develop and improve, step by 
step, a strategic security consultation mechanism, exchange more missions of military experts, and 
expand exchanges in respect of military officers’ training and defense studies...The EU should lift its ban 
on arms sales to China at an early date so as to remove barriers to greater bilateral cooperation on defense 
industry and technologies.407
The Chinese leadership has clearly expressed its interest in the furthering of ties 
with the EU on security and military matters. The EU, however, has maintained a rather 
low profile on military and security cooperation with the PRC, due to the likely 
opposition that too much proclaimed a cooperation on these matters would find across 
Europe’s national parliaments, within the European Parliament and among public 
opinions.408
Beneath the surface of the official declarations, it is argued here that China’s 
participation in the Galileo project, the related issue of advanced technology transfers 
and the proposed lifting of the arms embargo have come to represent the three most 
important security-strategic issues in Sino-European relations.409 The scholarly 
literature has tended to largely (if not completely) neglect these issues. Their relevance 
lies in the fact that they have gone far beyond the bilateral dynamics of EU-China 
relations to assume a global significance. The Bush administration, in particular, has 
voiced its concerns to: (i) China’s participation in the Galileo project; (ii) advanced 
technology transfers; (iii) and the proposed lifting of the EU arms embargo, on the
406 China’s EU Policy Paper, (2003) Title III.
407 China 'sEUPolicy Paper, (2003) Title V.
408 On this point most of the European interviewees agreed.
409 This is also emerged during the interviews with EU officials in Europe and China.
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grounds that they have the potential to boost China’s military modernisation and tilt the 
strategic balance across the Taiwan Strait in Beijing’s favour. US policy makers argue 
that with these policies -  even if only proposed as in the case of the lifting of the arms 
ban - the Europeans are acting without a clear political strategy towards East Asia. 
Washington is concerned that the Europeans are not consulting with the US on their 
policies towards China and East Asia in general, a part of the world whose security is 
guaranteed by Washington.410
In order to better understand the above criticism by the US and assess the impact 
of the security-strategic elements of the EU’s China policy on East Asia’s strategic 
balance we will now examine the question of China’s participation in the joint 
development of the Galileo satellite network, with the related issue of European high- 
technology transfers to Beijing. In the next Chapter, we will examine the arms embargo 
issue. The three issues are interrelated and give meaning and content to the security- 
strategic dimension of the EU’s China policy. It is hoped that by presenting the issues in 
such an order, the reader will gain a better understanding of the EU foreign policy 
towards China of the last years. This chapter will also examine the interplay between 
the EU level and the national level and evaluate to what extent there has been 
convergence among EU members on these issues. In addition, this chapter intends to 
provide evidence to the claim in Chapter 1 that France is the EU member state which 
has supported more strongly the development of a security-strategic linkage with the 
People’s Republic of China. It is argued in this chapter that both France’s space policy 
and its determination to have China play an important role in the development of 
Galileo has been Europeanised, in the sense that it has influenced the other European 
space powers: Germany, Italy, and Spain. The UK, in contrast, has kept a low profile on 
the Galileo issue and China’s participation in it.
The British government has found itself in a somehow delicate situation, given 
the strong American opposition to Galileo. The participation of London to the European 
global navigation satellite system has largely depended on the fact that Galileo has been 
presented as a civilian project, funded by the European Commission (DG TREN), the
410 Personal consultations with David Shambaugh, Director of the China Policy Program at the George 
Washington University and Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution (Washington); Ellen Bork, Acting 
Executive Director at the Project for the New American Century (PNAC - Washington); Derek J. 
Mitchell, Senior Fellow, Asia, International Security Program, Center for Strategic and International 
Studies (CSIS - Washington); and John J. Tkacik Jr., Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, The 
Heritage Foundation (Washington).
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European Space Agency (ESA) and various European departments of transportation or 
of research - and not as a strategic venture with a security dimension undertaken by 
defence departments.411 In this context, this chapter will also discuss the different 
conceptions of space between the EU and the US, as well as the different attitudes 
towards China with regard to space cooperation and, more generally, security-strategic 
issues.
5.2 The Galileo satellite network and China
Galileo is a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), alternative to the dominant US 
Global Positioning System (GPS) that will offer both civilian and potential military 
applications once it becomes operational in 2008.412 Galileo is designed to encircle the 
globe with 30 satellites in medium earth orbit, comprising 27 operational satellites and 
three reserves, plus two control centres on the ground. It will provide users, ranging 
from aircraft and shipping to cars and trekkers, with a navigational fix accurate to 
within just one metre -  which is more accurate than the fix that can be obtained using 
the public signal made available by the American GPS system. The European Union 
and the European Space Agency (ESA) kicked off the Galileo project in March 2002. 
The satellite system is developed by diverse European actors such as national space 
and/or aerospace agencies, the Paris-based European Space Agency and the EU.
On 30 October 2003, an agreement was reached for China’s cooperation and 
commitment to finance 200 million euros (out of an estimated total cost of 3.2-3.4 
billion euros) of Galileo.413 Formal negotiations with China commenced on 28 March 
2003 Two rounds of talks were held and both sides finalised a draft agreement on 18 
September 2003. On 27 October 2003, the Council authorised the EU Presidency 
(Italian) to sign the Cooperation Agreement on Galileo between the European 
Community and the PRC. The signature took place, significantly, during the sixth EU- 
China summit held in Beijing on 30 October 2003. According to the official wording:
411 Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 13 April 2006.
412 For more details on the technical, military and political aspects o f Galileo see: Gustav LindstrOm and 
Giovanni Gasparini, The Galileo Satellite System and Its Security Implications, European Union Institute 
for Security Studies, Occasional Paper n. 44, April 2003.
413 “EU China Summit concludes agreements on industrial policy, Galileo and Tourism”, available at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external relations/china/summit/jp 1103.htm.
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The agreement provides for co-operative activities on satellite navigation in a wide range o f sectors, 
notably science and technology, industrial manufacturing, service and market development, as well as 
standardisation, frequency and certification.414
On 19 September 2003, a joint Sino-European satellite navigation cooperation 
centre had been opened in Beijing. The China-Europe Global Navigation Satellite 
System Technical Training and Co-operation Centre (CENC) is meant to serve as a 
focal point for all activities on Galileo, as well as promote industrial cooperation with 
special attention given to development of applications. The CENC is jointly run by the 
Chinese Ministry of Science and Technology, the Chinese Remote Sensing Centre, the 
European Commission and the European Space Agency. According to the EU-China 
agreement, the main focus of Chinese participation will be on developing applications, 
as well as research and development, manufacturing and technical aspects of the Galileo 
project. In the words of F rancis Lamoureux, at that time Director General of the 
Directorate-General for Energy and Transport (DG TREN):
Never before has the European Union and China embarked on a cooperation project of the same 
magnitude as in Galileo. This project goes well beyond industrial or standardization issues. It entails a 
strong strategic component which will have far-reaching consequences on future Sino-European political 
relations.415
Moreover, as Commissioner Loyola de Palacio stressed: “the EU-China 
agreement will...secure a promising future for Galileo and European business 
interests”.416 European industries are, indeed, eager to collaborate with Chinese 
companies in space-based technologies and, more generally, aerospace. It is expected 
that in the context of the EU 7th Framework Programme for Research European and 
Chinese companies will join forces for developing the application market for Galileo. In 
sum, Galileo will facilitate European businesses’ entry into the promising Chinese 
aerospace sector while it will allow Chinese companies to acquire know-how and 
advanced space technology. In other words, with Galileo the EU upgrades the policy of 
constructive engagement -  based on the idea that the EU needs to sustain China’s 
development and its insertion in international society -  by adding a security-strategic 
dimension to it. We will discuss later the potential consequences of this security- 
strategic linkage for East Asia’s strategic balance and transatlantic relations.
414 See: http://www.cenc.org.cn/en/news/news2003102801 .htm& 18154326=3582134128.
415Speech o f Francois Lamoureux, Director General, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, (DG 
TREN), European Commission, at the Opening of EU-China negotiations on satellite navigation, 16 May 
2003.
416 See: http://www.cenc.org.cn/en/news/news2003102801.htm&l 8154326=3582134128.
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5.2.1 The commercial side of Galileo
The EU estimates that by 2020, Galileo will bring Europe tens of billions of euros in 
revenues and tens of thousands of job opportunities. Chinese experts expect revenues 
worth 260 billion yuan (23.6 billion euros) in Galileo systems applications by 2020.417 
The Galileo satellite system is implemented through the Galileo Joint Undertaking 
(GJU), which is a joint venture financed from the EU budget (through the European 
Commission) and the Paris-based European Space Agency (ESA). EU governments 
have pledged to cover as much as one third of the total cost of Galileo, while the rest 
will be offset by the private sector. In particular, a consortium of European companies is 
responsible for the development of the satellite network, including: the Franco-German- 
Spanish EADS; the British Inmarsat Ventures (satellite communications provider); 
French Thales (defence company); Italian Finmeccanica (defence company); French 
Alcatel (communications company); Spanish Hispasat (satellite group).
As the first non-EU partner for the project, China has agreed to invest 200 
million euros. In the first phase, Beijing has pledged to spend 70 million euros of which 
five million euros for the entrance fee. The EU-designated Chinese industrial partner for 
the Galileo project is the National Remote Sensing Centre of China (NRSCC). The 
NRSCC, a coordination body under the Ministry of Science and Technology, is 
mandated to choose domestic research institutes and companies to undertake relevant 
research and development. The NRSCC has authorised China Galileo Industries (a 
Chinese state-holding company) to develop Galileo’s satellite and remote sensing 
technologies and application systems. The Chinese state company is owned by China 
Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, China Electronics Technology Group 
Corporation, China Sat-com and the China Academy of Space Technology. According 
to Chinese policy makers, cooperation between China and the EU in the development of 
Galileo “will be helpful to China’s independent research on its own satellite-navigation 
systems”.418
In March 2005, the Galileo Joint Undertaking and Beijing agreed on the first 
phase of the implementation. According to the agreement, China Galileo Industries will
417 http://english.people.com.cn/200503/10/eng20050310 176228.html
418 Interview, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22 September 2004.
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help promote co-operation with the EU in commercializing the civilian use of the 
Galileo system in China, build an intelligent transport system based on accurate 
navigation information provided by Galileo, as well as upgrade communication and 
navigation for China’s fishing vessels.419 In other words, China Galileo Industries’ task 
is to mobilize domestic companies specializing in space, electronics and satellite 
technology in order to develop the civilian use of the Galileo satellite navigation system 
in China. It is important to note that Chinese leaders have stated on more than one 
occasion that the Galileo satellite network will provide data mainly for civilian uses in 
accordance with the joint EU-China agreement signed in October 2003. However, this 
position is often qualified in private discussions, since satellite navigation is inherently a 
dual-use technology.420
Cooperation between the EU and China over Galileo is also meant to boost 
European companies’ sales in China. Since the late 1990s, Europe’s aerospace 
companies have sold telecommunication satellites and other space technologies to 
Beijing. Furthermore, some European commercial remote sensing companies (like their 
American counterparts) have been selling spatial imagery to China for years. According 
to analysts, until now no observation satellite system has been exported from the EU to 
Beijing, with the exception of some low-resolution micro-satellites. However, the 
export of remote sensing satellite systems with limited resolution should be expected in 
the near future.421 More importantly, both the final content and the mechanism of the 
EU-China cooperation over Galileo and other space applications remain to be largely 
determined.422 In the words of a CASS official and former diplomat, EU-China 
cooperation over Galileo will go through “re-adjustments”, following the political trend 
of EU-China relations.423 For the Europeans, the more compelling political and strategic 
problem with regard to China’s participation in Galileo has been to guarantee the 
American ally that all the necessary security barriers are in place and that such 
cooperation will not endanger NATO or American strategic interests in the Asia- 
Pacific.424
419 See http://www.galileoju.com/page.cfm?voce=s2&idvoce=66&plugIn:= l.
420 Interviews, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), 
Beijing, 7-8 May 2005.
421 Interview, French Defence Ministry, Paris, 12 November 2005.
422 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 18 December 2005.
423 Personal consultation with Prof. Yang Yang, Bureau o f International Cooperation, Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences (CASS) at the margins of the international conference The International Politics o f  
EU-China Relations, held at the British Academy in London on 20-21 April 2006.
424 Interview, European Commission, Brussels, 18 December 2005.
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5.2.2 The political side of Galileo
The central political question -  with security and military implications -  is presented 
under a technical wording: access to the encrypted signals. Most of the countries that 
have showed an interest in cooperating with Galileo, such as India, Brazil and Israel, 
will not be allowed to pull down encrypted signals from the satellites that form the 
central element of the programme. These countries will only be allowed to access 
unencrypted signals that would be satisfactory for civilian applications. China, on the 
other hand, has not been officially denied access to the encrypted signals since Beijing 
is taking part to the development of the applications of the satellite network.425 EU 
officials stress, however, that a “security firewall” will be put in place to assure that 
China will not have access to secret Western traffic. According to interviews conducted 
by this author with officials at the European Commission and in the large EU member 
states, since Galileo is part of the development of a security-strategic linkage with 
China it will be, eventually, the evolution of EU-China political relations that will 
determine the final content and mechanism of China’s participation in Galileo.
Another contentious issue is related to the receivers able to decrypt Galileo 
signals, which are subject to export licensing in the supplier EU member states. In the 
EU-China agreement over Galileo there is specific language establishing the legitimate 
end-use China may make of encrypted signals received from the satellite network. 
However, some of the technologies needed by China to be able to read Galileo’s 
encrypted features need special export licensing and given its military applications, the 
technologies under discussion fall under the provisions of the arms embargo. Moreover, 
the technologies directly connected to the manufacture of weapons systems which 
utilise satellite positioning and targeting also fall under the arms embargo. In order to 
circumvent these legal obstacles, since the end of 2003 the EU governments that have 
supported more strongly China’s participation in the Galileo project (i.e. France and, to 
a lesser extent, Germany) have started to propose that the arms embargo be lifted 426
The rationale can be summarised as follows: if China is considered by the EU a 
strategic partner reliable enough to cooperate in Europe’s main space project, why then
425 Interview, ibid.
426 For further details on the arms embargo debate see Chapter 6.
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maintain an arms embargo imposed during the Cold War which, in the words of the 
advocates of the lifting, “does not correspond anymore to the political realities of the 
contemporary world”? In sum, the arms embargo issue is directly linked to China’s 
participation in the Galileo project. The two initiatives, though quite different in nature 
and scope, must be seen, however, as the logical extension in the security-strategic 
dimension of the EU’s policy of constructive engagement towards Beijing.
Europe’s invitation to China to participate in the Galileo project is also part of 
the growing cooperation between the EU and China on science and technology. At the 
eighth EU-China Summit in Beijing on 5 September 2005, the two sides endorsed a 
joint statement on cooperation in space exploitation, science and technology 
development.427 The latter is seen in Beijing as having great strategic significance for 
fostering China’s modernisation process. However, some EU partners -  especially the 
US and Japan -  have voiced their concerns about China’s participation in the Galileo 
project and, more generally, the growing EU-China science and technology cooperation, 
since it involves European advanced technology transfers that can be exploited for the 
modernisation of China’s army and power projection in the region 428
Chinese policy makers and scholars view co-operation with the EU over Galileo 
as an additional initiative aimed at promoting China’s space programme, which is 
considered a major undertaking aimed at advancing comprehensive national strength 429 
China’s involvement in Galileo is expected to further Beijing’s space capabilities and 
satellite recognition, which are likely to be exploited for both commercial and military 
uses. The most recent US Department of Defence Report on the Military Power of the 
People’s Republic of China (MPPRC) concludes that the modernisation of the PLA has 
gone beyond preparing for a Taiwan scenario and is likely to threaten third parties 
operating in the area, including the US.430 While Chinese leaders insist that their 
country is engaged in a “peaceful rise” to power, the US says that China is focusing on 
procuring and developing weapons that would counter US naval and air power,
427 http://europa.eu.int/comm/external relations/news/barroso/sp05 478.htm.
428 See Chapters 6 and 7.
429 Interview, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Beijing, 6 May 2005.
430 US Department of Defence, Report on the Military Power o f  the People’s Republic o f  China 
(MPPRC), October 2005.
178
especially in the Taiwan Strait.431 Moreover, according to the MPPRC report, China’s 
space programme is now intended to challenge American dominant position in the 
sector and this explains US concerns over China’s participation in the development and 
deployment of Galileo.432
The decision to allow China play a prominent role in the development of the 
Galileo project highlights divergent approaches between the EU and the US towards (i) 
China’s rise and (ii) the use of space. With regard to the former, it is important to 
underline that Europe does not view China as a potential military threat or peer strategic 
competitor. In this sense, Galileo must be seen as an extension in the security-strategic 
dimension of the policy of constructive engagement that has characterised the EU 
foreign policy towards China since the mid-1990s. With regard to the latter, it reflects 
the different conception between the EU and the US regarding the use of space. In 
essence, Washington places an emphasis on space power and control, while Europe 
stresses that the space should be used peacefully.433 Thus, while the US concentrates on 
leveraging the space to provide America and its allies an asymmetric military 
advantage, the Union is more concerned in creating useful -  i.e. commercial -  space 
applications for European peoples and industries. For European policy makers, EU- 
China cooperation is meant to boost commercial activities while the US looks at space 
from a different angle, i.e. the protection of its global interests and primacy in world 
affairs.
Under the Clinton administration, for instance, the US attempted to cooperate 
with China on space transportation. This was meant to curtail China’s exportation of 
missile technology to countries such as Iran and North Korea, very much like what had 
been done in the 1990s with Russia. The problem of illegal missile technology transfers 
between some US companies and China emerged in 1998, following the failed launch 
of an Intelsat satellite on a Long March booster, effectively ending this policy. The 
resulting classification of space technology on the US Department of State munitions
431 2004 Report to Congress o f  the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Chapter 8: 
China’s Military Modernization and the Cross-Strait Balance, available at: 
http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2004/04reportpagel5.pdf
432 William S. Murray III and Robert Antonellis, “China’s Space Program: The Dragon Eyes the Moon 
(and Us)”, in Orbis, Fall 2003, pp. 645-652.
433 See: Bastian Giegerich, Satellite States -  Transatlantic Conflict and the Galileo System, paper 
presented at the 46th ISA Annual Convention, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1-5 March 2005.
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list ended any cooperation in space with Beijing. As a result of the tightening rules in 
the US, transatlantic cooperation in space technologies decreased as well.
The US appears to believe that space technology should not be disseminated. 
The Europeans, on the other hand, seem to view space-related activites (technology 
included) as a medium for international cooperation.434 The question which has emerged 
in the last years is that very little cooperation regarding space-based security 
applications goes on between Europe and the US, despite their military alliance. Today, 
the EU only has relations with agencies such as NASA and the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) that focus on the peaceful use of space.
It is important to stress that according to EU policy makers, EU-China 
partnership over Galileo and other potential space applications is not meant to isolate 
the US, or balance against it. Nor it is meant to increase the proliferation of space 
technologies that would be used for anything other than peaceful aims. For the EU, 
Galileo is meant to build trust with China 435 Again, it is the continuation of the policy 
of constructive engagement based on the idea of change through trade. In addition, it is 
widely perceived at the DG TREN in Brussels436 and Paris that the EU-China 
cooperation over Galileo is a reaction of the isolationist space policies of the US in the 
last years. Those policies have adversely impacted international space cooperation 
through draconian export regulations. In addition, the US has committed itself to the 
control and militarisation of space. As a consequence, it appears that for EU policy 
makers in Brussels and Paris, Washington has forced other space-faring nations such as 
China and Europe to cooperate among themselves. In this context, EU-China 
cooperation in the Galileo satellite network goes well beyond their bilateral agreement 
to include - and highlight - the different perceptions and responses that both the EU and 
China have developed in the last decade to respond to Washington’s aerospace primacy.
434 Ibid., p. 3.
435 Interview, European Commission, Brusels, 18 December 2005.
436 The Directorate-General for Energy and Transport (DG TREN), based in Brussels, reports to Jacques 
Barrot (French) Vice-President of the European Commission, Commissioner for Transport and 
Andris Piebalgs (Latvian) Commissioner for Energy. The Director General of the DG TREN was 
Francois Lamoureux (French) until the end of 2005. Since 2006, the new Director is Matthias Ruete 
(German). Interestingly, the DG TREN (which controls Galileo) has been the preserve of Franco-German 
policy makers since the late 1990s.
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We will look at this in more detail, since it has implications not only for EU-China 
relations, but also for the emerging global space order.437
5.3 Behind Galileo: the development of an independent European aerospace sector 
in the post-Cold War era
Behind the development of Galileo there are well-planned European efforts to create an 
independent European aerospace sector. In this sense, Galileo - along with Airbus and 
the Arianespace project -  must be seen as representing the third most prominent 
example of Europe’s efforts to challenge the US’ technological and economic 
supremacy in the aerospace sector. The push towards the development of a strong and 
autonomous European aerospace sector derives from a desire of ensuring the EU’s 
strategic independence coupled with the fear of reduced influence in international 
affairs and declining international economic competitiveness. Thus, both economic and 
political considerations underpin Galileo and, more generally, the EU’s objective to 
develop and independent aerospace sector.
As discussed in Chapter 3 and 4, the post-Cold War period has been 
characterised by an emphasis on economic competition. The post-world war II period, 
coinciding with the Cold War era, was preoccupied with the political-ideological 
struggle which somewhat overshadowed economic concerns. Even if economic matters 
were addressed, these were always subordinate to the wider ideological conflict. The 
post-Cold War period, however, saw a swing in the pendulum leading directly to all 
kinds of economic conflicts, best revealed by the trade dispute between the US and 
Japan, on the one hand, and the differences between the US and the EU best 
exemplified by the growing competition between Boeing and Airbus. In this context, a 
new European discourse on economic security -  based on the perception of the EU’s 
declining international economic competitiveness and reduced influence in international 
affairs - provided the basis for the development of an independent aerospace sector, 
strong enough to counter American primacy, in order to ensure the EU’s strategic 
independence.
437 The idea of the multipolarisation of space has been put forward, in particular, by the Chinese 
leadership. See: http://www.china-un.ch/eng/gihvfy/hv2003/t85237.htm.
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Since the early 1990s, an independent aerospace capability has been perceived 
as having a key role for European industrial and technological development and it has 
begun to be closely associated with concepts of European security and political 
autonomy. This idea has been plearly expressed by the EU in its report Strategic 
Aerospace Review for the 21st Century (STAR 21) presented by the European Advisory 
Group on Aerospace to the President of the European Commission in July 2002.438 The 
aim of this high-level group was to “identify the key area which will determine the 
future competitiveness of the aerospace industry and its ability to contribute effectively 
to Europe’s main policy goals”.439 In the report, the European Advisory Group on 
Aerospace argues that:
A flourishing and competitive aerospace industry is essential to ensuring a secure and prosperous Europe. 
Apart from its contribution to sustainable growth, the aerospace industry is a home to key skills and 
technologies and an important driver of innovation; it guarantees the means for delivering services from 
space, and makes an essential contribution to security and defence, thereby helping to safeguard Europe’s 
freedom of action in its external policies.440
The STAR 21 report makes the link between the protection of the Union’s 
global competitiveness and economic security -  endorsed by the European Council of 
Lisbon in 2000 - and the development of the CFSP. In the words of the STAR 21 report, 
aerospace is seen as “vital to meeting Europe’s objectives for economic growth, security 
and quality of life. It is directly associated with, and influenced by a broad range of 
European policies such as trade, transport, environment and security and defence”. 
Moreover, the report continues “A strong, globally competitive industrial base is 
essential to provide the necessary choices and options for Europe in its decisions as 
regards its presence and influence on the world stage”.441
With regard to space capabilities, the STAR 21 report calls for the deployment 
on schedule of Galileo and argues for the need to take early action to “sustain European
438 European Advisory Group on Aerospace, STAR 21: Strategic Aerospace Review for the 21st Century. 
Creating a Coherent Market and Policy Framework for a Vital European Industry, Brussels, European 
Commission/Enterprise publications, July 2002.
Available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/aerospace/report star21 screen.pdf.
439 Ibid., p. 4. The European Advisory Group on Aerospace was set up in 2001. Chaired by Erkki 
Liikanen (Member of the European Commission responsible for Enterprise Policy), it comprised seven 
aerospace industry chairmen (among them, the chairmen of EADS, SNECMA, BAE Systems, THALES, 
Finmeccanica, Rolls-Royce), five European Commissioners (Trade, External Relations, Enterprise, 
Transport and Energy, Research), the EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (Javier Solana) and two members of the European Parliament. The report was presented to the 
President of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, on 16 July 2002.
440 Ibid., p. 6.
441 Ibid., p. 7
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launch capabilities and to explore applications of space technologies especially for 
communication and monitoring, including those required for security and defence”.442 
In essence, for the European Advisory Group on Aerospace a flourishing aerospace 
industry is a key component in enabling Europe to realise its political and economic 
ambitions, in particular for maintaining the EU’s competition in world markets for a 
wide range of civil and defence products and safeguarding the Union’s freedom of 
action in its foreign and security policy. As the STAR 21 report stresses:
Aerospace is an essential contributor to any national or supra-national system of security and defence. Its 
products, which include aircraft, space technologies, electronics, engineering systems and sub-systems, 
are crucial for domestic security as well as providing the capabilities for realising policy aims in 
neighbouring and in more distant parts of the world. A competitive aerospace sector is vital for any nation 
or region wishing to maintain full sovereignty over its territory, to exercise political influence beyond its 
borders and to have available to it the necessary range of political choices and options.443
In this context, the report underlines the importance of international cooperation 
and the fact that the demand for civil aircraft and other aerospace products over the next 
20 years is projected to arise outside the US or Europe’s market and come mainly from 
Asia and, in particular, China. In this context, building political and diplomatic relations 
with the above countries is key for acquiring increasing shares of these markets and, as 
a consequence, maintain Europe’s global competitiveness in the aerospace sector. As a 
matter of fact Asian countries - and, in particular, China -  have become the battleground 
between Boeing and Airbus, which fiercely compete against each other for the 
leadership of the world aerospace sector. Analysts estimate that since 2005, China has 
become the second largest market for aerospace, behind the US.444
In November 2005, during the state visit of Wen Jiabao to France, the Chinese 
Prime Minister started its four days tour in Toulouse, at the headquarters of Airbus. On 
that occasion, the Chinese Premier committed his government to buy 150 Airbus A320 
(worth US$ 9,3 billion), the biggest ever order for the Airbus conglomerate. Thanks to 
this order, Airbus has regained a large share of China’s aerospace market and by the end 
of 2005 the European constructor had surpassed Boeing in terms of contracted orders 
from China (804 for Airbus, against 801 for Boeing).445 This allows Airbus to position 
itself strategically in what is poised to become the most important market for the civil
442 Ibid., p. 9.
443 Ibid., p. 13.
444 Claude Fouquet, La France engrange 9 milliard d ’euros de contracts avec la Chine, Les Echos, 
Tuesday 6 December 2005, p. 6.
445 Ibid., p. 6.
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aircraft industry. Strategically, thus, China has become the most contentious battlefield 
between the two constructors, as demonstrated by Hu Jintao visit to the US in April 
2006 which started in Seattle at the headquarters of Boeing.
In this context of global competition, Airbus and Galileo must be seen as part of 
increasing EU’s efforts to counter American primacy in the aerospace sector. Especially 
after the first Gulf War, EU policy makers have begun to perceive a new security 
concern that some scholars have described as the interrelated issues of increasing 
technological dependency and declining international competitiveness.446 Increasingly, 
EU policy makers would perceive this new threat as coming from the US’s high 
technology industries. As the European Commission pointed out in 2001:
A new threat perception arising not from the East but from the West emerged in Europe during the second 
half of the 1990s. It was not a threat to national security and independence, but to European military- 
industrial survival and advanced technology competitiveness.447
According to the French analyst Franfois Heisbourg, this emerging American 
threat was a direct consequence of how EU policy makers evaluated the technology 
policy promoted by the Clinton Administration.448 Although the fundamental intent of 
many US programs was domestic, the comprehensive set of initiatives taken by 
Washington after 1992 in high technology, defence industrial, and exports promotion 
policies was perceived by EU policy makers as promoting an enhanced role of 
economic and technological issues in defining the US’s national security priorities. A 
series of decisions taken by the Clinton Administration led German and French 
observers, in particular, to stress that the EU would increasingly have to deal with a 
changed US perception of technology as an element of economic security.449
446 Thomas Lawton, Technology and the New Diplomacy: The Creation and Control o f  EC Industrial 
Policy fo r  Semiconductors, Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Company, 1998, p. 36.
447 METDAC Report, Conclusions and Policy Implications: As set out in the Final Report to the 
European Commission, Brussels, January 2001. The Management of European Technology: Defense and 
Competitiveness Issues (METDAC) thematic network was funded by the Commission from Spring 1998 
to Autumn 2000. See also: Sorin Lungu, “Power, Techno-Economics, and Transatlantic Relations in 
1987-1999: The Case of Airbus Industrie and Galileo”, in Comparative Strategy, No. 23, 2004, pp. 369- 
389.
448 See Francois Heisbourg, European Defence: making it work, Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, 
Chaillot Paper 42, September 2000 and personal consultation with Francois Heisbourg at the Foundation 
for Strategic Research, Paris, 7 July 2004.
449 See: Gilles Marcoin, “Le concept de s6curit6 6conomique: un ddfi pour l’Europe”, in Nicole Chaix 
(ed.), Economie et securite: de Vindustrie de defense a Vintelligence economique, Paris, Fondation pour 
les Etudes de Defense, 1996, pp. 125-134; and Joachim Rhode and Jens van Scherpenberg, 
“Defence/Civilian Technology Trends -  the Security/Economic Challenge”, in European
184
The creation in early 1993 of the National Economic Council (NEC) coupled 
with the establishment in 1994 of the position of Assistant Secretary of Defence for 
Economic Security (disestablished in 1996), indicated that the Clinton Administration 
was proposing a strong link between the preservation of American military and 
technological power and the vigorous pursuit of its own economic interests in global 
markets. Moreover, the launching of the Technology Reinvestment Program (TRP) in 
1993 was the largest dual use technology development effort ever attempted by the US 
Department of Defence. Its goals were to spin off defence technologies into commercial 
fields, lower costs for new defence technologies; and develop military useful and 
commercial viable technology in order to improve access to affordable and advanced 
technology. Finally, the Clinton Administration made it clear that it would use federal 
funds to promote the rationalisation of the American defence industry through a series 
of mergers to create giant corporations.450
In this context, the high-technology policy developments in the US, combined 
with the emphasis on economic security in defining the US’ national security priorities 
forced EU policy makers and scholars (and the Chinese, as we will discuss later) to 
rethink and adjust their industrial and technological goals, as well as the most 
appropriate means for achieving them. In the case of Europe, by the mid-1990s EU 
policy makers and industrialists began to articulate a new “US technological threat”. 
This rhetoric became explicitly anti-American, especially in France. While the French 
government adopted the anti-American argument on a political basis, the aerospace and 
defence firms were employing it for mainly economic reasons.451 In 1994, French 
defence analyst Yves Boyer suggested that the US had begun to promote a new 
international order in which advances in high-technology functioned as instruments to 
achieving economic and military dominance.452 At the same time, leading German 
aerospace industrialists, referring to post-Cold War developments, begun to voice 
concerns about Germany’s ability to maintain a competitive position in high-technology
Commission/DGI -  Seminars on Economic Security, Ebenhausen, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 
(SWP), 1994, pp. 4-12.
450 For a critical analysis of these developments see: Seymour Melman, From Private to State 
Capitalism: How the Permanent War Economy Transformed the Institutions o f  American Capitalism, 
Washington, National Commission for Economic Conversion and Disarmament, Briefing Paper 18, 
February 1997, available at: http://www.webcom.com/ncecd/bpl8.html.
451 Interview with Francois Heisbourg, Paris, 7 July 2004.
452 Yves Boyer, “Technologies, defense et relations transatlantiques”, in Politique etrangere, Vol. 59, 
No. 4, Winter 1994-95, pp. 1006-1015.
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sectors.453 In 1996, the French analyst Elie Cohen noted that since the early 1990s the 
American battle order with regard to Japan and Europe had been organised and 
conceptualised using concepts of economic security. As a result, the defence of the 
economic interest of the US had been elevated to the level of a strategic priority.454
In the US, the notion of economic security has traditionally included both 
military and defence-industrial implications, while European countries have tended to 
perceive such term as having primarily civilian and economic connotations.455 However, 
since the early 1990s due to the realisation that technological innovation was 
increasingly being driven from the commercial side and that it had to be integrated into 
military systems, defence industrial issues started to be perceived as having an impact 
on the EU’s technological competitiveness and, thus, on its economic security. As a 
consequence, EU policy makers have increasingly made the link between economic 
security and technological competitiveness of national firms in both the civilian and 
military markets. Following up on this, an independent aerospace capability has been 
perceived as having a key role in European industrial and technological development 
and it has begun to be closely associated with issues pertaining to the EU’s security and 
political autonomy.
In this context, the promotion of the Airbus programme in the 1990s became the 
first textbook case-study in which the European Commission used its financial assets to 
create competitors to the American-dominated aerospace sector.456 Following the 1996 
Boeing-McDonnell Douglas merger, the Trilateral Statement by France, Germany and 
the UK of 9 December 1997 called for the restructuring of the European aerospace and 
defence industry in order to limit overdependence on the US. The first step of the 
restructuring process was the establishment of Airbus as a Single Corporate Entity.457
453 Hartwig Knitter, “Hochtechnologie -  Sicherung des Industriestandortes Deutschland?” in Dokumente 
derLuft-und Raumfahrtindustrie, No. 9, Munich, Daimler-Benz Aerospace A.G., 1994.
454 Elie Cohen, La tentation hexagonale: la souverainete a Vepreuve de la mondialisation, Paris, Fayard, 
1996, p. 139.
455 Jens van Scherpenberg, “Transatlantic competition and European defence industries: a new look at the 
trade-defence linkage”, in International Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1, January 1997, p. 100.
456 See Thomas Duesterberg, “Global Competitiveness and U.S.-EC Trade Relations”, in The 
Washington Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 3, Summer 1993, p. 121. Airbus Industrie was formed under French 
law in 1970 as a Groupement d'lnteret Economique (GIE) and has been jointly owned by British 
Aerospace (BAE -  20%) of the UK, Aerospatiale o f France (37,9%), Messerschmitt-BOlkow/Blohm 
(MBB).Daimler-Benz Aerospace (DASA -  37,9%) of Germany, and Construcciones Aeronauticas 
(CASA -  4,2%) of Spain. Initially headquartered in Paris, the company moved to Toulouse in 1974.
457 Trilateral Statement, 9 December 1997, London, MoD Press Notice 208/97. The commercial success 
of Airbus highlights the fact that some large EU members, the European Commission, and industrial
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The establishment of Airbus Industrie can be seen as a strategic move instrument by 
some of the large European states in response to a challenge embodied in the US 
dominance of the post-Cold War II aerospace industry.
Furthermore, EU policy makers and industrialists started to push forward 
proposals for a thorough integration and restructuring of the aerospace and related 
defence industries in Europe. Airbus shareholders - British Aerospace (BAE), 
Aerospatiale of France, Messerschmitt-Bolkow/Blohm and Daimler-Benz Aerospace 
(MBB/DASA), and Construcciones Aeronauticas (CASA) - agreed to negotiate the 
establishment of a single integrated European Aerospace and Defence Company 
(EADC), merging all relevant assets, with core business in the fields of civil and 
military transport aircraft, combat and special military mission aircraft, helicopters, 
space launchers and orbital infrastructures, guided weapons, and defence and aerospace 
systems.458 This agreement paved the way for the creation of the European Aeronautic 
Defence and Space Company (EADS) in 1999.459
At the same time, international developments convinced EU policy makers to 
push forward the creation of an independent space and satellite positioning programme. 
The Kosovo air campaign by NATO in March-June 1999 demonstrated to EU policy 
makers that an improved air and space combat technological capability was a 
prerequisite for greater independence in security policy. It was also felt, in particular in
interests have been able to successfully engage in sustained collaboration in creating an effective 
instrument of commercial strategy in certain high technology sectors.
458 Joint report of Aerospatiale S.A., British Aerospace pic, Construcciones Aeronauticas S.A., Daimler- 
Benz Aerospace A.G., European restructuring in the field  o f  aerospace and related defence industries: 
Industrial response to the inter-governmental declaration o f 9 December 1997, March 27, 1998. For 
more details see: Burkard Schmitt, From cooperation to integration: defence and aerospace industries in 
Europe, Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Paper 40, July 2000; available at: 
http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai40e.pdf.
459 EADS -  European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company is the result of a series of moves. Firstly, 
the German DaimlerChrsyler Aerospace A.G, (DACA) took over the Spanish firm Construcciones 
Aeronauticas S.A, (CASA) on 12 June 1999. Then, DACA merged with A£rospatiale-Matra (France) on 
14 October 1999 creating EADS. Finally, on 14 April 2000, the joint venture between EADS with the 
Italian strategic partner Finmeccanica (Alenia Aerospazio S.A.) led to the final shape of the new 
European aerospace and defence conglomerate. The European Commission approved the creation of 
EADS N.V. (registered in the Netherlands) on 11 May 2000. As of 31 December 2004, about one-third of 
EADS stock is publicly traded on six European stock exchanges and the rest is divided among three major 
shareholders. Publicly traded: 34.08% (Includes 3.55% held by EADS employees, 0.06% held by the 
French government, and 0.78% held as treasury stock). Daimler-Chrysler: 30.17%; SOGEADE (Soci6t6 
de gestion de l'a£ronautique, de la defense et de l'espace - a French holding company): 30.17% (50% 
French government, 50% Lagarddre -  former MATRA); SEPI (Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones 
Industriales): 5.51% (Spanish state holding company). EADS is traded on Euronext Paris, the Frankfurt 
Stock Exchange, and the Madrid, Bilbao, Barcelona and Valencia stock exchanges. In the policy jargon, 
France, Germany, Spain and Italy are often refereed to as the “EADS countries”. We will see later the 
significance of the “EADS countries” for the development of the EU foreign policy towards China.
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France, that the lack of adequate European space capabilities and satellite navigation 
systems was greatly limiting the EU’s posture abroad by maintaining a high degree of 
strategic dependence from American technology. In this context, the EU decided to 
challenge the already existing American GPS by launching Galileo -  the European 
satellite navigation system which has sparked a significant transatlantic rift ever since. 
Galileo can be rightly considered, after Airbus and the Arianespace project, as the third 
common project that aims to secure the EU against too much dependence from the 
American aerospace sector.460
In 1996 the European Commission had adopted a policy document on space. In 
The European Union and space: fostering applications, markets and industrial 
competitiveness, the Commission pointed out that if  the EU did not want to be left 
behind on the very promising markets arising from the new space applications -  satellite 
telecommunications, satellite navigation, and earth observation -  the Union had to 
immediately come up with a suitable strategy.461 At the same time, some ESA officials 
published an article in which they stated that the time had come for Europe to take “the 
initiative to balance the US ambitions to promote worldwide acceptance of GPS for 
civil applications”, since this will give Europe “independence from foreign 
national/military satellite systems and control over its own element within a global civil 
navigation satellite system”.462
In 1998 the Commission released its policy paper Towards a trans-European 
Positioning and Navigation Network together with a European strategy for a global 
navigation satellite system (GNSS). In the document, the Commission stated that the 
GNSS represents a strategic challenge impacting on Europe’s position in the world and 
that foreign control over Europe’s navigation system would raise serious problems for 
both sovereignty and security. The document also underlined the potential dual
460 See Jost Vielhaber and Daniel Sattler, “Why Europe needs Galileo”, in Internationale Politik -  
Transatlantic Edition, Vol. 3, No. 4, Winter 2002, p. 35.
461 European Commission, The European Union and space: fostering applications, markets and 
industrial competitiveness, Brussels, COM (96) 617, 4 December 1996, available at:
http://aei.pitt.edu/3910/01 /OOP 151 1 .pdf.
462 Karin Barbance, Karl Bergquist, Simonetta Cheli, Valerie Hood, and Frederic Nordlund, “Satellite 
Navigation Activities: The International Context”, Space Communications, Vol. 14, No. 3,1996, pp. 155- 
161. At the time of the publication, the authors were all working in ESA’s International Relations Office.
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civil/military use of the GNSS. 463 In 1999 the Commission gave the name Galileo to 
the European space programme 464
Three European organizations have been cooperating closely to develop Galileo: 
the ESA, Eurocontrol (the organization responsible for coordinating air traffic control) 
and the Directorate General for Transport and Energy of the European Commission (DG 
TREN). EU member states participate in Galileo to varying degrees. However, Galileo 
-  and more generally, Europe’s space programme -  is mainly driven by France and, to a 
lesser extent, Germany. 465
5.4 EU member states’ space policies and the role of France
Among EU members France has taken the lead in the development of the satellite 
system and, more generally, Europe’s aerospace sector both in terms of financial 
commitment and political support. Paris accounts for approximately 40% of Europe’s 
overall spending in the space sector (military and civilian). Italy, Spain, Belgium and 
Germany have some significant military space programmes. The UK abandoned the 
development of its own space defence programme decades ago and now has access to 
military space information through the NATO infrastructure (communications) or via 
bilateral agreements with the US (intelligence). The other EU countries have only
463 European Commission, Towards a trans-European Positioning and Navigation Network together with 
a European strategy for a global navigation satellite system (GNSS), Brussels, COM/98/0029 final, 21 
January 1998.
464 European Commission, Galileo: Involving Europe in a New Generation o f Satellite Navigation 
Services, Brussels, COM (1999) 54 final, 7 May 1999, available at:
http://www.dft.gov.uk/steHent/groups/dft aviation/documents/pdf/dft aviation pdf 503448.pdf.
465 Alain Dupas, Stdphane Janichewski, Wulf von Kries, Kai-Uwe Schrogl, “A Franco German view of 
Europe’s ambition in space for the 21st century”, in Space Policy, Vol. 17, 2001, pp. 103-110; Alain 
Dupas and St6phane Janichewski are researchers at the Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES). 
Founded in 1961, CNES is the French government agency responsible for shaping and implementing 
France’s space policy in Europe. With a 2,400 strong workforce, CNES’ aim is, according to the official 
website, “to guarantee France’s independent access to space and maintain France and Europe’s 
competitive edge”. Wulf von Kries and Kai-Uwe Schrogl are researchers at the Germany’s Aerospace 
Research Center and Space Agency (Deutsches Zentrum fiir Luft und Raumfahrt -  DLR). DLR is a 
national institution and consists of 30 institutes at eight locations throughout Germany. Approximately 
5.000 employees work for DLR. With a budget of approximately 450 million euros, DLR also 
administers the space budget of the German government. See also Klaus Peter Ludwig and Stefan Hess, 
“Toward a European Space Policy”, in Internationale Politik -  Transatlantic Edition, Vol. 1, No. 2, 
Summer 2000, pp. 49-56; Klaus Peter Ludwig was at that time head of the International Relations Section 
of the Domier Satellite System; Stefan Hess was at that time head of the Space Department of the 
German Aerospace Industries Association (Bundesverband der Deutschen Luft -  und Raumfahrtindustrie, 
BDLI). See also Jost Vielhaber and Daniel Sattler, “Europas Aufbruch zu grOsserer UnabhSngigkeit: Ein 
Pladoyer fUr das Satellitenproject Galileo”, in Internationale Politik, No. 9,2002, pp. 47-52.
189
civilian space programmes. Overall, among EU member states, the civilian space sector 
is much more developed than the military.466
Table 9: EU member states’ space budgets 2003 (million of euros)
France 2,000
Germany 1,050
Italy 950
Britain 400
Source: ESA (2004) 467
Among the French political elite the conviction exists that only a united 
European policy can challenge the supremacy of the US in the aerospace sector, both in 
terms of the -  ever increasing -  budgets required and in terms of industry and user 
community base. Therefore, enlarging the national space effort to the entire European 
Union is clearly viewed in Paris as a prerequisite for starting any new major space 
programme like Galileo. Historically, France has played a key role in promoting the 
idea of an autonomous European launcher (the Arianespace project) and in translating it 
into facts. Moreover, French determination in pushing the space dossier has been 
instrumental for the promotion and development of Galileo and other European space 
undertakings, such as the Global Meteorological Environmental System (GMES).468
A major concern for French political leaders is that the various European 
aerospace programs must continue to draw sufficient political interest among EU 
governments so as to support and promote a genuine European construction agenda at a 
sufficient level. In turn, this pan-European aerospace programs have become a national 
objective for France. The development of a strong and independent European aerospace 
sector is viewed as part of France’s efforts at challenging the existing configuration of 
power in the international system. Politically, this challenge has been translated in the
466 Simonetta Cheli and Jean-Pierre Damis, “Towards a European Space Strategy?”, in The International 
Spectator, 2/2004, pp. 103-114.
467 European Space Agency (ESA), Annual Report 2004, available at: 
http://www.esa.int/esapub/annuals/annual04/ESA AR2004.pdf.
468 Interview, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 7 July 2004.
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discourse on multipolarity -  or multiple poles of influence - of which the EU is one of 
them. Since this view is not shared by the majority of EU members, especially the more 
Atlanticist ones, the challenge for France remains, according to the strategic analyst 
Xavier Pasco, to balance the objective of autonomy so that it remains “sufficiently 
ambitious to foster interest at the national [French] level without having it become a 
specifically national type of program unable to keep its European identity.. .this balance 
constitutes a prerequisite nowadays for any successful national and European space 
endeavour”. In other words, for France any new program must be balanced between 
national and European motivations; i.e., encompassing traditional national, as well as 
global purposes.469 Thus, the Galileo undertaking owes much to the fact that France -  as 
the main space power in Europe - has continued to preserve its national ability to act 
independently in space and is nowadays committed to translate this commitment at the 
European level.
Strategically, Galileo offers another example of French efforts to promote 
European autonomy within NATO. France cannot afford to build an alternative network 
of satellites to the dominant American GPS for its national needs. Moreover, most of 
France’s EU partners do not share French reservations about relying on the American 
GPS. For these reasons, the Galileo project has been presented to the public as an 
exclusive civilian project. However, satellite navigation system and positioning 
technology has military applications. It is, inherently, a dual use, system. Some of the 
services (for instance, the Positioning, Navigation and Timing -  PNT) will offer 
military planners and commanders a wide range of applications to manage assets, troops 
and munitions more effectively.
There has been a conscious and deliberate effort by EU institutions to promote 
and legitimise the development of an autonomous global navigation satellite system 
(Galileo) as a purely civilian project. The European Commission continues to 
emphasize the civilian applications of Galileo and the absence of any military 
application.470 The European Council stressed, in its decision on 16 March 2002, that
469 Xavier Pasco, “A Question of Balance: French Space Policy in the Global Age”, in Dana J. Johnson 
and Ariel E. Levite (eds.), Toward Fusion o f Air and Space: Surveying Developments and Assessing 
Choices fo r  Small and Middle Powers, Santa Monica: CA, RAND -  National Security Research Division, 
2003. Xavier Pasco is Maitre de Recherche at the Foundation for Strategic Research, Paris. He is one of 
the most authoritative voices on European space policy.
470 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council. Progress report on the Galileo research programme as at the beginning o f2004, Brussels, 18
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“Galileo is a civil programme, under civil control”.471 Moreover, the European 
Parliament released a report on Galileo in January 2004, stating that unlike the 
American GPS and the Russian GLONASS, it is a project, “which is and must continue 
to be used solely for civilian purposes”.472
The role of the European defence ministries and military agencies have 
remained largely hidden from the public debate. However, it appears that military 
considerations have played a role in advancing the project. Since the beginning, the 
French government, in particular, has consistently promoted Galileo’s military security 
role and, as such, Paris has engaged in examining the potential implications of GNSS 
for NATO and, more generally, for the transatlantic alliance.473 Senior French officials 
declared in March 2004 that Galileo could have military applications as early as 2010, 
raising protests in the Nordic states, Austria and Ireland.474 Another high-ranking 
French official stated that:
Galil6o constituera la seule alternative credible k l’instauration d’un monopole de fait du syst&me de 
positionnement global GPS et de l’industrie amdricaine dans ce domaine...Avec le signal PRS 
notamment, Galildo fournira un outil essentiel pour les activity de defense et de s£curit£ et pour la 
gestion des crises...sans dvoquer les nombreuses applications militaires, sur lesquelles le minist&re de la 
Defense, aujourd’hui utilisateur du GPS, r6f!6chit actuellement475
Furthermore, in the recently published Petit Guide de la Politique Europeenne 
de Securite et de Defense (PESD), published in October 2005 by the Permanent 
Representation of France to the EU, on Galileo is said th a t:
February 2004, COM(2004) 112 final. See also the Commission’s website:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy transport/galileo/index en.htm
471 European Council, Barcelona, 15-16 March 2002.
472 European Parliament, Report on the Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council on the State o f Progress o f  the Galileo Programme,2S January 2004, 
P5_TA(2004)0051, available at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oi/2004/ce096/ce09620040421en01280131.pdf
473 Interview, French Defence Ministry, Paris, 12 November 2005.
474 “Galileo may be battle-ready by 2010”, in EU Politixcom, 11 March 2004, available at: 
http://www.eupolitix.eom/EN/News/200403/57b385c8-157c-460c-b6a5-0e64447b6eed.htm
475 Patrick Bellouard (Chargd de mission du Premier ministre pour la coordination interminist6rielle du 
programme Galil6o), “Galileo, la navigation par satellite k l’heure europdenne”, in Les cahiers de Mars, 
n. 184, 2° trimestre 2005, pp. 73-79, quotations from p. 73 and p. 78 : Galileo will constitute the only 
credible alternative to the installation of a de facto monopoly of GPS global positioning and of the 
American industry in this domain...With the PRS signal in particular, Galileo will provide an essential 
tool defence and security activites and for crisis management...without mentioning the numerous military 
applications that the Ministry o f Defence, which currently uses the GPS, is pondering.
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Le syst&me de navigation par satellite Galileo aura des implications militaire et de s6curitd, qui devront 
etre prises en compte dans le cadre de la PESD.476
Thus, for France there is no doubt that Galileo is a grand commercial project 
with security and military implications. Among the other EU members, Germany, Italy 
and Spain share, to a large extent, French views of Galileo as a grand project, something 
of a public-oriented initiative similar to Airbus with a clear political and strategic goal 
rather than an exclusively commercial enterprise. The UK, Austria, Belgium and the 
Netherlands have preferred to underline the exclusive commercial side of the project. 
Finally, the Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden and Denmark) have expressed their 
interest in the development of Galileo but have expressed opposition to the inclusion of 
military uses.477 Some of the smaller EU members have joined Galileo not for strategic 
reasons, but for budgetary or bureaucratic circumstances and in a few cases for diverting 
money initially allocated for ESA’s slow-moving International Space Station.478
In conclusion, Galileo is Europe’s major aerospace project whose political- 
strategic goal is supported, primarily, by France. Germany plays an important role in 
terms of research and financing through German DaimlerChrsyler Aerospace and 
Germany’s Aerospace Research Center and Space Agency. Italian and Spanish 
aerospace industries have large stakes in the construction and delivery of the satellite 
network - Italy through Finmeccanica (Alenia Aerospazio) and Spain through 
Construcciones Aeronauticas (CASA). To note that the above countries are also the 
main shareholders of EADS, the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company.479
The above countries - France, Germany, Italy and Spain -  are usually referred to 
as the “EADS countries”. These EU members have strongly supported China’s 
participation in the Galileo project. Germany, Italy and Spain mainly for commercial
476 Permanent Representation of France to the EU, Petit Guide de la Politique Europeenne de Securite et 
de Defense (PESD), October 2005, p. 14 (Galileo, the navigation satellite system, will have military and 
security implications that will have to be taken into consideration in the framework o f the CFSP).
477 The positions o f the EU member states have been gleaned from interviews. See also: Johan Lembke, 
The Politics o f  Galileo, University of Pittsburgh, European Union Center -  Center for West European 
Studies, European Policy Paper No. 7, April 2001; available at: 
http://aei.pitt.edu/29/01/Politics of Galileo.pdf.
478 Francois Heisbourg, European Defence: making it work, Paris, EU Institute for Security Studies, 
Chaillot Paper 42, September 2000.
479 EADS is the result of a series of mergers among the German DaimlerChrsyler Aerospace A.G. 
(DACA), the Spanish firm Construcciones Aeronauticas S.A. (CASA) and the French A6rospatiale-Matra 
(France). Since 14 April 2000, EADS has established a joint venture with the Italian strategic partner 
Finmeccanica (Alenia Aerospazio S.A.). EADS also controls Airbus.
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considerations, while France also for political reasons (i.e., multipolarisation of space). 
The EADS countries are the same who have pushed more strongly in favour of a policy 
of constructive engagement towards China and, at the same time, watered down the 
more principled positions on human rights.480 We will see in Chapter 6 that the EADS 
countries have also strongly supported the lifting of the EU arms embargo on China.
The UK is also playing an important role in the construction and overall 
development of Galileo through British Aerospace (BAE Systems) and Inmarsat 
Ventures (satellite communications provider). From a political point of view, the British 
government has found itself in a somehow delicate situation, given the strong American 
opposition to the project. The participation of London to the European global navigation 
satellite system has largely depended on the fact that Galileo has been presented as a 
civilian project, funded by the European Commission, the European Space Agency 
(ESA) and various European departments of transportation or of research - and not as a 
strategic venture with a security dimension undertaken by defence departments 481
Moreover, China’s participation in Galileo is viewed in London as simply part 
of the policy of constructive engagement towards Beijing, without the political and 
strategic implications that the “EADS countries” -  and most notably France -  attach to 
it. However, there is no doubt that the Galileo satellite network will have potential 
military uses, since satellite navigation is, inherently, a dual-use technology. It is in this 
context that the US’ opposition to China’s participation must be understood. 
Washington increasingly views Beijing as a space competitor and it is concerned that 
through Galileo and related space-based technology cooperation the EU is contributing 
to the modernisation of China’s space program. We will discuss this further in the next 
section.
5.5 Behind China’s participation in Galileo: fostering Beijing’s space program
China is widely acknowledged as a space-faring nation. It is the third country after 
Russia and the US to have flown a man in space. However, while symbolically 
important, manned flight is not as valuable to China as its ability to hoist satellites into 
orbit. With thousand of isolated rural communities characterised by low population
480 For more details, see Chapter 4.
481 Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 13 April 2006.
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densities and limited telecommunication infrastructure, China is poised to greatly 
benefit from an increased use of advanced satellite technologies. Chinese leaders point 
out that the various applications of remote-sensing satellites, which have been very 
helpful in urban development and agriculture in many countries world-wide, would be 
an invaluable asset to help the PRC connect its scattered population, as well as boost 
economic growth.
In this context, Chinese policy makers and scholars view co-operation with the 
EU over Galileo as an additional initiative aimed at promoting China’s space 
programme, which has always been considered as a core initiative aimed at advancing 
comprehensive national strength.482 In the last years, European aerospace companies 
have been particularly eager to work with China, hoping to reap the benefits from the 
most promising emerging market. This has allowed China to pursue joint ventures, like 
Galileo, in the near term in order to develop indigenous capabilities in the longer 
term.483
In this vein, China’s manned space flight in October 2003 highlighted the 
dramatic achievements of Beijing in space technology. Compared to the US, Chinese 
space technology is not state-of-the-art. However, compared to other developing 
countries, China differs from having a space program that encompasses the full range of 
capabilities from satellite design to launch services. Traditionally, Beijing has tended to 
build satellites on its own, though current commercial and scientific collaborations with 
the EU, Russia and Brazil are aimed at joint development. China has also a well- 
developed commercial satellite launch industry and its space program is also notable for 
the exchange of personnel and technology between the civilian and military sectors.484
China’s space program was founded as part of Beijing’s Cold War strategic 
defence policy. Until 1985, when China initiated commercial launches, Chinese space 
activities were closed to the outside, and foreign countries for the most part refrained 
from working with China on space activities. As discussed in Chapter 2, during the 
Cold War the US’ West European allies cooperated in the efforts of the Coordinating
482 Interview, Chinese Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 6 May 2005.
483 Interview, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Beijing, 7 May 2005.
484 See: Evan S. Medeiros, Roger Cliff, Keith Crane, James C. Mulvenon, A New Direction fo r  China’s 
Defense Industry, Santa Monica, RAND, 2005.
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Committee for the control of strategic exports to communist countries (COCOM), based 
in Paris to embargo high technology sales and transfers to the PRC.
In the post-Cold War period, Beijing’s space program has been further 
strengthened because the technology being developed is dual-use and folds into the 
overarching Chinese goal of economic development. Moreover, the PLA’s involvement 
in space industries has encouraged support for dual-use space programs. The Chinese 
word for space - hangtian - refers to both space systems and ballistic, cruise, and 
surface-to-air missiles. In particular, the development of the ballistic surface-to-surface 
missiles has provided the basis for the development of space launch vehicles.485 From a 
strategic point of view, since the first Gulf War Chinese leaders have emphasized the 
link between the space and information fields, as well as the need for China to 
modernise its air and space forces to counter the technologically-advanced US military. 
China’s White Paper on space - White Paper on China’s Space Activities - released in 
November 2000 stated that Beijing is intent to industrialise and commercialise space to 
advance “comprehensive national strength” in the areas of economics, state security and 
technology 486
In addition, prestige is an important driver of China’s space development. This 
is most evident in the Chinese manned space program efforts. In October 2005, China 
launched its second manned rocket, the Shenzhou 6 and plans are underway for the 
Shenzhou 7 to be launched in 2007, which will involve a space walk. In recent years, 
China’s space programme has become a major political symbol of Chinese nationalism, 
contributing to fostering both the economic and military sectors. Since November 1999, 
with the launch of the Shenzhou 7, China has made important technological progresses, 
carefully monitored by the US.487 China’s space aspirations pose significant security 
and strategic concerns for Washington. Although most of China’s space programs have 
mainly commercial and scientific purposes, improved space technology has the 
potential to significantly improve Chinese military capabilities. According to American
485 See: Zhang Xinzhai, The Achievements and the Future o f  the Development o f China’s Space 
Technology, 10 June 1996, available at: http://www.space.cetin.net.cn/docs/HTM-E/007.htm.
486 The Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, White Paper on 
China’s Space Activities, Beijing, 22 November 2000, available at: 
http://www.spaceref.com/china/china.white.paper.nov.22.2000.html. For a comprehensive survey of 
China’s space capabilities and, more generally, Beijing’s defence industry, see: Evan S. Medeiros, Roger 
Cliff, Keith Crane, James C. Mulvenon, (2005).
487 See: David O. Meteyer, The Art o f Peace: Dissuading China from Developing Counter-Space 
Weapons, Institute for National Security Studies, US Air Force Academy, Colorado, INSS Occasional 
Paper 60, August 2005.
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analysts, China’s space programme is now intended to challenge American dominant 
position in the sector.488
There is no doubt that the EU is contributing to the modernisation of China’s 
space program. As discussed earlier, Galileo has been designed primarily for civilian 
uses. However, the satellite network, once operational, will have the potential to be used 
for military uses as well. Although the EU may never develop Galileo for military 
purposes, other countries involved in the construction of the satellite network may do 
so. It is in this context, therefore, that the decision of the EU to allow China cooperate 
in the development of Galileo has raised serious concerns in Washington.
The question here is that most space technologies are inherently dual-use 
technologies, with civil space activities sometimes having direct military analogues. A 
communication satellite, for instance, can be used for both military and commercial 
uses. Similarly, given sufficient capabilities, a satellite navigation system has direct 
military applications since its images identify objects and activities on the earth’s 
surface similar to a military reconnaissance satellite. In the case of Galileo, both the EU 
and China proudly state that the European GNSS will provide remote sensing data with 
resolution up to one meter. At present, the data resolution of the American GPS is only 
ten meters
The basic technologies required for commercial rockets and military missiles 
also share commonalities. This is a very sensitive issue which impinges on technology 
transfer regulations and where technical ambiguity can be deliberately exploited for 
circumnavigating existing export limitations to certain countries. Technically, it is 
difficult to determine where the line should be drawn regarding potentially relevant 
military technology. Moreover, in the case of China is fairly evident that much of the 
technology deemed essential for indigenous military aerospace capabilities includes 
technology also deemed essential for national economic development, and vice-versa. 
Thus, if a country has a technical space capability, then it will inherently have a military 
space capability. In this context, China’s cooperation in the joint development of the 
European GNSS would allow China to enhance its technical civilian space capability 
and, by default, also its military space capability.
488 Ibid. and William S. Murray III and Robert Antonellis, “China’s Space Program: The Dragon Eyes 
the Moon (and Us)”, in Orb is, Fall 2003, pp. 645-652. We will examine China’s defence budget and 
military modernisation in more details in Chapter 6.
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Analysts of the PLA say that the skill China would gain from participating in the 
Galileo system’s development would allow it to close an information gap that now gives 
the United States the advantage in the precise targeting of missiles and smart 
weapons.489 The system would also allow the PLA to improve sharply their command 
and control of forces in the field. China’s acquisition of the Galileo system will be a 
major setback to US efforts to limit China’s access to advanced military space 
technology. American critics of China’s participation in the Galileo project say that the 
EU is, in effect, assisting China’s military modernisation despite the embargo.490 In the 
2004 Defense White Paper, Chinese military planners make it clear that the use of 
advanced information technology is a top priority in efforts to make the army a modem 
force. American space analysts argue that access to secure navigation satellite signals is 
absolutely essential to the PLA realising its aim and that in this sense the EU is playing 
a critical role in helping the PLA fight its future wars.491 To back up this argument, 
American analysts argue that missiles would spearhead the Chinese military strategy for 
gaining the upper hand over Taiwan.492
Europeans have rejected suggestions that China could gain a military advantage 
from Galileo. EU officials argue that this signal, known as the Public Regulated 
Service, or PRS, would be withheld from China and any other non-EU participants in 
the system though the decision regarding China is not official 493 The PRS is an 
encrypted signal, meant to guarantee continuous signal access in the event of threats or 
crisis. Unlike other Galileo signals, the PRS will be accessible even when the other 
services are not available, making it suitable for security-and military-related uses.494 
Critics believe that the EU would find it extremely difficult to discriminate against a 
China with increasing economic and political power if Beijing insisted on access to the 
service. Even if the PRS signal and receiver equipment is off limits to China, some
489 Personal consultation with David Shambaugh and John J. Tkacik Jr.
490 This is the position of the more conservative elements in Washington that advocate a policy of 
containment towards China. Among them, there are John Mearsheimer and scholars in think tanks such as 
the PNAC, the Heritage Foundation and the Cato Institute.
491 Rick Fisher, Vice-President o f the Washington-based International Assessment and Strategy Center 
(IASC), quoted by David Lague in his article: “GPS Substitute for China?”, International Herald 
Tribune, Tuesday 19 April 2005.
492 See: Michael O’Hanlon, “U.S. Military Modernization: Implications for U.S. Policy in Asia”, in 
Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era o f  Uncertainty, Ashley J. Tellis and Michael 
Wills (eds.), Seattle, The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005, pp. 41-66, p. 61.
493 Interview, European Commission, DG TREN, Brussels, 18 December 2005.
494 Gustav LindstrOm and Giovanni Gasparini (2003), p. 19.
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American critics believe that Chinese technicians with inside knowledge of the 
technology would find it relatively easy to reverse engineer receivers or gain access to 
the codes.495
EU and Chinese officials recognise that the final content of China cooperation in 
the joint development of Galileo will follow the overall political evolution of EU-China 
relations. Hence, there is still a fair amount of unpredictability as to what China will be 
able to use -  or not to use -  in the end. However, US analysts of the PLA are worried 
that research work on Galileo will assist China - in any case - in developing its own, 
independent satellite navigation system.496 In fact, as already happened in the past, 
China will almost certainly be able to use foreign technology to upgrade its indigenous 
space capabilities.
Currently China, like other countries, has access to the American GPS and the 
Russian GLONASS. Cooperation in the Galileo project will increase its choice and 
capabilities. Beijing also operates its own two-satellite Beidou system, a less 
sophisticated system with significant limitations for military applications. These 
satellites provide the PLA with navigation and location data that can potentially be used 
to improve ballistic and cruise missile accuracy and to convert dumb bombs into 
precision-guided munitions. According to Joan Johnson-Freese, an American analyst of 
China’s military, there are indications that the GPS is being incorporated into all of 
China’s new fighters. It is also believed that the GPS is being integrated with 
commercially available satellite imagery to develop digital terrain maps for targeting, 
missile guidance, and planning. Moreover, the American scholar point out to the fact 
that China seems to have prioritised the development of missile early warning systems, 
navigational satellites and space surveillance.497 The dual-use nature of many of the 
technologies concerned leaves no doubts that by inviting Beijing to cooperate in the 
joint development of Galileo, the EU is contributing to further China’s space 
capabilities.
495 Richard North, Galileo - Implications fo r the United States, available at: 
http://www.brugesgroup.com/mediacentre/comment. liveVarticle^O 1.
496 Personal consultation with David Shambaugh, Derek Mitchell, John J. Tkacik and Valerie Niquet.
497 Joan Johnson-Freese, “’Houston, We Have a Problem’: China and the Race to Space”, in Current 
History, September 2003, pp. 259-265; see also by the same author: The Chinese Space Program: A 
Mistery Within a Maze, Malabar:FL, Krieger Publishing, 1998.
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The EU-China cooperation in space technologies is carefully monitored by 
Washington. David Shambaugh, for instance, has underlined the fact that without access 
to Western sources of supply “the pace and scope of PLA modernisation would be 
negatively affected.”498 With regard to satellite navigation, what worries more the US is 
that in case of conflict over Taiwan, the US will be able to shut down the GPS features 
currently utilised by Beijing, while Galileo would continue - in principle - to operate. 
The potential for Washington to restrict access to commercial satellite imagery or 
satellite navigation systems during a crisis is an important rationale for China to 
cooperate in Galileo, as well as to develop its independent capabilities.
The US military makes extensive use of space for intelligence, communications, 
meteorology and precision targeting. Chinese analysts note that the American army 
employed more than 50 military-specific satellites plus numerous commercial satellites 
in the 2003 Iraq war. They also highlight the extensive US reliance on GPS to support 
precision-guided munitions.499 The US’ space dependence will deepen as 
transformation and network-centric warfare increase the importance of rapid collection 
and dissemination of information down to tactical units and individual soldiers. 
Satellites also play a crucial role in US missile defences. As US dependence on space 
increases, concerns have grown about the potential for adversaries to attack US space 
assets. According to the current Department of Defence (DOD) doctrine:
The United States must be able to protect its space assets ... and deny the use of space assets by its 
adversaries. Commanders must anticipate hostile actions that attempt to deny friendly forces access to or 
use o f space capabilities.500
The report of the 2001 Rumsfeld Commission warns of a potential “space Pearl 
Harbor” if adversaries attack US satellites.501 Underpinning these concerns is the 
possibility that China might target US space assets in a future conflict over Taiwan. 
Indeed, Chinese strategists view US dependence on space as an asymmetric 
vulnerability that could be exploited. They argue that for a country that can never win a
498 David Shambaugh, “China’s Military Modernization: Making Steady and Surprising Progress”, in 
Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era o f  Uncertainty, Ashley J. Tellis and Michael 
Wills (eds.), Seattle, The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005, pp. 67-104, p. 98.
499 Interview, Beijing, 6 May 2005.
500 United States Department of Defence, Report o f  the Commission to Assess United States National 
Security Space Management and Organization, (Chairman: Donald H. Rumsfeld), Washington, 11 
January 2001, quotation from Chapter 3: US Objectives for Space. Report available at: 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/space2001011 l.html.
501 Ibid., Chapter 3.
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war with the United States by using the method of tanks and planes, attacking the US 
space system may be an irresistible and most tempting choice. Chinese strategists have 
explored ways of limiting Washington’s use of space, including anti-satellite (ASAT) 
weapons, jamming, employing lasers to blind reconnaissance satellites, and even using 
electro-magnetic pulses produced by a nuclear weapon to destroy satellites.502
In sum, the US is worried that China’s participation in the research and 
development of Galileo will boost the PLA’s ability to acquire the expertise that allows 
armed forces to be integrated for today’s increasingly digital warfare, in particular the 
most advanced early-warning systems and recognition satellites that would put China in 
a position to counter Taiwanese arms systems imported from the US. As such, 
Washington has put pressure on EU governments with regard to EU-China cooperation 
on satellite technology and related advanced technology transfers with security-military 
implications.503 More generally, the US government is concerned about the 
development of Galileo as an alternative satellite network to the dominant American 
GPS, as we will examine in the next section.
5.6 Galileo and the GPS
Since 2003, US policy makers have become increasingly concerned about the global 
coverage and the dual nature of the European navigation system.504 Galileo will, in fact, 
facilitate a large portion of its services to outside parties and for uses that were not 
originally intended. This will have important consequences for American space 
supremacy as other countries like China, Russia and India participate to the EU-led 
project. As discussed earlier, however, it is with regard to China’s participation in the 
research, development and deployment of the satellite network that the US is more 
worried about.
The problem revolves around the fact that Galileo, being a civilian project 
driven by commercial considerations, will offer users a continued service, without the
502 See: Leonard David, “U.S. Defense Report: China Working on Anti-Satellite Systems”, in Space.com, 
27 July 2005; available at: http://www.space.com/news/050727 china militarv.html.
503 Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 13 April 2006.
504 See: James Lewis, Galileo and GPS; From Competition to Cooperation, Washington, Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, June 2004, available at: 
http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/040601 galileo gps competition coop.pdf: and Richard North, 
Galileo: The Military and Political Dimensions, The Bruges Group, Paper n. 47, available at: 
http://www.brugesgroup.com/mediacentre/index.live?article=221.
201
risks inherent in the American GPS of being shut down for national security reasons. 
The GPS is, in fact, a Pentagon-led project, which can be shut off in case of danger for 
the security of the US. Since Galileo is marketed as a system which will not stop 
operating (as it is not intended, primarily, for military uses), the US is preoccupied 
about the potential misuses of the system by hostile parties. In particular, Washington is 
concerned that a hostile country -  for example, China in case of conflict with the US 
over Taiwan -  may be able to use the encrypted features of the European satellite 
network without the US being able to interfere with it. Hence, the initial opposition of 
the US to the Galileo project. However, in the face of the determination by the 
Europeans to push forward the Galileo project, Washington’s stance has shifted to 
finding a solution that will take into accounts American interests. The US has thus 
insisted, since the end of 2003, on reaching an agreement with the EU over the 
interoperability of the two systems in order to protect Washington’s global interests and, 
more specifically, avoid any hostile use of Galileo by China.505
American concerns have led to high-level transatlantic discussions during 2004, 
which resulted in the signature of an agreement between the EU and the US over the 
interoperability between the European GNESS (Galileo) and the American GPS. At the 
conclusion of the EU-US summit held in Ireland on 26 June 2004, the United States and 
the EU agreed on the “promotion, provision and use of the two satellite-based 
navigation systems and related applications”. Signed by the European Commission 
Vice-President, Loyola de Palacio, and US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, the 
agreement is intended to allow each system to work alongside the other without 
interfering with its counterpart’s signals, in order to protect and boost users worldwide. 
Moreover, the Bush Administration has made sure that Galileo’s services will not 
degrade the navigation warfare capabilities of US and NATO military forces.506
National security compatibility criteria have been added to the EU-US 
agreement of June 2004. In Article 11 it is stated that: “The Parties intend to prevent 
hostile use of satellite-based navigation and timing services while simultaneously 
preserving services outside areas of hostilities. To this end, their respective satellite 
based navigation and timing signals shall comply with the National Security 
Compliance for GPS and GALILEO Signals in the 1559-1610 Mhz Band, Part 1, Part 2,
505 Interview, Council of the EU, Brussels, 18 December 2005.
506 For more details on the discussions leading up to the EU-US agreement over Galileo, see: 
http://www.useu.be/Galileo/Feb2604JointUSEUGalileo.html.
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Part 3”.507 However, in the annex of the Agreement, it is stated that “access to Part 1, 
Part 2, Part 3 shall be only by the United States and those Member States that are a 
party to a General Security of Military Information Agreement (hereinafter ‘GSOMIA’) 
or a General Security of Information Agreement (hereinafter ‘GSOIA’) with the United 
States, which shall apply to the access, maintenance, use and release of these classified 
documents”.508
General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) negotiations 
are undertaken by the US government with those countries with whom Washington 
exchanges classified military information on a continuing basis, and then only when 
their capability and intent to protect classified military information has been firmly 
established by the completion of a favourable on-site security survey. The eligibility 
levels for the negotiation of a GSOMIA are established by the National Disclosure 
Policy Committee (NDPC), which is designated by the Secretaries of State and Defence 
as the central inter-agency authority within the executive branch of the US government 
responsible for the formulation, promulgation, administration, and monitoring of the 
National Disclosure Policy. The National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure o f  
Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International 
Organizations (short title: National Disclosure Policy or NDP-1), is a highly classified 
document.509 The insertion of this provision clearly indicates that the US views Galileo 
as a project that carries military and security implications. In this context, Article 13 of 
the EU-US Agreement establishes a “working group on security issues relating to GPS 
and Galileo”.510
What worries the US is the fact that China -  increasingly viewed as a space 
competitor - might be able to access the encrypted features. Among the non-EU partners 
in Galileo, China is the only country to which access to the encrypted features has not 
been officially denied.511 According to EU officials, this follows from Beijing actively 
contributing to the research, development and delivery into orbit of the satellite system.
507 Agreement on the promotion, provision and use o f Galileo and GPS satellite-based navigation 
systems and related applications {between the European Community and its Member States, o f the one 
part, and the United States o f  America o f the other part), 28 June 2004, Article 11.2; available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/energy transport/galileo/documents/doc/2004 06 21 summit 2004 en.pd 
f.
508 Ibid., Annex of the EU-US Agreement on Galileo-GPS (2004).
509 For more information see: http://crvDtome.sabotage.org/us-ndp.htm.
510 Ibid., EU-US Agreement on Galileo-GPS (2004), Article 13.
511 Interview, European Commission, DG TREN, Brussels, 18 December 2005.
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The more cynical critics add that commercial considerations may also play a role. 
However, no matter the future content or the level of access accorded to Beijing, the EU 
has granted China the status of the most important non-EU partner in Galileo, Europe’s 
flagship aerospace program. We will see in the next section the rationale behind it.
5.7 Pragmatic engagement: When Europe’s commercial interests meet with 
China’s desire to acquire Western technology
The EU’s decision to allow China cooperate in the joint development of Galileo must be 
seen as the logical extension in the security-strategic dimension of the policy of 
constructive engagement. As discussed in previous Chapters, since the mid-1990s, the 
overall goal of this policy has been to promote the fullest possible Chinese involvement 
in the international arena, whether on economic, social, political, security or military 
issues. At the same time, we discussed in Chapter 4 that Chinese leaders have 
considered the development of economic and technological exchanges and cooperation 
with foreign countries as paramount for fostering China’s modernisation and economic 
development. In this vein, Europe has become, over the years, a source for advanced 
technology that would otherwise be more difficult (if not impossible) to obtain from the 
US or Japan. China’s access to modem technology is cmcial for sustaining the 
country’s economic growth, which is one of the three main historical tasks established 
by Deng Xiaoping for guaranteeing the legitimacy of the post-Mao CCP leadership.
The idea of science and technology as the key element for increasing national 
strength dates back to the late 1970s. Deng Xiaoping himself pointed out, in a speech in 
1980, of the need to keep up with the latest developments in science and technology, as 
well as in international exchanges of scientists and information if the primary task of 
sustaining the country’s economic growth was to be achieved.512 According to scholars, 
an emerging discourse on science and technology, aptly termed “techno-nationalism”, 
has emerged in China in the last decades. For Christopher Hughes, techno-nationalism 
“becomes a strategic context within which policy is oriented towards autonomy and 
independence from other states through policies that can be either state-owned or non­
governmental enterprises”.513 For instance, Hughes point out that by the end of the 
1990s Jiang Zemin’s ideology of the Three Represents elevated the scientific and
512 For more details see: Christopher R. Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era, Milton Park, 
Routledge, 2006, p. 30.
513 Ibid., p. 34.
204
technological personnel to the status of a revolutionary vanguard leading the nation to 
wealth and power.514 This explicit form of Chinese techno-nationalism represented the 
growing realisation that China’s economic development increasingly depended on 
access to international investments, know-how, and advanced technology.
In its blueprint for the medium-to long-term social and economic development, 
the Chinese government singled out science and technology as the “primary production 
forces”.515 The necessity to narrow the gap between China and the world’s advanced 
science and technology level figures among its main tasks. Over the last years, Beijing 
has undertaken significant efforts to improve its own Research and Development 
(R&D) capacities, for example, through science and technology research programs 
aiming at the promotion of key technologies.
Since the beginning of the reform period, China has launched five major science 
and technology programs. The first one was the Key Technologies R&D Program 
initiated in 1982 to serve China’s industrial development by concentrating resources on 
technologies that were felt urgently needed in order to upgrade the industrial sector and 
foster economic growth. The following was the Spark Program in 1986, which aimed at 
developing the rural economy through science and technology and to initiate 
technological changes in village and town enterprises (VTE). In March 1986 a report on 
Suggestions on Tracing the Development o f World Strategic High-Technology was 
submitted to the State Council and Deng Xiaoping. This report became the platform for 
the High-Tech Research Development Program (known as 863). The main mission of 
the 863 Program was to monitor the international developments in advanced 
technologies and submit suitable proposal to Chinese authorities. Moreover, the 863 
aimed at reducing the gap between China and the developed countries (the so-called 
“first world” in the Maoist jargon) in several important fields, as well as, achieving 
breakthroughs in sectors where China held a comparative advantage. The 863 program 
coincided in time with initiatives in Japan and the EUREKA program in Europe, which 
were introduced in response to the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI - Star Wars) in the 
US.516
514 Ibid., p. 34.
515 Report on the Outline o f the Tenth Five-Year Plan fo r National Economic and Social Development, 
delivered by Zhu Rongji, Premier of the State Council, at the Fourth Session of the Ninth National 
People’s Congress, 5 March 2001. See: http://english.people.com.cn/features/lianghui/zhureport.html.
516 For more details on the High-Tech Research and Development Program of China (known as 863 
Program), see: http://www.863.org.cn/english/index.html.
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In 1988 the Chinese government launched the Torch Program 517 with the 
specific objective of developing new-technology industries in China and in 1997 the 
National Basic Research Program o f China (known as the 973 Program) was launched. 
The 973 overall objective was to establish a number of scientific projects that would 
boost China’s long-term economic development.518 Finally, in 2004 the Chinese 
government adopted the 2020 Science and Technology Plan, with the aim to provide an 
overall framework for the above mentioned programs and foster Western technology 
transfers.
Advanced technology transfers from developed countries, through foreign 
investments, is considered by Beijing an important tool to upgrade China’s technology 
base and to increase the technology content of its export products in order to sustain 
global competitiveness over the longer term. In this context, China’s state industrial 
policy actively encourages the transfer of foreign technology. Since the mid-1990s, 
these objectives are reflected in the Guidelines fo r  Foreign Investment.519 Transfer 
arrangements have become a regular feature of Joint Venture (JV) contracts, although 
the conditions required do not always satisfy Western partners. Approval procedures, 
subject to strict government scrutiny, are cumbersome and the respect of confidentiality 
of business secrets is doubtful. Access to China’s attractive market is often used as 
leverage to push foreign partners to provide their technology on terms that most 
Western companies would not be ready to accept anywhere else.520 Likewise, contract 
for larger JVs require, on an increasing scale, that the Western company should 
contribute to the establishment of cooperative R&D departments, if not transfer some 
production-lines altogether. It was remarkable in this context the case of the French 
company Areva in March 2006, the world’s top nuclear constructor. The Chinese 
authorities have overtly exerted pressures in order to extract better terms of technology 
transfers. Since Areva refused, the Chinese have been reluctant (so far) to grant the 
long-coveted contract to the French company. .
517 For more details on the Torch Program see: 
http://www.chinatorch.gov.cn/eng/other/MainContents.htm.
518 For more details on the National Basic Research Program of China (known as the 973 Program) See: 
http://www.973.gov.cn/English/Index.aspx.
519 Since 1995, the Guidelines fo r Foreign Investment are explicitly aiming at the transfer of technology 
through FDI in sectors like energy, agriculture, transportation, infrastructure and other basic industries. In 
recent years, the emphasis is more and more on advanced technology and defence-related industries such 
as aerospace.
520 Interview, Europe-China Chamber of Commerce, Beijing, 26 September 2004.
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The European Commission has taken an active role in enhancing EU-China 
scientific and technological (S&T) cooperation by allocating a significant amount of 
funds as part of its framework program for research (EUREKA). The level of 
cooperation under this program has increased since a bilateral S&T agreement entered 
into force in 1999 and programs have been established to link research organisations, 
industry, universities and individual researchers in specific projects supported by the 
EU budget. A joint EU-China office for the promotion of research cooperation was 
established in June 2001 in Beijing, to help Chinese scientists access the European S&T 
Framework Program. At the same time, an agreement was reached on the specific S&T 
cooperation priorities for the coming years, namely biotechnology, environment, 
information technology and nanotechnologies.521
As discussed in Chapter 4, the EU has important economic (closely linked to 
political and strategic) interests in a sustainable development in China. It can, therefore, 
be argued that transferring technology and know-how at low cost in areas crucial to a 
sustainable growth is in the EU’s very interest. On the other hand, the EU has obviously 
also an economic interest in exploiting its competitive edge and selling advanced 
European technology at market prices to China -  though the inadequate enforcement of 
International Property Rights (IPR) legislation remains an important hurdle. In this lies 
also a substantial long-term interest for Europe for, in increasingly globalised markets, 
Europe’s competitiveness is likely to depend on its capacity to maintain and develop its 
comparative advantage on high-technology goods.
Transferring latest technology and R&D capacity as actively encouraged - and 
increasingly required - by China’s policy of technological upgrading could, in the 
longer term, undermine the EU’s (relative) global competitive position. It seems that in 
the face of the fierce global competition for the Chinese market the Europeans have 
bowed to the insisting requests from Beijing that companies and governments should 
contribute to the establishment of cooperative R&D departments - such as the Sino- 
European satellite navigation training and cooperation centre opened in Beijing in 
February 2003 - if not transfer some production-lines altogether. Airbus, for instance, 
has increasingly offered China projects that will, over time, make Chinese producers 
critical suppliers of components and sub-assemblies for some of the most important
521 Interview, European Commission delegation in Beijing, 27 September 2004.
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Airbus products.522 These agreements have also allowed European consortia such as 
Eurocopter, which is itself a first-tier supplier of Airbus, to work more closely with 
Chinese partners such as the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation (which is a partner to 
Airbus).
Washington is worried about the prospect of China becoming a technological 
superpower also thanks to European advanced technology transfers to Beijing.523 This is 
not without fundament. Indeed, the process of achieving rapid technological progress 
and reaching the status of a technological superpower has been the substance of China’s 
2020 Science and Technology Plan.524 The 2020 Plan covers altogether twenty different 
but also closely related features. Manufacturing is one of them for which the Chinese 
Academy of Engineering (CAE) has been given the mandate of coordinating views on 
China’s future course in industrial development. Basic research is the responsibility of 
the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), while the State Defence and Technology 
Commission focuses on China’s future in military technology. The National Research 
Centre for Science and Technology Development (NRCSTD) is entrusted with the task 
of coordinating the various scientific institutions in order to reach its ambitious goal by 
2020.
In 2004, China’s expenditure in science and technology accounted for 1.23% of 
GDP. In the Outline of the 11th Five-Year Plan for China’s National Economic and 
Social Development approved in March 2006 by the National People’s Congress, it is 
stated that Beijing will launch a number of major S&T projects, especially in ICTs, life 
sciences and space technologies. Moreover, the State Council has recently published an 
Outline of the National Program for long-and medium- term development of S&T, 
indicating that the country’s expenditure on S&T would account for 2.5% of GDP by 
2020 and that annual R&D would be US$ 111 billion -  similar in percentage to the 
other developed countries.525
522 Claude Fouquet, La France engrange 9 milliard d ’euros de contracts avec la Chine, Les Echos, 
Tuesday 6 December 2005, p. 6.
523 Jon Sigurdson, China Becoming a Technological Superpower -  A Narrow Window o f  Opportunity, 
Singapore, East Asian Institute, Working Paper No. 194, June 2004, available at: 
http://swopec.hhs.se/eiiswp/papers/eijswpO 194.pdf
524 See: http://www.chinadaiiv.com.cn/english/doc/2006-02/09/content 518645.htm.
525 Data from the paper presented by prof. Yang Yang o f the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences at the 
international conference on The International Politics o f EU-China Relations, held at the British 
Academy in London on 20-21 April 2006.
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As discussed earlier, cooperation with the EU on S&T is viewed in Beijing as 
highly strategic. Both China and the EU have agreed to open their research programs to 
accommodate the increasing number of joint research projects. More and more Chinese 
are invited to participate in the EU-funded 7th Framework Program for Research, 
Technology Development and Demonstration Activities (RTD) for the period 2007- 
2013 and China is attracting Europeans into projects under the 863 and 973 
programs.526 Access to advanced technology not only ensures competitiveness over the 
medium to longer term, but it is also a prerequisite for the modernisation of the Chinese 
industry - and army. In the next chapter, we will discuss these issues further by 
analysing the arms embargo issue, as well as European arms and dual-use goods exports 
to China.
Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the main themes that have characterised the development of 
the strategic partnership between the EU and China. Central to this new discourse is the 
idea that relations between the two sides have gained momentum and acquired a new 
strategic significance. The declaration of strategic partnership in October 2003 was 
accompanied by two substantial moves: the signature of the agreement allowing China 
to participate in the Galileo global navigation satellite system and the promise by EU 
policy makers to their Chinese counterparts to initiate discussions on the lifting of the 
EU arms embargo on China. This Chapter has focused on China’s participation in the 
Galileo project and the related issue of European advanced technology transfers to 
China.
The central political question with regard to China’s participation in Galileo is 
the access to the encrypted signals. Beijing has not been officially denied access to these 
encrypted signals since Beijing is taking part to the development of the applications of 
the satellite network. EU officials have stressed that a “security firewall” will be put in 
place though they recognise that Galileo is part of the development of a security- 
strategic linkage with China and that as such the final content and mechanism of 
China’s participation in Galileo will be determined by the overall evolution of EU- 
China political relations.
526 For more details see: http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal relations/china/intro/st.pdf.
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This chapter has also highlighted the divergent approaches between the EU and 
the US towards (i) China’s rise and (ii) the use of space. With regard to the former, as 
discussed earlier Galileo must be seen as the logical extension in the security-strategic 
dimension of the policy of constructive engagement that has characterised EU foreign 
policy towards China since the mid-1990s. Europe’s (and the US’) response to China’s 
rise has been to engage with Beijing in order to exploit the opportunities offered by its 
seemingly limitless market opportunities. But contrary to Washington, Europe does not 
perceive Beijing as a military threat or as a potential peer (security-strategic) 
competitor. In the same vein, Galileo reflects the different conception between the EU 
and the US regarding the use of space. In essence, Washington places an emphasis on 
space power and control, while Europe stresses that the space should be used 
peacefully. Thus, while the US concentrates on leveraging the space to provide America 
and its allies an asymmetric military advantage, the Union is more concerned in creating 
useful -  i.e. commercial -  space applications for European peoples and industries. For 
Europeans the EU-China cooperation on space-based technologies is meant to boost 
commercial activities while the US looks at space from a different angle, i.e. the 
protection of its global interests and primacy in world affairs. We will discuss this 
question further in the next Chapter, which is devoted to the analysis of the arms 
embargo issue and the different approaches of the US and the EU towards East Asia’s 
strategic balance.
To sum up, the Galileo project -  like other pan-European aerospace programs -  
is part of the development of a strong and independent European aerospace sector. 
Strategically, France is the EU member state which has promoted more strongly 
European autonomy. In this sense, Galileo is part of France’s efforts at challenging the 
existing configuration of power in the international system. With regard to China’s 
participation in Galileo, it appears that France’s strategic and commercial interests to 
include Beijing as a partner in the development of the European satellite system has 
been Europeanised. Paris has, in fact, succeeded in influencing the other EU space 
powers - Germany, Italy and Spain -to establish a security-strategic linkage with Beijing 
over the use of space. France -  along with the Schroder government (1997-2005) -  has 
also been the strongest advocate of the lifting of the EU arms embargo on China, as we 
will discuss in the next Chapter.
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Chapter 6
Strategic partnership II: 
The arms embargo issue and 
East Asia’s strategic balance
China and the EU will maintain high-level military-to-military exchanges, develop and improve, step by 
step, a strategic security consultation mechanism, exchange more missions of military experts, and 
expand exchanges in respect o f military officers’ training and defense studies...The EU should lift its ban 
on arms sales to China at an early date so as to remove barriers to greater bilateral cooperation on defense 
industry and technologies.
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China’s EU Policy Paper, October 2003527
II faut assumer les responsabilitSs. L'embargo actuel n'a aucune justification et d'ailleurs aucune 
consequence. C'est une mesure de circonstance qui est purement et simplement hostile k regard de la 
Chine. Je vous rappelle que la Coree du Nord n'est pas soumise k l'embargo de lTJnion europeenne, c'est 
vous dire si nous sommes 1 k dans une situation qui n'a aucune justification, ni fondement. C'est la raison 
pour laquelle la France, comme d'ailleurs la plupart des pays de 1'Union europeenne sont favorables k la 
levee de cet embargo que rien ne justifie aujourd'hui. Je pense que cet embargo sera leve dans les mois 
qui viennent, en tous les cas, je le souhaite.
Jacques Chirac, French President, Beijing, 9 October 2004.528
Introduction
This chapter examines the other key issue of the EU-China strategic partnership : the 
proposal to lift the EU arms embargo on China. The lifting was officially tabled by 
France and Germany in Fall 203, at a particular propitious time for EU-China relations. 
In October 2003 the EU and China signed the agreement on the joint development of 
the Galileo satellite system and in the previous month the European Commission had 
released its last policy paper on China. At the sixth EU-China summit held in Beijing on 
30 October 2003 the EU and China established a strategic partnership, only a few days 
after Beijing had published its policy paper on the EU. At the time, the international
527 Chinese Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, China’s EU Policy Paper (Title V), Beijing, October 2003.
528 Speech by Jacques Chirac during his state visit to China in October 2004; available at 
http://www.elvsee.fr/elvsee/elvsee.fr/francais/interventions/conferences et points de presse/2004/octobr 
e/conference de presse coniointe de m iacques Chirac president de la republique et m hu iintao p 
resident de la republique populaire de chine.22770.html.
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press dubbed EU-China relations as a “love affair”.529 With Galileo, the growing 
economic relationship started to include a security-strategic linkage, in a situation of 
total absence of issues that could provoke a conflict between the two sides. The 
proposal to lift the arms embargo was intended to give further meaning and content to 
this newly established strategic partnership. China’s participation in the Galileo satellite 
system and the proposal to lift the arms embargo are two interconnected issues, part of 
the same rationale that, in the previous Chapter, we summarised as follows: if China is 
considered by the EU a strategic partner reliable enough to cooperate in the 
development of Europe’s main space project, why then maintain an arms embargo 
imposed during the Cold War which, in the words of the advocates of the lifting, “does 
not correspond anymore to the political realities of the contemporary world”?530 In sum, 
the arms embargo issue and China’s participation in the Galileo project are 
interconnected and must be seen as the logical extension in the security-strategic 
dimension of the EU’s policy of constructive engagement towards Beijing.
The first part of this chapter examines the debate surrounding the proposal to lift 
the arms embargo, with particular emphasis on the positions of the individual EU 
member states. The key question of the lifting revolves around the adoption of a revised 
EU Code of Conduct (CoC), which is meant to set in place checks and monitor 
European arms sales to China. Hence, the second part of this chapter analyses the 
current provisions of the EU Code of Conduct and the European defence sector. In the 
last part, this chapter will discuss the international politics of the arms embargo issue, 
focusing on the US’s opposition to the lifting and the consequences of an eventual 
lifting for East Asia’s strategic balance.
6.1 The debate on the arms embargo
The arms embargo issue is currently postponed due to: (i) strong US opposition; (ii) 
China’s failure to provide clear and specific evidence on the improvement of its human 
rights record; and (iii) the passing of the anti-secession law by China’s National 
People’s Congress (NPC) in March 2005, clearly aimed at Taiwan. For the purposes of 
this research it is important to recall the main themes that have been raised for - and
529 David Murphy and Shada Islam, China’s Love Affair With Europe, Far Eastern Economic Review, 12 
February 2004, pp. 26-29.
530 These were the words used by Jacques Chirac, President of France, in October 2004 to justify the 
proposed lifting of the arms embargo.
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against - the lifting (as the issue is still, in theory, on the EU agenda) The lifting of the 
arms embargo was first officially proposed by France and Germany at the European 
Council of Brussels in December 2003. In that occasion, all EU member states agreed, 
in principle, to initiate discussions on the issue.531. The advocates of an end to the arms 
embargo base their case on a number of reasons. First of all, they claim, China has 
changed. Since the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown on students, Beijing has 
significantly reformed its system of government and its economy, as well as moderated 
its aggressive tendencies in Asia. For this, a reward should be made. French President 
Jacques Chirac, in particular, has led this position dubbing the arms embargo as 
“outdated”. In January 2004, Chirac stated that “the ban no longer corresponds to the 
political reality of the contemporary world and therefore makes no sense today”.532 
German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder, during a state visit to China in December 2003, 
had declared that the embargo should be lifted.533 By the end of 2003, both Prime 
Minister Silvio Berlusconi and the Spanish Prime Minister had joined the same position 
(i.e. France, Germany, Italy and Spain: the EADS countries). By May 2004, the UK, 
Finland and the Netherlands joined the camp of the supporters of the lifting.534 
Sweden’s and Denmark’s situation were the most complex. None of the two wanted to 
break EU consensus but at the same time their parliaments opposed the lifting. To note 
that especially Sweden has a rather active Taiwan lobby in parliament.535
Notwithstanding the nuances, by the mid-2004 it appeared that all EU 
governments had agreed to start discussions on the procedures and criteria for lifting the 
arms embargo. The Franco-German proposal had been Europeanised, in the sense that it 
had succeeded in influencing the other EU members. Moreover, once the decision to 
start discussions on the lifting has been taken within the CFSP framework, Annalisa 
Giannella, the Personal Representative on Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction to Solana travelled to the United States, Japan, Australia and to the other
531 See Presidency Conclusions of the European Council, Brussels, 12 December 2003, available at: 
http://vyww.dt.tesoro.it/Aree-Docum/Relazioni-/Unione-Eur/Documenti-l/Presidencvl/Presidencv- 
Conlusion.pdf. Point 72 (p. 19) of the Presidency Conclusions states that: “The European Council invites 
the General Affairs and External Relations Council to re-examine the question of the embargo on the sale 
of arms to China”.
532“Chirac renews call for end of EU arms embargo on China”, Agence France-Presse, 27 January 2004.
533 “SchrOder Backs Sales to China of EU Weapons”, Wall Street Journal, 2 December 2003.
534 James Kirkup, “Blair’s Backing for China Trade Angers Activists”, The Scotsman, May 11, 2004, 
available at: http://news.scotsman.com/archive.cfm?id=536302004.
535 Personal consultation with Gustav LindstrOm, Research Fellow at the EU Institute for Security 
Studies, Paris, 25 October 2005.
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concerned Asian partners of the EU, to explain why the Europeans were considering 
lifting the EU arms embargo on China.
The official position of the Council in favour of the lifting is based on the 
argument that the EU Code of Conduct on arms sales and normal national arms export 
policies and controls will still apply, thereby preventing abuses when it comes to 
exporting arms to China.536 Moreover, EU officials say that by treating China as a 
respected interlocutor, they can encourage its peaceful integration into the international 
community. They even argue that European weapons are too expensive and that China 
has frequently declared that it has no intention of buying weapons from Europe.537 
Thus, the end of the embargo would principally serve to show that the EU does not 
discriminate against Beijing but treats it on a par with nations such as Russia.538
However, the Nordic countries led by Denmark and Sweden though accepting in 
principle to discuss the lifting, have repeatedly voiced their criticism with regard to 
China’s failure to provide clear and specific evidence on the improvement of its human 
rights record. Chris Patten explained the position of the more principled countries by 
stating that “more assurances from Beijing on human rights would make it easier for EU 
governments to explain any decision to lift the embargo”.539
Also the European Parliament and some national Parliaments have intervened in 
the debate for opposing the lifting. On 28 October 2003, the German Parliament, 
including the vast majority of Chancellor Gerhard Schroder’s own Social Democrats 
and virtually all of Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer’s Greens, passed a resolution 
opposing Berlin’s attempts to lift the embargo. On 19 November 2003, the European 
Parliament passed a similar resolution with 572 votes against 72. And on 11 March 
2004, leaders of the four German political parties representing Germany in the 
European Parliament sent an open letter to Chancellor Schroder urging him to abandon 
his support for the lifting. In the 2005 Annual Report on the CFSP, with 431 votes in
536 Personal consultation with Annalisa Giannella.
537 Interview with Henriette Geiger, European Commission, China desk, Brussels, 10 July 2004.
538 Chinese officials stress the fact that the only other countries with which the EU has maintained an 
arms embargo are Zimbabwe, Sudan and Myanmar. Interview with Yang Hua, Deputy Director, 
Department of European Affairs, Chinese Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 22 September 2004.
539 Chris Patten, Lifting o f the Arms Embargo on China: the Rueda Report on Arms Exports, speech by 
Chris Patten, European Commissioner for External Relations to the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 16 
November 2004; available at: http://www.defense-aerospace.com/cgi-
bin/client/modele.pl?prod:=48947&session=dae.20435556.1146516274.RFZzMsOa9dUAACISgns&mod 
ele=jdc 1.
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favour and 85 against, the European Parliament urged again the Council not to lift the 
arms embargo. In the Report, the MEPs “call on the Council not to lift the arms 
embargo until greater progress is made in the field of human rights and arms exports 
controls in China and on Cross-Straits relations”.540
Human rights concerns are not the only argument used by the opponents to the 
lifting of the embargo. From a merely military and security point of view, once the 
embargo is lifted, China would be able to acquire weapons systems -  especially 
advanced early warning capabilities as well as surface-to-air and air-to-air missile 
systems - from Europe that could affect the military balance across the Taiwan Strait in 
Beijing’s favour.
In this context, it is important to recall that French and British military 
exchanges and joint manoeuvres with the PLA took place in 2004, during the debate on 
the proposed lifting of the arms embargo. Joint manoeuvres are an important component 
of cooperation in military and security matters. Yet, they are also about the display of 
the latest military equipments and technology. More precisely, France and China held 
joint military exercises in the South China Sea in March 2004 (just before the 
presidential elections in Taiwan), the first ever naval manoeuvres between China and a 
Western country.541 Following France, in June 2004 the UK held joint maritime search- 
and-rescue exercises with the PLA.542
Since the beginning of 2004, Washington has stepped up pressure on the EU 
(and some key member states such as the UK).543 More specifically, the US government 
has voiced threats of retaliation in EU-US industrial and defence cooperation in case the 
arms embargo is lifted. The US bases its opposition to the lifting of the arms embargo
540 European parliament, Report on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Brok’s Report, 28 
November, 2005) discussed and adopted by the European Parliament on 2 February 2006. Quotation from 
point 34. Report available at:
http://www.europarl.eu.int/registre/presse/debat du iour daily notebook/2005/en/par/DG- 
INFO DN(2005)04-14(PAR004) EN.doc.
541 France and China have established a strategic dialogue and held annual consultations on defence and 
security matters since 1997, complemented by the training of Chinese military officers. Interview with 
Marc Abensour, Deputy Director for the Far East, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris, 7 July 2004.
542 The UK has, since 2003, started an annual strategic security dialogue with the PRC and has also been 
training PLA officers. Interview, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, London, 13 April 2006. For more 
details see: May-Britt Stumbaum, “Engaging China - Uniting Europe? European Union Foreign Policy 
towards China”, in Nicola Casarini and Costanza Miisu (eds.), European Foreign Policy in an Evolving 
International System: The Road Towards Convergence, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2006.
543 Interview, Ian Seckington, First Secretary (Political), British Embassy in China, Beijing, 21 
September 2004.
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on the following reasons: (i) The ban was originally imposed because of concerns over 
human rights, and the human rights situation in China has not improved to the point 
where it merits lifting the ban; (ii) The US has concerns about EU export controls and 
the ability to protect sensitive technology from being transferred to China; (iii) The US 
has obligations and interests in maintaining a balance between Taiwan and China and 
ensuring that Taiwan can defend itself.544
In response to US criticism, EU officials have asserted that the lifting of the 
arms embargo would be mainly a “symbolic gesture”. In other words, the lifting would 
be a political act that does not suggest that the EU member states seek to sell arms or 
defence technologies (which the embargo also covers) to China. EU members have 
clarified that the lifting is not meant to change the current strategic balance in East Asia. 
In this context, EU members have been asked not to increase arms exports to China 
“neither in quantitative nor qualitative terms”. In the Presidency Conclusions of the 
European Council held in Brussels on 16-17 December 2004, the EU member states 
stated that:
The European Council reaffirms the political will to continue to work towards lifting the arms embargo. It 
invited the next Presidency to finalise the well-advanced work in order to allow for a decision. It 
underlined that the result of any decision should not be an increase of arms exports from EU Member 
States to China, neither in quantitative nor qualitative terms. In this regard the European Council recalled 
the importance of the criteria of the Code of Conduct on arms exports, in particular criteria regarding 
human rights, stability and security in the region and the national security of friendly and allied countries. 
The European Council also stressed the importance in this context of the early adoption of the revised 
Code of Conduct and the new instrument on measures pertaining to arms exports to post-embargo 
countries (“Toolbox”).545
With regard to the last sentence, EU officials have repeatedly stressed that a 
revised Code of Conduct will be put in place.546 This new Code of Conduct will amend 
the one adopted in 1998 and establish criteria for EU arms sales worldwide. While 
discussions are still underway with regard to the new Code of Conduct, we will now 
examine the existing provisions.
544 Richard Lawless and Randy Schriver, Administration Views on US-China-Taiwan Relations, 
testimony before the US China Economic and Security Review Commission, 6 February 2004, available 
at: www.fnsg.com
545 European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 16/17 December 2004.
546 Annalisa Giannella (Personal Representative for Weapons of Mass Destruction, Council of the 
European Union -  High Representative), paper presented at the International Conference on China’s 
Challenge to Europe and the US organised by the Aspen Institute (Italy) in Rome on 11 March 2005.
216
6.2 European arms export control policies and the EU Code of Conduct
The EU ban on arms sales to China was adopted by the European Council on 27 June 
1989. The embargo took the form of a European Council Declaration since in 1989 the 
Treaty did not provide the possibility for the adoption of a legal instrument in this 
field.547 Due to the nature of the declaration, the scope of the embargo was not clearly 
defined. Thus, different EU member states have interpreted the embargo on arms sales 
to China in different ways. In addition, the arms embargo on China does not cover a 
large proportion of sensitive items, which are, on the contrary, covered by the Dual Use 
Regulation.548 The latter is a legally binding instrument directly applicable in EU 
member states. It sets out all the requirements which need to be met and the procedures 
to be followed for the granting of an export license.549
In the years following the adoption of the embargo, EU member states’ arms 
export control policies have continued to converge as illustrated by the adoption of 
common criteria to be applied to arms exports in 1991 and 1993 and by the subsequent 
adoption, in 1998, of the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. The Code of Conduct 
lays down eight criteria against which member states assess applications to export 
military equipment. Among the criteria set out in the Code, several take into account 
concerns expressed by some partners of the EU, especially the US. For instance, respect 
of human rights in the country of final destination (Criterion Two), preservation of 
regional peace, security and stability (Criterion Four), national security of the member 
states and of territories whose external relations are the responsibility of a member state, 
as well as that of friendly and allied countries (Criterion Five), existence of a risk that 
the equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under 
undesirable conditions (Criterion Seven), and compatibility of the arms exports with the 
technical and economic capacity of the recipient country (Criterion Eight).550
In addition, the operative provisions of the Code require, inter alia, that: (i) as 
appropriate, EU member states should assess, through the CFSP framework, the
547 European Council Declaration on China: Madrid, 26-27 June 1989, available at:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal relations/cfsp/sanctions/measures.htm# 1
548 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1334/2000 of 22 June 2000 setting up an European Community regime 
for the control of exports of dual-use items and technology, available at: http://europa.eu.int/eur- 
lex/pri/en/oi/dat/2000/1 159/1 15920000630en00010215.pdf.
549 See: Alberto Traballesi (ed.), Controlling the Transfer o f  Military Equipment and Technologies in 
Italy, Rome, Center for High Defence Studies, December 2004.
550 Council of the European Union, EU Code o f  Conduct on Arms Exports, Brussels, 8 June 1998, 
available at: http://www.europaworld.org/DEVPOLAWAR/Eng/Conflict/Conflict DocA eng.htm
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situation of potential or actual recipients of arms exports from EU member states; (ii) 
EU member states should circulate between themselves details of licences refused in 
accordance with the Code of Conduct, with explanations of why the licences have been 
refused; (iii) an annual EU report on arms exports by member states, containing 
statistical annexes, should be published.
The statistical annexes have become more and more detailed since the first EU 
annual report in 1999, so that they now contain figures on the number and value of 
licences granted per destination with some member states supplying details broken 
down per military list category. The statistical annexes also contain figures for the 
number of denials issued, and the criteria on which such denials are based.551 On 25 
April 2005, in accordance with Operative Provision 5 of the Code of Conduct, the 
Council adopted a new version of the Common Military List of the EU.552 In October 
2005, in a further move, the EU member states adopted a User’s Guide to the EU Code 
o f Conduct on Arms Exports, with the aim to help member states (in particular, export 
licensing officials) apply the Code of Conduct.553
According to EU officials, the above provisions are aimed at ensuring mutual 
political control among member states as well as transparency and accountability.554 
However, a report by the European Parliament released in October 2004 points out that, 
in the past, both the embargo and the EU Code of Conduct have been varyingly and 
erratically applied by EU member states.555 In addition, the Council in its Sixth Annual 
Report o f  the EU Code o f Conduct on Arms Exports declares that a number of EU 
member states have partially sidestepped the embargo by supplying China with 
components for military equipment, particularly engines for aircraft, frigates and 
submarines. The report shows that the value of licenses for arms exports to China
551 Sixth Annual Report According to Operative Provision 8 o f the European Union Code o f Conduct on 
Arms Exports (2004/C 316/01), Brussels, 12 December 2004, See: http://europa.eu.int/eur- 
lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oi/2004/c 316/c 31620041221 enOOO 10215.pdf
552 Available at: http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oi/2005/c 127/c 12720050525en00010027.pdf
553 Council of the European Union, User’s Guide to the EU Code o f  Conduct on Arms Exports, Brussels, 
14 October 2005, 13296/05, PESC 853, COARM 43. See, in particular, the list of Internet addresses for 
national reports on arms exports, p. 33.
554 Interview, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 18 November 2005.
555 Report on the Council's Fifth Annual Report According to Operative Provision 8 o f the European 
Union Code o f  Conduct on Arms Exports, A6-0022/2004, Rapporteur: Ratil Romeva Rueda, European 
Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs, October 19, 2004, available at: 
http://www2.europarl.eu.int/omk/sipade2?PUBREF=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A6-2004- 
0022+0+DQC+P D F+V 0//EN&L=EN & LE VEL=3 &N A V=S& LSTDOC=Y
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increased from €54 million in 2001 to €210 million in 2002 and €416 million in 2003. 
France, Italy and the UK, Europe’s main arms manufacturers, accounted for almost all 
of the sales.556
In its 2005 Annual Report, the Council states that in 2004 EU member states 
exported military equipment worth more than €340 million to China, significantly less 
than in 2003. Among the EU-25, eight member states concluded a total of 202 deals for 
transferring military equipment to China. France accounted for the largest share, signing 
123 contracts worth €169 million in total, followed by the UK (38 contracts, €148 
million), and the Czech Republic (7 contracts, €19 million).557 Thus, notwithstanding 
the embargo, some EU governments -  and their arms manufacturers - have been able to 
circumvent it by selling components for arms or dual-use goods (with both military and 
civilian applications).558 It is therefore to the analysis of Europe’s defence industry that 
we will now move.
6.3 The European defence sector
EU arms producers are very keen on entering into the promising Chinese market. For 
Europe’s defence sector, China -  and indeed, the whole of East Asia - is just another 
market. It is, in fact, a very critical market for a European defence industry that 
increasingly depends on exports for the bulk of its revenues. BAE Systems, the British 
arm manufacturer, for example, typically does 70% of its business outside the United 
Kingdom, as does Thales of France. Overseas sales comprise nearly half of the Swedish 
defence company Saab’s revenues, while EADS is also heavily dependent upon 
exports.559 Furthermore, the European defence industry suffers much more from the 
embargo than do US arms producers, who have the benefit of a domestic defence 
market four times larger than all of Europe combined. In addition, US defence firms 
regularly capture around half of a $40 billion-a-year business in international arms 
exports.560
556 Council of the European Union, Sixth Annual Report o f  the EU Code o f  Conduct on Arms Exports, 
Brussels, November 2004, available at: http://vyww.sipri.org/contents/expcon/codereport6.pdf
557 Council of the European Union, Seventh Annual Report o f the EU Code o f Conduct on Arms Exports, 
Brussels, December 2005.
558 See: David Cronin, “EU military exports to China continue despite arms embargo”, in European 
Voice, 8-14 December 2005, p. 4.
559 See: EADS In-depth Report, 14 October 2005.
560 See: The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2004/2005, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2004.
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Putting an end to the arms embargo is, however, unlikely to result in Beijing 
buying more European weapons. European defence firms cannot hope to compete with 
Russia’s prices or technology-transfer arrangements, nor with the fact that Russian 
weapons are simply a better fit for a Chinese army based on Soviet design and 
technology. More likely, European arms producers would mainly provide the PLA with 
competing bids in order to extract better deals from Moscow.561 Nevertheless, Europe 
might be able to sell components or subsystems that could greatly contribute to the 
modernisation of the PLA and fill critical technology gaps, particularly in such areas as 
command and control, communications, or sensors.562 In sum, EU arms producers will 
profit from the lifting of the arms embargo, since it would open the way to arms sales 
from China’s procurement budget, the second fastest growing in the world after the 
US.56*
The lifting of the arms embargo would also allow EU defence companies to sell 
to Beijing weapons systems which utilise satellite positioning and targeting. For 
instance, EADS is directly connected with the manufacture of those weapons systems 
that can be guided in space by satellites. We discussed before that the EADS group is 
Galileo’s largest industrial partner. The EADS group includes, inter alia, Airbus (the 
aircraft manufacturer) Eurocopter (the world’s largest helicopter suppliers), and MBDA, 
the world’s second largest missile producer.564 EADS is also a major partner in the 
Eurofighter consortium as well as the prime contractor for Ariane, the launcher that will 
deliver the Galileo satellites into orbit. As discussed in Chapter 5, the EADS countries 
(France, Germany, Spain and Italy) have keenly supported the lifting of the arms 
embargo, as well as China’s participation in the Galileo project. The same EU members 
have pushed more strongly in favour of a policy of constructive engagement towards 
China and, at the same time, watered down the more principled positions on human 
rights.565
561 Interview with Henriette Geiger, China Desk, DG XII (External Relations), European Commission, 
Brussels, 9 July 2004.
562 Personal consultation with David Shambaugh at the margins of the international conference on The 
International Politics o f  EU-China Relations, held at the British Academy in London on 20-21 April 
2006.
563 Ibid., IISS (2004).
564 MBDA is a joint-venture resulting from a merger in 2001 between Matra BAE Dynamics, EADS 
Aerospatiale Missiles and A16nia Marconi Systems.
565 For more details see Chapter 4.
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The problem facing EU policy makers and industrialists wanting to enter the 
lucrative Chinese market is that European defence companies are still largely dependent 
on US cooperation on defence technology, not to mention the importance of the US 
market for some of them. American retaliation could take the form of target sanctions at 
specific defence contractors that sell sensitive military-use technology or weapons
l
systems to China. According to US policy makers, these companies could be restricted 
from participating in defence-related cooperative research, development, and production 
programs with the US in specific technology areas or in general. Such measures are 
allowable under the rules of the World Trade Organisation, which permit protectionist 
measures based on national security concerns.566
Washington is adamant to prevent its advanced defence technology, currently 
shared with the EU allies, ending up in Chinese hands. Some US scholars have argued 
that loopholes in any new EU Code of Conduct would allow China to acquire 
subsystems and technologies to make their weapons far more accurate and deadly.567 
The hope in Brussels is that informal consultations with the US (and Japan) on what the 
EU member states sell to China would prevent sensitive technology transfers and defuse 
a serious transatlantic dispute.568 However, this underestimates US opposition to the 
lifting. The more conservative elements in Washington complain that by proposing to 
lift the arms embargo the EU is acting “irresponsibly” towards East Asia, an area where 
the Union has few real strategic interests, but where the US is robustly committed to its 
security.569 We will discuss this important issue in transatlantic relations in the next 
section.
566 US Code, Title 41, Chapter 1, Section 50.
567 This is the view put forward by the more conservative think tanks in Washington such as the PNAC, 
the Cato Institute, The Heritage Foundation. See for instance: John J. Tkacik, Jr., Washington Must Head 
O ff European Arms Sales to China, Washington, The Heritage Foundation, 18 March 2004, available at: 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/bgl739.cfTn.
568 Interview, Council of the EU, Brussels, 18 November 2005.
569 This is particularly voiced by some neo-conservative elements in Washington. This author had the 
opportunity to discuss these issues with some of them at the margins of the International Conference on 
China’s Challenge to Europe and the US organised by the Aspen Institute (Italy) in Rome on 11 March 
2005. In particular The Heritage Foundation and the PNAC have been prominent in voicing criticism to 
the lifting. See for instance the website of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC) at: 
http://www.newamericancentury.org/eastasia.htm.
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6.4 US opposition to the lifting (and to China’s participation in Galileo)
Since the signature of the EU-China agreement on Galileo in October 2003 and the 
official proposal by France and Germany to start discussions on the lifting of the arms 
embargo, the US has begun lobbying and pressuring key EU members (especially the 
UK). With regard to Galileo and China’s participation in the European satellite system, 
we discussed in Chapter 5 that the EU-US Summit in June 2004 reached a compromise 
regarding the interoperability of the two systems and guaranteed the American ally that 
Beijing will be restricted access to the encrypted features. However, it has been with 
regard to the arms embargo issue that US opposition has become more visible. The 
strong opposition from the US (coupled with increasing uneasiness in many national 
parliaments and within the EP) along with China’s passing of the anti-secession law in 
March 2005 clearly aimed at Taiwan convinced the majority of the European 
governments to postpone discussions on the lifting. Moreover, the new German 
government led by Angela Merkel reversed the previous policy advocated by Schroder 
and in the end only France, Italy, and Spain were left to openly support the lifting. After 
the European Council of June 2005, Washington congratulated the “wise decision” 
taken by the Europeans to shelve the issue.
The US’ strong opposition was based on the fact that for the Bush administration 
the prospect of the People’s Republic of China armed with weapons technologies from 
the EU facing American forces in the South China Sea would be something that could 
forever change the post-Cold War geopolitical order. Both the Bush administration and 
the Democrats have argued that the proposal of lifting the arms embargo is a “cynical 
ploy to open doors for the European defence industry” and that, even if  arms sales 
remain limited, the EU is “tossing aside more than a decade of human rights concerns 
for economic gains”.570 American criticism gathered pace at the beginning of 2005, 
when all commentators were expecting that the EU would lift the 16-year old arms
thembargo to coincide with the 30 anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between the EC and the PRC in 1975.
570 Although US opposition to the lifting is bipartisan, this author has decided to emphasize the views of 
the more conservative elements in Washington to show the vehemence o f the arguments used against the 
proposal to lift the arms embargo (but bearing in mind that also the Democrats have used strong wordings 
against the lifting). For instance, see: Ellen Bork, Human Rights and the EU Arms Embargo, 
Memorandum to Opinion Leaders, Washington, Project for the New American Century (PNAC), 22 
March 2005. Available at: http://www.newamericancenturv.org/europe-20050322.htm. See also: John J. 
Tkacik Jr. and Nile Gardiner, “Blair could Make a Strategic Error on China”, Backgrounder, Washington, 
The Heritage Foundation, No. 1768, June 7, 2004.
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In the first months of 2005, US policy makers adopted a series of initiatives that 
clearly demonstrated to their European counterparts the bi-partisan nature of the 
opposition to the lifting. For instance, at the beginning of February 2005, the 
Republican Policy Committee circulated a paper compiled by John Kyi, an Arizona 
Senator, which warned, in essence, that if  the EU ignores US security concerns, the US 
will restrict technology transfers to EU member states.571 On 16 February 2005 Porter 
Goss, the director of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), while delivering the 
agency’s annual assessment of worldwide threats, warned that China's military 
modernisation was tilting the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait and increasing the 
threat to US forces in the region. Dropping any mention of the co-operative elements of 
the US-China relationship that had characterised previous CIA statements, Gross stated 
that China was making determined military and diplomatic efforts to “counter what it 
sees as US efforts to contain or encircle China”.572 A few weeks earlier, on 2 February 
2005, the US House of Representatives had voted unanimously (411-3) to pass a 
resolution condemning the EU’s moves toward lifting its arms embargo on China. The 
resolution alleged that lifting the embargo could destabilise the Taiwan Strait and put 
the US Seventh Fleet at risk. “It is in this context that the EU’s current deliberations on 
lifting its arms embargo on China are so outrageous” declared Tom Lantos, the senior 
Democrat on the House of Representatives’ International Relations Committee.573
What has driven US’ concerns is, firstly, that the EU code of conduct is not 
legally binding and, secondly, that the embargo is interpreted differently by the 25 
member states of the EU. What worries the US more is the transfer from the EU to 
China of the expertise that allows armed forces to be integrated for today’s increasingly 
digital warfare. This includes communications gear, hardened computer networks and 
night-vision cameras, as well as the most advanced early-warning systems and 
recognition satellites that would put China in a position to counter Taiwanese arms 
systems imported from the US.574 Moreover, Washington is worried that China would 
be able to use Galileo’s encrypted features for military purposes, or gain access to secret
571 United States Senate, Republican Policy Committee (Jon Kyi, Chairman), US Generosity Leads the 
World: The Truth about US Foreign Assistance, 22 February 2005.
572 Global Intelligence Challenges 2005: Meeting Long-Term Challenges with a Long-Term Strategy, 
testimony o f Director of Central Intelligence Porter J. Goss before the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence: http://www.cia.gov/cia/public affairs/speeches/2004/Goss testimony 02162005.html
573 1 09th Congress, 1st Session H.Res.57, Urging the European Union to maintain its arms embargo on 
China (http://www.fapa.org/EU%20Embargo/TEXT HRES57.htm!
574 See Richard D. Fisher Jr., The Impact o f Foreign Weapons and Technology on the Modernization o f 
China's People's Liberation Army, draft report for the US-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, January 2004.
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Western traffic. To sum up, the US’ major concern is that the EU may contribute to tilt 
East Asia’s strategic balance in Beijing’s favour, thus putting at risk American troops 
committed to the maintenance of the status quo. We will examine these issues in the 
following section.
6.5 East Asia’s strategic balance
The US is the true guarantor of East Asian security. From the Spanish-American war 
through the Cold War, the US has understood that its security depends upon preventing 
any hostile foreign power or coalition from dominating the Asia-Pacific. America’s 
alliances in the region and its military presence, directed from the Pacific Command in 
Hawaii and, now also, from the Central Command in Florida, have provided a stable 
security structure for the region in recent decades. Of the Pacific Command’s 300,000 
personnel, almost one-third is forward-deployed in permanent bases in Japan and South 
Korea. Mutual defence treaties with Tokyo and Seoul -  plus unofficial agreements with 
Taipei -  underpin the US security presence in Northeast Asia. In Southeast Asia, the 
US has security treaties with Australia, the Philippines and Thailand.575
From an economic perspective, the US market is a major driver for many East 
Asian economies. East Asia has become the most important trading region for the US, 
having surpassed even North America. However, its economic importance is not limited 
to trade alone. During the extraordinary growth of the mid- to late-1990s, US equity 
investors shifted their focus increasingly to Asian markets and, over time, the stock of 
American investment in the region expanded dramatically. Moreover, East Asia has 
become the provider of inexpensive, high-quality products to US consumers, creating a 
huge trade deficit with these countries, reflected in the growing foreign reserves kept 
within the regions’ central banks.
575 See: Michael Yahuda, International Politics o f the Asia-Pacific, 1945-2005, London, Routledge, 
2005; and Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era o f Uncertainty, Ashley J. Tellis and 
Michael Wills (eds.), Seattle, The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005; see also: William T. Tow, 
Asia-Pacific Strategic Relations: Seeking Convergent Security, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2001 .
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Table 10: World Foreign Reserves, US$ billion
(as of 28 February 2006)
Country Foreign Reserves
China 853,70
Japan 850,06
Taiwan 256,98
South Korea 215,95
India 146,16
Hong Kong 125,70
Singapore 120,25
Malaysia 72,20
Thailand 54,80
Indonesia 35,54
Source: II Sole 24 Ore576
China’s foreign reserves have jumped from $165 billion in 2000 to $854 billion 
at the end of February 2006, becoming the largest in the world. The political question 
here is that most of Asian foreign reserves are invested in US treasury bonds. As a 
result, the US has a strategic interest -  almost a national security interest -  in the 
prevention of regional warfare, particularly a conflict that would involve East Asia’s 
largest powers. The interest in maintaining a peaceful environment in East Asia is based 
on the desire to prevent disruptions to global commerce (which would have a direct 
impact on the US relative welfare position) and the likely exacerbation in tensions and 
possibility of arms races that could result in the aftermath of a regional war. Both 
conflicts and military build-ups among Asia’s great powers are seen by American 
policy makers as germane in bringing about serious consequences for the US and its 
allies.577
In this context, Washington has a wide range of security and strategic interests 
in Asia. First of all, given the fact that US foreign policy is still based upon a desire for
576II Sole 24 Ore, Wednesday 29 March 2006, p. 4.
577 See: Ashley J. Tellis, “Military Modernization in Asia”, in Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military 
Modernization in an Era o f  Uncertainty, Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (eds.), Seattle, The National 
Bureau of Asian Research, 2005, pp. 3-40.
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dominance in certain spheres -  what scholars have termed as hegemonic -  the US has 
an interest in ensuring that major Asian powers, such as China, Japan, Russia, and India 
-  are not aligned against it. In other words, it is in the primary interest of Washington to 
monitor developments in the above countries in order to ward off the emergence of 
strong anti-US alliances in the region. From an IR perspective, this form of defensive 
realism has been replaced, in the last years, by the idea that the US should not only 
prevent the coalescence of threatening constellations of major powers, but also try to 
ensure the continuation of US primacy. In this context, US scholars and policy makers 
largely agree that China is the only country with the potential -  in future -  to challenge 
Washington’s dominant position.578
US-China relations are key to the maintenance of regional stability. At the 
economic level there seems to be an implicit bargain with Beijing: Washington tolerates 
China’s surging exports to the US and the resulting bilateral trade surplus for China, but 
China recycles its new wealth by helping to finance the US budget deficit. 
Economically, therefore, China and the US are more and more interlocked. Together, 
they have been driving the world economy in the last years. At the political level, 
though, things are different. In the 2002 National Security Strategy, the Bush 
administration stated that the US “welcome[s] the emergence of a strong, peaceful, and 
prosperous China”.579 However, the US also believes that China’s declared “peaceful 
rise” (and “harmonious development”) cannot be taken for granted and that the lack of 
democratisation and political liberalisation in China could presage tensions in future 
US-China relations. Moreover, the Taiwan issue continues to loom large on US-China 
relations. At the beginning of his first mandate in 2000, President Bush dubbed China a 
“strategic competitor”. Bush himself has declared his firm commitment to the defence 
of Taiwan and Secretary of State for Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, has expressed alarm 
with regard to the pace and nature of China’s military build-up.580
What worries more the Bush administration is that China’s fast-growing 
economy and the country’s rapid industrialisation are giving Beijing previously
578 See: The Emergence o f Peer Competitors: A Framework fo r  Analysis, Santa Monica, RAND, 2001.
579 George W. Bush, President of the United States of America, The National Security Strategy o f the 
United States o f  America, Washington, September 2002, in particular section VIII; 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf
580 Victor Mallet and Guy Dinmore, “The Rivals: Washington’s Sway in Asia is Challenged by China”, 
Financial Times, 18 March 2005, p. 19; see also The United States and Asia: Toward a New US Strategy 
and Force Posture, Santa Monica, RAND, 2001.
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unimaginable financial and technical resources to modernise its armed forces.581 
Blocked by the EU arms embargo and Washington’s refusal to authorise arms sales to 
the mainland, Beijing has depended largely on Moscow as a supplier in recent years and 
-  to a lesser extent -  other countries like Ukraine and Israel.582 China’s defence industry 
has been restructured in recent years to increase efficiency and put it on a profit-seeking 
basis. To raise capital, nearly 50 defence manufacturers have listed on the Hong Kong 
and Chinese stock markets. Though China still lags behind Western, Japanese and 
South Korean shipbuilders in technology and efficiency, the main enterprise, China 
State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC), increased its output by 65% in 2004 to 3.6 
million tons as part of a construction programme focused on destroyers with stealth 
features, hard-to-detect submarines and support craft.583
Estimates of the real China’s military budget are, however, difficult to assess. 
American analysts tend to believe that “even the PLA is probably unsure of how much 
money the Chinese military has at its disposal”.584 During the annual session of the 
National People’s Congress in March 2005, Beijing announced a 12,6% increase in its 
official defence budget, to US$ 30 billion. In 2005, the RAND Corporation concluded 
that China’s total defence expenditures (based on 2003 data) were between 1.4 and 1.7 
times that official number.585 What worries the US is the size of China’s foreign 
procurement budget. For the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the latter 
“is not known, but is likely to be substantial”.586 Based on these estimates, China ranks 
third in the world in overall defence spending after the US and Russia. According to the 
more conservative elements in Washington that view China as an emerging threat to US 
primacy, China’s military spending is growing both rapidly and in a sustained fashion
581 See: Dwight Perkins, “China’s Economic Growth: Implications for the Defense Budget”, in Strategic 
Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era o f Uncertainty, Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills 
(eds.), Seattle, The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005, pp. 363-386.
582 David Shambaugh, “China’s Military Modernization: Making Steady and Surprising Progress”, in 
Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era o f Uncertainty, Ashley J. Tellis and Michael 
Wills (eds.), Seattle, The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005, pp. 67-104; see also: Konstantin 
Makienko, “Les ventes d’armes de la Russie & la Chine. Aspects strategiques et economiques", in Le 
courier despays de I ’Est, n. 1032, February 2003, pp. 29-38.
583 Ibid., David Shambaugh (2005) and Dwight Perkins (2005). See also: Evan S. Medeiros, Roger Cliff, 
Keith Crane, James C. Mulvenon, A New Direction for China’s Defense Industry, Santa Monica, RAND, 
2005.
584 David Shambaugh, “China’s Military Modernization: Making Steady and Surprising Progress”, in 
Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era o f Uncertainty, Ashley J. Tellis and Michael 
Wills (eds.), Seattle, The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005, pp. 67-104, p. 78.
585 Keith Crane, Roger Cliff, Evan Medeiros, James Mulvenon, and William Overholt, Modernizing 
China's Military: Opportunities and Constraints, Santa Monica, RAND, 2005, p. 133.
586 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), Strategic Survey 2004/05, London, Routledge, 
May 2005, p. 307.
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precisely at a time when there is no pressing external threat to China. This alone fuels 
suspicions in the more conservative elements of the Bush administration - as well as in 
some of China’s neighbours, in particular, Japan and Taiwan - that Beijing is actively 
pursuing a military build-up.
The 2005 US Department of Defence Report on the Military Power of the 
People’s Republic of China (MPPRC) concludes that the modernisation of the PL A has 
gone beyond preparing for a Taiwan scenario and was likely to threaten third parties 
operating in the area, including the US.587 While Chinese leaders insist that their 
country is engaged in a “peaceful rise”, the US says that China is focusing on procuring 
and developing weapons that would counter US naval and air power, especially in the 
Taiwan Strait.588 The US is committed to assisting the island under the Taiwan 
Relations Act, the 1979 law that accompanied the US switch of diplomatic recognition 
from Taipei to Beijing.589 Chinese leaders have always maintained that they reserve the 
right to use violence at home to keep China intact -  and they stress that Taiwan is part 
of the Chinese territory. In March 2005 the Chinese National People’s Congress 
adopted the anti-secession law, which reiterates the “sacred duty” for the PLA to take 
military action if Taiwan takes a decisive step toward declaring independence.
Washington’s concerns about China’s rising military power and regional posture 
are shared by Tokyo, which in the February 2005 2+2 statement on Cross-Strait pointed 
out that the status quo is a matter of mutual concern, thus implying that China is a 
potential threat.590 Tokyo’s worries were sharpened at the end of 2004, when a Chinese 
nuclear-powered submarine entered Japanese territorial waters. In addition, Sino- 
Japanese relations were strained by the repeated incursions by Chinese destroyers into a 
disputed part of the East China Sea between the two countries, which is believed to 
contain rich oil and gas deposits. Japan sees China’s naval build-up as a threat to the sea
587 US Department of Defence, Report on the Military Power o f  the People’s Republic o f  China 
(MPPRC), October 2005.
588 2 004 Report to Congress o f the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Chapter 8: 
China’s Military Modernization and the Cross-Strait Balance, available at: 
http://vyww.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2004/04reportpagel5.pdf
589 Section 2(b)(6), The Taiwan Relations Act, P.L. 96-8, approved April 10,1979.
590 Interviews with Jun Hasebe, Second Secretary, Japanese Embassy in the UK, London, 29 April 2005 
and Otaka Junichiro, Deputy Director, European Policy Division, European Affairs Bureau, Japanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 12 may 2005.
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lanes on which it depends.591 On 16 February 2005, the US and Japan held top-level 
security talks at which they agreed to set new common security objectives to deal with 
what they called “unpredictability and uncertainty” in East Asia. This new initiative is 
the most important addition to the 1994 US-Japan Security Alliance, which is 
considered the linchpin of US interests in East Asia. The agreement should allow Tokyo 
to further extend its military cooperation with Washington, which is currently inhibited 
by Japan’s pacifist constitution. It will also greatly increase pressure for a revision of 
the war-renouncing article of the constitution, something that the Koizumi 
administration is keen to achieve. The Japanese Prime Minister wants to change the 
current limited status of Japan’s Self-Defence Forces (SDF) and convert them into a 
full-fledged military.592
Following up on the 2005 February talks, on 29 October 2005 Tokyo and 
Washington jointly assented to long-pending changes in bilateral security collaboration, 
including important alterations in roles, missions, capabilities and force posture 
alignments that will take place over the coming six years. The document issued by the 
Japan-US Security Consultative Committee outlines 15 areas of defence cooperation 
and seven measures designed to enhance policy and operational coordination. Like the 
US-Japan agreement of February 2005, the October 2005 document reflects a growing 
anxiety about the increasing capability of China’s armed forces and it clearly signals 
that Japan has decided to adopt a more assertive stance toward Beijing. Moreover, by 
declaring in the February 2005 joint communique that Taiwan is a “mutual concern” for 
both the US and Japan, the Koizumi government has dropped Tokyo’s long-standing 
policy of neutrality towards the Taiwanese issue.593
Beijing views the February 2005 US-Japan security accords as a sign that Tokyo 
is actively siding with Washington over Taiwan. The Chinese Foreign Ministry 
denounced it as a interference in China’s internal affairs, since the mainland insists that 
Taiwan is still a province of one China. The official People’s Daily newspaper wrote of
591 Christopher W. Hughes, “Japanese Military Modernization: In Search of a ‘Normal’ Security Role”, 
in Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era o f  Uncertainty, Ashley J. Tellis and Michael 
Wills (eds.), Seattle, The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2005, pp. 105-136.
592 Ibid., see also: Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, Japan’s Visions fo r  Future Security and 
Defense Capabilities, October 2004, available at:
www.iiaponline.org/resources/iapan/securitv/Japan%20CSDC%20Report.pdf.
593 See: East Asian Strategic Review 2005, The National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, June 2005; 
and Rdgine Serra, L ’6volution strategique du Japon : un enjeu pour I ’Union, European Union Institute for 
Security Studies, Occasional Paper n. 59, June 2005.
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a “brazen provocation which the Chinese people would not tolerate”, accusing the US 
and Japan of seeking an excuse to expand in the Pacific with the aim of containing 
China.594 Beijing’s response was to pass an anti-secession law in March 2005, clearly 
aimed at Taiwan.
The above events were happening while in Europe the debate on the proposed 
lifting of the arms embargo was underway. China’s anti-secession law in March 2005, 
coupled with the firm US opposition to the lifting, have induced EU policy makers, in 
Spring 2005, to postpone any decision regarding the lifting of the arms embargo.595 The 
impasse over the arms embargo has weakened the image of the EU, which has found 
itself being pulled in two opposite directions. On the one hand, the lure of the Chinese 
market had led EU members -  in particular the French, German, Italian and Spanish 
governments -  to promise the lifting to the Chinese leadership. On the other hand, the 
strong opposition of the US, the passing of the anti-secession law and China’s human 
rights record have convinced the Europeans to shelve the issue. Robert Zoellick, 
currently US Deputy Secretary of State, posed the right question in April 2005: “As 
Europe becomes a larger player on a global stage, we urge it to consider some of the 
messages it sends. Why would Europe want to send that symbolic message to this 
point?”.596 While no easy answer appears to be in sight, it is clear that by proposing to 
lift the arms embargo the EU had become an additional factor- albeit unconsciously -  
of East Asia’s strategic balance. We will examine this topic further in the next Chapter.
Conclusion
In the last Chapters it was argued that beneath the surface of official declarations (i) 
China’s participation in the Galileo project, (ii) the related issue of advanced technology 
transfers and (iii) the proposed lifting of the arms embargo have come to represent the 
three most important security-strategic issues in Sino-European relations. Their 
relevance lies in the fact that they have gone far beyond the bilateral dynamics of EU- 
China relations to assume a global significance. The Bush administration, for instance, 
has voiced its concerns to these security-strategic elements of the EU foreign policy
594 People’s Daily, 17 February 2005.
595 On 1st July 2005, Britain took over the Union’s rotating Presidency. Given the close ties between 
London and Washington, it is not surprising that by the end of 2005 no decision had been taken as to 
when re-open discussions on the lifting of the arms embargo. Also the Austrian Presidency (1 January-30 
June 2006) has not put the issue on the agenda.
596 International Herald Tribune, 6 April 2005.
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towards China on the grounds that they have the potential to boost China’s military 
modernisation and tilt the strategic balance across the Taiwan Strait in Beijing’s favour. 
The more conservative elements in Washington argue that with these policies -  even if 
only proposed as in the case of the lifting of the arms ban - the Europeans are acting 
irresponsibly towards East Asia, a part of the world whose security is guaranteed by 
Washington.
Notwithstanding the nuances among EU members, by the mid-2004 it appeared 
that all EU governments had agreed to start discussions on the procedures and criteria 
for lifting the arms embargo. In sum, the Franco-German proposal had been 
Europeanised, in the sense that it had succeeded in influencing the other EU members. 
However, due to the strong opposition of the US to the lifting of the arms embargo, the 
passing of the anti-secession law by the National People’s Congress in March 2005 
(clearly directed at Taiwan), and the lack of any serious progress in Beijing’s human 
rights record, the EU members have decided to postpone the issue. The UK Presidency 
of the EU in the second half of 2005, for instance, has been responsible for steering EU 
foreign policy towards China in a new direction, which would increasingly take into 
consideration the interests of the American ally. It was under the British Presidency, in 
fact, that the EU has established the EU-China strategic dialogue (initiated in December 
2005) alongside the EU-US and EU-Japan strategic dialogues on East Asia (initiated in 
September 2005). These newly established consultative mechanisms serve the purpose 
to move forwards EU-China relations by taking into account American and Japanese 
perspectives. Europe’s establishment of a security-strategic linkage with China has 
contributed to make the EU an additional factor -  albeit unconsciously -  of East Asia’s 
strategic balance. We will analyse Europe’s role and involvement in East Asian 
security, focusing on Cross-Strait relations, in the next Chapter.
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Chapter 7
The inter-regional level II 
The security dimension
Europe’s involvement in East Asia’s strategic balance and the
Taiwan issue
The EU supports the peaceful resolution of differences between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of 
China, rejecting the use or threat of force. It urges both sides to resume constructive dialogue, and to 
eschew dogmatic positions. The EU insists that any arrangement between Beijing and Taipei can only be 
achieved on a mutually acceptable basis, with reference also to the wishes of the Taiwanese population.
Website of the European Economic and Trade Office in Taipei (accessed on 14 April 2006)597
Le Gouvemement franfais confirme sa position constante sur 1'unicitd de la Chine. II s'oppose h quelque 
initiative unilat^rale que ce soit, y compris un r£f6rendum qui viserait & modifier le statu quo, accroitrait 
les tensions dans le ddtroit et conduirait & l'ind£pendance de Taiwan. II considdre que les relations entre 
les deux rives du d6troit doivent reposer sur un dialogue constructif afin de trouver un rdglement 
pacifique h la question de Taiwan et d'assurer la stability et la prosp6rit£ dans la region.
Joint franco-Chinese Declaration, Paris, 27 January 2004598
Introduction
As discussed in the previous Chapters, three elements of EU foreign policy towards 
China have the potential to impact on East Asia’s strategic balance: (i) China’s 
participation in the Galileo satellite system; (ii) European advanced technology transfers 
to China; and (iii) the proposed lifting of the arms embargo. In particular the arms ban, 
though currently postponed, has been strongly opposed by the US on grounds that it
597 Quotation from the website of the European Commission (European Economic and Trade Office in 
Taipei), http://www.deltwn.cec.eu.int/EN/eu taiwan/overviewofeu taiwanre1ations.htm.
598http://www.elvsee.fr/elvsee/elvsee.fr/ressources documentaires/asie/chine/declaration commune fran 
cochinoise visite d etat de m hu iintao president de la republique populaire de chine.2334.html.
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may -  if adopted -  contribute to boosting China’s military modernisation and, as a 
result, tilt East Asia’s strategic balance in Beijing’s favour.
The problem is that Washington is committed to the maintenance of the strategic 
balance across the Taiwan Straits. The'term “strategic balance” refers here to the 
relative capabilities of the two sides to achieve their respective strategic objectives in 
relation to the other. For China, this strategic objective is reunification with Taiwan on 
China’s terms. Taiwan’s objectives are to maintain its political independence, freedom 
of action, and way of life, free from coercion or undue influence from China, and to 
gain acceptance as a member of the international community. The concept of a strategic 
balance encompasses but is broader than an assessment of the military balance between 
two sides - though the military balance is what deters China to take over Taiwan, 
according to most American analysts. Cross-strait strategic balance, however, also 
includes the impact of economic, social and cultural ties between China and Taiwan on 
cross-Strait strategic dynamics; the influence of changing social developments on each 
side as they affect notions of self-identity, mutual identity, etc.; and the effect of 
international perspectives and involvement in cross-Strait affairs. Washington is the 
ultimate guarantor of the above strategic balance and as such is concerned if other 
players (in this case the EU) take initiatives which may have the potential to affect this 
strategic balance without prior consultation and/or accommodation with the US.
The Bush administration has voiced its criticism -  and strongly opposed - the 
more security-related elements of the EU’s China policy, since with these initiatives, 
Washington argues, the Europeans do not take into adequate consideration (i) the US’ 
strategic interests in East Asia and (ii) the role of Washington as the ultimate guarantor 
of regional security.599 The EU’s China policy of the last years has in fact revealed 
profound differences between the EU and the US on how to deal with China’s rise. 
While the EU and its member states do not perceive China as a military threat, some 
powerful voices in the US argue that China is a potential threat and needs to be 
contained.
599 See: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Symposia on Transatlantic 
Perspectives on Economic and Security Relations with China, Washington, 108 Congress, Second 
Session, Brussels 30 November 2004 and Prague 2 December 2004; available at: 
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2004hearings/transcripts/Q4 11 30 transcript.pdf.
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While Chinese leaders insist that their country is engaged in a “peaceful rise” 
and “harmonious development”, some powerful voices in the US argue that China is 
focusing on procuring and developing weapons that would counter US naval and air 
power, especially in the Taiwan Strait.600 The US is committed to assisting the island 
under the Taiwan Relations Act, the 1979 law that accompanied the US switch of 
diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.601 On the basis of the Taiwan Relations 
Act, the US export weapons to the island. The US President, George W. Bush, declared 
in April 2001 that the US would do “whatever it takes” to defend Taiwan against an 
attack by mainland China.602 Washington has recently reminded Beijing that the US has 
committed itself to reduce progressively arms sales to Taiwan but also to maintain a 
qualitative advantage in favour of Taipei which, according to the above mentioned 
MPPRC Report, is currently diminishing due to recent acquisitions by the PLA.603 
Chinese leaders have always maintained that they reserve the right to use violence at 
home to keep China intact -  and they stress that Taiwan is part of the Chinese territory. 
In March 2005 the Chinese National People’s Congress adopted the anti-secession law, 
which reiterates the “sacred duty” for the PLA to take military action if Taiwan takes a 
decisive step toward declaring independence.
Any tension in Cross-Strait relations could thus presage tensions between 
Washington and Beijing. In this context, recent European initiatives aimed at 
establishing a security-strategic linkage with Beijing are impacting on Sino-US 
relations. This explains the strong opposition of the US against the lifting of the arms 
embargo and the need to obtain reassurances from European partners that China will not 
be allowed to access the encrypted features of the Galileo satellite system. The arms 
embargo issue, in particular, has become a “wake-up” call for the US and has led some 
American commentators to dub Europe an “irresponsible” player in East Asia 604 since 
the lifting, according to the US, may put at risk American forces committed to the 
defence of Taipei.
600 2004 Report to Congress o f  the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Chapter 8: 
China’s Military Modernization and the Cross-Strait Balance, available at: 
http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2004/04reportpagel5.pdf
601 Section 2(b)(6), The Taiwan Relations Act, P.L. 96-8, approved April 10, 1979.
602 See: Ashley J. Tellis, “Military Modernization in Asia”, in Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military 
Modernization in an Era o f Uncertainty, Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (eds.), Seattle, The National 
Bureau o f Asian Research, 2005, pp. 3-40 and Michael D. Swaine and Roy D. Kamphausen, “Military 
Modernization in Taiwan”, in ibid. Strategic Asia 2005-06, pp. 387-422.
603 Michael D. Swaine and Roy D. Kamphausen, “Military Modernization in Taiwan”, in Strategic Asia 
2005-06, pp. 387-422.
604 This emerged with interviews with all US scholars and policy makers.
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Taiwan remains a thorny issue in US-China relations and, more recently, also in 
Japan-China relations. As discussed in the previous Chapter, in February 2005, the US 
and Japan held top-level security talks at which they agreed to set new common security 
objectives to deal with what they called “unpredictability and uncertainty” in East Asia. 
Since 2005, Japan has begun to seriously identify China as a potential threat. In the joint 
communique the two sides declared that Taiwan is a “mutual concern” for both the US 
and Japan. The latter is worried of an escalation in Cross-Strait relations, since should a 
war between the US and China break out, American troops will come from Okinawa, 
thus bringing Tokyo in the conflict.
For the EU, Taiwan is not an issue of major or immediate concern. However, 
any confrontation between the US and China -  with the likely involvement of Japan - 
will inevitably disrupt regional stability and thus jeopardise Europe’s economic interests 
in the area. It is clear that cross-Strait relations cannot be considered marginal, if only 
because China considers Taiwan part of the mainland. Yet, Europeans have tended to 
overlook the Taiwan issue, mainly for not upsetting Beijing which considers the 
principle of the one China policy the basis for political relations with third countries. 
However, over the years the EU and its member states have continued to maintain and 
develop relations with Taiwan. This chapter will explore these issues, in the context of 
current evolution and upgrading of Europe’s relations with Asia. The EU has large 
stakes in the maintenance of regional stability in East Asia, since only a peaceful 
environment can protect Europe’s growing economic interests in the region.
This Chapter begins with an examination of recent developments of the EU’s 
Asia strategy which, in the last years, has been characterized by the inclusion of a 
security dimension. As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, by cooperating with Beijing on 
space satellite technology and by proposing to lift the arms embargo the EU has become 
an additional factor -  albeit unconsciously -  of East Asia’s strategic balance. It is 
because of the establishment of a security-strategic linkage with Beijing that the Taiwan 
issue has come to the fore. Hence, the next section analyses the Taiwan issue. It is 
argued here that the development of relations between China and Taiwan, as well as the 
potential conflict that may arise by miscalculations or unilateral/aggressive postures 
from one of the two sides continue to be one of the key questions of East Asia’s 
security. The following section examines the EU’s Taiwan policy from its inception in
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1972, i.e. after the West’s normalisation with Beijing and the switch of diplomatic 
relations from the island to the mainland. In particular, the section examines the main 
themes that have characterised relations between Europe (both at the national and the 
EC/EU level) and Taiwan since the official recognition of the PRC as the only China. 
Since the early 1970s, the EC/EU has been neither directly involved nor it has devoted 
the issue the due attention. While the European Commission and the Council have 
adopted, over the years, an accommodating attitude towards the principle of the one 
China policy so as not to upset Beijing, the European Parliament has put forward, in the 
last decade, a position on the Taiwan issue that goes beyond the common stance set 
forth by the EU member states (and adopted by the Commission and the Council). In 
the final part of the chapter, we will draw some conclusions on the EU’s Taiwan policy 
in light of the EU’s Asia policy and growing EU-China relations.
7.1 The evolution of the EU’s Asia strategy at the beginning of the 21st century: the 
inclusion of a security dimension
As discussed in Chapter 3, since the early 1990s the EU and its member states - in 
particular Germany and France - have pushed for the adoption of a more pro-active 
engagement towards Asia, on the assumption that the Asian markets would be 
increasingly important for maintaining Europe’s global competitiveness and its 
(relative) welfare position. In 1993, Germany became the first EU member state to 
elaborate a strategy towards Asia and in 1994 the European Commission released its 
Communication on the EU ’s New Asia Strategy (NAS). Since the beginning, the overall 
strategy of the EU’s policy in Asia has been related to economic matters which, 
according to the Commission, need to be presented “in the framework of the political 
and security balance of power in the region”.605 While the NAS concentrated on the 
whole continent, the subsequent establishment of the ASEM process in 1996 clearly 
indicated that the priority for the EU was the development of relations with the 
economically thriving East Asian countries. In Chapter 3 we also examined the EU’s 
response to the Asian financial crisis, arguing that in the middle of the crisis -  i.e. 
during the ASEM II in London in 1998 - the EU moved quite deliberately to exploit the 
situation to further the development of a common EU foreign economic policy and 
promote the EU as a global economic power. This pro-active foreign policy agenda was 
dictated by the belief that Europe’s economic security was increasingly affected by
605 European Commission, Towards a New Asia Strategy, COM(94) 314 final, 13 July 1994., p. 2.
236
developments in Asia and, as a consequence, the EU needed to respond to the Asian 
financial crisis in order to protect the Union’s welfare position.
In September 2001, the European Commission reviewed its Asia policy 606 with 
the aim to provide EU member states with a more updated, coherent and comprehensive 
approach to the long-standing variety of EU-Asia relations that over the years had 
matured into a process of individual dialogues linking the EU with ASEAN607, China608, 
Japan609, South Korea610, India611, Indonesia612 and on the ASEM process613, energy614 
and environment sectors615. The 2001 Commission’s document Europe and Asia: A 
Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnership asserts that the prosperity of the two 
regions is inseparably linked. Europe’s current Asia strategy is based, therefore, on the 
understanding that the economic prosperity of Europe may be jeopardized not only by 
financial crises, but also by political instability in the region. Echoing the European 
Commission’s concerns, the European Security Strategy (ESS) adopted by the European 
Council in Brussels on 12 December 2003 states that “problems such as those in 
Kashmir...and the Korean Peninsula impact on European interests directly and 
indirectly...nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks in South Asia...are all of 
concern to Europe”.616 In this vein, the Union needs “to develop strategic partnerships, 
with Japan, China...and India”.617 In sum, both the ESS and the latest Commission’s 
Communication on Asia recognise that it is in the EU’s own strategic interests to 
engage Asia not only on economic and trade issues, but also - and increasingly - on 
security matters. But what has the EU done in support of Asian security?
Europe’s involvement in the security architecture of the Asia-Pacific region 
dates back to the mid-1990s. For instance, the EU is a member of the multilateral
606 European Commission, Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnership, 
Brussels, COM(2001) 469 final, 4 September 2001.
607 Creating a New Dynamic in ASEAN-EURelations, COM (96) 314 final, 3.07.96.
608 Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China, COM (98) 181 final, 25.03.98.
609 Europe and Japan: The Next Steps, Brussels, COM (95), 73 final, 1995; and Overview o f  EU-Japan 
Relations, Brussels, CEC, 2000.
610 Framework Agreement on Trade and Co-operation with the Republic o f Korea, COM (98) 147 final, 
8.12.98.
611 EU-India Enhanced Partnership, COM (96) 275 final, 25.06.96.
612 Developing Closer Relations between Indonesia and the EU, COM (00) 50 final, 2.02.00.
613 The Asia-Europe Cooperation Framework (AECF) 2000, Seoul, ASEM III, October 2000.
614 Europe-Asia Cooperation Strategy for Energy, COM (96), 308 final, 18.07.96.
615 Europe-Asia Cooperation Strategy in the Field o f the Environment, COM (97) 490 final, 13.10.97.
616 The European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, Brussels, 
December 2003, p. 11
617 Ibid., p. 20-21.
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security activities of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Council for Security 
Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP). The ARF as “track-one” represents the 
governmental level (in particular, diplomats from the foreign ministries), CSCAP as 
“track-two” involves regional experts of think tanks and universities, as well as 
government officials in private capacity. With the establishment of the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM) in 1996, a “track-two” has been initiated which also includes a 
multilateral security dialogue on various levels between Europe and Asia. Finally, in 
September 1997, the EU through the European Commission has also become a member 
of the Korean Energy Development Organisation (KEDO), created to implement 
denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. Since their establishment in the mid-1990s, 
all the above mentioned inter-regional security cooperation activities have been widened 
and deepened. Moreover, a number of bilateral security and military cooperation 
agreements between EU members and Asian countries has been initiated in the last 
years.
The EU has further contributed to peace and security in the region by assisting 
the establishment of democratic governments in Cambodia and East Timor Finally, the 
EU has been instrumental in ensuring the implementation of the peace agreement 
between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) which 
fights for the independence of the Indonesian province of Aceh. In order to supervise 
the peace process, the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) has begun its operations on 15 
September 2005, with hundred of monitors from the EU and from a number of ASEAN 
countries. In this context, the European Commission is providing assistance to the 
reintegration of former GAM combatants and is funding a number of programmes to 
support the democratic process and rule of law in Aceh.
Although Europe has no permanent military forces deployed in East Asia after 
the return of Hong Kong to China, the United Kingdom is still a member of the Five- 
Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), a military consultation agreement with 
Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore. In addition, France has an operational 
military presence in the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific, with thousand of troops 
that can be deployed in East Asia in a relative short time.618
618 For more details see: http://www.ambafrance-us.org/atoz/defense.asp.
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The most significant contribution that Europeans are currently making to Asia’s 
strategic balance, however, is through their growing arms sales in the region. Arms 
transfers are in large part about corporate profit, but they also represent strategic 
decisions. In recent years, Asia has become an increasingly important market for an 
European defence industry that depends more and more on exports for the bulk of its 
revenues. Furthermore, the demand for aerospace products (both civilian and military) 
over the next 20 years is projected to arise outside the US or Europe’s market and come 
mainly from Asia and, in particular, China. The latter has become the battleground 
between Boeing and Airbus, which fiercely compete against each other for the 
leadership of the world aerospace sector. Analysts estimate that since 2005, China has 
become the second largest market for aerospace, behind the US.619 In this context, EU- 
China cooperation on satellite navigation and other space-based technologies - which 
are likely to foster China’s civilian and military space capabilities -  along with 
European advanced technology transfers and arms sales (likely to increase after an 
eventual lifting of the arms embargo) represent huge commercial opportunities for 
Europe’s defence industry and aerospace sector.
Although any decision on the lifting of the arms embargo is currently postponed, 
some EU members (in particular, France, the UK, Germany and Italy) continue to sell 
weapons to Beijing. In its latest Annual Report, the Council states that in 2004 EU 
member states exported military equipment worth more than €340 million to China, 
though significantly less than in 2003 (whose total amounted to €416 million). By the 
end of 2004, eight EU member states concluded a total of 202 deals for transferring 
military equipment to China. France accounted for the largest share, signing 123 
contracts worth €169 million in total, followed by the UK (38 contracts, €148 
million).620 Thus, in spite of the embargo, some EU governments -  and their arms 
manufacturers - have been able to circumvent it by selling components for arms or dual- 
use goods (with both military and civilian applications). -
As discussed earlier, the more conservative elements in Washington argue that 
China’s participation in the Galileo project (with the related issue of advanced
619 “La Chine: le nouvel eldorado d’EADS”, in Air & Cosmos, n. 2009, 9 December 2005, pp. 10-11; see 
also Claude Fouquet, La France engrange 9 milliard d ’euros de contracts avec la Chine, Les Echos, 
Tuesday 6 December 2005, p. 6.
620 Council o f the European Union, Seventh Annual Report o f  the EU Code o f Conduct on Arms Exports, 
Brussels, December 2005.
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technology transfers) and the proposed lifting of the EU arms embargo on China (which 
will likely increase European arms sales) may contribute to help China’s military 
modernisation and potentially tilt East Asia’s strategic balance in Beijing’s favour in a 
situation where there could be future tensions in US-China relations, especially over 
Taiwan. The question here is that the EU does not view Taiwan and cross-Strait 
relations as an issue of immediate strategic interest (contrary to the US). Moreover, 
growing EU-China relations appear to have drastically reduced the scope of the EU’s 
Taiwan policy.
It is important to recall at this point that the EU and its large member states 
(Germany, France, the UK and Italy) since the early 1990s have pushed for the adoption 
of a more pro-active engagement with Asia, on the assumption that taking advantage of 
the thriving Asian markets would be increasingly important for maintaining Europe’s 
global competitiveness and its (relative) welfare position. According to the US and 
other concerned Asian partners of the Union such as Japan and Taiwan, recent European 
initiatives aimed at fostering a security-strategic linkage with China (mainly supported 
by France and, to a lesser extent, Germany and Italy) could have the potential to affect 
East Asia’s strategic balance and, as a consequence, Europe’s economic interests in the 
area.
At the same time, we have seen in previous chapters that China has become a 
key partner of the EU and that EU policy makers have made the link between China’s 
development and Europe’s economic security. As discussed in Chapter 4, this 
securitisation discourse argues that Europe’s future economic prosperity will 
increasingly depend on European companies’ capacity to acquire shares of the Chinese 
market (including the defence market) which, in turn, depends on maintaining good 
political relations with the Chinese leadership. In this context, why should Europe 
bother about Taiwan and, more generally, Cross-Strait relations? The answer is 
straightforward: political developments in China and Taiwan that could affect cross- 
Strait relations would have a direct detrimental impact on East Asia’s security and 
economic growth. Consequently, EU exports and FDI in the area could be affected, thus 
bearing directly upon EU’s economic security and welfare position. As such, recent 
developments of the EU’s China policy that could have an impact on cross-Strait 
relations and, more generally, East Asia’s strategic balance point to the need for the EU 
to devote more attention to the Taiwan issue. In the following section, we will analyse
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the Taiwan question and how Europe has engaged with the island since 1972, i.e. after 
the West’s normalisation with Beijing and the switch of diplomatic relations from the 
island to the mainland.
7.2 The Taiwan issue
The key issue of cross-Strait relations comes down to two inter-related questions: 
Taiwan’s future political status (unification with the mainland or de jure 
independence) and the means to arrive at this future political status. Over the years 
scholars have questioned whether mainland China and Taiwan will be reunified 
according to Beijing‘s demands, whether the present situation will continue - with 
Taiwan functioning as a separate and independent society - or whether Taiwan will, 
in fact, attain de jure sovereignty. The above questions, taken together, constitute the 
Taiwan issue.621
The majority of scholars agree that the dispute over Taiwan has the potential 
to threaten China’s stability. In the worst case, it would lead to a war between China 
and the US, since Washington is committed to the defence of the island. Given the 
global implications of such a conflict, the Taiwan issue is, thus, not only a cause of 
concern for East Asia and the US, but is also significant for the EU and its member 
states. As discussed earlier, any tension arising in the Taiwan Straits has the potential 
to disrupt regional stability and have an impact on European trade and investments in 
the area.
Although Chinese leaders have made the realistic assessment that the goal of 
reunification is not achievable in the near future, they would be willing to sacrifice 
the country’s stability in order to avoid a declaration of independence from 
Taiwan.622 Beijing, in fact, still asserts its right to use force against Taiwan, as 
demonstrated in the passing of the anti-secession law in March 2005. However, the 
problem is complicated by the fact that today the island does not need a proclamation 
of independence in the traditional sense, since Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian 
has on several occasions stated that Taiwan already is a sovereign state. In this vein,
621 See: Christopher R. Hughes, “Living with ‘One country, two systems’? The future of Beijing’s 
Taiwan policy”, in Cambridge Review o f International Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 2, May 2001, pp. 124-138.
622 Christopher R. Hughes, “Nationalism and multilateralism in Chinese foreign policy: implications for 
Southeast Asia”, in The Pacific Review, Vol. 18, No. 1, March 2005, pp. 119-235.
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Beijing would respond with military action if the international community, led by the 
US, were to acknowledge Taiwan’s sovereignty or if the island would take steps to 
further consolidate its separate status in a way that China regards as irrevocable.623
According to scholars and opinion polls, the majority of Taiwanese are in 
favour of a continuation of the present situation, the maintenance of the status quo.624 
In other words, Taiwan constitutes an independent society with its own political 
system, its own armed forces, and so forth. What sets the island apart from sovereign 
states is recognition by the international community -  and as a corollary, exclusion 
from international organisations where statehood is required. Most Taiwanese seem 
to be opposed to the prospect of reunification with Beijing as long as the one-party 
rule by the Chinese Communist party (CCP) continues. Taiwanese policy makers 
argue that unification cannot take place before the mainland is also democratically 
ruled. In other words, there seems to be a prerequisite put forward by Taipei, namely 
that unification cannot take place before both societies, on either side of the Strait, 
have similar political systems.625 
\
In the last years, Taiwan and China have moved much closer to each other in 
terms of economic integration. From an economic point of view, in fact, the two 
societies are increasingly mutually dependent, despite the lack of political dialogue 
between the authorities. However, the question is how long can the current status quo 
last. The emphasis placed by Taiwan’s political leaders on the island’s special status 
continues to infuriate Beijing’s leadership, as well as raise nationalistic sentiments
v
among the Chinese.626 As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, Chinese leaders have 
retaliated in the past against those European countries who had not complied to the 
one China policy, demonstrating how sensitive the CCP regime is to national sirens. 
Any dispute across the Strait, no matter how minor the cause, has the potential to 
develop into a major crisis. For instance, in Autumn 2003, Taiwan’s President Chen 
Shui-bian announced his intention to hold a referendum on a new constitution. 
Beijing interpreted this as a way of consolidating the island’s independency and
623 For more details see: Christopher R. Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era, Milton Park, 
Routledge, 2006, in particular section 4.
624 Interview, Taipei Representative Office in the UK, London, 28 April 2006.
625 For more details see: Shelley Rigger, “The Unfinished Business o f Taiwanese Democratisation”, in 
Dangerous Strait: The US-Taiwan-China Crisis, Nancy Tucker (ed.), New York, Columbia University 
Press, 2005.
626 Hughes (2005).
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threatened Taiwan with military action. It was the intervention of President George 
W. Bush (under pressure from Taipei and the Taiwanese lobby in the Congress) that 
eased the situation. The US President stated that Washington would oppose any 
unilateral action that might be interpreted as altering the status quo. As a result, Chen 
Shui-bian retreated and modified the wording in the referendum.627 Instead of being 
asked to take a stance on a new constitution, the electorate was asked about 
increasing the defence budget should China refuse to remove the missiles targeted at 
Taiwan.628
From the interviews conducted in China, it appears that Chinese leaders have 
made Taiwan a question of life and death. Taiwan is closely related both to national 
self-esteem and to the ability of the present regime to stay in power. Moreover, there are 
reasons inherent to the proximity of the island to the mainland. Beijing, in fact, does not 
want to find itself in a situation in which a sovereign Taiwan could place its territory at 
the disposal of an enemy. Thus, Beijing’s foremost objective is to prevent any action by 
the political leadership of Taiwan that might make reunification impossible.629 
Moreover, as already discussed, Washington is also part of the game. According to the 
Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, the US is committed to the defence of Taiwan.630 The 
US President, George W. Bush, declared in April 2001 that the US would do “whatever 
it takes” to defend Taiwan against an attack by mainland China.631 In this sense, the 
Taiwan issue is a global question which has the potential to disrupt regional stability. It 
is in this context that Washington has reacted strongly to the establishment a EU-China 
security-strategic linkage.
As discussed earlier, China’s participation in the Galileo project, the related 
issue of advanced technology transfers and the proposed lifting of the arms embargo 
may have the potential (especially if the embargo is lifted) to affect East Asia’s strategic 
balance, in a situation where the most powerful resident countries are engaged in the 
modernisation and upgrading of their armies and defence systems. The EU does not 
view the future status of Taiwan and cross-Strait relations as issues of immediate
627 Rigger (2005).
628 Interview, Taipei Representative Office in the UK, London, 28 April 2006
629 Interview, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, 7 May 2005.
630 Section 2(b)(6), The Taiwan Relations Act, P.L. 96-8, approved April 10, 1979.
631 See: Ashley J. Tellis, “Military Modernization in Asia”, in Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military 
Modernization in an Era o f Uncertainty, Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (eds.), Seattle, The National 
Bureau of Asian Research, 2005, pp. 3-40 and Michael D. Swaine and Roy D. Kamphausen, “Military 
Modernization in Taiwan”, in ibid. Strategic Asia 2005-06, pp. 387-422.
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concern. Because of that, the US has criticised the EU for the more security-related 
initiatives towards Beijing for lack of strategic vision of - and real commitment to - East 
Asia’s strategic balance and the future of Taiwan. In the next section we will examine 
how the EC/EU -  both member states and the supranational institutions (Commission, 
Council, Parliament) -  have dealt with the Taiwan issue.
7.3 The EU and the Taiwan issue
7.3.1 EU member states’ relations with Taiwan
All European countries, with the exception of the Holy See, have established 
diplomatic relations with the PRC and, as a consequence, have developed non- 
official relations with Taipei. Due to China’s insistence on the “one China” policy, 
Europe-Taiwan ties are limited to the commercial, scientific and cultural sphere. 
Since the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan lost it seat in the UN in favour of 
mainland China, only the US has expressed serious concern for the future of the 
island. European countries have never been a party to the settlement of the Taiwan 
issue, with the exception of the UK which had participated in the Cairo (1943) and 
Potsdam (1945) inter-Allied conferences. On these occasions, London made it clear 
that Taiwan should be restored to China and that the Taiwan question was a Chinese 
internal affair.632
In March 1972, the UK issued a joint communique with the PRC. In it, 
London acknowledged the position of the Chinese government, i.e. that Taiwan is a 
province of the PRC. Back in 1964, France had recognised Beijing unconditionally, 
as part of de Gaulle’s policy of “national independence”. It was generally admitted 
that with the recognition of the PRC, France had also acknowledged the sovereignty 
of Beijing over Taiwan. On 27 September 1991, the French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs clarified this point. In the communique issued on the sale of frigates to 
Taiwan, it was stated that “France reaffirms the terms of the Franco-Chinese joint
632 For more details see: Fran?oise Mengin, “A Functional Relationship: Political Extensions to Europe- 
Taiwan Economic Ties”, in The China Quarterly, No. 169, March 2002, pp. 136-153.
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declaration of 1964 according to which the PRC government is the sole legal 
government of China”.633
The European Community recognised the PRC in 1975, abiding from the 
beginning by Beijing’s one China policy. Taiwan was denied membership to the 
EC’s Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), as well as any other economic 
assistance from which all the other Asian new industrialised countries were 
benefiting. Since the beginning, EC-Taiwan relations have remained confined to 
economic, scientific and cultural issues. Unlike Japan and the US which simply 
continued relations with Taiwan on a non-official level after normalisation with 
Beijing, European countries have tended to develop strictly non-official ties. In the 
case of Japan, continuation of relations with Taiwan took the form of a non­
governmental agreement signed in December 1972 (three months after severing 
diplomatic relations), while in the case of the US it took the form of the Taiwan 
Relations Act passed by the Congress on 10 April 1979.
Devoid of state content, from the end of the 1970s Europe-Taiwan relations 
started to focus on developing commercial relations, in light of the island’s economic 
dynamism that offered growing opportunities for European companies. However, 
over the years a network of non-official representative offices developed both in 
Europe and in Taipei. During the 1970s and 1980s the heterogeneous designations of 
these representative offices symbolised the unofficial, almost underground, presence 
of Taiwan in Europe. Since the early 1990s, under the pressure of Taipei and 
European companies competing for key contracts in the emerging Taiwanese market, 
some EU members accepted changes of name in order to standardise the various 
designations and to upgrade the status of the offices. Thus, in Portugal, Spain, 
Austria, Norway and Luxembourg the representative office became the “Taipei 
Economic and Cultural Office”, while in Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
France, Denmark, Ireland, and the UK it became “Taipei Representative Office” and 
in Sweden and Latvia “Taipei Mission”. At the same time, EU governments begun to 
establish offices in Taiwan, using various designations but carefully avoiding any 
hint that would suggest more than a trade, scientific or cultural association.634
633 See: Patricia Wellons, “Sino-French Relations: Historical Alliance vs Economic Reality”, in The 
Pacific Review, Vol. 7, No. 3,1994, pp. 341-348.
634 See: Robert Ash, “Economic Relations between Taiwan and Europe”, in The China Quarterly, No. 
169, March 2002, pp. 154-180.
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While European governments continued to remain unwilling to engage in any 
institutionalisation of bilateral relations with Taiwan, arms sales to the island have 
continued. In 1981 the Netherlands sold two submarines to the ROC and France sold 
16 La Fayette frigates to the Taiwanese navy in 1991 (worth $3.8 billion) and 60 
Mirage 2000 fighter-interceptors in 1992. In 1993, the newly appointed government 
of Edouard Balladour authorised the sale to Taiwan of some armaments for the 
frigates.635 These sales unleashed strong criticism from Beijing. In 1981, China 
downgraded its relations with the Netherlands and took commercial reprisals. It was, 
however, France’s decision to sell advanced weaponry to Taiwan that triggered the 
strongest reactions. Beijing retorted harshly, by announcing the closure of the French 
Consulate General in Guangzhou and barring French companies from bidding for the 
contract to build the subway system in the same city. These sanctions aimed not only 
at punishing France, but also at deterring further arms sales to the island by other 
European countries. As a result, Germany did not authorise the sale of submarines 
and frigates in 1993.636
Arms sales are a sensitive aspect of foreign policy. In particular in the case of 
China and Taiwan where the military balance is a key element for maintaining the 
status quo. The US has clearly defined its policy in this field both towards Taipei and 
Beijing. The amount of American weapons that can be shipped to Taiwan is 
specified by the Taiwan Relations Act of 10 April 1979 and the US-PRC joint 
communique of 17 August 1982. On the contrary European governments have 
continued to authorise arms sales to China - and Taiwan - without a clear strategy or 
political vision in sight. The best example of this short-sighted European policy was 
represented by France in 1994. In March 1994 Sino-French relations were further 
strained by Paris’ decision to sale to Taiwan $2.6 billion more in advanced 
weaponry, including Exocet, Crotale and Mistral missiles, torpedos, anti-submarine 
sensors and electronic warfare equipment.637
635 Personal consultation with Prof. Valerie Niquet, Director, Centre Asie IFRI, Institut Fran?ais des 
Relations Internationales, at the margins of the conference on Developing a European security 
perspective on China, Paris, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS), 3 March 2006.
636 See Chapter 2.
637 See Chapter 2.
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Following Beijing’s strong reaction, France decided to invert this trend by 
publicly reaffirming China’s “sole and inalienable sovereignty over Taiwan”. The
t V ijoint communique signed in Paris on 12 January 1994 on the eve of the 30 
anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between France and the PRC 
was aimed at untangling the Sino-French crisis by declaring that “the French 
government commit itself not to authorise French firms in the future to participate in 
the armament of Taiwan”, while the Chinese side declared that “French firms are 
welcomed to compete, on an equal footing, on the Chinese market”.638 In sum, 
France obtained the reassurance that the loss of the Taiwanese market would be 
compensated by increased opportunities in the mainland.
At the strategic level, it is interesting to compare the sale of the French 
Mirages and that of 150 American FI6s in 1992. Although George Bush had 
authorised the sale for domestic purposes and to prevent the purchase of the French 
fighters, the American administration had also emphasized the strategic aspect of the 
deal, reaffirming the US’ commitment to a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue. 
Washington reminded Beijing that the US had committed itself to reduce 
progressively arms sales to Taiwan but also to maintain a qualitative advantage in 
favour of Taipei, which was currently diminishing due to recent acquisitions by the 
PLA.639
In the case of French arms sales to Taiwan, however, concerns for cross- 
Strait strategic balance was largely absent. Driving the French deal were mainly 
commercial considerations -  promoting French companies in order to redress the 
trade deficit. In the end, taking advantage of Taiwan growing economy was felt more 
important than to send a message about Taiwan’s future. This attitude continued until 
the end of the 1990s, as demonstrated by the decision of the French government in 
December 1999 to sell to Taiwan an observation satellite (Rocsat-2) built by the 
defence company Matra (also involved in the Galileo project).640 The deal triggered 
severe tensions between Paris and Beijing. China put pressure on France to cancel 
the deal throughout 2000, insisting on the dual-use of the satellite, but it was 
unsuccessful. That event would be the last, as France in the last years has not sold
638 Wallons (1994); see also Chapter 2.
639 Michael D. Swaine and Roy D. Kamphausen, “Military Modernization in Taiwan”, in Strategic Asia 
2005-06, pp. 387-422.
640 See Chapter 5.
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Taiwan any important weapons system. French policy makers have, in fact, decided 
to concentrate on the Chinese market and carefully avoid any move that could upset 
Beijing.641
To sum up, since the early 1990s the EU’s Taiwan policy has been driven by 
commercial considerations. Taipei has been able to cash in on the attractiveness of its 
market for European companies strengthening in this way Taiwan’s external 
relations and by establishing the island as an important Asian market for European 
businesses, in particular in the defence, nuclear and transport sector.642 While EU 
members have focused, on enhancing business opportunities, what about the EC/EU 
institutions with regard to the Taiwan issue?
7.3.2 The European Commission
In the European Commission website it is stated that the EU sticks to the one China 
policy and recognises the government of the PRC as the sole legal government of 
China while it recognises Taiwan as an economic and commercial entity.643 The EU 
has solid relations with Taiwan in non-political areas and maintains exchanges in 
various technical fields, such as economic relations, science, education and culture.
On 10 March 2003, the European Commission established a permanent presence on 
the island through the opening of its European Economic and Trade Office (EETO).
In line with the EU’s one China policy, the EETO does not engage in relations of a 
diplomatic or political nature. The main purpose of EETO is the promotion of 
economic ties.644
Taiwan is the EU’s third (or fourth -  it depends on the year) largest trading 
partner in Asia, after China, Japan (and sometimes South Korea).645 The Commission 
promotes trade and investment flows between Europe and Taiwan, and as such 
Brussels has strongly supported Taiwan’s accession to the WTO on 1 January 2002 
as the “Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu” (or
641 Interview, French Embassy in China, Beijing, 24 September 2004 and Personal consultation with 
Prof. Val6rie Niquet, Paris, 3 March 2006.
642 Ash (2002).
643 See: http://ec.europa.eu/comm/extemal relations/taiwan/intro/index.htm.
644 For more details see the European Economic and Trade Office (EETO) website: 
http://www.deltwn.cec.eu.int/.
645 Data from the EETO website.
248
simply “Chinese Taipei”). Moreover, the European Commission holds annual 
consultations with Taiwan, alternately in Brussels and Taipei, which cover all 
relevant aspects of the relationship. The last round of consultations took place in 
Brussels in Summer 2006. With regard to cross-Straits relations, the official position 
of the EU is the following:
The EU supports the peaceful resolution of differences between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of 
China, rejecting the use or threat of force. It urges both sides to resume constructive dialogue, and to 
eschew dogmatic positions. The EU insists that any arrangement between Beijing and Taipei can only 
be achieved on a mutually acceptable basis, with reference also to the wishes of the Taiwanese 
population.646
This is the official position put forward by the European Commission. What 
about the position that the EU member states have taken in the CFSP framework?
7.3.3 The Council
The Council had taken an active interest in Cross-Strait relations back in 1996. During 
the missile test crisis in March 1996, the EU Presidency in the CFSP framework 
expressed “deep regrets”. In the words of the Presidency:
The EU deeply regrets the firing by the PRC of missiles, beginning in the morning of March the 8th, into 
test zones in Taiwan Strait...The EU, recalling the pledge always made by the PRC to stick to its 
fundamental policy on the Taiwan issue, which is seek a peaceful solution, calls on the PRC to refrain 
from activities which could have negative effect on the security o f the entire region.647
Moreover, in July 1999 another crisis erupted, this time provoked by former 
President Lee Teng-hui’s “Two States Theory”, The Council reacted promptly, with the 
indication that China should be more self-restrained and that Taiwan should not go too 
far:
The European Union notes with concern recent developments concerning relations across the Taiwan 
Strait. The EU supports the principle of ‘One China’. It underlines the necessity of resolving the question 
of Taiwan peacefully through constructive dialogue. The EU hopes that every effort will be made to 
clarify misunderstanding and to maintain constructive dialogue. It urges both sides to avoid taking steps 
or making statements with increase tension.648
646 Quotation from the website of the European Commission (European Economic and Trade Office in 
Taipei), http://www.deltwn.cec.eu.int/EN/eu taiwan/overviewofeu taiwanrelations.htm.
647 Press statement on China's military exercises o ff the Taiwan coasts, Italian Presidency of the EU, 8 
March 1996.
648 Taiwan: Principle o f "One China ", CFSP Presidency Statement, Brussels, 20 July 1999.
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Notwithstanding the above statements by the Presidency of the EU in the 
aftermath of the two most serious crises in the Taiwan Strait in the last decade, the EU 
and its member states have kept a rather low profile on the issue since they are quite 
susceptible to Beijing’s concerns. The EU and its member states adhere to Beijing’s one 
China principle, they cannot extend formal recognition to the ROC, nor can they 
envision extending recognition to an independent Taiwan state. All gestures suspected 
of this kind of recognition or enhancing the island’s political status are forbidden and, 
thus, likely to engender retaliation by Beijing. As discussed earlier, Chinese leaders had 
taken concrete reprisals against some EU members for having sold arms to Taiwan.
In sum, neither the EU nor the member states recognise Taiwan as a sovereign 
state, but only as a separate customs territory or economic entity. Moreover, the 
European Commission, the Council and the member states have carefully avoided 
dealing with the ROC-Taiwan authorities on a “govemment-to-govemment” basis and 
taking any act implying political recognition. In contrast to this “common position” - 
which deliberately maintain a political distance from Taiwan so as not to irritate Beijing 
- the European Parliament has, on many occasions, explicitly adopted a more 
favourable stance towards the island.
7.3.4 The European Parliament
As discussed in Chapter 1, with regard to the CFSP the EP has only consultative power 
and, as such, it cannot impose its opinion on the Commission or the Council. However, 
over the years, through the adoption of resolutions, as well as, oral and written 
questions, the EP has focused on various issues concerning Taiwan. In particular, the 
EP has followed the island’s internal political transformation, Taiwan’s participation in 
inter-governmental organisations, cross-Strait relations, and EU-Taiwan political ties.649 
This stance of the EP has elicited a fair amount of criticism from Beijing.
The fact that Taiwan has become a fully-fledged Westem-style democracy is 
possibly the most important reason for the continuous support given by the EP to the 
island.650 When Taiwan launched its first political reform at the end of the 1980s with
649 For more details see: Yuchun Lan, “The European Parliament and the China-Taiwan Issue: An 
Empirical Approach”, in European Foreign Affairs Review, No. 9, 2004, pp. 115-140.
650 Interview with Luciano Vecchi, former MEP (Socialist group), Modena, 24 February 2006.
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the lifting of martial law and the lifting of the ban on new political parties, some MEPs 
asked the Council of Foreign Ministers to develop political links with the “Republic of 
China in Taiwan”.651 Moreover, at the height of the missile crisis during Taiwan’s 
presidential election in 1996, the MEPs viewed Beijing’s military exercise as a 
temptation of interference in Taiwan’s process of political transformation, and 
expressed their support for the people of Taiwan in the face of Beijing’s “provocative 
behaviour” of trying to influence the outcome of the election.652 Moreover, the EP 
considered the election of Chen Shuibian in 2000, after more than fifty years of rule by 
the Kuomintang, as a landmark in the development of democracy on the island. The 
change of majority at the parliamentary level after the legislative elections in December 
2001 was seen by the MEPs as a sign that Taiwan had established a fully-fledged 
democratic system and as a result the EP invited the EU members to recognise the 
success story of Taiwan’s democratisation and its importance for other Asian 
countries.653
With regard to cross-Strait relations, the year 1996 was a turning point for the 
EP’s approach to the issue. In two urgent resolutions, the MEPs condemned Beijing’s 
firing of missiles in international waters close to Taiwan. Since these events, the EP has 
expressed its concerns and asked the mainland to renounce threats of the use of force 
for achieving unification. Furthermore, in a landmark resolution on the EU Strategy 
towards China: Implementation o f the 1998 Communication andfuture steps for a more 
effective EU policy adopted in April 2002 the MEPs emphasized that:
Any arrangement between China and Taiwan can only be achieved on a mutually acceptable basis; 
expresses the view that the future of cross-Strait relations will depend on both sides’ willingness to 
demonstrate flexibility...the will and approval of the 23 million people in Taiwan must be respected and 
accounted for in the light of a hopefully peaceful solution between the parties.654 .
In September 2002 the EP passed a resolution on the Europe-Asia Partnership, 
where concerns were expressed regarding:
651 Question No. H-827/88, 17 January 1989, by Selva (PPE group), concerning political relations with 
the Republic of China in Taiwan.
652 Resolution sur la menace d ’une action militaire de la Republique Populaire de Chine contre Taiwan, 
adopted by the European Parliament on 15 February 1996.
653 Europe-Asia Partnership, Resolution by the European Parliament on the Commission communication 
A strategic framework fo r enhanced partnership between Europe and Asia, 5 September 2002.
654 EU Strategy Towards China, European Parliament resolution on the Commission communication to 
the Council and the European Parliament on a EU Strategy towards China: Implementation of the 1998 
Communication and future steps for a more effective EU policy, P5_TA (2002) 0179, as quoted in Tang 
Shaocheng, “EU’s Taiwan policy in the light of its China policy”, in Asia Europe Journal, No. 1, 2003, 
pp. 511-525, p. 519.
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The arms build-up between China and Taiwan; [the EP] urges both sides to de-escalate the arms build-up 
and in particular for China to withdraw missiles in the coastal provinces across the Taiwan Strait.655
Both resolutions irritated Beijing, as the EP made clear that the mainland’s right 
to use military force in the cross-Strait dispute was unacceptable. In fact, the EP 
asserted that the EU’s adherence to the one China principle is directly linked to its 
commitment to a peaceful resolution. Moreover, any arrangement between China and 
Taiwan should be achieved on a mutually acceptable basis. For the first time there was 
an explicit reference to the will and approval of the people in Taiwan.
In the September 2002 resolution, the EP went even further. By urging 
withdrawal of China’s missiles, the EP clearly interfered with the mainland’s internal 
affairs. It was the first time for the EP to link the EU’s adherence to the one China 
principle with Beijing’s renunciation of the use of force. The fact that the resolution 
urged Beijing to withdraw the missiles threatening Taiwan was a clear demonstration of 
a significant pro-Taiwanese lobby in the EP.656
The resolution urging China to withdraw the missiles was voted with 448 
against 26.657 Following the EP resolutions, Beijing reacted by warning the EP not to 
impede the development of China-EU relations and “immediately cease” its 
interference in China’s internal affairs.658 However, China’s mild reaction was based on 
the fact that the EP has only symbolic powers in the making of the CFSP. Beijing has, 
in fact, constantly lobbied the Commission, the Council and, more importantly, the 
individual (large) member states in order to obtain political concessions -  i.e. silence 
over the Taiwan question - or for reiterating the one China principle. At the same time, 
lobbying the EP is the main objective of Taipei’s diplomats in Brussels.659
The EP has also expressed its opposition to the lifting of the EU arms embargo 
on China in various occasions. On 19 November 2003, the European Parliament passed
655 Europe-Asia Partnership (2002).
656 According to officials of the Taipei Representative Office in the UK, the EP resolutions must be 
attributed to Taiwan’s friends in the EP. Since 1991 there is a Taiwan Friendship Group in the EP which 
spreads across all political factions. Among the prominent pro-Taiwanese MEPs it is worth mentioning 
Graham Watson (UK, Lib Dem) and Olivier Dupuis (I, Lib Dem) as some of the more active initiators of 
resolutions or written questions calling for more support for Taiwan.
657 Shaocheng (2003), p. 521.
658 Xinhua (English), 7 September 2002.
659 Interview, Taipei Representative Office in the UK, London, 28 April 2006.
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a resolution with 572 votes against 72 asking the Council not to lift the embargo. On 11 
March 2004, leaders of the four German political parties representing Germany in the 
European Parliament sent an open letter to Chancellor Schroder urging him to abandon 
his support for the lifting. Furthermore, in November 2005 the EP adopted the Brok’s 
Report on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (431 votes in favour, 85 votes 
against, 31 abstentions). Among other issues, the report calls on the Council not to lift 
the arms embargo against China and insists once more on a binding EU code on arms 
exports. In the report, Taiwan is described as a “model of democracy for the whole of 
China”.660
The strong words are due to the marginal role played by the EP in the 
elaboration of the CFSP. As a result, MEPs are largely exempted from any direct 
political responsibility for their provocative stances vis-a-vis cross-Strait relations. 
Moreover, Taiwan has never been a political priority for the EU (and the MEPs as 
well), given its distance and the fact that the EU does not have a direct strategic or 
political interest in the Taiwan Strait issue, nor does have any credible military power in 
the region to implement its opinions on Beijing in the way the US can. In other words, 
Taiwan is perceived as marginal for the EU and its member states when compared to 
China.661
Thus, in the absence of significant pressure from domestic constituencies or 
external allies -  with the exception of the EP -  the EU and its member states are 
extremely cautious about taking positions that might provoke Beijing’s hostility. The 
EU’s circumspection is compounded by the fact that all the member states recognise the 
PRC as representing the whole of China and that they tacitly or explicitly accept 
Beijing’s claim that there is but one China of which Taiwan is a part. As a result, the 
EU’s Taiwan policy is geared towards the status quo, i.e. maintain the stability in order 
to achieve two objectives: (i) take full advantage of the economic opportunities in 
Taiwan; (ii) avoid any confrontation with Beijing on the international status of Taiwan 
so as to continue to take full advantage of the Chinese market.
660 Report on the Common Foreign and Security Policy (Brok’s Report, 28 November, 2005) discussed 
and adopted by the European Parliament on 2 February 2006; quotation from point 34. Report available 
at:http://www.europarl.eu.int/registre/presse/debat du jour daily notebook/2005/en/par/DG-
INFO DN(2005')04-14(PAR004) EN.doc.
661 Interview, Council of the EU, Brussels, 18 December 2005.
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7.4 The EU’s Taiwan policy in light of growing EU-China relations
As discussed earlier, the EU does not have a direct and immediate strategic interest in 
the Taiwan issue nor does have any serious capability to affect the cross-Strait strategic 
balance. However, the decision of the EU to invite China play a prominent role in the 
development of Galileo and the proposed lifting of the arms embargo have prompted 
strong US’ criticism.662 The Bush administration has argued that with these initiatives 
the EU could potentially help China’s military modernisation and tilt, as a consequence, 
cross-Strait strategic balance in Beijing’s favour. Washington is concerned about 
China’s surging defence spending. According to American analysts, Beijing’s 
increasing purchase of dual-use goods is already altering the military balance across the 
Taiwan Straits and, more generally, in the Asia Pacific region.663 In is in this context 
that the US views the recently established EU-China security-strategic linkage as a 
move that impacts on Washington’s immediate interests in the region with the potential 
to put at risk American troops committed to the defence of Taiwan. The same 
perception is held in Tokyo664 and Taipei.665
In this context of growing US-China misperceptions, some EU member states 
have also stepped up cooperation with China on military matters - as part of the newly 
established strategic partnerships between Beijing and the large EU members. Back in 
1995 the European Commission had identified the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as a 
potential dialogue partner. Since the establishment of the EU-China strategic 
partnership in 2003, consultations on security and defence matters, military exchanges 
and joint manoeuvres with the PLA have been undertaken by some EU member states. 
Germany has held several rounds of high-level consultations on security and defence 
with China, underpinned by visits of high-ranking military and civilian representatives 
such as the General Inspector of the Armed Forces and the German Defence Minister. 
Moreover, Germany has been training PLA officers at its Military Academy in
662 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Symposia on Transatlantic Perspectives on 
Economic and Security Relations with China, Washington, 108 Congress, Second Session, Brussels 30 
November 2004 and Prague 2 December 2004; available at: 
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2004hearings/transcripts/04 11 30 transcript.pdf.
663 Dwight Perkins (2005).
664 Interview with Jun Hasebe, Second Secretary, Embassy o f Japan in the UK, London, 29 April 2005 
and with Otaka Junichiro, Deputy Director, European Policy Division, European Affairs Bureau, 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, 12 May 2005.
665 Interview, Taipei Representative Office in the UK, London, 26 April 2006.
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Hamburg and established a regular anti-terror mechanism dialogue with Beijing.666 
France and China have also established a strategic dialogue and held annual 
consultations on defence and security matters since 1997, complemented by the training 
of Chinese military officers. France and China held joint military exercises in the South 
China Sea in March 2004. Since 2003, the UK has also started an annual strategic 
security dialogue with the PRC and has also been training PLA officers. Following 
France, in June 2004 the UK held joint maritime search-and-rescue exercises with the 
PLA.667
The problem is that while consultations on security and military exchanges 
between EU member states and China are increasing in quantity and quality, there is a 
certain lack of coordination at the EU level. Security and military issues are still 
jealously kept within the control of EU member states, thus rendering difficult for the 
EU to put forward a common and comprehensive security strategy vis-a-vis China and 
explain it to Washington and to Europe’s concerned Asian partners. Moreover, the fact 
that the EU is not involved in Cross-Strait relations, nor has showed any serious 
commitment to contributing to find a solution for the future status of Taiwan, has raised 
concerns both in Tokyo and Washington with regard to Europe’s involvement in East 
Asian security.668
Taiwan is not only distant and of no immediate politico-strategic interest for 
Europe. Taiwan is also economically marginal for the EU and its member states when 
compared to China. As discussed in previous Chapters, the EU-25 has become China’s 
first trading partner (ahead of the US and Japan), as well as the major supplier of 
advanced technology and an important source of foreign direct investment. By allowing 
China to participate in the Galileo project and by officially proposing to lift the arms 
embargo on China (though currently postponed), the EU has upgraded and expanded the 
policy of constructive engagement of the last decade to include a security-strategic 
linkage. In sum, growing EU-China relations appear to have further reduced the scope 
of the EU’s Taiwan policy.
666 Personal communication with Dr Heinrich Kreft, Senior Strategic Analyst, Policy Planning Staff, 
German Foreign Office, 6 March 2006.
667 For more details see: May-Britt Stumbaum, “Engaging China -  Uniting Europe? European Union 
Foreign Policy towards China”, in Nicola Casarini and Costanza Musu (eds.), The Road Towards 
Convergence: European Foreign Policy in an Evolving International System, Houndmills, Palgrave, 
forthcoming in 2006.
668 This has emerged from interviews with American and Japanese policy makers.
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In the 2003 China’s EU Policy Paper the one China principle receives a fair 
amount of attention. Under the heading “strictly abide by the one-China principle”, 
Beijing asks the EU’s commitment to the following:
The one-China principle is an important political cornerstone underpinning China-EU relations. The 
proper handling of the Taiwan question is essential for a steady growth of China-EU relations. China 
appreciates EU and its members’ commitment to the one-China principle and hopes that the EU will 
continue to respect China’s major concerns over the Taiwan question, guard against Taiwan authorities’ 
attempt to create “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” and prudently handle Taiwan-related issues. 
In this connection, it is important that the EU
- Prohibit any visit by any Taiwan political figures to the EU or its member countries under whatever 
name or pretext; not to engage in any contact or exchange of an official or governmental nature with 
Taiwan authorities.
- Not to support Taiwan’s accession to or participation in any international organization whose 
membership requires statehood. Taiwan’s entry into the WTO in the name of “separate customs territory 
of Taiwan, Penghu, Jinmen, Mazu” (or Chinese Taipei for short) does not mean any change in Taiwan’s 
status as part of China. EU exchanges with Taiwan must be strictly unofficial and non-governmental.
- Not to sell to Taiwan any weapon, equipment, goods, materials or technology that can be used for 
military purposes. 669
To complicate matters, there continues to be the ingrained habit among EU 
member states to pursue diverse and sometimes diverging national foreign policies. For 
instance, France’s close embrace (some diplomats even speak of “intimacy”) with China 
has been accompanied by a change of position with regard to Taiwan. This shift in 
Beijing’s favour was remarkable during the state visit by Hu Jintao, the Chinese 
President, to Paris in January 2004. On that occasion, President Jacques Chirac stepped 
up his criticism of Taiwan’s planned referendum on 20 March 2004 (which would ask 
voters whether Taiwan should increase its defences, if China refused to redeploy 
hundreds of missiles pointed at Taiwan), describing it as a threat to stability in East 
Asia. In Chirac’s words:
Le Gouvemement fran^ais confirme sa position constante sur l'unicitd de la Chine. II s'oppose k quelque 
initiative unilatdrale que ce so it, y compris un rdfdrendum qui viserait k modifier le statu quo, accrottrait 
les tensions dans le ddtroit et conduirait k l'inddpendance. de Taiwan. II considdre que les relations entre 
les deux rives du ddtroit doivent reposer sur un dialogue constructif afin de trouver un rdglement 
pacifique k la question de Taiwan et d'assurer la stability et la prospdritd dans la rdgion 670
669 Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China’s EU Policy Paper, October 2003, Section I (The Political 
Aspect).
670 Joint Franco-Chinese Declaration, Paris, 27 January 2004. See also http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia- 
pacific/3432675.stm. Following Chirac’s remarks, especially the sentence “all initiatives that can be 
interpreted as aggressive by one side or the other are dangerous for everyone and thus irresponsible”, 
Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Richard Shih said that Taipei would go ahead with the vote, and 
blamed China for pressurising European governments on the issue.
256
In the same vein, in April 2005 Jean-Pierre Raffarin, at that time French Prime 
Minister, declared that the anti-secession law adopted in March 2005 by the National 
People’s Congress was compatible with France’s one China policy.
Among the other EU members, Germany has traditionally maintained a low 
profile on Taiwan so as not to upset Beijing. The Federal government has consistently 
reaffirmed the one China policy in many occasions. In January 1993, for instance, 
Chancellor Kohl refused to approve the sale of 10 submarines and 10 frigates to Taiwan 
in order not to upset relations with the PRC. Since 1997, with the accession of Gerhard 
Schroder to the Chancellery, Germany has severely reduced ties with Taiwan.671 During 
his state visit to China in December 2003, Schroder declared that Germany would 
continue not to sell any “sensitive materials” (i.e., weapons) to Taiwan.672
At the same time, there are other EU members which are more sensitive to the 
Taiwan issue, such as Sweden and the Netherlands. These are also some of the member 
states which have more strongly criticised China’s human rights record and have raised 
their concerns with regard to the lifting of the arms embargo. In sum, the EU’s Taiwan 
policy reveals the persistence by EU member states to pursue different national policies. 
In this situation, it is difficult to foresee how EU member states may accommodate 
growing EU-China relations with the EU’s Taiwan policy (and without taking into 
consideration the problem of reconciling European perspectives with those of the US).
Conclusion
What this chapter has sought to demonstrate is that the EU and its member states do not 
view EU-China security strategic linkage the same way as the US (as well as Japan and 
Taiwan). Contrary to the US, the EU does not view China as a possible military threat 
or strategic peer competitor. This largely explains Europe’s invitation to Beijing to join 
in the development of Galileo, advanced technology transfers to China, the proposal to 
lift the arms embargo (though currently shelved) and the continuation of European arms 
sales to China. As discussed in Chapter 6, the US has recently accused Beijing of 
increasing its military spending in a sustained fashion precisely at a time when,
671 Interview, German Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, Berlin, 10 March 2006.
672 See: Jean-Pierre Cabestan, “The Role of France in Sino-European Relations: Central or Marginal?”, 
paper presented at the international conference on The International Politics o f  EU-China Relations, 
London, 20-21 April 2006, p. 16.
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according to Washington, there is no pressing external threat to China. This 
interpretation fuels suspicions in the US and in some of China’s neighbours - in 
particular, Japan and Taiwan - that Beijing is actively pursuing a military build-up. It is 
in this context and with the idea of the need to contain China militarily that Washington 
has strongly criticised Europe’s establishment of a security-strategic linkage with 
Beijing since the EU’s China policy does not take into adequate consideration, 
according to the Bush administration, the US’ strategic interests in the region.
The difference between the EU and the US’ China policy and, more specifically, 
with regard to the impact of a EU-China strategic linkage on East Asia’s strategic 
balance emerged during interviews conducted by this author with EU policy makers in 
Europe, China and Japan. In essence, Europeans do not make the same connections as 
the US do. In fact, the Europeans interviewed do not think that China’s participation in 
Galileo and an eventual lifting of the arms embargo may affect significantly East Asia’s 
strategic balance and have a bearing on Washington’s interests in the area. With regard 
to Galileo, for instance, there emerged from interviews that most of the time the Foreign 
Ministry was highly unaware of the security-military implications of China’s 
participation in Galileo.673 Yet, as discussed in Chapter 5, cooperation over Galileo is 
likely to foster the modernisation of China’s space program. Furthermore, the lack of 
coordination at the national level (between the Foreign Ministry and the office of the 
Prime Minister/Chancellery and between the former two with the Defence or Transport 
Ministry responsible for Galileo) and the lack of coordination at the EU level among 
member states are largely responsible for Europe’s tendency to overlook strategic- 
security considerations, in stark contrast to the US. We will discuss this issue further in 
the next section devoted to the concluding remarks.
673 Most of the people in the Foreign Ministries honestly said to me that they did not have a clue about 
Galileo and its implications for China’s modernisation of its space capabilities. The only authoritative 
experts of Galileo that this author has been able to access are in the French Defence Ministry (or 
academics working in close contact with the above Ministry) and in China.
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Conclusion
There is no doubting our commitment to deeper engagement. We want to fully normalise our relations 
with China. The EU-China relationship continues to expand. And at our last Summit both sides undertook 
to work for a comprehensive new framework agreement to steer this increasingly complex and important 
relationship and give political expression to our strategic partnership.
Josd Manuel Barroso, President o f the European Commission, 16 July 2005.674
Since 1975, Europe-China relations have been developing steadfastly and since 2003, 
the relationship has acquired a new strategic significance. After a brief overview of the 
main points raised in this study, we will discuss the question of China in transatlantic 
relations and of the emergence of the EU as a global actor and its effective capabilities 
in that context. In the final part, we will outline some of the most promising avenues for 
future research.
1. The evolution of Europe-China relations
1.1 From secondary relationship to post-Cold War partnership (1975-1995)
As discussed in Chapter 2, formal relations between the European Community (EC) and 
the People’s Republic of China were established in 1975, following the diplomatic 
recognition of Beijing by the United States in 1972. However, during the Cold War 
Sino-European relations were mainly derivative of Cold War imperatives and broader 
relations with the two superpowers. Strategically, from the mid-1970s, Chinese leaders 
would oppose any Western moves toward detente with Moscow and strongly support 
NATO. Such status also afforded China increased access to European defence suppliers. 
In the second part of the 1970s, Beijing purchased anti-air and anti-tank missiles from 
Italy and West Germany, radars from France, and jetfighter engines and technologies
674 Jos6 Manuel Barroso, The dragon awakes: the EU and China’s economic rise, Shanghai, EU-China 
International Business School, 16 July 2005; available at: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/extemal relations/china/docs/barroso speech0705.pdf.
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from Great Britain. This was possible since following the re-establishment of US-China 
diplomatic relations, Washington had accepted that its European partners sold certain 
weapons to the PRC which the US itself, due to domestic constraints, was still unable to 
sell.
From the mid-1980s onwards, it was also Western Europe’s potential role as a 
new pole in a future multi-polar world, and not only as a bulwark against Soviet 
hegemony, that attracted Beijing’s attention. Some Chinese scholars had argued for a 
multi-polar perspective in international relations and had come to the growing 
realisation that the European integration process would have a major role to play in the 
gradual political emancipation of Eastern Europe from Moscow. Deng Xiaoping himself 
called for the establishment of a united and strong Europe.
In an attempt to diversify its growing dependence on Japan and the US for 
imported technology, China began to increase its commercial ties with West Europeans. 
After a trade agreement had been signed with the EC in the late 1970s, in 1984 the two 
sides agreed on a broader Trade and Co-operation Agreement (TCA). The EC offered 
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) access and included in the Community’s Generalised 
System of Preferences (GSP) provisions from 1980, in stark contrast with Beijing’s 
exclusion from the GSP of the United States. By 1987, two-way trade totalled $13 
billion. This amounted to a mere 15% of China’s total foreign trade, and a scant 1% of 
total EC trade.
The crackdown on students’ demonstrations of 4 June 1989 in Tiananmen 
Square had a considerable impact on China-West Europe relations. In the aftermath of 
the massacre, the EC responded by imposing a range of sanctions that paralleled those 
of the US. However, in the months following the massacre China made a number of 
minor changes to its human rights legislation and these were received by the EC as 
justification for restoring normal relations. As a result, most of West European 
sanctions were lifted during the Summer of 1990, with the exception of the arms 
embargo.
Domestic developments in China after Tiananmen, the end of the Cold War and 
the gathering pace of the globalisation process created new possibilities for the 
development of EU-China relations. With the exception of arms sales, cooperation and
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trade relations had been fully restored by 1991. Negotiations for China’s General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) accession, which had been broken off in 1989, 
were restarted in 1991. The value of Chinese imports accorded GSP preferences 
increased from 2.9 billion Ecu in 1989 to 14.1 billion Ecu in 1994. Also the EU’s aid to 
China increased significantly in the first half of the 1990s. The only explicit form of 
political pressure that survived the immediate reaction to the Tiananmen Square events 
was the EU’s practice of tabling a resolution criticising China’s human rights record in 
the annual meeting of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR).
Strategically, by the mid-1990s Chinese leaders had come to perceive the post- 
Cold War environment as a transition process from a bipolar to a multi-polar system of 
international relations, while EU policy makers and elites tended to avoid world order 
issues and became intent on deepening the integration process and on equipping the EU 
with a common foreign and security policy.675 It was argued in Chapter 2 that it was the 
German China policy model that would have a significant impact upon the subsequent 
development of the EU policy of engagement towards China. Germany’s approach to 
Beijing -  spearheaded by the Kohl government - has been founded on three principles: 
(i) silent diplomacy -  i.e., no confrontation with Beijing on human rights or other 
sensitive issues; (ii) change through trade -  i.e., encouraging political liberalisation in 
China via economic development; and (iii) a strict “one China” policy -  i.e., without 
conceding to the pro-Taiwanese lobby. The success of the Germany’s China policy 
made an impact on the rest of Europe’s policy making elite. Thus, by the mid-1990s, 
due to the new weight acquired by Germany after the reunification, its lead in 
formulating a pragmatic approach to Beijing, and the awesome commercial results that 
ensued from it, Germany’s China policy had succeeded in influencing the behaviour of 
the other EU member states (especially the large ones). With the publication of its first 
policy paper on China in 1995, the European Commission officially laid down this new 
policy of engagement towards Beijing, which came to be characterised as “constructive 
engagement”.
675 For more details on the question of how far European governments and elites responded to the 
transformation of their strategic environment at the end of the Cold War by rethinking their strategic 
foreign policies see: Robin Niblett and William Wallace (eds.), Rethinking European Order: West 
European Responses 1989-1997, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001.
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1.2 The E U ’s China policy in the context o f  the EU ’s New Asia Strategy 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the normalisation of relations with China in the post-Cold 
War period was part of the development of a new EU’s Asia strategy. The German 
government became the first EU member state to put forward, in 1993, a strategy 
towards Asia. In the Asien Konzept der Bundesregierung, Germany outlined the new 
significance of the Asian markets for Europe. This had become evident since 1992, 
when the EU trade with Asia overtook EU-US trade for the first time. The German 
concept paper stated that Germany - and Europe as a whole - had to face the challenge 
of an economically thriving Asia and strengthen economic relations with the largest 
growth region in the world. The view was held in Bonn that Germany’s economic 
interests would increasingly depend on the ability of German companies to enter into 
Asian markets. Because of the sheer magnitude of Asia, it was felt that the Federal 
Republic had to necessarily work through the EU in order to increase its political and 
economic leverage vis-a-vis the region.
While the United Kingdom (UK) and France had been traditionally known for 
their leaning towards Asia resulting from their past involvement in the region, this new 
German interest was something of a novelty. Following up on Germany, other EU 
members started to give Asia a higher priority and in 1994 the European Commission 
released its Communication EU ’s New Asia Strategy (NAS), with the aim to strengthen 
the Union’s economic presence in Asia as well as contribute to the development and 
consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the region. In a further development of the EU’s Asia strategy, 
the EU and ten East Asian countries established the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 
1996. Over the years, ASEM has become the most important inter-regional forum for 
discussion and cooperation between the EU and East Asia. In this context, Chinese and 
French leaders, in particular, have come to support ASEM because they see it as an 
additional factor contributing to the emergence of an East Asian bloc independent of 
Washington and, more generally, to the trend towards the multi-polarisation of the 
international system. Since the mid-1990s, the NAS and ASEM have provided the 
broader frameworks within which the EU has developed the policy of constructive 
engagement towards China.
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1.3 The EU ’s policy o f constructive engagement towards China 
As discussed in Chapter 4, in the context of the NAS, in July 1995 the European 
Commission released its Communication A Long-Term Policy for China-Europe 
Relations. The document declared that “the time has come to redefine the EU’s 
relationship with China, in the spirit of the new Asia strategy”. With the aim to put the 
EU member states’ relationships with the PRC into a single integrated framework, the 
Commission declared that relations with China are bound to be a cornerstone in 
Europe’s external relations, both with Asia and globally. While the analysis 
concentrates on China’s economic upsurge and the potentialities of its market for 
European business, the paper lays down a strategy of constructive engagement for 
integrating China in international society.
Since the mid-1990s, the EU’s policy of constructive engagement has come to 
define Europe’s approach to China. In essence, constructive engagement stands for 
Europe’s support for China’s fullest possible involvement in the international arena, 
whether in the economic, social, political, environmental, security-strategic or military 
dimensions. The focus of the policy of constructive engagement has been on helping 
China support its transformation process to become a good citizen of international 
society, with the underlying belief that this approach would lead, over time, to greater 
political liberalisation and promotion of human rights.
The policy of constructive engagement puts a lot of emphasis on economic 
matters, following the emergence of a new discourse on economic security in both the 
EU and China since the beginning of the 1990s. The advocates of this discourse have 
propounded the idea that, on the one hand, Europe’s protection of its (relative) welfare 
position is increasingly linked to China’s development and the capacity for European 
companies to acquire growing shares of the Chinese market. On the other hand, Chinese 
policy makers have expressed the idea that China’s economic security and 
modernisation process would increasingly depend on fostering relations with European 
countries, in particular for obtaining advance technology that would be more difficult to 
acquire from the US or Japan. China’s access to modem technology is crucial for 
sustaining the country’s economic growth, which is one of the three main historical 
tasks established by Deng Xiaoping as the litmus test for the legitimacy of the post-Mao 
CCP leadership. As a result of this two-way linkage, EU-China commercial ties have 
grown impressively in the last years.
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Since 2004, the EU-25 is currently China’s biggest trading partner and one of its 
most important foreign investors. Between 2000 and 2004, EU-China trade almost 
doubled, with exports rising from €25.8 billion to €48 billion and imports growing from 
€74.4 billion to €126.7 billion. Since 1978, when China started to open up its economy, 
EU-China trade has increased more than 40-fold to reach around €175 billion in 2004. 
China trade imbalances are increasingly creating problems with the EU. The Union’s 
trade deficit with China increased from €48.6 billion in 2000 to €78.7 billion in 2004. 
This is the EU’s largest bilateral trade deficit and it almost doubled over the last four 
years. The Union and China are -  so far -  quite complementary in the global division of 
labour. China exports to the EU mainly labour-intensive goods, or mechanical and 
electrical products with low technology content, while the EU exports to China largely 
capital-intensive goods, such as steel and chemical products or technology-intensive 
goods. However, in the last years China’s active industrial policy is turning the country 
into a low-cost competitor in high-skill industries. Consequently, China has started to 
seriously challenge EU industries that are considered sensitive, in particular the 
chemical, engineering and the textile sectors. The latter, in particular, has become a 
contentious issue across Europe, reinforcing the perceived need of protectionist 
measures against China.
EU member states compete against each other for China’s market shares in order 
to redress the growing bilateral trade deficits and maintain the global competitiveness of 
their companies. This European scramble for the Chinese market has been skilfully 
exploited by the Chinese leadership in order to obtain political concessions, usually in 
the form of silence over sensitive issues pertaining to China’s domestic affairs (human 
rights violations, political liberalisation, Tibet, Xinjiang, etc) or national pride (Taiwan). 
By giving priority to commercial considerations and by tending to shy away from 
openly criticising Beijing, the large EU members have been greatly responsible for the 
Union’s overall diminution of critical pressure. This attitude has repeatedly met with 
criticism from the European Parliament (EP), the smaller EU members (especially the 
Nordic countries) and NGOs. The EU’s approach has also been criticised by the US on 
the grounds that the large EU members’ tendency to adopt an uncritical attitude towards 
Beijing has not been supportive of the West’s efforts to bring about political change in 
China. The shift towards a more uncritical attitude was manifest most visibly in the 
decision of the EU to cease supporting a motion against China in the United Nations
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Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR). In return for this conciliatory approach, 
China agreed to re-engage in a dialogue on human rights, a quid pro quo imposed most 
strongly by the more principled Nordic countries.
Since 1998 the EU-China human rights dialogue has been held twice a year. It 
constitutes the only platform to engage China on sensitive issues and for the channelling 
of EU concerns directly to the Chinese authorities. Moreover, the Commission supports 
a number of human rights related co-operation programmes (on village governance, 
legal co-operation, promotion of women’s rights, network on Human Rights Covenants 
etc.) aimed at Chinese civil society. In sum, it appears that there has been a division of 
labour in EU foreign policy towards China. While the EU level (i.e. the European 
Commission) and the more principled EU member states (mainly the Nordic countries) 
have aimed at engaging Chinese civil society and put human rights and democratisation 
pressure on Beijing, the large EU members have rather engaged the Chinese state by 
seeking to maintain good political relations with Chinese leaders in order to boost 
commercial exchanges.
Overall, Europe’s approach is based on the belief that by engaging Beijing in a 
constructive way at all levels and in all dimensions and by concentrating on supporting 
China’s transformation process, over time the Union would be able to acquire more 
leverage over political developments in China. It is this belief that sustains -  and 
qualifies -  the policy of constructive engagement. To translate this approach into 
concrete action, in the last decade the European Commission and the EU member states 
-  in particular the Nordic countries - have channelled a considerable amount of 
resources and energies into projects aimed at supporting China’s transformation 
process. In Chapter 4 we examined the Nordic countries’ development policies with 
China, which stand out among EU member states both in terms of financial 
commitment and number of projects. Moreover, we also looked at a more sophisticated 
form of cooperation, namely the UK’s support - through top British financial people -  
to China’s banking and financial sector reform. Finally, we examined the growing 
cooperation projects and sectoral dialogues that the European Commission has launched 
over the years, with the aim to support China’s integration in the international 
community and promote the country’s transition to an open society. Since 2003, this 
EU’s policy of constructive engagement has been widened and deepened to include a 
significant security-strategic dimension.
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1.4 Strategic partnership
As discussed in Chapter 5, since 2003, the EU and China have upgraded their relations 
to strategic partnership. Central to this strategic partnership is the idea that relations 
between the EU and the PRC have gained momentum and acquired a new strategic 
significance. More significantly, the declaration of strategic partnership in October 2003 
was accompanied by two substantial moves: the signature of the agreement allowing 
China to participate in the Galileo global navigation satellite system and the promise by 
EU policy makers to their Chinese counterparts to initiate discussions on the lifting of 
the EU arms embargo imposed on China in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square 
crackdown on students.
The development of a security-strategic linkage between the EU and China has 
increasingly attracted the attention -  and concern -  of the United States. According to 
Washington, the above initiatives may contribute to help China’s military modernisation 
and potentially tilt East Asia’s strategic balance in Beijing’s favour in a situation where 
there could be future tensions in US-China relations, especially over Taiwan.
The central political and strategic question with regard to China’s participation 
in Galileo is the access to the encrypted signals. China has not been officially denied 
access to these encrypted signals since Beijing is taking part to the development of the 
applications of the satellite network. EU officials have stressed that a “security firewall” 
will be put in place though they recognise that Galileo is part of the development of a 
security-strategic linkage with China and that as such the final content and mechanism 
of China’s participation in Galileo will be determined by the overall evolution of EU- 
China political relations.
The EU-China agreement on the joint development of the Galileo satellite 
system highlights the divergent approaches between the EU and the US towards China’s 
rise and the emerging global space order. Galileo must be seen as the logical extension 
in the security-strategic dimension of the policy of constructive engagement that has 
characterised EU foreign policy towards China since the mid-1990s. While both Europe 
and the US engage economically with Beijing in order to exploit the opportunities 
offered by its seemingly limitless market, contrary to Washington, the EU does not 
perceive Beijing as a military threat or as a potential peer competitor that needs to be
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contained. Moreover, Galileo reflects the different conception between the EU and the 
US regarding the use of space and the emerging global space order. In essence, 
Washington places an emphasis on space power and control, while Europe stresses that 
the space should be used peacefully. Thus, while the US concentrates on leveraging the 
space to provide America and its allies an asymmetric military advantage, the Union is 
more concerned in creating useful -  i.e. commercial -  space applications for European 
peoples and industries. For the EU, Sino-European cooperation on space-based 
technologies is meant to boost commercial activities while the US looks at space from a 
different angle, i.e. the protection of its global interests and primacy in world affairs.
The Galileo project -  like other pan-European aerospace programs such as 
Airbus and the Ariane launcher -  must be seen as part of the development of a strong 
and independent European aerospace sector in the post-Cold War era. France is the EU 
member state which has promoted more strongly European autonomy. In this sense, 
Galileo is part of France’s efforts at challenging the existing configuration of power in 
the international system. Paris has succeeded in influencing the other EU space powers - 
Germany, Italy and Spain - to establish a security-strategic linkage with Beijing over the 
use of space. France -  along with the Schroder government (1997-2005) -  has also been 
the strongest advocate of the lifting of the EU arms embargo on China.
As discussed in Chapter 6, by the mid-2004 all EU governments had agreed to 
start discussions on the procedures and criteria for lifting the EU arms embargo on 
China. However, due to the strong opposition of the US, the passing of the anti­
secession law by the National People’s Congress in March 2005 (clearly directed at 
Taiwan), and the lack of any serious progress in Beijing’s human rights record and 
legislation, the EU members have decided to postpone any decision on the lifting. The 
impasse on the arms embargo, however, has led EU member states to steer EU foreign 
policy towards China in a new direction. In the aftermath of the official shelving of the 
arms embargo issue, the EU has established the EU-China strategic dialogue (initiated 
in December 2005) alongside the EU-US and EU-Japan strategic dialogues on East Asia 
(initiated in September 2005). These newly established consultative mechanisms serve 
the purpose to move forwards EU-China relations by taking into account American - 
and Japanese - perspectives.
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For the EU the development of a EU-China security-strategic linkage is meant to 
upgrade relations with China and to build trust with Beijing. For the Bush 
administration, however, these European initiatives could help China’s military 
modernisation and potentially tilt East Asia’s strategic balance in Beijing’s favour in a 
situation where there could be future tensions in US-China relations, especially over 
Taiwan. With initiatives like the proposal of lifting the 17-year old arms embargo, 
argues the US, the EU is disregarding (i) the US’ strategic interests in East Asia and (ii) 
the role of Washington as the ultimate guarantor of regional security.676
The establishment of the strategic partnership has revealed profound differences 
between the EU and the US on how to deal with China’s rise. While the EU and its 
member states do not perceive China as a military threat, some powerful voices in the 
US argue that China is intent on challenging US’ strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific 
and, as such, Beijing needs to be contained. While Chinese leaders insist that their 
country is engaged in a “peaceful rise” and “harmonious development”, the more 
conservative elements of the Bush administration argue that China is focusing on 
procuring and developing weapons that would counter US naval and air power, 
especially in the Taiwan Strait.677
As discussed in Chapter 7, the US is committed to assisting the island under the 
Taiwan Relations Act, the 1979 law that accompanied the US switch of diplomatic 
recognition from Taipei to Beijing. On the basis of the Taiwan Relations Act, the US 
export weapons to the island. The US President, George W. Bush, declared in April 
2001 that the US would do “whatever it takes” to defend Taiwan against an attack by 
mainland China. Washington has recently reminded Beijing that the US has committed 
itself to reduce progressively arms sales to Taiwan but also to maintain a qualitative 
advantage in favour of Taipei which, according to the above mentioned MPPRC Report, 
is currently diminishing due to recent acquisitions by the PLA. Chinese leaders have 
always maintained that they reserve the right to use violence at home to keep China 
intact -  and they stress that Taiwan is part of the Chinese territory. In March 2005 the
676 See: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Symposia on Transatlantic 
Perspectives on Economic and Security Relations with China, Washington, 108 Congress, Second 
Session, Brussels 30 November 2004 and Prague 2 December 2004.
677 2 004 Report to Congress o f  the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Chapter 8: 
China’s Military Modernization and the Cross-Strait Balance.
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Chinese National People’s Congress adopted the anti-secession law, which reiterates the 
“sacred duty” for the PLA to take military action if Taiwan takes a decisive step toward 
declaring independence.
Any tension in Cross-Strait relations could presage tensions between 
Washington and Beijing. In this context, recent European initiatives aimed at 
establishing a security-strategic linkage with Beijing are impacting on US-China 
relations. This explains American strong opposition against the lifting of the arms 
embargo, as well as the request to obtain reassurances from European partners that 
China will not be allowed to access the encrypted features of the Galileo satellite 
system. In sum, the recently established strategic partnership, aimed at upgrading the 
policy of constructive engagement to include a significant security-strategic dimension, 
has brought up the question of how different the EU and the US’ China policy have 
become in the last years.
2. China in transatlantic relations
There are both similarities and differences between the EU and the US’ China policy. 
With regard to similarities, at the most basic level, the US and the EU share the 
commitment to see China integrated in international society and become a responsible 
stakeholder in the global system. Both would like China to be a status quo rather than a 
revisionist power and believe that by enmeshing Beijing in international institutions 
they may help ensure this outcome by supporting China’s socialisation and acceptance 
of international norms of behaviour. This approach can be said to have guided both 
Europe and the US since the late 1970s.
Both the EU and the US want to bind China into international organisations. 
Moreover, they both have an interest in the improvement of human rights in China. 
While Washington has tended towards public diplomacy and the tabling of resolutions 
on China at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva, the Europeans (mainly the 
European Commission and the more principled EU members) have preferred private 
diplomacy and encouraged China’s ratification of -  and adherence to -  UN human 
rights covenants. Both the EU and the US support the good governance and the rule of 
law in China, with the aim to improve respect for human rights, help the smooth 
functioning of a market economy, and create legal safeguards against an arbitrary and
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repressive state. Both the EU and the US would like China to adhere to the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), as well as to adhere and fully implement the 
obligations stemming from WTO membership. In sum, the EU and the US have both an 
interest in supporting China’s integration in the international community and help the 
country’s transformation into an open society.
Notwithstanding the commonalities, there are growing transatlantic differences 
with regard to China. The first and foremost is the way the EU and the US view China. 
The EU does not perceive China as a military threat nor as a potential peer competitor. 
The more conservative American policy makers and scholars, on the contrary, view 
China mainly through military lens and some American think tanks (in particular, the 
RAND) have been active in the last decade in putting forward scenarios of China 
becoming a peer competitor of the US and seriously challenge Washington’s dominant 
position in the Asia-Pacific. In certain conservative quarters of the policy making elite 
in Washington, China is perceived as the greatest threat to American primacy in world 
affairs. The latter is a goal repeatedly stated by some powerful and influential 
conservative think tanks such as the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Project 
for the New American Century (PNAC).
Europe has not bought into the China’s threat discourse coming from 
Washington. Contrary to Sino-American relations, EU-China ties have continued to 
improve steadily both in the economic and security-strategic (and even military) 
dimensions. This policy of engagement vith China at all levels and in all dimensions is 
explained by the fact that, unlike the US, the EU does not have immediate strategic 
interests in the Asia-Pacific, nor is there a Taiwan question that could trouble EU-China 
relations. In this context of complete absence of issues that could provoke a conflict 
between the two sides (as opposed to US-China relations), since 2003 the EU has 
established a security-strategic linkage with Beijing, on already sound economic 
bilateral relations -  and actually with the intention to boost the latter. Today, the 
political and security-strategic dimensions in EU-China relations have become -  
according to European Commission officials -  as important as the more traditional 
economic and commercial ones. While there is a clear separation in the US’ China 
policy between the economic -  which has continued to flourish - and the security- 
strategic and military dimensions -  which is the one that poses problems - in the case of
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he EU it is precisely the security-strategic dimension that has been fostered in recent 
years.
In essence, by inviting China to play a prominent role in the development of the 
Galileo satellite system and by proposing to lift the arms embargo (though the latter is 
currently shelved), the EU and its member states intend to build trust with China. It is, 
in other words, the extension in the security-strategic dimension of the policy of 
constructive engagement that has characterised the EU’s China policy in the last decade. 
On the contrary, the Bush administration appears to be concerned about China’s 
military modernisation and power projection. The US’s paramount interest is to avoid 
that China becomes a peer competitor able to challenge America’s dominant position in 
the Asia-Pacific.
In sum, the way the EU and the US view China is probably the most striking 
difference between the two and has an impact on their respective China policy. With 
regard to the EU, the examination of the EU foreign policy towards China of the last 
decade contained in this study indicates that the EU and its member states have firmly 
adhered to the arguments in favour of engagement at all levels and across all 
dimensions. The overriding general objective of the EU’s China policy in the last 
decade has been to promote the fullest possible Chinese involvement in the international 
arena, whether in the economic, social, political, or security-strategic dimensions. This 
objective is based on the understanding that in a situation of growing interdependence, 
the developments in China not only have a far-reaching impact on itself, but also have 
global and regional implications. As a result, the EU believes that an engagement policy 
with China at all levels and in all dimensions is conducive to supporting China’s 
integration in the world economy and its transition to an open society. The 
transformation of China into a good citizen of international society is seen in Europe 
(and in the US) as a highly strategic objective since a fully integrated China will be a 
responsible stakeholder in the international system. Furthermore, since China plays an 
increasingly important role in maintaining regional stability, political developments in 
China that could affect East Asia’s security environment would have a direct 
detrimental effect on China’s -  and East Asia’s - economic growth and, consequently, 
on EU exports and FDI in the region, thus impacting directly upon EU’s economic 
interests and security. For all the above reasons, the EU thinks that it is in its interests
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(and of the international community as a whole) to engage firmly and fully (i.e. across 
all dimensions) with Beijing.
The US’ China policy, in contrast, is a combination of containment and 
engagement. While China is an important commercial partner of the US, Beijing is 
neither a political partner nor a military ally of Washington. Henry Kissinger has 
characterised the US-China relationship as “beset with ambiguity”.678 In the 2006 
Quadrennial Defence Review Report (QDRR) the Department of Defence identifies 
China as having “the greatest potential to compete with the United States and file 
disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military 
advantages absent U.S. counter strategies”.679 The Pentagon’s perception of China as a 
military threat appears to contrast with assessment by officials of the State Department 
or the Office of the National Intelligence. Robert Zoellick, currently Deputy Secretary 
of State, has urged China “to become a responsible stakeholder” in the international 
system. According to John Negroponte, the Director of National Intelligence, China 
must be seen rather as a challenge than as an enemy or military threat.
American scholars and policy makers alike can be divided, broadly speaking, in 
three different schools of thought. One side of this debate points to China’s 
accumulation of military capacity, its emergent economic strength and its increasingly 
nationalistic and adversarial postures on certain issues -  in particular on the Taiwan 
question. As a consequence, they advocate a firm US (and possibly Western) policy of 
restricting the projection of such power. The scholars and policy makers in favour of a 
containment policy are to be mainly found in the Department of Defence and in the 
more conservative think tanks (American Enterprise Institute/Project for the New 
American Century, the Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute), but also within more 
liberal think tanks (the Brookings Institution and the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies). To those arguing for such a policy of containment, lenient 
policies undertaken with the aim of securing strategic partnership with China would 
merely embolden the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in its authoritarianism at home, 
encourage further nationalistic posturing abroad, and, by facilitating the growth of 
China’s trade surplus, provide resources for additional arms development.
678 Henry Kissinger, “Conflict is not an option”, in International Herald Tribune, 9 June 2005, p. 9.
679 US Department of Defence, Quadrennial Defence Review Report, Washington, 6 February 2006, p. 
29.
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On the other side, there are those who favour an engagement policy vis-a-vis 
China. The advocates of engagement argue that China is still relatively weak militarily 
(compared to the US), spending less as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
on defence than the US and still handicapped by relatively primitive military hardware 
based on Soviet technology. Moreover, some scholars argue that the potential of the 
Chinese market may be overstated and that China is facing so many internal challenges 
that the Chinese leadership needs a stable and peaceful international environment in 
order to focus on domestic issues. Among the problems that are presenting a challenge 
tp the current Chinese leadership there are the role of the CCP, political liberalisation, 
ethnic conflicts, but also the social costs of the reform of the ailing State-Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs), unemployment, inflation, the growing gap between rich and poor 
and between the coastal areas and the interior, migration due to inequalities in regional 
development or to environmental degradation. In sum, for the advocates of engagement, 
the above problems suggest the need for cooperation with China at the bilateral level as 
well as in multilateral (i.e. UN, WTO), inter-regional (APEC) and regional bodies 
(ASEAN Regional Forum). Hence, the insistence of some American scholars and policy 
makers on a firm policy of engagement toward China. Traditionally, members of this 
approach are found in the Department of State and the Bureau of the US Trade 
Representative, as well as within the more liberal think tanks (with some exceptions, as 
discussed earlier).
For other commentators, the containment versus engagement debate does not 
fully capture the complexity of the US-China relationship and its consequences for the 
Asian region. Some scholars currently argue that there could be no question of not 
engaging with China and supporting China’s new regional diplomacy, but that there is 
equally no good reason for pandering to China and being less critical to its authoritarian 
regime. These commentators tend to advocate a combination of the stick and the carrot: 
a firm security posture -  especially with regard to any unilateral move by China to take 
Taiwan by force -  but at the same time behaving in a constructive way towards Asia 
and China, since it if appears that the US are provocative toward Beijing, that might 
force regional actors to make a stark and unwelcome choice between Beijing and 
Washington, with the risk to jeopardise US’ policy in the region.
Chinese leaders insist that their country is engaged in a “peaceful rise” and 
“harmonious development”. However, some powerful voices in the US argue that China
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is focusing on procuring and developing weapons that would counter US naval and air 
power, especially in the Taiwan Strait. Any tension in Cross-Strait relations could thus 
presage tensions between Washington and Beijing. In this context, recent European 
initiatives aimed at establishing a security-strategic linkage with Beijing are impacting 
on Sino-US relations. This explains the strong opposition of the US against the lifting of 
the arms embargo and the need to obtain reassurances from European partners that 
China will not be allowed to access the encrypted features of the Galileo satellite 
system. The arms embargo issue, in particular, has become a “wake-up” call for the US 
and has led some American commentators to dub Europe an “irresponsible” player in 
East Asia. Robert Zoellick, currently US Deputy Secretary of State and himself in 
favour of a policy of engagement with China, posed the following question in April 
2005 with regard to the EU proposal to lift the arms embargo on China: “As Europe 
becomes a larger player on a global stage, we urge it to consider some of the messages it 
sends. Why would Europe want to send that symbolic message to this point?”.680 
Zoellick’s remark point out to the question of the emergence of the EU as a global actor, 
of its pretensions, as well as of its effective capabilities. We will discuss it further in the 
following -  and last -  section, before moving to the discussion of the future research 
agenda.
3. China as a test for the emergence of the EU as a global actor
China is a test for the EU foreign policy and, more generally, for the emergence of the 
EU as a global actor. As discussed in the introduction, during the Cold War, the role of 
the European Community was to provide vital economic and military support for the US 
in its efforts to contain the Soviet Union and in this context it constituted a key part of 
the Cold War global order. According to Hans Maull, the EU will continue to be a 
civilian power which, however, does not entail an inability or unwillingness to use 
military power, but rather it suggests the specific way in which military power is 
exercised and applied -  i.e. towards a civilising of international relations.681 At the same 
time, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5, the EU is also a power able to influence China. 
Its principal instruments of influence are its economic weight, advanced technology 
resources, and soft power -  mainly in the form of the various development aid and 
cooperation programs launched by the European Commission and the EU member
680 International Herald Tribune, 6 April 2005.
681 Hans Maull, “Europe and the New Balance of Global Order”, in International Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 4, 
2005, pp. 775-799.
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states, in particular the Nordic countries. In the above mentioned article, however, 
Maull argues that “the EU is not a power in international relations in the traditional 
sense of the word and it is unlikely to become one any time soon”.682 As suggested 
throughout this study, though, in the case of the EU’s China policy the EU and its 
member states have also pursued actions and displayed behaviours that we would have 
expect to come from a power in the traditional sense of the word.
As discussed in the central Chapters of this thesis, the EU’s China policy does 
show elements, today, that can be associated to those of a traditional power. The point 
here is not that the EU is either a civilian power whose aim is civilising international 
relations or a power in the more traditional sense of the word which pursues power 
politics. The examination of the EU foreign policy towards China shows that, today, the 
Union is both. On certain policy issues the EU does indeed show a distinctive behaviour 
that we would expect from a civilian-normative or soft power. For instance, we 
discussed in Chapter 4 the growing number of cooperation projects by the European 
Commission and the Nordic countries aimed at civilising China according to Western 
values and at transforming the country into an open society. At the same time, on other 
issues the EU and its member states pursue policies and initiatives that we would expect 
to come from a more traditional power. For instance, in the case of China’s participation 
in the Galileo satellite system discussed in Chapter 5 the EU and some of the large EU 
members have intentionally sought to cooperate with the PRC in order to counter a 
perceived American primacy in the aerospace sector. Moreover, the proposal to lift the 
EU arms embargo on China discussed in Chapter 6 is clearly aimed at taking advantage 
of the opportunities offered by China’s defence procurement budget, the second largest 
in the world after the US. The decision of the EU and its member states to establish a 
security-strategic linkage with China derives from the desire to acquire new markets for 
the European defence industry and counter American primacy in the defence and 
aerospace sector.
The existence of both civilian -  or soft power - Europe and great power Europe 
comes from the distinctive type of international actor that the EU is. This dual nature 
derives from the diversity of the actors involved in the EU foreign policy. We discussed 
in Chapter 4 that there has been a division of labour in EU foreign policy towards 
China. While the EU level (i.e. the European Commission) and the more principled EU
682 Ibid., p. 793.
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member states (mainly the Nordic countries) have been used to engage Chinese civil 
society and put human rights and democratisation pressure on Beijing, the large EU 
members have rather engaged the Chinese government by seeking to maintain good 
political relations with the Chinese leadership in order to boost commercial exchanges. 
Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 5, the large EU members have pushed more strongly 
in favour of the establishment of a security-strategic linkage with Beijing.
What does the above say with regard to the emergence of the EU as a global 
actor and its capabilities here? As discussed above, the EU is indeed an international 
actor whose policies towards China have started to impact on the US’ strategic interests 
in East Asia. In terms of capabilities, however, we discussed in Chapter 6 that the EU 
and its member states decided to shelve the proposal to lift the arms embargo following 
the strong opposition by the US and the internal debate among EU members on China’s 
improvement of its human rights’ record and legislation. The main hindrances to 
Europe’s capabilities in world affairs are, thus, both exogenous and endogenous. With 
regard to the former, the traditional alliance with -  and sometimes, dependence from -  
the US has played a role in the development of the EU’s China policy. As discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6, Washington strongly opposed the lifting of the arms embargo and 
requested reassurances from European partners that China will not be allowed to access 
the encrypted features of the Galileo satellite system.
With regard to the endogenous factors, as discussed in Chapter 1, the 
weaknesses of Europe’s foreign policy making mechanisms are largely responsible for 
the incapacity of the Union to pursue common policies and speak with a single voice. 
However, some critics of EU foreign policy may argue that it is precisely because of 
this complex foreign policy making mechanism that the more principled EU members 
have been able, for instance, to block an eventual decision in the CFSP framework to 
start discussions on the lifting of the arms embargo. This tension is likely to persist for 
the foreseeable future.
The analysis of EU foreign policy towards China in the last decade raises the 
question of whether the EU is also a strategic international actor. In other words, 
whether European governments have been willing and able to think “strategically” 
about their place in the world, their preferred pattern of world order, and their preferred 
strategic partners. As discussed in Chapter 5, since 2003 it appears that EU policy
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makers, both at the EU and national level, have started to think strategically about 
China. However, it seems that this European strategic approach is the result of the 
insistence of the Chinese leadership to think about EU-China relations in strategic terms 
and place the Sino-European strategic partnership within discourses of the emerging 
global order. China’s interest in cultivating a partnership with the EU and, individually, 
with the large EU members (UK, France, Germany, and Italy) is part of China’s attempt 
to cope with the constraints of American power in the post-Cold War era and to hasten 
the advent of an international system in which the US would no longer be so dominant. 
Chinese policy makers and scholars repeatedly stress that Beijing’s partnerships with 
other great powers are both a reflection of the transition to multi-polarity and an 
arrangement that will accelerate the process.
In this vein, Chinese leaders have repeatedly stated that the strategic partnership 
with the EU should serve to promote global multilateralism, the democratisation of 
international relations and what is being referred to as global multipolarisation. In 
Beijing’s view, China and the EU are both on a peaceful rise, i.e., on the way to become 
global balancing forces pursuing similar international political strategies. Thus, Chinese 
leaders hope to enlist the EU as one of the emerging poles that, at least in principle, 
could work with Beijing on fostering a multilateral environment and limit some of the 
perceived American unilateral attitudes in world affairs. The discourse on multipolarity 
is shared by some EU policy makers, in particular the French political elite and, to a 
lesser extent, elements within the European Commission in Brussels. Both China’s and 
France’s discourse on multipolarity, however, cannot be seen as power balancing in the 
classic sense. In the case of China, multipolarity is taking the form of the establishment 
of strategic partnerships with other great powers within a broader multilateral system 
based on the United Nations and international law. For French policy makers as well, 
the notion of multipolarity is not employed for balancing against the US in the classic 
sense, but rather for meaning a benign multipolar international system whose modus 
operandi is multilateralism.
Thus, it seems that both Chinese and French leaders were willing to think 
strategically about their place (in the case of French leaders, this place would be both 
France and Europe) in the world, their preferred pattern of world order, and their 
preferred strategic partners. As discussed in Chapter 5, EU policy makers have 
remained vague with regard to the concrete objectives and purpose of the strategic
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partnership with China (with the only exception of French leaders). Nonetheless, the EU 
and its members states have clearly stressed multilateralism as a common ground for the 
development of the EU-China relationship. Europe’s preferred strategic partners, in the 
same vein, are those countries which, according to the European Security Strategy, are 
committed to an effective multilateral system and to upholding and developing 
international law and the role of the United Nations. The EU hopes to enlist China 
among the countries that are committed to an effective multilateralism. The ESS makes 
also clear that the transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable and that the EU is seeking an 
effective and balanced partnership with the US. In this lies one of the most crucial 
challenges ahead for the EU: to accommodate the emerging EU-China strategic 
partnership -  based on multilateralism and largely shared views on global order that try 
to limit some of the perceived unilateral attitudes of the current Bush administration -  
with the traditional transatlantic relationship, in a situation characterised by American 
primacy and its doctrine of pre-emptive strike.
As discussed in Chapter 2, China has a long history of wanting to triangulate 
between global power centres in order to lessen the strength of the dominant power that 
appears most threatening to its interests. It was the US in the 1950s and 1960s and the 
Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s, following the Sino-American rapprochement. 
Moreover, from the mid-1980s onwards, it was also Western Europe’s potential role as 
a new pole in a future multi-polar world, and not only as a bulwark against Soviet 
hegemony, that attracted Beijing’s attention. Since the end of the Cold War, Chinese 
leaders had come to perceive the post-Cold War environment as a transition process 
from a bipolar to a multi-polar system of international relations and have argued in 
favour of a stronger EU as a potential balancer against American primacy. In the 
declaration of strategic partnership signed in October 2003, Chinese leaders clearly 
expressed their desire to enlist the EU as one of the emerging poles that, at least in 
principle, could work with Beijing on fostering a multilateral environment and limit 
some of the perceived American unilateral attitudes in world affairs.
The discourse on multipolarity is largely shared by the EU core members, in 
particular after the 2003 US’ war against Iraq. However, the UK and the more 
Atlanticists Central and Eastern European countries are wary of openly challenging 
Washington by supporting a discourse on multipolarity that, if on one side appears to 
appease European public opinions disaffected by America’s pre-emptive actions is, on
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the other side, quite devoid of practical content and meaning. Thus, EU member states 
have come to agree on a multilateral international system as the preferred pattern of 
world order and stressed that the EU-China strategic partnership is based on this shared 
principle.
If the establishment of the EU-China strategic partnership will succeed in 
building trust with Beijing and further integrate China in international society and, at 
the same time, advance multilateralism, it will be a success for the EU. Moreover, if 
Europe convinces Washington’s policy makers of the need to consult with Europeans 
on the West ‘s China policy -  with the hope that the more conservative views in 
Washington who view China as a threat may be lessened by a structured dialogue with 
the European partners -  it will also be a success. With all the contradictions and 
recurrent setbacks of EU foreign policy, it is the hope of this author that if the EU 
succeeds in the above tasks -  full integration and socialisation of China at all levels and 
in all dimensions, the lessening of the more US aggressive postures towards Beijing that 
could lead to mutual misperceptions and misunderstandings, and the advancement of an 
effective multilateral international system -  it will be possible to argue that the EU will 
have succeeded in emerging as an effective and responsible global actor that aims at 
civilising international relations. It may be wishful thinking, but this author firmly 
believes that international politics is as much about reality (largely examined in this 
study) as it is about utopia.
Future research agenda
(I) The emergence o f  the EU as a global actor
Following up on the concluding remarks, there is further scope for research on the 
international role of the EU and, more generally, on what kind of power the Union is 
and will be. Recently, Bastian Giegerich and William Wallace have questioned the 
notion of the EU as a “soft power” by analysing the empirical evidence of the EU’s 
military involvements abroad. In the same vein, the analysis of the security-strategic 
dimension of EU foreign policy towards China has demonstrated that the EU can also 
behave in way that we would expect to come from a more traditional power. More work 
is needed on this area in order to refine our concepts and apply them to the question of
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the emergence of Europe as a global actor and of the kind of power that Europe is -  and 
will be.
(II) Central Eurasia and Russia in EU-China relations
From a geopolitical perspective, China’s economic development, increasingly affect 
Europe’s energy security. Recent developments point to the growing importance 
attached by EU members to this issue. For instance, the last Russo-German summit took 
place in the oil-reach Siberia, clearly indicating that securing Russian energy supplies to 
Europe is one of the main priorities for EU policy makers. In this context, developments 
in Central Asia, Russia and in China could greatly affect oil supply to Europe and thus 
impact directly on Europe’s economic security and its welfare position. In this context, 
more research is needed on the consequences that the Central Eurasia and Russia factors 
could have for the future development of EU-China relations.
(III) EU-China relations and world order
The last avenue for future research is more theoretical and -  according to this author -  
probably the most challenging one, i.e. how to explain EU-China relations in the 
context of growing regionalism, inter-regionalism and American primacy. This research 
has analysed EU-China relations using a three-level analysis, defined as: bilateral (EU- 
China), interregional (EU-Asia) and global (mainly transatlantic relations). This 
approach has remained largely un-theorised due to the empirical nature of this study. 
But while stock taking is essential - hence the quotation of Gramsci at the beginning of 
the thesis -  it is maintained here that EU-China relations need to become the topic of 
more theoretical-oriented scholarly works. David Kerr, for instance, has started to 
contribute to the theorisation of this emerging linkage between states, regions, and 
world order for the study of EU-China relations. In this vein, more research needs to be 
developed in this increasingly important and promising area.
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